The most 2005 book to ever exist, despite having its origins in the '80s. Farts around on the fence between intellectual and crude (he quotes Wittgenstein -- but also cusses! lol) but doesn't really say anything. Ends with "sincerity itself is bullshit," which is some pure mid-aughts BS of its own.

Read to get off my shelf, as I'm not sure why I had it in the first place.

Kant said that Hume had awoken him from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’. “Bullshit” managed to put me to sleep. One expects so much from such a well-known philosopher like Frankfurt, but this is so dry and uninspiring. Somewhere along the road, we have to start realizing that having clarity of thought and excellent reasoning powers do not necessarily mean that you are saying something important or meaningful. The best thing about the book was that it’s only 67 pages long. The worst thing was that I had to pay for it.

Yeah, Harry. Then there's opportunistic bullshit like this "book". I've read issues of the Reader's Digest with more intellectual heft than this dismal effort.

42 großzügig bedruckte Taschenbuchseiten zur Definition von Bullshit - irgendwie war ich mir sicher, dass hierbei noch genügend Raum bliebe für amüsante und/oder satirische Betrachtungen darüber, wann und wo überall Sprüche abgelassen würden, die als Bullshit zu betrachten wären.
Doch weit gefehlt. Dieses Büchlein ist eine durch und durch ernsthafte linguistische und philosophische Abhandlung über den Begriff Bullshit, wobei alleine die ersten 12 Seiten dazu dienen, die Abgrenzung zu Humbug festzulegen.Weiterhin wird die Herkunft wie auch die Verwandtschaft ähnlich klingender Worte analysiert, was ihn von der Lüge unterscheidet und so weiter und so weiter.
Für Linguisten mag dies durchaus geeignet sein ihren Wissensdurst zu stillen, für Anna und Otto Normalo (zu denen ich mich auch zähle) findet sich jedoch nur recht wenig wirklich Interessantes. So bin ich nun ein bisschen schlauer geworden, unterhalten habe ich mich dabei aber nicht.

Brief (67 small pages) analysis by a professor of philosophy regarding what is meant by the title term. It was funny (to me) to consider the range of terms (e.g., hot air, hogwash, balderdash, drivel, and one I hadn't come across before, "imposture") resembling "bullshit", but most of the discussion is given over to differentiating BS (indifference to the truth of what you are saying, phoniness) from lying (intentional misrepresentation, which is necessarily false). Wraps it up with the surprising claim that "sincerity itself is bullshit", based on the premise that we don't really know the truth about ourselves, and that truth is unstable anyhow, so purporting to be sincere [to be telling the truth about oneself) shows callous indifference for the truth.

At the risk of sounding like one of my own students casually dismissing my carefully constructed research or argument, I'm not sure I buy that last part. Seems as if there's at least an important difference in degree between perhaps-misguided but sincere commentary and garden-variety BS.

Overall, an interesting topic to take on, but given the topic I was surprised how little contact he made with ordinary conversation, examples of BS from public figures, etc. Seems as if it would be a subject on which at least your examples/anecdotes could be quite accessible. Instead, there's a lengthy dissection of an incident involving Wittgenstein taking someone to task for saying (when very sick) that she felt like a dog who'd been run over. Apparently, W. called BS on the grounds that she couldn't possibly know what a dog who had been run over feels like.

Ummmmmmm, besides revealing Wittgenstein as a little lacking in social skills, I can't really see the woman's comment as a prototype of bullshit worthy of being highlighted here.

On Bullshit is Bullshit

The author essentially tries to do two things: define "bullshit" and compare bullshit to lying. He doesn't do either particularly well. There's no real insight here, and it's not written in a particularly engaging way. This little book made the New York Times Bestseller List, despite having nothing to say. I can't help but think the author bullshitted us.

Fun little philosophical investigation on what bullshit is. I imagine Frankfurt had fun writing this one.

The author, as an analytic philosopher, distinguishes between bullshit and lies. He holds that telling lies presupposes knowing what is false and what is true. In other words, the liar is cognizant of what he is hiding, namely the truth. On the other hand, bullshit is characterized by a lack of concern or respect for truth. The bullshitter does not care whether what he/she is saying is true or false. Truth or falsity is of no importance for him/her. This lack of care for truth, the author argues, is a greater enemy of truth than lies.

It seems to me what constitutes bullshit is an instrumental use of language in the attempt to get what you want or get rid of what you don't like without paying attention to the truth or falsity of what you say. Suppose that somebody's behavior is annoying you. Then you use whatever words that come to your mind to stop him. Here the truth or falsity of your words is of no import to you. What matters instead is to get what you want. Another example is advertisement which is, in many ways, bullshit par excellence. The aim of the advertiser is to convince other people to buy what he/she is advertising. What he/she says doesn't necessarily need to be false. But it is still bullshit because there is no concern for truth.

Given the ubiquity of bullshit in our world, it seems we ought to have a thorough understanding of it. This, in part, requires giving primacy to truth as the highest value. This is why I'm going to read Harry Frankfurt's book "On Truth."

