While the first essay, which focuses on the concept of perfection, is somewhat lacking. It seems overly preoccupied with engaging in the technical debates of the time and doesn't sufficiently present her own original ideas. However, the last two essays are truly outstanding. In them, Murdoch delves into the relationships between beauty/art and love/virtue, as well as their connections to the good, transcendental idealism(s), and the nature of reality. She advances a highly humane philosophy that calls for a return to the centrality of love and a sense of humility in the face of the Good. Her work is darker, more heartfelt, and more "mystical" compared to most Anglophone philosophy. After all, she constantly cites Simone Weil, so one wouldn't expect logical positivism. It represents a return to the idea that philosophy is not just a game for academics but something that has practical application to the most crucial questions of life as we live it.

Of course, these were lectures, and there are certain very intriguing ideas that aren't as fully developed as one might hope. For example, her aesthetics - what exactly is the art of fantasy as opposed to the true art that reveals reality in all its hidden ordinary everydayness? This is likely because these are the really interesting concepts that merit much more in-depth investigation. Nevertheless, I would still very much like to hear her further thoughts on these matters.

So, is it thought-provoking? Certainly. But even more so, it is tantalizing. There is so much that is hinted at or shown, but as is often the case with such profound topics, perhaps even more exploration might not be enough.

A fascinating little book indeed! It's more of a collection of essays that come together to form a cohesive and often persuasive argument. It's against modern philosophy, such as Kant, existentialism, and empiricists, and in favor of reclaiming Platonic ideals. I don't entirely agree with all of it, as I find those Platonic ideas to have their own problems. But what's most interesting about the philosophical position Murdoch is arguing for is highlighting the emptiness of the modern experiment. It calls for a re-enchanting of our philosophical aims, something he discovers in history.
The critique starts with dismantling the cult of the self. In the modern context, largely due to the existential problem it creates, philosophy has been forced to reposition an unattainable higher virtue using concrete terms. We might call this science, humanism, progress, liberty, freedoms, human rights, globalism, or nationalism. Whatever it is, these virtues function as the highest order, largely detached from our ability to reason either from or towards them. The end result of any reasoned attempt to claim that an empirical process can define and locate goodness on its own and within the observable functions of a society or natural order has been a sharp detachment, even if it's sometimes invisible and out of sight, from what is required for goodness to be sovereign.
Murdoch argues for an essential differentiation between beauty and goodness. Beauty is what we can observe and experience as a shadow, while goodness is the higher virtue that can only be seen dimly. Saying that goodness can never truly be grasped, seen, reached, or defined might seem contrary to the modern approach, but it's actually what allows us to locate it within the empirical process. What we observe in beauty (and its opposite, the ugly) is freed from having to bear the weight of explaining its own existence, and this act of seeing binds us necessarily to knowledge as an intrinsically external reality. It exists, even though we can't see it, and we know it exists because of its relationship to a functional reality that can be observed.
The sovereignty of the good seems to push us to name the good. There's something in our human nature that drives us in this direction. But this is precisely where the interchange between the sovereign and the functional realities that guide our existence becomes necessary and important. Naming the good makes the functional sovereign, when it's not. So, goodness must remain an unattainable and unexplainable mystery. It's not unknowable, but sovereign. A mystery with the explanatory power to justify, define, and explain things like morality precisely because it's not morality and contains the power to explain its own existence.
Here, I note a divergence between Murdoch and myself. One of the places Murdoch ends his argument is by claiming that engaging the sovereignty of the good means recognizing and accepting our functional reality. This means, somewhat ironically, accepting that the self doesn't exist, meaning doesn't exist, and the humble man knows he is nothing and virtue is pointless. Only by accepting these things can we become virtuous, discover and see goodness, and discover the self. This is the great conundrum of reasoned existence. In a sense, I recognize this honest assessment of reality as a strength of his argument. It's one of the great shortcomings of much modern philosophy that it has lost sight of this essential reasoned conclusion, showing much of modern empiricism to be operating on a fallacy, even if through willful ignorance. At the same time, the modern experiment does reveal an important point about this philosophical position - awareness of the truthfulness of this kind of futility, nihilism, and meaninglessness, even if the philosophical exercise desires to reclaim existence, meaning, and purpose from its grip, needs and requires allegiance to our illusions to work. We have to remain at least willfully ignorant, even if the will is equally an illusion, to accept goodness as sovereign over our lives. And that's a precarious position for philosophy to be in.
There is another way, perhaps sought by those looking back at the philosophers who didn't separate philosophical aims from theological ones. It's not hard to see the religious language in Murdoch's argumentation. We see Truth or goodness only partly or dimly, as we see God. Goodness must be able to justify its own existence, as would God. We see goodness in the functional, as we see God. We seek goodness as we seek God apart from our own workings. Murdoch acknowledges this, but sees religion as an expression or outworking of his philosophical position, not its source. It's simply the natural outcome of not naming the good in the modern sense. It's just language that would translate to good/goodness rather than god/godliness. I'm not convinced this works, though. I don't think the argument in this book can achieve what it sets out to do, which is to give goodness a transcendent quality. Goodness is held captive to the necessary recontextualization that effectively makes it a moving target. Goodness becomes dependent on something else to explain its existence. In a sense, the concept of God operates in this way too, but the difference is that recontextualization doesn't redefine God. Instead, God is a Truth that, by its nature, must always be contextualized and re-contextualized. These are two ways of seeing dimly, seeing partially, of seeing the shadows of the true thing.
In any case, it's a compelling read. There's a lot to think about, revisit, and wrestle with. And most importantly, I think it's well argued, succinct, and compact as a philosophical treatise.

