Among other victories, Murdoch makes significant contributions. Firstly, she presents an account of attention that challenges our philosophical focus on choices at specific decision points as the core of our moral lives. Instead, she emphasizes the cultivation of dispositions directed towards moral ends, which she refers to as 'The Good'. This is a never-ending task that demands regular maintenance.

Secondly, she combines various diverse philosophical traditions into a coherent and unified criticism. Behaviorism, the Kantian will, utilitarianism, and existentialism all wrongly glorify a narrow form of freedom as the source of human morality, namely making rational choices at discrete decision points.

Consequently, Murdoch's book mainly succeeds as a normative recommendation and as a corrective to the overemphasis on the will in Western philosophy. However, she fails to provide a convincing account of metaphysics. That is, she does not offer compelling arguments regarding why 'The Good' necessarily exists (ontology) and what 'The Good' is like. For these reasons, I must concede that although the book offers an imaginative portrayal of moral life, it does not establish the moral authority of those recommendations nor convince me that her conception of 'The Good' is accurate. Murdoch is well aware of this.

Love is a profound and complex concept that goes beyond mere emotion. It is about seeing the good in others and being willing to overlook their flaws for the sake of their well-being. As Iris Murdoch points out, love is a kind of charitable vision that allows us to view people and things in a positive light. However, the question of when and how goodness arises is a philosophical one that requires careful consideration. Murdoch also contrasts love with the naturally self-interested nature of humans and argues that love, together with virtue, can guide our decisions towards the good. Understanding the world as it really is and making it good on all levels is a noble task.

One aspect that I found confusing in Murdoch's work is her reference to philosophers as Lucifer. It seems like a provocative term that is used to shock rather than to make a meaningful point. While Lucifer is often associated with evil, it is important to remember that he was once an angel. Additionally, the idea that the state predefines the freedom of the individual and the desired goodness is a controversial one. While a certain degree of structure and hierarchy may be necessary for the common good, it is also important to allow for individual freedom and choice.

Despite these criticisms, Murdoch's ideas about love and goodness are thought-provoking and值得深思的. She reminds us that love is not just a feeling but a way of life that requires sacrifice and humility. By striving towards the good, we can become better people and make the world a better place.

Brilliant!

This book is truly a life-changing read. It has the power to transform your perspective and way of thinking.

It is an absolute must-read for anyone who has an interest in philosophy, morality, or literature. The profound ideas and insights presented within its pages will make you reflect on the deeper meaning of life and the values that matter.

Whether you are a student, a professional, or simply someone who enjoys exploring different ideas, this book is sure to captivate and inspire you.

It offers a unique blend of intellectual stimulation and emotional resonance, making it a truly remarkable work.

So, don't miss out on this opportunity to embark on a journey of self-discovery and enlightenment.

Pick up this book today and prepare to be amazed.

In the third and final essay of this slim collection,

author Iris Murdoch emphasizes the significance of metaphor as a descriptive instrument in philosophy.

However, her model scenarios, such as a judgmental mother and her daughter-in-law, and the romanticized pursuit of perfection, precisely made me feel uneasy.

The average person in her discussion of morality in a godless world struck me as extremely bourgeois, very Oxfordian, and strictly Western.

When she asserts that the humble man is the closest we can come to an easily recognizable representation of the good man, one knows she fails to see that this person is one who accepts the existing state of affairs.

For Murdoch, who can be delightfully old-fashioned, is surely not advocating the status quo!

Yet without that awareness, "The Sovereignty of Good" can seem classist and limited in scope.

Even so, the book prompts the mind to think.

Personally, I value her elevation of literature above science, indeed her overall criticism of empirical science as the ultimate and all-encompassing.

Given that Murdoch is also a novelist, I wonder if she is ultimately guiding us to her novels as more effective means for her philosophical ideas.

