It’s a rather courageous little book that essentially advocates for her brand of Platonism in ethics. The core argument is that we must believe in an external guide; otherwise, we’ll despair as life is rife with suffering and we’re at the mercy of chance. God may no longer suffice, but perhaps the Good can. Maybe if we look closely enough, we can perceive beauty in art or nature and, while admiring it, forget ourselves for a moment. Beauty can serve as evidence of something greater or as an example of the possibility of becoming less egoistic. One can even utilize the Good as a means to realign oneself during moments of weakness. Unlike the moral philosophers of her era, she doesn’t claim neutrality; instead, she explicitly labels egoism - the default state of humans - as the enemy. To overcome it, the first step is to truly look. Great artists manage to set aside their ego and create something that reveals reality and transcends their personal concerns.

She reacts against the behaviorism of her age that painted a picture where inner life is either useless or non-existent, with only actions mattering. In this behavioristic view, what’s publicly available is neutral and objective, similar to Humean sense-data. In every human, what’s publicly available is captured by the use of reason and immediately compels her to form the appropriate beliefs. With everything open, clear, and objective, choices become strictly a matter of the person’s will plus the value system each individual happened to form while growing up.

Against this static and显然 misguided image, Murdoch reminds us that there can be changes in a person that can’t be accounted for by overt behavior. She tells us that there can be an inner struggle that leads to a better perception of what’s out there and a change in attitude towards it. Her model is based on vision, not action. Even if there is something publicly available that’s common to everyone, it’s not relevant to morality (but to science), so those instant beliefs are either impossible or irrelevant to morality. What’s important and more fundamental (even from a scientific perspective) are the reasons for acting and the concepts and vocabulary one uses. People use different ones and see things differently, and effort is required to see them clearly or - since her concern is moral rather than epistemological - justly, fairly, and lovingly. This introduces struggle and progress towards an ideal - but never-reachable - point of a clear, just vision of the right action or even of love, making her model Platonic, with concrete universals. It is the correct vision of things that makes one act rightly. It also makes the moment of decision less important. The actual work has been done before by seeing, and in the moment of choice, perhaps the goal can be to have no choice but to do what’s right, an image that artists sometimes use for what they do (Nietzsche and Nehamas also discuss this).

This book penned by Iris Murdoch is, in the final analysis, an endeavor to refute the incursions that existentialism, utilitarianism, and behavioural psychology were making into moral philosophy.

From what I have gleaned, Murdoch's overarching contention is that there exists a thing which we term 'goodness'. However, we do not reach it through pure, unconstrained will. Instead, it is goodness, once properly known, that restricts our will. We relinquish our'self' in order to pursue the good.

Overall, despite being written in the 20th century, I find the book to be invigorating. The encroachments of science into the domain of the good have, in my view, persisted, to the extent that we have been left with a muddled understanding of goodness. It is thus pleasant to unearth treasures like this that strive to resist such pressure. Nevertheless, I am left somewhat perplexed by the book: I cannot quite fathom where Murdoch 'positions' the 'good'. She posits some spiritual realm while simultaneously presuming that God, at least as we have conventionally understood God in the West, does not exist. I believe that to assert that some transcendental good exists, and that this good is not'mysterious' in that we can and do have access to it, demands at least a further explication of how this is related, or not, to the concept of a God who reveals...

Perhaps Murdoch could have delved deeper into this aspect to clarify her stance and make her argument more compelling. Despite this shortcoming, the book still offers valuable insights and food for thought regarding the nature of goodness and its place in moral philosophy.

A short collection of lectures can often have a profound impact, and this one is no exception.

It offers a highly enlightening perspective on various aspects. In particular, it provides a sharp and incisive critique of numerous trends that were prevalent in early twentieth-century philosophy.

By delving into the ideas and movements of that era, the lectures expose the flaws and limitations of certain philosophical approaches.

Moreover, the author undertakes a fascinating reappropriation of Plato. This involves reexamining and reinterpreting the works of the ancient philosopher in light of the contemporary context.

The result is a fresh and engaging exploration that bridges the gap between the past and the present.

Overall, this short collection of lectures is a valuable contribution to the field of philosophy, offering both critical insights and a new way of looking at the works of Plato.

It is sure to stimulate further思考 and discussion among scholars and enthusiasts alike.

Philosophy is something that I can understand and appreciate!

