Great book!

I have read it at least twice, although not always in strict order.

This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the state of modern ethics and alternative viewpoints.

I especially admire how Murdoch had the courage to confront the then prevalent trends.

Her return to exploring personal ethics - and, we might add, responsibility (rather than, say, 'saving the planet') is of great necessity.

Moreover, her argument for moral realism and the role of the inner life is truly convincing.

I recommend this book to anyone who is dismayed at the highly polemical state of current moral discourse.

Often, this discourse seems to ignore accountability to the world as it is, thereby favouring forms of wishful thinking.

This book offers a refreshing perspective and valuable insights that can help us navigate the complex terrain of modern ethics.

Whew! It has been tough going. The discussion was brilliant, yet it was hard to understand the philosopher's detailed approach to the question of what is "good." The main point that I took away is this: "I can only choose within the world I can SEE, in the moral sense of'see' which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort." At the level of serious common sense and of an ordinary non-philosophical reflection about the nature of morals, it is perfectly obvious that goodness IS connected with knowledge. However, it is not with impersonal quasi-scientific knowledge of the ordinary world. Instead, it is with a refined and honest perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one. This understanding challenges us to look beyond the surface and truly engage with the moral dimensions of our choices and actions.

You might think you have an affinity for philosophy until you actually attempt to read it. Good grief! It can be quite a challenge. However, Murdoch manages to navigate this complex terrain with skill. She avoids getting lost in the overly academic and abstruse discussions while still offering valuable and profound insights on crucial aspects such as God, Goodness, Art, and Love.

Her quotes are particularly thought-provoking. For instance, she states that the ideal situation is better represented as a kind of 'necessity'. This is something that saints have spoken about and that any artist can easily understand. The idea of a patient, loving regard directed at a person, thing, or situation presents the will not as unimpeded movement but rather as something more akin to 'obedience'.

She also emphasizes that freedom is not simply an inconsequential display of one's power or influence. Instead, it is the disciplined process of overcoming the self.

Furthermore, Murdoch believes that there is a place both within and outside of religion for a type of contemplation of the Good. It is not just the domain of dedicated experts but can also be engaged in by ordinary people. This attention is not merely about planning specific good actions but rather an attempt to look away from the self towards a distant, transcendent perfection. It is a source of uncontaminated energy and a wellspring of new and unimagined virtues. This attempt, which involves turning one's attention away from the particular, can be especially helpful when faced with seemingly insurmountable difficulties and when feelings of guilt keep pulling one's gaze back towards the self. This, according to Murdoch, is the true mysticism that is intertwined with morality, a kind of undogmatic prayer that is real, important, yet perhaps also difficult and prone to corruption.

This book is truly excellent.

However, for a beginner in the field of philosophy, it wasn't an overly easy read.

Murdoch's papers typically present profound views on moral philosophy.

She contemplates a Platonist approach, which delves into the deeper aspects of moral ideals and their existence beyond the physical world.

Moreover, she provides an overview of man as a moral agent among other objects.

This exploration helps us understand how humans make moral decisions and interact with the surrounding world from a moral perspective.

But I'll stop right here for now, as there is so much more to discover and analyze in her works.

Perhaps with further study and reflection, I will be able to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complex and fascinating ideas presented by Murdoch.

Love is the general name for the quality of attachment. It has the capacity for infinite humiliation, and it is the source of our greatest mistakes.

However, when it is even partially refined, it forms the energy and passion of the soul in its search for the Good. It is the force that binds us to the Good and connects us with the world through the Good.

Its existence is the unmistakable sign that we are spiritual beings, drawn to what is excellent and created for the Good. It is a reflection of the warmth and light of the sun.

Love is a complex and multi-faceted emotion. It can bring great joy and fulfillment, but it can also cause pain and heartache.

Yet, despite its flaws, love is an essential part of the human experience. It gives meaning and purpose to our lives and allows us to connect with others on a deep and profound level.

We should strive to refine our love, to make it more pure and selfless, so that it can become a force for good in the world.

The humble man, as Murdoch describes, has a unique perspective. Because he views himself as insignificant, he can perceive other things objectively. He realizes the futility, or telos-lessness, of virtue, yet also its distinct value and the boundless nature of its demands.

"The humble man, because he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as they are. He sees the pointlessness [i.e., telos-lessness] of virtue and its unique value and the endless extent of its demand." (pp. 101)

Throughout the book, Murdoch presents a compelling vision of the order and unity of morality, seeing virtue and beauty as aspects of the Good. However, she stops short of taking what the author believes is the logical final step, which is to acknowledge a metaphysical basis for this unity. Perhaps she is reluctant due to embarrassment, pride, fear, or an honest inability to believe in a personal God. The author leans towards the latter. This omission is a disappointing and significant flaw that undermines her overall position.

Without this metaphysical foundation, her proposal seems to lead back to the very kind of improvised morality and invented religion that she criticizes in her contemporaries. Admittedly, her version is more in line with the lived experience of ordinary people and thus has some merit. But as experience shows, only intellectuals can "believe" in a religion they have created because it is based on their own arbitrary preferences, which is precisely the subjectivity they aim to avoid.