As I persist in my search and delineation of the building blocks of my philosophical self, I find that Murdoch’s The Sovereignty of Good has bestowed upon me much to contemplate, a path to traverse, and an idea to uncover and actualize. In the three essays within The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch offers a lucid and calibrated reflection on philosophy – its purpose and current state – and on good – what it is and how to be good. For me, Murdoch’s central contention is that perhaps between the unchangeable divine call to be as preordained (determinism) and the free will to be whatever (existentialism) lies a definition of good that combines the best of both worlds and urges us to be attentive and become what our moral imagination and moral efforts lead us to envision. This concept of good, which should be supreme over all, might just be the answer to our pursuit of goodness and a moral philosophy that we can claim as our own.

ON PHILOSOPHY

“There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the construction of elaborate theories, and a movement back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts. McTaggart says that time is unreal, Moore replies that he has just had his breakfast. Both these aspects of philosophy are essential to it.” (p.1)

“The position in question, in contemporary moral philosophy, is one that seems unsatisfactory to me in two related ways, in that it ignores certain facts and simultaneously imposes a single theory that allows for no communication with or escape into rival theories.” (p.1)

“‘It is the constructive task of a philosophy of mind to provide a set of terms in which ultimate judgments of value can be very clearly stated.’” (p.2)

“To engage in philosophy is to explore one’s own temperament, while simultaneously attempting to discover the truth.” (p.45)

“It seems to me that there is a void in present-day moral philosophy. Areas peripheral to philosophy expand (psychology, political and social theory) or collapse (religion) without philosophy being able in one case to encounter, and in the other case to rescue, the values involved.” (p.45)

“It is often difficult in philosophy to determine whether one is saying something reasonably public and objective, or whether one is merely erecting a barrier, specific to one’s own temperament, against one’s own personal fears. (It is always a significant question to ask about any philosopher: what is he afraid of?)” (p.71)

“Moral philosophy cannot avoid taking sides, and would-be neutral philosophers merely take sides surreptitiously. Moral philosophy is the examination of the most important of all human activities, and I believe that two things are required of it. The examination should be realistic…Secondly, since an ethical system cannot but commend an ideal, it should commend a worthy ideal…How can we make ourselves better? This is a question moral philosophers should strive to answer.” (p.76)

ON GOOD

The Idea of Perfection

“Moore believed that good was a supersensible reality, that it was a mysterious quality, unrepresentable and indefinable, that it was an object of knowledge and (implicitly) that to be able to see it was in some sense to possess it. He thought of good upon the analogy of the beautiful; and he was, despite himself, a ‘naturalist’ in that he regarded goodness as a real constituent of the world.” (p.3)

“I have employed the word ‘attention’, which I borrow from Simone Weil, to convey the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality.” (p.33)

“Do we truly have to choose between an image of total freedom and an image of total determinism? Can we not offer a more balanced and illuminating account of the matter? I propose that we can if we simply introduce into the picture the idea of attention, or looking, of which I was speaking above. I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also, of course, ‘distorted vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word…One is often compelled almost automatically by what one can see.” (pp.35-36).

“The moral life, from this perspective, is something that persists continuously, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices. What transpires in between such choices is indeed what is crucial.” (p.36)

“[G]oodness is associated with knowledge: not with impersonal quasi-scientific knowledge of the ordinary world, whatever that may be, but with a refined and honest perception of what is truly the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a certain, perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline.” (p.37)

“As moral agents, we must endeavor to see justly, to overcome prejudice, to avoid temptation, to control and curb imagination, to direct reflection. Man is not a combination of an impersonal rational thinker and a personal will. He is a unified being who sees, and who desires in accordance with what he sees, and who has some continual slight control over the direction and focus of his vision.” (p.39)

“We are not always the individual in pursuit of the individual, we are not always responding to the magnetic pull of the idea of perfection.” (p.41)

On “God” and “Good”

“Briefly stated, our image of ourselves has become overly grand, we have isolated and identified ourselves with an unrealistic conception of will, we have lost the vision of a reality separate from ourselves, and we have no adequate conception of original sin.” (p.46)

