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For the long version of this review, see my notes and highlights. For the short version of this review: feel free to skip the early dialogues, and read for cultural weirdness and prompts to thinking rather than "wise Plato will tell me how to be virtuous" or the equally understandable and equally useless counter-reaction of "wow look at how bad Plato's opinions are."
(I didn't read any of these as closely as they deserved - though I did make a daily discursive meditation practice out of it, which is another valuable thing I got from this - and I tried to stay away from secondary literature, because you only get to go in blind once. Both are reasons to revisit many of these dialogues, obviously.)
For the medium version, a few themes that stuck out at me.
The division of labor
The economics of the division of labor play a central role in all of the most seminal thinkers of the transition to modernity - Smith, Marx, Weber. I was surprised to find that this was true of Plato as well, because it seems incidental in just about every dialogue other than Laws (which no one reads) and Republic (which, to be fair, everyone does.) But you read every dialogue and it looms in every single one, I think it's fair to say that there's something going on. Socrates asks some variation of "is this knowledge like the knowledge of a medical doctor?... of a ship's pilot?... of a cobbler?" so consistently that there are even meta-jokes around it, like a TV show where the writers start responding to the fans' memes.
Plato's position as an aristocrat in a sort-of-democratic society with a huge slave population and a booming commercial economy is the obvious background here. He's got snobbery towards manual workers of all kinds and especially towards the enslaved, whose capacity for virtue is constantly impeached (and not as an overt condemnation of slavery, though you could probably develop it in that direction.) He's got a hierachical model of metaphysics (and love) that matches this vertical principle. But the division of labor, and its creation of bonds of mutual dependence, exists in a constant dialectical tension with this. The specialized knowledge of the philosopher and of virtue is constantly adduced from examples to specialized knowledge in other fields, as is the need to always defer to the relevantly specialized person. In Republic, most prominently, the need for specialized production forms the basis for civilization as such, no less than in Smith (and, no less than in Marx, a multitude of evils flow from the establishment of class society, though that is glossed over) and "justice" comes to be defined as everyone sticking to their own place.
Form, medium, and irony
From the beginning, when Socrates protests to the criminal court that he's at a loss because he lacks natural eloquence and launches into a highly eloquent and stylized speech, to written condemnations of writing, to sophistical refutations of sophists, Plato is really interested in form-content tensions. And dialogues are great at this, because (1) while a wholly written form they are one more obviously in imitation of speech than other genres, and (2) by placing the words in the mouth of another, you get more critical distance between what is said and what Plato thinks.
That said, despite or rather alongside all the critical comments on writing, you can see the shift from a more "speakerly" style in the beginning to a more "writerly" one later on, one that redounds to the benefit of the subtlety and interestingness of the dialogues. That is, the most frustrating thing about the early dialogues is how, with granted a bit of stylistic smoothing over, they seem like the sort of philosophical conversation Socrates might have had with real-life Athenians - something that would be more satisfying if they weren't constantly leaning on the fact that people are a lot easier to lead around, and a lot less capable of spotting a contradiction, in spoken than written word. The problem with the early dialogues, then, is that Socrates has few worthy opponents, and so his tripping them up doesn't lead to many interesting conclusions.
Later on, we shift from this to worthier opponents, longer speeches, and more abiguous and subtle claims, which increasingly take the form of myths. And the myths are just great. (Can you spot the structural parallels/inversions between the Ring of Gyges and the Cave?) And I suspect they are great largely because they force you to do what the early "Socrates" doesn't, which is read charitably.
The power of words
This is perhaps an expansion of the above, but Plato is very concerned with the power that words have, and the ability to derive truth value from discourse or dialectic alone. This is clear in his two most consistent opponents - the Sophists, who argue cynically, too unfaithfully to dialectic - and then the worthy opponent, Parmenides, who speaks seemingly too faithfully to dialectic, so constrained that he can't speak of anything but a metaphysical abstraction. Both of these are temptations to "Socrates" and Plato's entire project of arriving at a not merely instrumentally practical (as the sophists') and not merely self-consistent (as the Eleatics') form of dialectic.
