Straight up philosophical musing about the nature of BS, without a trace of irony or snark. This was a brief essay, made into a smart little hardback pocket book for some inexplicable reason. Harry argues that those who simply do not care about the truth, and are most practiced in this art, are able to turn it to their advantage (this is in vogue today, ala George Santos and a former president creating a new world out of the lust of their hearts). Outright lying is rare, argues Frankfort, since it carries risk of exposure and humiliation. But the BS master runs amuck, confident and free. Lord, please let this pass, turn the hearts of your people to a love for truth. A friend at work gave me this tiny tome, which had the pleasant unintended outcome of assisting my annual reading goal after a slow start this year.

Sometimes a great way to learn how to philosophize is just to see it done. In this short monograph, talented philosopher, Harry Frankfurt, analyzes the concept of "bullshit" (B.S.). What do we mean, precisely, when we say of something that it is B.S.? Or that someone is a B.S.er? Frankfurt takes on this task and produces a fine piece of philosophy, with some helpful points along the way.

Frankfurt claims that the essence of B.S. is a lack of connection with truth, an indifference to how things really are. It's not so much as presenting falsehoods as it is presenting something phony. The B.S.er is faking things. There's a difference between B.S.ing and lying. A liar at least is concerned with the truth enough to know that he needs or wants to misrepresent it. The B.S.er just says a bunch of "shit." And "shit" is matter which everything nutritious as been removed. The death of health and nutrients.

Lies misrepresent a state of affairs or the beliefs of the speaker concerning the state of affairs. The liar cares about the facts. The B.S.er doesn't. He just means to deceive us as to what he is up to. He misrepresents what he is up to - someone concerned with the way things are. The liar hides the fact that he is lying, the B.S.er that he cares about truth. Thus the B.S.er is neither on the side of truth or error. His eyes are not on the facts, at all.

By virtue of this, says Frankfurt, the B.S.er is a greater enemy of the truth than the liar. Thus B.S.ing, which is popular and prevalent in our society, involves a retreat from correctness (which the liar cares enough about to hid, and the honest man cares enough about to get right and promulgate) to a different sort of discipline - sincerity. Rather than trying to represent the world correctly, he turns toward himself. But why think we can know ourselves all that well? Facts about ourselves are not often resistant to skeptical dissolution. I could only think of God's words in Jeremiah: "The heart is wicked and deceitful above all else, who can know it?" Thus Frankfurt finds that sincerity, as espoused in an anti-realist, post-modern context, is itself bullshit.

Frankfurt's book makes for spring boarding into some interesting debate and discussion - something Frankfurt is known for doing (e.g., Frankfurt-style counterexamples to ought implies can do otherwise). Indeed, his little book spawned "Bullshit and Philosophy," a book with many articles on the concept and nature of B.S. by professional philosophers (which I have yet to read all the way through).

Some people (even reviewers here) have called Frankfurt's book a book of B.S. on B.S. But I don't think so. At least not as Frankfurt defines it. Frankfurt is obviously concerned with the truth. And it is doubtful that a B.S.er would give away his trade secrets. Artists don't give away their tricks, so why think that a B.S. artist would?

But the book isn’t without its problems. For example, Frankfurt relays a story about when one of Wittgenstein's friends was in the hospital. Wittgenstein called her to see how she was doing and she told Ludwig that she felt "just like a dog that has been run over." Wittgenstein "was disgusted" and replied, "You don't know what a dog that has been run over feels like." After some analysis, Frankfurt says that Wittgenstein is calling bullshit on his friend, Fania Pascal. But later, Frankfurt describes B.S. as "hot air." Of course he explains what he means by this, but if he wasn't B.S.ing us here, it's hard to see how Pascal was without some special pleading or ad hocery. Frankfurt used a metaphor. Hot air is vaporous and empty just like B.S. speech is. But Pascal's statement was metaphorical as well. And Wittgenstein's obsession with not allowing "language to go on holiday" (and his a-holeish demeanor in general), is what prompted his "caring" remark to his hospitalized friend. (Of course she should have told him that he was not playing in her language game and was trying to impose his rules on to incommensurable systems of speech.)No doubt Frankfurt's use of "hot air" would merit Wittgenstein's disrepute.