“Much of contemporary moral philosophy appears both unambitious and optimistic…I think the charge is also true, despite some appearances, of existentialism. An authentic mode of existence is presented as attainable by intelligence and force of will. The atmosphere is invigorating and tends to produce self-satisfaction in the reader, who feels himself to be a member of the elite, addressed by another one. Contempt for the ordinary human condition, together with a conviction of personal salvation, saves the writer from genuine pessimism. His gloom is superficial and conceals elation…Such attitudes contrast with the vanishing images of Christian theology which represented goodness as almost impossibly difficult, and sin as almost insuperable and certainly as a universal condition.” (p.49)

“There are men in history who are traditionally regarded as having been good (Christ, Socrates, certain saints), but if we attempt to contemplate these men, we find that the information about them is scanty and vague, and that, apart from their great moments, it is the simplicity and directness of their diction that chiefly colors our conception of them as good. And if we consider contemporary candidates for goodness, if we know of any, we are likely to find them obscure or else, on closer inspection, full of frailty. Goodness appears to be both rare and hard to envision.” (p.51)

“It is significant that the idea of goodness (and of virtue) has been largely supplanted in Western moral philosophy by the idea of rightness, perhaps supported by some conception of sincerity. This is to some extent a natural outcome of the disappearance of a permanent background to human activity: a permanent background, whether provided by God, by Reason, by History, or by the self.” (p.52)

“Are there any techniques for the purification and reorientation of an energy that is naturally selfish, in such a way that when moments of choice arrive, we shall be certain of acting rightly?” (p.53)

“Prayer is properly not petition, but simply an attention to God which is a form of love. With it goes the idea of grace, of a supernatural assistance to human endeavor that overcomes the empirical limitations of personality.” (p.54)

“I shall suggest that God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention; and I shall go on to suggest that moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central concept that has all these characteristics.” (p.54)

(1)\\tAttention

“[W]e can all receive moral assistance by focusing our attention upon things that are valuable: virtuous people, great art, perhaps the idea of goodness itself.” (p.55)

“[O]ur ability to act well ‘when the time comes’ depends partly, perhaps largely, upon the quality of our habitual objects of attention.” (p.55)

(2)\\tUnitary

“All I suggest here is that reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world, and that increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity.” (p.56)

“Such a reflection requires and generates a rich and diversified vocabulary for naming aspects of goodness. It is a shortcoming of much contemporary moral philosophy that it shuns discussion of the separate virtues” (p.56)

(3)\\tTranscendence

“We cease to be in order to attend to the existence of something else, a natural object, a person in need.” (p.58)

“It may be agreed that the direction of attention should properly be outward, away from self, but it will be argued that it is a long step from the idea of realism to the idea of transcendence.” (p.58)

(4)\\tPerfection (absolute good)

“The idea of perfection functions thus within a field of study, producing an increasing sense of direction.” (p.60)

“The idea of perfection moves, and possibly changes, us (as artists, worker, gent) because it inspires love in the part of us that is most worthy.” (p.60)

“The idea of perfection is also a natural producer of order.” (p.60)

(5)\\tNecessary existence

(6)\\tRealism

(7)\\tDetachment

“It is evident here what is the role, for the artist or spectator, of exactness and good vision: unsentimental, detached, unselfish, objective attention.” (p.64)

“I would suggest that the authority of the Good seems to us something necessary because the realism (ability to perceive reality) required for goodness is a kind of intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time a suppression of self. The necessity of the good is then an aspect of the kind of necessity involved in any technique for exhibiting fact.” (p.64)

“The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing.” (p.64)

(8)\\tSee

“It is in the capacity to love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy consists. The freedom which is a proper human goal is the freedom from fantasy, that is the realism of compassion. What I have called fantasy, the proliferation of blinding self-centered aims and images, is itself a powerful system of energy, and much of what is often called “will” or “willing” belongs to this system.” (p.65)