Moreover, it's really extremely good. Perhaps I just read her essays. In short, moral decision theory has problems when it fails to take into account the intervening time that builds up between major or moral decisions.

Rather than attempting to impose a strict adherence to a single moral principle, Murdoch contends that the contemplation of the Good is the core of making right or moral decisions.

If we think about the Good, the decision, even regarding difficult matters such as our relationship with our significant others, shouldn't be overly hard to reach.

Or rather, it probably will be difficult because focusing on the Good is quite challenging as we love fantasy, delusion, and things that strengthen the notion that our lives have some hidden or deeper meaning.

Paying attention to the Good means attending to a reality that is not distorted in our favor. Murdoch presents the greatest artists, like Tolstoy and others, as examples of those who prepare us to experience the truth of our human condition.

I cannot say that I fully followed or understood her. Maybe, in part, this is due to listening to the audiobook. Still, some things she said really sparked my reflections.

She presented an interesting thought experiment. In it, someone, out of a sense of duty, treats a relative decently even though she despises them. Eventually, however, she experiences an inner change of heart and values, and comes to love them as they are. Externally, her behavior remains identical.

Again, I cannot recall her exact reason for bringing this up, but it was in connection to behaviorism. It's fascinating how this shows an inner change when behaviorism is only concerned with the external, where there was no change. I would argue that this inner move towards a good ideal is of great importance.

Enlightenment thinkers were horrified of tradition, looking at the irrationality, violence, and chaos it often led to, and favored individual reason instead. But after the French Revolution, with its reign of terror, many would again favor tradition over individual reasoning.

Murdock presents a third way. If I understand it correctly (and I highly doubt I do), it is the pursuit of ideal concepts.

As we reflect on the ideals of courage or love, there will be a journey of discovery. We are to behold the good in the same way we behold beauty. The words, such as "love," are context-bound. We gradually gain a fuller understanding of the concept by observing it in different contexts.

It's interesting how people demonstrate a belief in the Good, some abstract and unreachable ideal of perfection that is never fully definable. We can point to people who are remarkable in certain aspects, but we realize they are not perfect.

I think having some type of telos is crucial. Sure, perfectionism can be dangerous, but someone who has the concept of a beautiful ideal and incrementally gets closer to it will无疑 be a better human being. As a Christian, I can hope that truth, beauty, and goodness truly exist. They are not simply fantasies in our heads.

It was a rather slow beginning with Essay #1. The concept of perfection seemed a little challenging to fully grasp. Moreover, it happened to be the longest among the three essays, which made it quite a struggle for me to get through.

However, something remarkable occurred midway. All of a sudden, the ideas seemed to leap off the page, captivating my attention and making the reading experience much more engaging.

Essay #2 was truly amazing. The exploration of "On God and Good" was thought-provoking and profound. I'm certain that I will be revisiting this essay in the future. Although the ending was somewhat of a letdown, I think that upon a reread, I'll simply pretend that the last page and a half is blank, thus preserving the essence and impact of the earlier parts.

Essay 3, for which the book is named, was just okay. It didn't have the same level of excitement or depth as Essay #2, but it did ease me out of the reading experience well enough. Overall, it was a solid read that offered valuable insights and perspectives on various topics.

I was introduced to this book through John Vervaeke's outstanding lecture series 'Awakening from the Meaning Crisis'. It is a concise yet highly erudite work that merits repeated study due to its abundance of ideas. In my opinion, the fact that such a judgment can be made about the entire book is poetically fitting, as the very first page emphasizes philosophy's task of constantly returning to the 'beginning'. This deepening movement coexists with philosophy's conventionally understood role of constructing elaborate systems of thought. I have found the book to be a work that invites the reader to fully engage with its ideas. It is by no means an easy read. Even after reading it twice, I was still somewhat hesitant to write a review, as I felt that I had yet to truly grasp and appreciate some of its subtler points. However, I will mention some key takeaways. *Spoilers Ahead*