Overall, I thought this was an excellent little book. It's small in size and comes in at 67 pages. So its easily read in less than an hour. I recommend it for those who want to see how philosophers go about doing (part of) their job - analyzing claims and making them clear so that we can properly debate and discuss them, if we need to at all after the vagueness and ambiguities have been removed. Frankfurt takes a good first step towards analyzing the concept of B.S. No doubt more work could be done.

اول اینکه ترجمه‌ی کتاب اصلا خوب نیست، مترجم با تمام وجود سعی کرده که سواد ادبی خودش را به رخ خواننده بکشه و همین باعث میشه که قسمت ترجمه کتاب خیلی سخت‌خوان و در برخی قسمت‌ها نافهم بشه. اما به همان اندازه جستار آقای ملکیان بسیار روان و خواندنی بود.
برای من خیلی جالب بود که یک نفر انقدر دقیق و به صورت جامع و کامل مزخرفات روزمره (که در حال حاضر به لطف شبکه‌های اجتماعی هر روز هم شایع‌تر میشه) که هر روز مردم و مقامات در حال گفتنش هستند را بررسی کنه. ولی به نظرم کتاب میتونست خیلی کمتر و در حد یک مقاله‌‌ی ۲۰ صفحه‌ای ارائه بشه. چون بعضی از قسمت‌ها به سمت گزافه‌گویی و توضیح بدیهیات رفته بود.
تعریف حرف مفت در کنار راست و دروغ و این نکته که حرف مفت می‌تواند به مراتب از دروغ گفتن خطرناک‌تر باشه برای من قابل تامل و جذاب بود. حین خواندن کتاب به حرف‌های روزمره خودم و حرف‌هایی که دیگران می‌زدند از حیث حرف مفت بیشتر توجه کردم و حیرت زده شدم از حجم حرف مفتی که می‌زنم و می‌زنند.
خلاصه که کتاب ارزش خواندن را حتما داره، حداقل از این نظر که ما را با تعریف حرف مفت و پروپاگاندای فردی و جمعی آشنا می‌کنه.
و اینکه تا بیشتر از این حرف مفت نزدم ، سخن را کوتاه کنم.

”When an honest man speaks, he says only what he believes to be true; and for the liar, it is correspondingly indispensable that he considers his statements to be false. For the bullshitter, however, all these bets are off: he is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.”

3, 5.

Toți știm ce înseamnă expresia „a mînca rahat”. Și toți am mîncat măcar o dată în viață rahat. Dar, dintre muritori, cei mai mari mîncători de rahat sînt, firește, politicienii și filosofii. Aburitorii...

Volumul cuprinde două articole ceva mai lungi semnate de filosoful analitic Harry G. Frankfurt în 2005 și 2006: On Bullshit și On Truth. Ne-am deprins să scoatem vorbe. Vremea noastră se remarcă printr-o creștere masivă a acestui fel de ocupație. E timpul flecărelii. Vrînd-nevrînd (dar mai mult vrînd), o practicăm toți. Vorbim ca să vorbim, vorbim ca să flatăm, vorbim ca să impresionăm, ca să luăm ochii vulgului profan (asta e, desigur, o formă de impostură), vorbim pentru că trebuie să spunem ceva, orice (la un examen, la o adunare politică, la o sindrofie, la un parastas etc.). Nu contează relația discursului nostru cu adevărul. De fiecare dată vrem să-i convingem pe ceilalți (fraierii), să-i luminăm, să-i aducem pe calea ortodoxiei, să-i determinăm să vadă în noi niște Făclii, niște Vizionari.

