"درباره ی نویسندگانی که چه امروز و چه آینده ادعا کنند که از مطالب اصلی فلسفه ی من چیزی می دانند، اعم از این که بگویند آن را از دهان من شنیده یا از دیگران آموخته و یا خود به تحصیل آن نایل گردیده اند، فاش می گویم که آنان، بنابه عقیده ای که من درباره ی فلسفه دارم، از فلسفه کوچکترین خبری ندارند. در مورد آن مطالب اصلی هیچ گونه نوشته ای از من در وجود نیامده و در آینده نیز وجود پیدا نخواهد کرد..." ص 1988

PARMENIDES
Summary
In this dialogue a young Socrates discusses with Parmenides and Zeno his own conception of reality as consisting of nonphysical (incorporeal?) “Forms.” This discussion spring from Socrates’ criticism of Zeno whether “all” is one or many - Zeno claiming the latter and in defense of Parmenides.

Results
If a Form should be “itself by itself” then it cannot be in us. They have their being in relation to themselves (p. 367). But not necessarily: “”insofar as it is in others, it would touch the others [because it is whole]; but insofar as it is in itself, it would be kept from touching the others, and being in itself, would touch itself.” - “Apparently.” - “Thus the one would touch itself and others.” (p. 381).

Round 1: One in relation to itself
One cannot have parts
cannot have shape
cannot contain or be contained
cannot move or be moved
cannot rest (because it cannot be in anything - the contained part)
is undifferentiated but cannot be same either - One is not “differentness” or “sameness"
outside of time
Conclusion: “Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it.” (p. 376)
Round 2: One related to others
One is whole
one has being
Being makes one many (because being in time divides it)
*essential reversal of all claims in Round 1...
Conclusion: “therefore, the one was and is and will be, and was coming to be and comes to be and will come to be.” (p. 387).
Round 3: One in relation to Being
The instant is the change between two states: “this queer creature, the instant, lurks between motion and rest - being in no time at all - and to it and from it…” (p. 388).
Conclusion: One neither is nor is not…
Round 4: Other to One
others partake of whole and have parts
Conclusion: “Thus the others would be both like and unlike themselves and each other."
Round 5: Is One? Consequence if One is.
If one is, are others not?
Conclusion: Thus if one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and, likewise, in relation to the others.” (p. 391).
Round 6: Consequence if One is not
Conclusion: “And thus the one, if it is not, both comes to be and ceases to be, and does not come to be or cease to be.” (p. 394).
Round 7: Is One not? Consequences for One if it is not.
Conclusion: Nothing is related to One because nothing belongs to it. “Thus one, since it is not, is not in any state at all.” (p. 395)
Round 8: Consequences for Others if One is not.
Conclusion: “Accordingly, if one is not and many are, the many must appear both the same as and different from each other, both in contact and separate from themselves, both moving with every motion and in every way at rest, both coming to be and ceasing to be and neither, and surely everything of that sort, which it would not be easy enough for us to go through.” (p. 396).
Round 9: If One is not but Others are.
Conclusion: “So if one is not, none of the others is conceived to be one or many, since, without oneness, it is impossible to conceive of many. … Therefore, if one is not, the others neither are more are conceived to be one or many.” (p. 397).

How it compares to previous work
Main strategies used to obtain it
Parmenides raises six difficulties that entail in Socrates’ view. One of these is the “third man” which twentieth century analytic philosophers have paid a lot of attention to. Parmenides teaches Socrates that he must not only consider the consequences of his hypothesis but also the consequences of its denial, leading to eight different trains of thought. Explicitly: you must examine the consequences for the thing you hypothesize in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whichever you select, and in relation to several of them and to all of them in the same way; and, in turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you hypothesize you hypothesize as being or as not being.” (p. 370).

My questions
is everything contestable? Are these the boundaries of the language, or has Socrates just submitted an ill-formed theory? Does our empirical reality supplement the language game or merely provide a possible definition of reality? This conclusion is baffling.


PHAEDRUS

Summary
In this dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus, Socrates critiques a speech of Lysias’. The principal theme is the nature and limitations of rhetoric, and it also includes a discussion about the lovers and the soul.

Results
Writings cannot constitute knowledge of a matter. Knowledge is only written on the soul and is capable of endless expression. There are 2 kinds of madness: illness and divine inspiration. Of divine inspiration, there are four parts: prophetic inspiration with Apollo, mystics with Dionysius, poets with the Muses, and lovers with Aphrodite. The parts of art of rhetoric: 1) seeing together things that are scattered and collecting them into one kind, making clear the subject of discussion. 2) to cut up each kind according to its species, and try not to splinter any part. Is the matter simple? What things does it have the power to act on naturally?By what things is it naturally acted upon? Is it complex? We must, then, enumerate them all and then investigate the same with respect to each.

How it compares to previous work

Main strategies used to obtain it
Socrates’ discussion of the soul endeavors to show that it is necessary to know the truth of a particular thing before talking about it. In other words, Lysias has not done his homework. We can be led to false conclusions when we do not first properly understand the object of discussion. Socrates argues for Love on the basis of its ontology, and after that on the basis of its etymology.
My questions
Could this critique of reading and writing be helpful in proceeding to write such knowledge in the soul? What about the process of writing, Socrates? Does not that exercise affect the soul in its progress?
Is the theory of Forms different from Parmenides in this text?

Does the One make an appearance? If so, how?
We do see the soul. For Socrates, the soul is immortal because it is always in motion, and moves itself - never leaving off from its own being (which leads to it not having a source? p. 524). He then goes on to describe the soul as a team of winged horses. The transmigration of the soul (p. 524) sounds a lot like Origen’s own theory. The main difference is that Origen’s souls fall to earth, but Socrates souls, having drifted down, seek a soulless body to inhabit. Though I could be wrong, Socrates’ description on p. 526 sounds a lot like “falling”. They fall out of “forgetfulness”.
How may I be beautiful on the inside (the closing prayer of the dialogue)?
Lysias (on p. 508) did not learn in his soul, he merely memorized by reading. We become beautiful on the inside by training our soul well to gaze on the subject of al true knowledge, visible only to the intelligence. This is the real. These people will appear mad to the rest of the world - the madness of gazing not he true/real alone. We must reach a “reasoned unity” from our perceptions, gathered from the “recollection of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god,” (p. 527). We are in touch with god by memory.
What are the limitations of rhetoric? Why write? Why Speak
Writing is for reminding not for remembering. It cannot lodge into the soul.