Murdoch examines the current state of moral psychology, which is modeled on a combination of scientific naturalism and existentialism. In this view, the moral agent is seen as only existing in moments of decision/action that are publicly observable. This represents a behaviorist, utilitarian, and so-called objective vision of morality, in which the interiority of the moral agent is either completely ignored or reduced to insignificance. Under this view, what matters are public utterances and acts whose meanings are clear and determined by how they are used and interpreted in the social context. The hazy, indefinite world of the inner contents of consciousness is set aside in favor of focusing on an objective, atomized, and definite world of facts. Similarly, the moral agent is seen as only existing in acts of free choice among a clearly specified set of options/intentions that are presented to the agent through a process of rational deliberation. Murdoch, drawing inspiration from Platonism, challenges these notions, which she views as illegitimate extensions of a certain idea of Wittgenstein that he himself did not apply to the moral domain. She argues that 'attention', in a sense similar to its use by Simone Weil, is properly a moral act. It is not that the agent is absent between flashes of decision/action observable in the public world, but rather that the moral act involves a selfless and attentive orientation towards reality in a contemplative attitude best characterized by the metaphor of vision. This reminded me a great deal of Iain McGilchrist's emphasis on Attention in his magnum opus 'The Matter With Things'. Additionally, the type of moral framework that Iris criticizes makes a great deal of sense under McGilchrist's Hemispheric Hypothesis, according to which the way of apprehending of the Left Hemisphere, with its drive to limit, define, demarcate, capture, and control reality at the expense of the more holistic, global, richer yet indefinite insights of the Right Hemisphere, is a tendency that is responsible for the current weakened state of Western civilization.

Grounding morality in 'Attention' has several interesting implications. For example, in contrast to the romanticist view in which the role of the ego complex in determining behavior is shunned in favor of the existentialist notion of a radically self-defined, untethered, and independent freedom, Murdoch offers a more nuanced perspective. The age-old idea of humanity as fallen and in a state of sinful self-indulgence is acknowledged and given its proper due by relating it to the reality of the selfish ego complex. Instead of relying on supreme feats of willpower that go against reality/naturalism and our sinful nature, Murdoch emphasizes a developmental view of moral agency in which agency is redeemed through a proper orientation towards The Good via attention and the expectation of grace that follows. Murdoch introduces the Platonic concept of Love/Eros directed towards The Idea of the Good, which cannot be defined or pinned down yet represents a transcendent moral standard. She reminds us of Plato's allegory of the Cave, in which the Idea of The Good is likened to the Sun, which cannot be directly apprehended but must be presupposed when making any normative judgment. Iris reframes the ideas of prayer, transcendence, and morality in a more secular perspective by grounding them in an agent's aspiration towards virtue and a proper relationship to reality. Instead of the moral agent creating new values independently of the world through self-assertion, values are seen more as discoveries that emerge through a striving towards a standard of perfection and a reverent obedience to the truth as it reveals itself.

Furthermore, another idea that I found interesting was the view that instead of making false idols out of isolated virtues whose relationships with other virtues are not considered relevant, the meanings of the virtues themselves gradually undergo transformation for the moral subject who, through participating in them, comes to view them in the right relationship within the hierarchy of virtues. This reminded me of Jordan Peterson's lecture on the symbolic meaning of the Tower of Babel, in which an isolated virtue is arbitrarily asserted as the top of the value hierarchy, and its unchallenged authority quickly makes the entire structure tyrannical. This is partly due to an uncritical adoption of a fixed idea of that particular virtue that does not admit of developmental redefinition. This harks back to the Platonic idea of Truth as Aletheia, in which reality gradually discloses itself, a notion that is naturally grounded in Attention. According to Murdoch, instead of the virtues being predefined and given to the subject from without through their effective meanings in social discourse, the meaning of a particular virtue becomes progressively clearer to the subject through a developmental process, although in a way that is different from a postmodern interpretation where meaning is completely arbitrary and relative. It is a view that balances the need for an objective standard of virtue with the recognition of the relative/subjective character of moral realization.

The idea of knowing through participation is closely related to John Vervaeke's emphasis on the need to emancipate from the 'tyranny of propositions'. The idea that moral realization is not simply a matter of accepting the right propositions and forming the 'proper beliefs'. In a sense, the reality of a virtue cannot be fully understood unless one immerses oneself in them and incorporates them into daily practice. Under this process, not only is the agent himself transformed, but the very meanings of the virtues themselves mature. Viewing the agent as an unchanging, disinterested observer rationally deliberating over the 'right propositions' seems to be a limited approach that does not do justice to the complexity of moral development. One cannot simply calculate rationally without immersing oneself in the process. Otherwise, one risks falling into performative contradiction.