Traducătorul n-a echivalat termenul „bullshit”, dintr-o pricină simplă: nu poate fi tradus printr-un singur cuvînt. Îl explică într-o notă: „Rahat, porcărie, fandoseală, insolență, prostii, absurdități, minciuni”. Cîteva fraze din primul articol, On Bullshit:

„O persoană poate să mintă chiar și dacă afirmația pe care o face este adevărată, cîtă vreme este incorectă și are intenția să inducă în eroare” (De tot rahatul, p.10).

„Domeniul reclamei și domeniul relațiilor cu publicul, la fel ca și tărîmul politicii, strîns înrudit cu ele în zilele noastre, sînt saturate de bullshit” (De tot rahatul, p.20).

„Bullshit-ul nu trebuie neapărat să fie ceva fals, diferă de minciuni prin intenția lui de denaturare” (De tot rahatul, p.42).

„Bullshit-ul este de neocolit în situația cînd o persoană e nevoită să vorbească despre un subiect de care nu are habar” (De tot rahatul, p.48).

On first reading, this book/essay is enormously compelling and entertaining. But subsequent readings raise serious worries about Frankfurt's account. For example:

On Frankfurt's account, there are two necessary conditions for something to count as bullshit:

(1) The speaker must be indifferent to the truth of what he says.
(2) He must intend to deceive his audience about his indifference to the truth of what he says.

Who would count as such a producer of bullshit? Maybe the Fourth of July Orator who makes a bunch of patriotic claims which he doesn't care are true or false, and who aims to convince his audience of patriots that he actually believes. But that seems like a special case. Many other kinds of things we would intuitively call "bullshit" don't have those features.

Even Frankfurt's example involving Wittgenstein and Fania Pascal lacks one of these two features: Pascal does not, in any obvious sense, intend to deceive Wittgenstein about her indifference to the truth of what she says ("I feel just like a dog that has been run over").

Moreover, it is unclear why Frankfurt thinks that the bullshitter is a greater enemy of truth than the liar, as he famously claims. He may be indifferent to the truth of what he says, but he clearly cares about giving his audience false beliefs about his own attitudes. So he isn't completely indifferent to the truth.

*******
Re-reading February 2022

I teach this pretty frequently, and I think I can say better now what I think Frankfurt gets wrong about the description of the Fania Pascal/Wittgenstein exchange as an example of bullshit. Not only does Pascal not intend to deceive Wittgenstein about her alleged indifference to the truth, but she also isn't indifferent to the truth of what she says. She does know how a dog feels when it is run over, namely *really bad*. The reason Wittgenstein is annoyed by her expression is that it isn't the most apt description of how she feels—I think Wittgenstein thinks there are more precise ways of saying how she feels. The "dead dog" anecdote occurs in the context of Pascal remembering other expressions of precision from Wittgenstein:

"Francis told me that Wittgenstein would devote hours to shaving off tiny slivers from the small photos he took before he would be satisfied with some kind of balance achieved. Certainly when he gave me my copies they were much reduced from the original size; one was now smaller than an inch square. During the Spanish Civil War Wittgenstein, seeing in our room an enlarged photograph of John Cornford, who had just been killed in Spain, sniffed: 'They think you can just enlarge a photo. Now look. It's all trousers.' I looked, and of course, he was right." (Recollections of Wittgenstein, p.28)

Wittgenstein appears upset not by indifference to the truth of what she says, but by her choosing a sloppy analogy.

Just no. Philosophical.... well..... bullshit.

The title is no irony, it's what it says it is. BS. It's one long mental wank lecture by a college professor of the word and its meanings in every possible boring, mildly-interesting, wow, I didn't know that, kind of way. It's intellectual humour done not to amuse an audience as its first aim but because the professor is amusing himself that he can do this sort of thing, and well.

All this sounds like I didn't enjoy it, but you know when it comes to stars I'm wavering between 1.5 and a 4.5, I can't decide. You can read the paragraph above in a slightly negative tone of voice and then it also reads in an ironic kind of way that I kind of admire the professor and had also quite enjoyed both his work and why he did it. I just can't decide so three stars it is.