“Freedom is not strictly the exercise of the will, but rather the experience of accurate vision which, when this becomes appropriate, occasions action. It is what lies behind and in between actions and prompts them that is important, and it is this area that should be purified.” (p.65)

“I think it is more than a verbal point to say that what should be aimed at is goodness, and not freedom or right action, although right action, and freedom in the sense of humility, are the natural products of attention to the Good.” (p.69)

“Action is an occasion for grace, or for its opposite. However, the aim of morality cannot be simply action. Without some more positive conception of the soul as a substantial and continually developing mechanism of attachments, the purification and reorientation of which must be the tasks of morals, ‘freedom’ is easily corrupted into self-assertion and ‘right action’ into some sort of ad hoc utilitarianism.” (p.69)

“I have throughout this paper assumed that ‘there is no God” and that the influence of religion is waning rapidly. Both of these assumptions may be challenged. What seems beyond doubt is that moral philosophy is daunted and confused, and in many quarters discredited and regarded as unnecessary. The vanishing of the philosophical self, together with the confident filling in of the scientific self, has led in ethics to an inflated and yet empty conception of the will, and it is this that I have been mainly attacking. I am not sure how far my positive suggestions make sense. The search for unity is deeply natural, but like so many things that are deeply natural may be capable of producing but a variety of illusions.” (p. 74)

The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts

“Our destiny can be examined but it cannot be justified or fully explained. We are simply here. And if there is any kind of sense or unity in human life, and the dream of this does not cease to haunt us, it is of some other kind and must be sought within a human experience that has nothing outside it.” (p.77)

“I think the ordinary man, with the simple religious conceptions that make sense for him, has usually held a more just view of the matter than the voluntaristic philosopher, and a view incidentally that is in better accordance with the findings of modern psychology.” (p.81)

“But, whatever one thinks of its theological context, it does seem that prayer can actually induce a better quality of consciousness and provide an energy for good action that could not otherwise be available.” (p.81)

“Our states of consciousness differ in quality, our fantasies and reveries are not trivial and unimportant, they are profoundly connected with our energies and our ability to choose and act. And if the quality of consciousness matters, then anything that alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be associated with virtue.” (p.82)

“Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself, to see and to respond to the real world in the light of a virtuous consciousness.” (p.91)

“‘Good is a transcendent reality’ means that virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is.” (p.91)

“However, in spite of what Kant was so greatly afraid of, I think there is a place both within and outside religion for a sort of contemplation of the Good, not just by dedicated experts but by ordinary people: an attention that is not just the planning of particular good actions but an attempt to look right away from self towards a distant transcendent perfection, a source of uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite unimagined virtue.” (p.99)

“Of course Good is sovereign over Love, as it is sovereign over other concepts, because Love can name something bad. But is there not nevertheless something about the conception of a refined love that is practically identical with goodness? Will not ‘Act lovingly’ translate ‘Act perfectly’, whereas ‘Act rationally’ will not? It is tempting to say so. However, I think that Good and Love should not be identified, and not only because human love is usually self-assertive…Good is the magnetic centre towards which love naturally gravitates.” (p.99)

“The humble man, because he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as they are. He sees the pointlessness of virtue and its unique value and the endless extent of its demand…The humble man perceives the distance between suffering and death. And although he is not by definition the good man, perhaps he is the kind of man who is most likely of all to become good.” (p.101).

Edifying is a concept that holds great significance. It refers to the process of being educated, enlightened, and inspired in a profound and meaningful way.

An edifying experience can have a lasting impact on an individual's life, shaping their values, beliefs, and perspectives. It can open up new worlds of knowledge and understanding, and encourage personal growth and development.

Edifying can occur in many different forms, such as through reading a great book, attending a thought-provoking lecture, or having a deep conversation with a wise mentor. It can also be achieved through artistic expression, such as painting, music, or literature.

In a world that is often filled with distractions and chaos, the pursuit of edifying experiences is more important than ever. By seeking out opportunities for learning and growth, we can enrich our lives and become better equipped to face the challenges and opportunities that come our way.