Absolutely mind blowing!

When we look at Murdoch from a philosophical perspective, her true genius shines through. Her moral vision is truly unique and stands out in a crowd. It is something that ought to be recognized more widely and deeply. We have a task at hand, and that is to ensure that her remarkable moral insights and perspectives are given the attention they deserve. We owe it to her to do this. She has made significant contributions to the field of philosophy and ethics, and it is our responsibility to honor and promote her work. By doing so, we can gain a better understanding of the complex moral issues that we face in today's world and be inspired to make more informed and ethical decisions. Let us not overlook the genius of Murdoch and do our part to ensure that her moral vision continues to have a lasting impact.

Ugh, I read this such a long time ago that I can barely recall what it was actually about. However, I do distinctly remember having a great fondness for it.

Not only was the content captivating, but the writing style was also truly engaging. Murdoch has this remarkable ability to be a high-quality mid-century philosopher and at the same time, a highly readable author.

This combination is, strangely enough, quite a rarity. It's not often that one finds a philosopher whose work is both intellectually stimulating and accessible to a wide audience.

Murdoch seems to have mastered this art, and it's no wonder that I gave this work a 5/5 stars rating.

Even though my memory of the specific details may have faded, the overall impression it left on me still lingers, a testament to its excellence.

This is a truly crisp and illuminating volume.

While I'm not certain that I'm completely convinced by Murdoch's so-called "Platonism," there is no denying that her aspirational vision of ethical life is highly inspiring.

She posits that ethical life involves the development of increasingly honed faculties of just and loving "seeing" and "unselfing."

This idea challenges us to look beyond our own self-interests and to see the world and others with a more just and loving perspective.

It encourages us to cultivate a sense of empathy and compassion, and to strive for a more ethical and meaningful existence.

Although I may have some reservations about her "Platonism," I find myself drawn to her vision of ethical life and the potential it holds for personal and social transformation.

Overall, this volume offers a thought-provoking and engaging exploration of important ethical concepts that is well worth reading and reflecting upon.

Manufactured Trilogies #47: Theoretical Frameworks for WTF is the Now

This installment of Manufactured Trilogies presents three significant works that offer unique perspectives on the current state of affairs.

Hannah Arendt's "The Origins of Totalitarianism" delves into the historical and ideological roots of totalitarian systems, exploring how such extreme forms of governance emerged and the profound impact they had on society.

Iris Murdoch's "The Sovereignty of the Good" examines the nature of goodness and morality, challenging traditional views and presenting a new framework for understanding ethical behavior.

Bruno Latour's "Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime" focuses on the urgent issue of climate change, offering insights into the complex relationship between humans and the environment and proposing ways to address this global challenge.

Together, these three works provide a rich and diverse set of theoretical frameworks that can help us better understand the present moment and navigate the uncertainties of the future.

DNF about 1/3 in.

The app I was using to listen to this while doing my dumb job lost my place when I got interrupted by some idiot.

As it was all just a boring beige British discourse on ethics, I wasn't interested enough to get re-centered in it.