In this regard, she reminds the author of Raimond Gaita, who has also attempted to salvage aspects of the Christian moral life. But like Murdoch's philosophy, such attempts, already criticized by Nietzsche over a century ago, will remain unconvincing to all but a few who share the same mindset.

These invented creeds may be useful and, at times, a step in the right direction. But are they the Truth? Murdoch leaves us with this question, wondering.

Re-reading in conjunction with the current project of reading Murdoch's novels, I find that the third of the three essays is by far the most accessible to those, such as myself, who have a limited knowledge of philosophy.

In fact, on someone's suggestion, I began with the third essay this time. It has proven to be a very helpful exercise. Reading this essay is truly worth the effort because the ideas and beliefs presented here are vividly reflected in her novels, especially in the early novels that I am currently reading.

As I delved into the essay, I was able to gain a better understanding of the philosophical concepts that Murdoch explores in her works. This newfound knowledge enhanced my reading experience of her novels, allowing me to appreciate the depth and complexity of her writing even more.

I look forward to continuing my exploration of Murdoch's novels and essays, and I believe that this combined reading approach will provide me with a more comprehensive and profound understanding of her literary genius.

An underappreciated treasure.

This remarkable book gathers three of Iris Murdoch's essays that delve into the foibles and failings of that particular beast which Elizabeth Anscombe once dubbed "modern moral philosophy".

It offers a truly fascinating exploration of a wide range of topics that might initially seem diverse. These include art, with its profound influence and the complex ways it shapes our understanding. The meaning of words is also a crucial aspect, as it underpins our communication and our perception of the world. The import of history to philosophy cannot be underestimated either, as it provides the context and the foundation upon which philosophical ideas are built. And finally, the nature of goodness, a topic that has intrigued philosophers throughout the ages, is examined with Murdoch's unique insights.

Murdoch was, to a large extent, single-handedly responsible for many of the less-than-flattering thoughts I hold regarding the limitations of overly specialized and professionalized academic philosophy. This is hardly surprising, considering that she chose to leave that realm and embark on a career as a novelist, bringing a fresh perspective and a new way of looking at the world.

I'd agree with Iris Murdoch that 'an unexamined life can be virtuous.' 'Goodness is a function of the will.' 'Thought cannot be thought unless it is directed towards a conclusion.' I can't agree that it follows its own paths without the intervention of my will. She does mean a conscious will, when the unconscious would not be engaged, and is quoting Hampshire who's confined to consciousness.

I do identify myself with my will, my unconscious will that is, which is also myself. I'd let someone go because he wanted to, failing to secure whom I wanted to secure as I could have once I'd got him back to the flat and had space to work in, so had a problem what to do. It was a problem conscious thinking failed to solve and could only be resolved by my unconscious which thought it through while I attended to its thinking, which wasn't logical, but reached a conclusion I accepted as right though it was impossible to go over the chain of its reasoning from beginning to the end. The conclusion was that I should forget who I loved until I met him again, as my unconscious reassured I would and I didn't doubt, because it would be too painful and quite pointless to be knowingly loving him in the meantime.

I'd have to disagree then that 'a decision does not turn out to be an introspectible movement' when in the above example mine was. It is also possible to consciously decide one way but to act contrarily and as the overriding unconscious will has decided. 'Something introspectible might occur but if the outward context is lacking that something cannot be called a decision.' What if the inward movement is between one's unconscious and another's? There may be an outward context: a boy asked me to join him on his way to school. I didn't see why I should but, within, my unconscious intervened with me and I did, asking the boy if a man – as I inwardly then saw my unconscious – had prompted him to ask. He didn't know about that but he knew the prompting had come from me. Both his decision to ask and mine to comply were introspectible movements. Murdoch also gives an example against Hampshire's notion that 'anything which is to count as a definite reality must be open to several observers.' None of the several observers of the boy's asking and my complying was party to our introspectible decisions.

'Difficult choices often present... experience of void... of not being determined by the reasons,” conscious reasons. My example above explains how the choice is otherwise made and why there's no ensuing experience of void in my case or loss, angst. Sartre who has no truck with the unconscious yet says 'when I deliberate the die is already cast', an indication of decision by the unconscious, as Murdoch is suggesting. She describes angst as 'a kind of fright the conscious will feels when it apprehends the strength and direction of the personality which is not under its immediate control.' She suggests 'we have to accept a darker, less fully conscious, less... rational image of the dynamics of the human personality. With this dark entity behind us we may... decide to act... and... find as a result both energy and vision are unexpectedly given. But if we do leap ahead of what we know we still have to try to catch up.' No amount of understanding can replace the action of will, that of the unconscious one that is.