One of her most interesting insights/admissions was the acceptance of the psychological fact that the practice of prayer does have a recognizable potency. She views prayer not as a series of 'petitions' or requests but as a loving attention towards God/idea of unity/transcendence that allows the agent to focus away from the selfish ego and gain a psychological energy that enables one "to be good and courageous even in a concentration camp". Despite being a professed atheist, at least in the sense of not believing in a personal God, she still recognized that "God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention" (her own words). Iris recognizes that despite the modern tendency towards secularization, something very much like prayer (loving attention towards transcendence) is essential for moral development. Her ideas seem very similar to those of Martin Buber and Allama Iqbal. For Iqbal, the rational observer of nature who pays loving attention to the works of nature and seeks to understand their underlying unity is also engaged in the practice of prayer.

The book is much deeper and richer than an initial reading reveals, and I will continue to return to it to refine my understanding and extract its insights and connections.

Brief and abstract as it may seem, this appears to be a pragmatist approach to "the good". It suggests that we recognize it when we encounter it, or perhaps more precisely, when we are actively pursuing it. There is more to explore on this topic, and one can find additional insights on Books Are Our Superpower.

The idea of a pragmatist approach to the good implies that rather than relying on theoretical definitions or abstract concepts, we understand the good through our practical experiences and actions. When we are engaged in the pursuit of something that we believe to be good, we are in a better position to recognize its true nature. This approach emphasizes the importance of active participation and exploration in determining what is good for us.

Books, as a superpower, can play a significant role in this process. They can expose us to different perspectives, ideas, and experiences, helping us to expand our understanding of the good. By reading about the lives and actions of others, we can gain valuable insights into what it means to pursue the good and how to recognize it in our own lives. Additionally, books can inspire us to take action and pursue the good in our own unique ways.

I'm going to be completely honest. I found certain arguments in this book rather hard to follow. As a result, I may have to reread it in order to better understand the concepts. Despite this, I have to say that it was quite interesting. Normally, I'm not a big fan of reading philosophy books. I often think that a lot of the time, they seem to be out of touch with reality and discuss things that are simply not scientifically possible. However, I decided to give this book a try since the topic was so intriguing.

Below are some quotes that I found to be particularly interesting. Overall, the book did manage to provide some food for thought and stimulation.

Chapter 1 - The Idea of Perfection
Pg 33. "We are men and we are moral agents before we are scientists, and the place of science in human life must be discussed in words. This is why it is and always will be more important to know about Shakespeare than to know about any scientist."

Pg 38. "Angst may occur where there is any felt discrepancy between personality and ideals. The concept of Angst should be distinguished from its ancestor, Kant's Achtung, in which dismay at the frailty of the will is combined with an inspiring awareness if the reality which the will is drawn by (despair at the sensuous will, joy in the rational will)."

Chapter 2 - On 'God' and 'Good'
Pg 55. "The notion that value should be in some sense unitary, or even that there should be a single supreme value concept, may seem, if one surrenders the idea of God, far from obvious. Why should there not be many different kinds of independent moral values? Why should all be one here?"

Pg 56. "The idea of an 'order' of virtues suggests itself, although it might of course be difficult to state this in any systematic form. For instance, if we reflect upon courage and ask why we think it to be a virtue, what kind of courage is the highest, what distinguishes courage from rashness, ferocity, self-assertion, and so on, we are bound, in our explanation, to use the names of other virtues. The best kind of courage (that which would make a man act unselfishly in a concentration camp) is steadfast, calm, temperate, intelligent, loving." She concludes by writing, "All I suggest here is that reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world, and that increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity.

Pg 57. "One might start from the assertion that morality, goodness is a form of realism." I think she was using this premise to start an argument but I really didn't get where she was going with this.

Pg 58. "What is truly beautiful is 'inaccessible' and cannot be possessed or destroyed."

Pg 68. "Good, not will is transcendent."

Pg 70-71. "It is frequently difficult in philosophy to tell whether one is saying something reasonably public and objective, or whether one is merely erecting a barrier, special to one's own temperament, against one's own personal fears. (It is always a significant question to ask about any philosopher: what is he afraid of?)"

Pg 73. "If one is going to speak of great art as 'evidence', is not ordinary human love an even more striking evidence of a transcendent principle of good?"

Chapter 3 - The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts
Pg 76. "Ethics should not be merely be an analysis of ordinary mediocre conduct, it should be a hypothesis about good conduct and about how this can be achieved. How can we make ourselves better? is a question moral philosophers should attempt to answer."