So, let us all strive to be edified, to constantly seek out new knowledge and experiences, and to grow and evolve as individuals. For in doing so, we can make a positive impact on the world around us and leave a lasting legacy for future generations.

Where virtue is concerned, we often have an intuitive grasp that goes beyond our clear understanding, and we grow by simply looking and observing. The study of literature is the most essential and fundamental aspect of culture as it educates us on how to envision and understand human situations. We are moral agents before we are scientists, and the role of science in human life must be discussed in words. This is why knowing about Shakespeare is more important than knowing about any scientist.

Doing philosophy means exploring one's own temperament while also attempting to discover the truth. Rilke said of Cézanne that he painted 'There it is' rather than 'I like it'. This requires discipline in both art and morals. One could say that art is an excellent analogy of morals or even a case of morals.

A great artist, in terms of his work, is a good man and a free man in the true sense. The consumer of art has a similar task as its producer: to be disciplined enough to see as much reality in the work as the artist has put into it and not to 'use it as magic'. The appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only the easiest available spiritual exercise but also a completely adequate entry into the good life as it checks selfishness in the interest of seeing the real.

I have proposed that moral philosophy needs a new, more realistic, and less romantic terminology to rescue thought about human destiny from a scientifically minded empiricism that cannot handle real problems. It is always a significant question to ask about any philosopher: what is he afraid of? Art is a human product, and virtues as well as talents are required of the artist. The good artist, in relation to his art, is brave, truthful, patient, and humble.

Art is not a diversion or a side-issue; it is the most educational of all human activities and a place where the nature of morality can be seen. It gives a clear sense to many ideas that seem more puzzling elsewhere and is a clue to what happens elsewhere. Goodness is connected with the acceptance of real death, real chance, and real transience. Only against this difficult psychological background can we understand the full extent of what virtue is like. The good man is humble.

Only rarely do we meet someone in whom goodness positively shines, someone in whom we are amazed to find the absence of the anxious, avaricious tentacles of the self. Any other name for Good must be a partial name, but names of virtues suggest directions of thought. The humble man, seeing himself as nothing, can see other things as they are. He understands the pointlessness and unique value of virtue and the endless extent of its demand. Simone Weil tells us that the exposure of the soul to God condemns the selfish part of it not to suffering but to death. The humble man perceives the distance between suffering and death. And although he may not be the good man by definition, perhaps he is the kind of man most likely to become good.

In The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch presents a neo-Platonic view of the moral life, contrasting it with the ideas of British empiricists and European existentialists. She objects to the behaviorist, existentialist, and utilitarian portraits of the self, arguing that the moral life is not just external but also internal. The example of M and D shows that inner moral action is real and important.

Murdoch offers a more complex account of human subjectivity, emphasizing its historical, moral, and non-reducible internal aspects. Freedom, for her, is related to how one sees the world and what one pays attention to. It liberates us from self-centered fantasies and helps us see others and ourselves more truly.

The Good, which Murdoch models after the Christian Neoplatonic conception of God, is the external object of attention needed to be freed from selfishness. It is undefinable, one, perfect, transcendent, and non-representable. Contemplation of the Good pulls us out of the cave of self-centered fantasies and leads to moral action.
Murdoch also explores practical techniques to help us orient ourselves toward the Good, such as prayer, love of beauty in nature and art, and the pursuit of intellectual disciplines. These practices can help us to "unself," view the world with clarity and justice, and love the truth.
While The Sovereignty of Good presents an attractive version of the moral life, it does not systematically defend its metaethical position. More needs to be said about the Good as a transcendent reality in our post-metaphysical and postmodern era. Nevertheless, Murdoch's critique of the behaviorist-existential model of human selfhood and her emphasis on the moral importance of attention are valuable contributions to moral philosophy.

**Aristotle is not the Shakespeare of science**

Aristotle, a renowned philosopher, is often regarded as a significant figure in the history of thought. However, it is important to note that he is not the Shakespeare of science. While Aristotle made important contributions in various fields such as logic, ethics, and biology, his approach and the nature of his work are quite different from that of Shakespeare in the realm of literature.