Numerology
There's something going on with the number four in Plato, with it signifying, maybe, completion? Is this a Pythagorean thing??????? idk guess i should get around to that secondary reading
(I didn't read any of these as closely as they deserved - though I did make a daily discursive meditation practice out of it, which is another valuable thing I got from this - and I tried to stay away from secondary literature, because you only get to go in blind once. Both are reasons to revisit many of these dialogues, obviously.)
For the medium version, a few themes that stuck out at me.
The division of labor
The economics of the division of labor play a central role in all of the most seminal thinkers of the transition to modernity - Smith, Marx, Weber. I was surprised to find that this was true of Plato as well, because it seems incidental in just about every dialogue other than Laws (which no one reads) and Republic (which, to be fair, everyone does.) But you read every dialogue and it looms in every single one, I think it's fair to say that there's something going on. Socrates asks some variation of "is this knowledge like the knowledge of a medical doctor?... of a ship's pilot?... of a cobbler?" so consistently that there are even meta-jokes around it, like a TV show where the writers start responding to the fans' memes.
Plato's position as an aristocrat in a sort-of-democratic society with a huge slave population and a booming commercial economy is the obvious background here. He's got snobbery towards manual workers of all kinds and especially towards the enslaved, whose capacity for virtue is constantly impeached (and not as an overt condemnation of slavery, though you could probably develop it in that direction.) He's got a hierachical model of metaphysics (and love) that matches this vertical principle. But the division of labor, and its creation of bonds of mutual dependence, exists in a constant dialectical tension with this. The specialized knowledge of the philosopher and of virtue is constantly adduced from examples to specialized knowledge in other fields, as is the need to always defer to the relevantly specialized person. In Republic, most prominently, the need for specialized production forms the basis for civilization as such, no less than in Smith (and, no less than in Marx, a multitude of evils flow from the establishment of class society, though that is glossed over) and "justice" comes to be defined as everyone sticking to their own place.
Form, medium, and irony
From the beginning, when Socrates protests to the criminal court that he's at a loss because he lacks natural eloquence and launches into a highly eloquent and stylized speech, to written condemnations of writing, to sophistical refutations of sophists, Plato is really interested in form-content tensions. And dialogues are great at this, because (1) while a wholly written form they are one more obviously in imitation of speech than other genres, and (2) by placing the words in the mouth of another, you get more critical distance between what is said and what Plato thinks.
That said, despite or rather alongside all the critical comments on writing, you can see the shift from a more "speakerly" style in the beginning to a more "writerly" one later on, one that redounds to the benefit of the subtlety and interestingness of the dialogues. That is, the most frustrating thing about the early dialogues is how, with granted a bit of stylistic smoothing over, they seem like the sort of philosophical conversation Socrates might have had with real-life Athenians - something that would be more satisfying if they weren't constantly leaning on the fact that people are a lot easier to lead around, and a lot less capable of spotting a contradiction, in spoken than written word. The problem with the early dialogues, then, is that Socrates has few worthy opponents, and so his tripping them up doesn't lead to many interesting conclusions.
Later on, we shift from this to worthier opponents, longer speeches, and more abiguous and subtle claims, which increasingly take the form of myths. And the myths are just great. (Can you spot the structural parallels/inversions between the Ring of Gyges and the Cave?) And I suspect they are great largely because they force you to do what the early "Socrates" doesn't, which is read charitably.
The power of words
This is perhaps an expansion of the above, but Plato is very concerned with the power that words have, and the ability to derive truth value from discourse or dialectic alone. This is clear in his two most consistent opponents - the Sophists, who argue cynically, too unfaithfully to dialectic - and then the worthy opponent, Parmenides, who speaks seemingly too faithfully to dialectic, so constrained that he can't speak of anything but a metaphysical abstraction. Both of these are temptations to "Socrates" and Plato's entire project of arriving at a not merely instrumentally practical (as the sophists') and not merely self-consistent (as the Eleatics') form of dialectic.
Numerology
There's something going on with the number four in Plato, with it signifying, maybe, completion? Is this a Pythagorean thing??????? idk guess i should get around to that secondary reading