La segunda parte del contraste de la sociedad abierta contra los pensadores colectivistas, en este caso una crítica contundente a las ideas que surgieron de Hegel y Marx quienes tuvieron fuerte influencia platónica (el cual hace una crítica en la primera parte). Es algo pesado pero tiene bastante discusión epistemológica y tal vez podría servir de referencia para los estudiantes del mainstream de economía que suelen caer en un cientifismo similar al que proponía Marx y los socialistas científicos basados enteramente en el marxismo.
Nachdem sich Popper in Band 1 an Platon abgearbeitet hat, behandelt er hier Hegel und Marx und kommt zu seinem Schlussurteil über den Historizismus an sich. Dabei fließt deutlich seine persönliche Haltung ein, seine Argumentation bleibt aber weitgehend stringent und sachlich. An der ein oder anderen Stelle hätte ich mir etwas ausführlichere Erläuterungen gewünscht. Insgesamt aber ein eindrucksvolles Plädoyer für die Gleichwertigkeit jedes Menschen und die Kraft der Vernunft als gemeinsame Grundlage.
Εισαγωγή με κριτική στον Χέγκελ και τη μοναρχική οπτική του πάνω στο πανούργο εν. Απαξίωση του ανωτέρω λόγω της υπεράσπισης του προς τα πρωτεία του λόγου (αφανούς/geist/πρώτη νεοπλατωνική απορροή). Συμπαθής διατριβή πάνω στον Μαρξ, τον οποίο αναγνωρίζει ως σημαντικό κοινωνιολόγο , αλλά αντιτίθεται στην ουτοπία του η οποία στερείται ερείσματος με βαρύτητα. Περιγραφή των επιχειρημάτων τους από μια παλαιοφιλελευθερη γνώμη (J.S. Mill) η οποία όμως έγινε ειδως των προβλημάτων του φιλελευθερισμού στον χρόνο. Αντιμεσσιανισμος και αναγνώριση της αδυναμίας του ανθρώπινου να πραγματώσει την μεγα- ουτοπία ( αντ'αυτου πρόταση προς piecemeal εμπειρικές αλλαγές στο κοινωνιοοικονομικο). Κριτική και στον καπιταλισμό ως το χρονικό όριο που τον γνώρισε. Καλο ανάγνωσμα για οποίον είναι αντιδογματικος και δεν κοιτάει τη διάρκεια μας ως μαγεία πάνω στη γη και μπορώ να πω ότι στις τελικές σελίδες είναι μια ρεαλιστική αφύπνιση που υμνεί τον πραγματισμό. Καλές οι πηγές του και η χρήση των για να τεκμηριώσει γνώμη και να την παρουσιάσει χωρίς να βιάζει την αποδοχή της σε κανένα απόσπασμα
I didn't enjoy part two as much as the first volume. I haven't read enough Marx to fully understand the thrust of that portion of the argument and can't really respond to it. Popper does admit that Marx was a good person and was successful in improving the lot of the general worker, maybe more than any other person. This doesn't stop Popper from linking Marx with fascism.
Popper's critique of Hegel is the same as Schopenhauer's. Essentially that Hegel is a boot-licking faux philosopher that writes gibberish and is a proponent of absolute power. It's true that Hegel is a terrible writer, but so is Kant. Although that detracts from the ease of access to his philosophy, it doesn't detract from the message. Hegel was clearly in favor of reforming the absolute monarchy and in favor of the French Revolution. Even his haircut was styled after his hero Napoleon! Popper is right to critique the Philosophy of Nature, it's a terrible book, although I wonder if the science was really out of touch with German academia at the time. Popper doesn't get Hegel's dialectic and doesn't seem to think it's important to understanding Hegel. Thesis/antithesis/synthesis is an over simplification.
Popper simplesmente pegou nas noções de politica que eu tinha, baralhou e voltou a dar de uma maneira completamente nova. A diferença está nas pequenas coisas e Popper leva tudo ao extremo ao mostrar e apontar os erros de dois dos mais influentes pensadores do século 20.
I would commend this book. I don't follow him in every direction, but I think his critique of historicism, socialism is damning. The first volume is better than the second.
On a stylistic note, for a philosopher, he is quite lucid and often very funny. His stuff on Hegel had me chuckling.
Really enjoyed this book. It is a fun read. Never seen someone hate Hegel as much as Popper, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and the colourful language they use gives this book great personality. Popper continues to give great critiques, but since my understanding of Hegel and Marx is limited, I'm relying partly on the faith of his research and reflection.
I do disagree with his focus on rationality and impartiality (though he is much more nuanced), because people are more than rational, individual beings. My point is not that rationality isn't important, but rather, I think that Popper seems so uncritical about the good of rationality and individualism (and against collective action) because of his positionality of being a white man in Europe. I want to be careful about how I say this. I think that these arguments benefit the established structure, and limit the acceptance of a plurality of perspectives. That the reason he can feel so liberated in individuality is because he is part of dominant society, and maybe has less to worry about when it comes to identity and one's place in the world.
But again, Popper is so much more nuanced (and I might also be reading his words in a way he didn't intend). Popper genuinely cares and worries about a free and open society, so I have no doubt that he would have a good answer for my concern. I think he is a great advocate of piecemeal democracy. His discussion on the Paradox of Freedom was interesting.
After the 2016 American election, I'm not sure whether rationality by itself is the key. A balance needs to be struck, and I lean more towards emotion and historical context. However, he has convinced me about the underlying flaws of historicism .
I also have to note that Popper often says "He" when talking about philosophers and rationalists, which can understandably affect one's enjoyment of the book. He also describes America as a great democratic, non-colonial state, which speaks to a questionable judgement because America is the definition of a colonial state.
Критика робіт Гегеля була для мене пізнавальною, а от критика Маркса доволі слабка, бо Поппер не економіст. Критику Маркса краще читати у Гаєка, Мізеса та інших авторів австрійської економічної школи. Хоча Поппер мені подобається, мушу визнати, що він не завжди був переконливим у своїх аргументах і багато в чому помилявся (про його помилки я написала у відгуку на перший том).