"Our natures are, indeed, elusively insubstantial-notoriously less stable and less inherent than the natures of other things. And insofar as this is the case, sincerity itself is bullshit."

This is how the work ends :)

"When we characterize talk as hot air, we mean that what comes out of the speaker’s mouth is only that. It is mere vapor. His speech is empty, without substance or content. His use of language, accordingly, does not contribute to the purpose it purports to serve. No more information is communicated than if the speaker had merely exhaled. There are similarities between hot air and excrement, incidentally, which make hot air seem an especially suitable equivalent for bullshit."

In this very short work, perhaps essay, Frankfurt makes concise and believable distinctions between concepts that many people think to be interchangeable (ie. Lying, humbug, bluffing, joshing in regards to bullshit). An enjoyable and thoughtful read for people who tend to break down certain expressions (such as me) and wonder where the hell said expressions originated. Recommended.

ছোট্টো বই, সব মিলায়ে প্রলয়ঙ্করী কোনো সিদ্ধান্তে পৌছায় না, তবে গুল বা চাপা, বা আরো সত্যের কাছাকাছি গিয়ে বললে, ধাপ্পা যে বিষয়টা আছে, তার উপর বেশ এক হাত নিয়ে নিছেন লেখক।

একটার পর একটা উদাহরণ টানছেন, মিথ্যা আর ধাপ্পার পার্থক্য টানতে গিয়ে, কী কী কারণে ধাপ্পা দেয়া যায় থেকে শুরু করে, অভিধান আর ব্যক্তি ভিটগেনস্টাইনে চলে গেছেন, উদাহরণ টানতে সাথে নিয়েছেন এজরা-পাউন্ড সেইন্ট-অগাস্টিনদের - সব মিলায়ে, এই বইটা শেষে একটা প্রলয়ঙ্করী না হইলেও অদ্ভূত সিদ্ধান্তে গিয়ে পৌছায়, সততা বাস্তবতা আর ঐ যারে বলে সিনসিয়ারিটি, সেই বিষয়ে - ষোলো পাতার বই, চাই কি আজই পড়তে পারেন।

কিন্তু এই বইটারে শেষে, নয়দিন পরে এসে একটা প্রকাণ্ড ধাপ্পা মনে হচ্ছে, ধাপ্পা, লেখকের বুলশিটের সংজ্ঞায়ন মোতাবেক নয়, এক বিন্দুও অসত্য লিখেন নাই তিনি, কিন্তু একরকম ধাপ্পাই, খুব একটা জাহিরীয়ানা হয়ে গেলো, একজন জ্ঞানী লোক যখন নেমে আসেন শস্তা মাটিতে - কিন্তু বইটা ভালোও, এইসব লোকেরা মাঝে মাঝে ছয়শো পাতার অভিসন্দর্ভ বাদ দিয়ে এসব চটি লিখলে ভালোই লাগে, কী সুন্দর পড়েও ফেলা যায় দ্রুত।

I read this piece to get further elaboration on the meaning of bullshit that has been used by Mohd. Affandi Hassan in his work, "Pandirisme dalam Komuniti Dunia", where he criticises the Malay literature particularly the modern one which "lack concern to the truth and reality".

Harry Frankfurt in this essay adds that those who do the bullshit is the one who does not care whether things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.

The real lie according to St. Augustine is the lie which is told solely for the pleasure of lying and deceiving.

Thus, Frankfurt adds, the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person's obligations opportunities to speak about some topic are more excessive than his knowledge of the facts that are relevant to that topic. They speak extensively about matters of which they are to some degree ignorant.

What is worse is that they deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are. And the notion of "democratisation of opinions about everything" just exacerbated the condition.

That is why in the Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad SAW said it is better to remain silence if we can't say good words.
( من كان يؤمنُ بالله واليوم الآخِر فلْيَقُلْ خيرا أو لِيَصْمُت)

Even we need to refer something to the one who knows better than us or in the other word – to put the authority in its position.
(فاسئلوٓا أهل الذكرِ إن كنتم لا تعلمون)