But other than that errant claim, only a petulant reader would dismiss what Murdoch has to say. Iris Murdoch, a respected writer and thinker, has put forward some profound ideas. Her views on virtue are particularly noteworthy. She argues that virtue is not something easy or superficial. It requires discipline and is a deep and complex concept. Virtue is indifferent to our self-satisfaction at reaching false or true way-stages. In other words, true virtue is not about feeling good about ourselves for achieving certain goals, whether they are real or imagined.

Everyone should read this. Everyone. Murdoch's insights into virtue can have a profound impact on our understanding of ethics and moral behavior. By reading her work, we can gain a deeper appreciation for the complexity of virtue and the importance of cultivating it in our lives. It is not just for scholars or those interested in philosophy; everyone can benefit from reflecting on Murdoch's ideas and applying them to their own experiences.

Eh... What initially appeared to be a solid recommendation from a lecturing professor unfortunately morphed into a rather disappointing book review. The author in question seems more intent on coming across as intelligent by relying heavily on jargon and convoluted language rather than presenting actionable or meaningful content. The numerous painful examples provided only serve to showcase the author's ability to memorize facts rather than offer any real-depth analysis.

After the first reading, I made a second pass through the text, hoping to uncover some good analysis on the concept of "good" from the author's perspective. However, what I found instead was a confirmation that the author's writing style is as disjointed as poorly formulated philosophy and theory. It meanders aimlessly, never quite reaching a firm destination or conclusion. The author fails to offer practical insights or even apply common sense to his ramblings.

To be fair to the author, I was indeed seeking wisdom relevant to being, acting, and perhaps even doing "good." But without proper periods or punctuation, it was a struggle to find any coherent message. Nevertheless, despite all these flaws, I still found some redeeming qualities in the book.

That human beings are naturally selfish seems true based on the evidence.

Whenever and wherever we observe them, despite a very small number of apparent exceptions, this trait becomes evident.

Modern psychology has provided some insights into the nature of this selfishness.

The psyche is an individual shaped by history, constantly looking out for itself.

In some respects, it is like a machine; it requires energy sources to function and is predisposed to certain patterns of activity.

The much-vaunted area of its freedom of choice is not typically very extensive.

One of its main pastimes is daydreaming, as it is reluctant to face unpleasant realities.

Its consciousness is not usually a transparent glass through which it views the world, but rather a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie designed to shield the psyche from pain.

It continuously seeks consolation, either through the imagined inflation of self or through fictions of a theological nature.

Even its acts of loving are more often than not an assertion of self.

I believe we can likely recognize ourselves in this rather disheartening description.

It makes us reflect on our own nature and the ways in which our selfish tendencies may impact our lives and relationships.

Perhaps by being more aware of these aspects, we can strive to overcome them and become better individuals.

I discovered this compilation of three essays to be extremely profound and meaningful. It is not only thought-provoking but also highly inspiring, especially for a student like me who is engaged in the study of moral philosophy.

There is no doubt that Murdoch's ideas have always been, are currently, and will continue to be regarded as controversial and subject to debate. However, there is a unique quality in her writing that compels you to sit down and listen intently, with a certain earnestness, to what she has to say next.

This, I believe, can be attributed to the candor in her writing, the extensive breadth of her knowledge, the evident conviction in her words, and her focus on an important yet under-explored topic, namely moral perception.

Fortunately, Murdoch positions her rich discussion of moral perception within a broader conversation about the appropriate and inappropriate ways of doing moral philosophy.

Even if one disagrees with Murdoch's conclusions, reading her work, in my opinion, is an essential exercise for developing a more lucid understanding of the practice of philosophy.

But please don't let my inclination towards all things philosophy dissuade any non-philosophers from reading this collection. There is a great deal here that will be of interest to theologians, artists, and all those who are concerned with questions regarding the good life.