What does 'good' mean? Moore asked. She says the answer concerns the will. I doubted my will was good since he activated faults in others, Mrs Thompson's jealousy of me for example which incited her son, my friend to assault me. I didn't want to think about it because if my man was bad so was I and my concern was to be good. 'Can we make ourselves morally better?' No. Since goodness or badness is a spiritual attribute, we can only be made better if our unconscious will is made better by a good one. 'Sartre can admit... we choose out of some pre-existent condition which he also... calls a choice.' It is, if the condition is that of the unconscious will's choice. 'Kant pictured the mystery [of moral choice] in terms of an indiscernible balance between a... rational agent and [a] mechanism. We have learned from Freud to picture the mechanism as something... individual and personal which is... very powerful and not easily understood by its owner. What we... are... is an obscure system of energy out of which choices and... acts of will emerge at intervals in ways which are often unclear and... dependent on the condition of the system in between the moments of choice. Is there any way that when moments of choice arrive we [can] be sure of acting rightly? '

'Deliberately falling out of love is not a jump of the will, it is the acquiring of new objects of attention and thus of new energies as a result of refocusing,' or using the love determinedly not on the person who invoked it but in order to make art in accordance with the choice of the unconscious will in inciting love as means to that end.

'Explicit... willing can play some part,... as an inhibiting factor.' My man wanted me to go to Oxford to shake the hand of a future American president. I demurred. He, my unconscious will, is, however, my daemon, so she is wrong to cite that of Socrates, which 'only told him what not to do', as substantiating inhibition by a conscious will. Mine doesn't tell me what to do. It no longer speaks to me at all.

This book has indeed puzzled several readers. They have contended that the author either fails to expound an argument for her stance or does so in such an unclear way that it becomes impossible to assess her claims. This is regrettable yet not astonishing considering the novelty of the author's claims. Her claims are novel, at least in relation to the dominant trends of analytic moral philosophy and existentialism that she was addressing.

However, Murdoch's argument is actually quite straightforward. She has presented an extensive argument for the indispensability of a particular Platonic account of the concept of good. Kant once argued that formal concepts should only be introduced to the extent that they are necessary for conceptualizing some object. In these terms, the author posits that a Platonic notion of good is necessary to understand a wide variety of phenomena that are related because they fall under this concept.

This text can be regarded as a response to Hare's assertions regarding the priority of the prescriptive sense of good. According to Hare, stating that some x is good means that x is somehow involved in an imperative prescribing some action. For instance, to say that this is a good car implies that people in an appropriate situation who desire a car should choose this car.

For Murdoch, Hare's prescriptivist understanding of good is hopelessly inadequate for conceptualizing the phenomena relevant to a proper comprehension of goodness. Good things may necessitate all kinds of actions, but to say that something is good is to recognize its value as something worthy of love. It is also about realizing that one must strive to become perfect or at least better than one is at any given moment to fully appreciate the value of that which is good. Due to this, good can never be fully expressed in purely prescriptive terms. Not because good is a purely descriptive concept, but rather because goodness exceeds any given understanding of the set of actions required by the goodness in question. In this sense, good is indefinable; not because it is empty but because of its fullness.

Murdoch reminds us that ethics may often be ordinary, but it should pull us out of our comfort zone in an effort to offer a fleeting glimpse of a more noble form of life.

The text presents a balanced view of certain aspects that the author both liked and disliked. What I liked: Firstly, her defense of inner life is quite appealing as it emphasizes the importance of the intangible aspects within us. Secondly, considering love as a moral concept gives a new perspective on the nature of love. Thirdly, her critique of scientism/positivism challenges the overemphasis on scientific methods and rationality. Fourthly, the idea of morality as everyday conduct makes it more accessible and practical. Finally, attention as practice is an interesting concept that highlights the significance of being fully present. What I disliked: However, the language of realism, seeing reality "as it really is," is unclear to the author. It leaves room for interpretation and may not be as straightforward as it seems. Additionally, her critique of the ego might seem a bit one-sided or not fully explored.

“We are what we seem to be, transient moral creatures subject to necessity & chance.” This slim little book is truly affecting. It is written so lucidly and thoughtfully that even if you ultimately disagree with Murdoch or think philosophy is generally boring, you will likely find some meaning here, something to chew over. Love, virtue, goodness, beauty, freedom, art – all are examined here wonderfully.

I appreciate how, though she deeply opposes existentialism, behaviorism & utilitarianism, she takes the time to really examine their arguments and to acknowledge the (few) merits she thinks they have.

One main idea here is Murdoch's assertion that morality exists and it’s all about selflessly looking, paying attention beyond “the fat relentless ego” with a “just loving gaze directed upon an individual reality.” Love is central here and she does not mean love of self. Our interior moral lives progress privately, continually, if we really look beyond our biases, self-concerns & illusions: “The more the separateness & differentness of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs & wishes demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing.”

Vision>Action

"Freedom is not the sudden jumping of the isolated will in & out of an impersonal logical complex, it is a function of the progressive attempt to see a particular object clearly."

"Where virtue is concerned we often apprehend more than we clearly understand & grow by looking."

"By the time the moment of choice has arrived the quality of attention has probably determined the nature of the act."