Pg 76-77. Murdoch states some assumptions in her argument. They are that humans are naturally selfish and that human life has no external point. She writes, "There are properly many patterns and purposes within life, but there is no general and as it were externally guaranteed pattern or purpose of the kind for which philosophers and theologians used to search. We are subject to necessity and chance."

Pg 82. "The most obvious thing in our surroundings which is an occasion for 'unselfing', and that is what is popularly called beauty."

Pg 83. "Plato pointed out that beauty is the only spiritual thing which we love by instinct."

Pg 85-86. "Art is not a diversion or a side-issue, it is the most educational of all human activities and a place in which the nature of morality can be seen. Art gives a clear sense to many ideas which seem more puzzling when we meet with them elsewhere, and it is a clue to what happens elsewhere. An understanding of any art involved a recognition of hierarchy and authority."

Pg 93. "Humility is not a peculiar habit of self-effacement, rather like having an inaudible voice, it is selfless respect for reality and one of the most difficult and central of all virtues." I thought this was a great phrasing of humility. It's usually not associated with reality but it makes sense.

The Sovereignty of Good is a remarkable collection of three essays that delve deep into the realm of moral philosophy, with the concept of Good at its core.

In these essays, Murdoch challenges the prevalent schools of thought regarding the normative aspect of morality. The three dominant schools she critiques are behaviorism, utilitarianism, and existentialism.

Behaviorists focus on scientific examination and assert that behavior is acquired through interaction with the external world, rather than internal processes such as thought. Utilitarians advocate for actions that enhance happiness and well-being, emphasizing outcomes as the measure of moral judgment rather than intentions. Existentialists, on the other hand, stress individual existence, freedom, and choice, arguing that we are born as blank slates and our development occurs through conscious acts of will.

Murdoch provides a scathing critique of how these theories explain moral behavior. She contends that morality can be influenced by one's inner life, contrary to the view that our concept of a good deed or moral act is solely based on external experiences.

To illustrate her point, Murdoch presents the case of a mother who dislikes her daughter-in-law but always treats her kindly. Through a process of self-reflection and paying closer attention to the daughter-in-law, the mother begins to see her in a different light. This example shows that moral activity can occur independently of external expression.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the book is when Murdoch applies her concept of morality to the idea of freedom. She argues that freedom is not just the act of choosing in the public sphere, as existentialists believe, but also involves deliberately paying attention to both observable and unobservable reality.

Freedom, according to Murdoch, is the act of trying to see the world clearly, in all its manifestations. We use the concept of Good to make sense of reality, illuminate it, and act upon it to bring about an inward change for the better.

Overall, The Sovereignty of Good is a thought-provoking read that challenges our assumptions about morality and freedom. While the writing may be a bit dense at times, it is well worth the effort to engage with Murdoch's profound ideas.

Challenging collection of three essays with some valuable insights on art, beauty, and goodness. The first essay is rather dry, lacking in engaging elements. However, the second and third essays are truly rewarding. For lay-readers, it is advisable to start on page 12. This is to avoid getting turned off by the tedious preliminary stuff that was specifically meant for academic specialists in the 1960s.

Though Murdoch confesses atheism in the third essay, stating that there is no “telos”, her idea of Goodness is essentially a de-personified concept of God. It is an undefinable concept that is transcendent, towards which we should all direct our attention and effort in love and humility. I think the confusing parts in her work are a result of her contradictory convictions. On one hand, there is stubborn rationalism, and on the other, a genuine love for the good and beautiful. Her commitment to realism, when coupled with the assertion that life is pointless, suggests that her 'good art' must be dark, and perhaps even hopeless.

Still, there are valuable insights to be gleaned from her work. She opposes moral skepticism and relativism, while also echoing some of Plato's good ideas for a post-modern readership. This makes her work an interesting and thought-provoking read, despite its challenges.

This book is rather disappointing.

Murdoch's writing in this work is rather incoherent and lacks a high degree of logic. There is an abundance of verbiage, along with spurious analogies and what can only be described as atheistic theology.

It seems that her true strength lies in being a novelist. Perhaps she should have stuck to that genre, as her skills in creating engaging fictional worlds and characters are far more evident than in this particular piece of writing.

The lack of clarity and the presence of these rather strange elements make it a less than satisfying read for those expecting a well-structured and intellectually stimulating work.

Overall, it is a book that fails to live up to expectations and leaves the reader with a sense of disappointment.