It made my eyes glaze over and I have an MA in this shit.

Didn't seem like it would illuminate her fiction so I'm just going to quit here.

Too dull and no discernable payoff - didn't seem like she had a novel take on the subject matter.

And the narrator kept saying Dez-carts for Descartes.

So I put on some grindcore and pushed through at work.

Listening to books sucks. I don't think I can call it reading because I can't pay the attention necessary to fully engage.

Moreover, the lack of visual cues and the monotony of the narrator's voice often make it difficult to stay focused.

Sure, it can be a convenient way to consume literature while multitasking, but it just doesn't have the same impact as actually reading the words on a page.

Maybe I'll give it another try someday, but for now, I'm sticking with the old-fashioned way of reading.

Arguably, the most captivating area of philosophy at present is moral psychology.

I assure you that I'm not merely stating this because it happens to be my area of interest! Moral psychology is a diverse and fascinating field that delves into the relationship between human psychology and ethics.

In moral psychology, we explore a wide range of issues. For instance, what drives human action in general and moral action specifically? What makes an individual morally responsible? Do emotions hold ethical significance? What are the conditions under which someone merits moral blame? What constitutes personhood? What is identity, and what role does it play in ethics? Is having a good character more crucial than simply performing right acts?

Murdoch's remarkable little book can be attributed with much of the contemporary intrigue in moral psychology. In this work, Murdoch draws inspiration from Ancient Greek ethics to illuminate the ethical importance of human psychology.

The result is that Murdoch, not only in helping to rejuvenate interest in moral psychology but also in contributing to the resurgence of contemporary philosophers' interest in Ancient Greek ethics.

Consequently, this book has been of great interest and has had a profound impact on contemporary moral philosophy. And that, in and of itself, should serve as a compelling reason to read this outstanding book.

This is not what I expected, yet it is truly fascinating.

There are certain points that I was unable to fully appreciate due to the lack of necessary knowledge. Murdoch assumes a rather high level of philosophy background, which makes it a bit challenging for me.

I didn't agree with several of her points, and in many ways, I also didn't concur with her main thesis. However, I still found this to be extremely helpful in understanding the world from a different perspective.

It forces me to step out of my comfort zone and consider ideas that I might not have otherwise entertained.

Although I may not agree with everything, the experience of engaging with her work has broadened my intellectual horizons and made me more open to different ways of thinking.

It serves as a reminder that there are always multiple perspectives to every issue, and by exploring them, we can gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the world around us.

It is truly strange (which doesn't mean, of course, that it's bad) to see someone talking about the "Good" in this way in the 1960s of the 20th century. I like what Robert Hullot-Kentor says about it: the fact that this kind of concept sounds distant and "old" doesn't mean that they have simply become outdated. In fact, on the contrary - it's just that one can't lose sight of their obsolescence when trying to handle them.

Basically, I think that what I really agree with is Plato, which brings me closer to Murdoch, although she simplifies the problem of the relationship between art, beauty, and truth: Evil has no positive existence and in the end only means the absence - i.e. ignorance - of the Good, whose force is irresistible etc.

Okay, irresistible in terms: rivotril, cocaine, etc. should soothe the conscience of any arrogant CEO (all of them, for better or for worse), and it is perfectly possible to never understand that the problem has to do with this so-called absence. Moreover, it's not the kind of thing that can be solved in individual minds, since, as Adorno says somewhere, a liberation of the spirit that is not also a liberation of men is not a liberation of the spirit. But I digress.

A Dense yet Enlightening Read

This is a work that is both dense and highly enlightening. Murdoch presents a profound argument that the Good exists, yet we are largely blind to it. She posits that moral progress hinges on the ability to learn to see this Good.

This has led me to reflect deeply on various aspects. Secular spirituality comes to the fore, along with the intricate interplay between contemplation and action, as well as between aesthetics and morality. The significance of selfless and just attention cannot be overstated. Additionally, the meanings of love, death, chance, and humility are all brought into sharp focus.

Even in those instances where her arguments might seem to be overstated or underdeveloped, they possess a clever and subversive quality. As such, this is an excellent book for those who enjoy engaging in debates with existentialists and behaviorists.

I have a strong desire (and indeed, I should) to return to this book at some future point. It is a work that clearly has much more to offer and reveals new layers of depth with each reading.

Please provide the article that needs to be rewritten and expanded so that I can help you.