On Bullshit

حرف مفت چیه؟ چه فرقی با دروغ داره؟ کسی که چرند می‌گه با کسی که دروغ می‌گه، کسی که لاف می‌زنه و کسی که شیادی می‌کنه چیه؟
فرانکفورت با اسنفاده از فرهنگ انگلیسی استنفورد، داستانی از ویتگنشتاین، کتاب شیوع شیادی و ... سعی می‌کنه دید ما رو به حرف مفت روشن کنه. کسی که حرف مفت می‌زنه، در هر حال مشغول نادرست‌نمایی عقاید خودش‌ در مقابل شنوندگان هست اما تفاوتی که با دروغ‌گویی داره، و این تفاوت ذات حرف مفت رو تعیین می‌کنه: «هسته اصلی تمایز میان او و دروغ‌گو این است. او و دروغ‌گو، هر دو، جد و جهدشان در ارتباط با حقیقت است. اما امری که دروغ‌گو درباره‌ی خودش پنهان می‌کند این است که در تلاش است تا ما را از درک درست واقعیت دور کند؛ قرار نیست ما بدانیم که او می‌خواهد معتقد شویم به چیزی که خود کاذب‌ش می‌داند. از سوی دیگر، امری که حرف‌مفت‌زن درباره‌ی خودش پنهان می‌کند این است که ارزش صدق گزاره‌هایی که بیان می‌کند در مرکز توجه‌ش قرار ندارد؛ آن چه قرار نیست ما بفهمیم این است که قصد او نه گزارش‌کردن حقیقت است و نه کتمان کردن آن.» بنابراین حرف‌مفت زن با توجه به مقصودی که داره (مثلا تظاهر)، گزاره‌ها رو بدونِ توجه به صدق و کذب‌شون انتخاب می‌کنه و یا تغییر می‌ده.
مورد بعدی که حرف‌مفت‌زدن رو میشه مقایسه کرد با اون، لاف‌زدن‌ه. « به خلاف دروغ‌گویی محض، در لاف‌زنی بیشتر نه کاذب بودن، که ساختگی بودن مطرح است.» و ایت شباهت‌ لاف زدن به حرف مفت زدن‌ه: «زیرا ذات حرف مفت این نیست که کاذب باشد، بل این است که چرت باشد.»
در دو سه آخر هم، بحثی رو شروع می‌کنه درمورد این‌که چرا حرف مفت زیاده؟ و «اشکال متنوع شکاکیتی که امکان هرگونه دسترسی قابل اعتماد ما به واقعیت عینی را انکار می‌کند» رو به عنوان یکی از جواب‌های این سوال مقداری توضیح می‌ده، هرچند کافی نیست و به‌نظر اثبات این ادله نیاز به مقاله‌ای جدا داره؛ چون به نتیجه عجیب‌غریبی می‌رسه که می‌گه «سرشت‌های ما، درواقع، قوام دست‌یافتنی‌ای ندارند و ، آشکارا، کمتر از سرشت‌های سایر چیز‌ها ثبات و ذات دارند. و تا آن‌جا که وضع از این قرار باشد، خود صداقت نیز حرف مفت است.»
مقاله جالبی بود، مخصوصا بخاطر توضیح کلمات رایجی که در این موارد استفاده می‌شه و به شخصه موشکافی‌هایی این چنینی رو دوست دارم.

ترجمه قابل قبول است.
جستار مصطفی ملکیان مفید اما بخش اول جستار زائد است.
ویراستاری درستی ندارد
صداقت از دنباله‌دارترین مفاهیم طرح شده در کتاب است که نه معادل‌اش پانویس شده و نه در نمایه آخر کتاب آمده.
Sincerity
کلی بحث و مقاله در مورد نظر عجیب فرانکفورت پیرامون صداقت پیدا می‌کنید
اون جایی که میگه:
صداقت هم حرف مفت است

An important little read, Harry G. Frankfurt’s essay, On Bullshit, establishes a theoretical framework for examining bullshit. What is bullshit? Why is there so much of it? What circumstances might proliferate bullshit on a societal scale, but also within our personal relationships? These are the central questions with which this book examines.

Chillingly, Frankfurt outlines the differences between liars and bullshitters. Lying, oddly enough, maintains a concern with the truth; bullshit, however, is wholly unconcerned with fact, by nature. Part of the insidious nature of bullshit is that it really does not hold a conviction to reality, so much as it is connected to the character of the bullshitter themselves.

“Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about.” In that quote, Frankfurt illustrates the amorphous nature of bullshit; how it exists rampant in our political system, and even in the banality of our everyday interactions.

This book makes me want to do better; to be more conscious in how I respond and engage in conversation. It is okay to not know and to not have an opinion on everything; we are finite beings and we need to be okay with simply not knowing. Moreover, being aware of the fact that we cannot be knowledgeable of everything, can and should push us to grow, so that we might continue to expand our ability to communicate effectively and truthfully.

On Bullshit (Sobre a Treta) é um pequeno livro de 2005 baseado num ensaio de 1986. Em 1986 o presidente dos EUA era Ronald Reagan, em 2005 era George W. Bush, eu ouvi falar do livro pela primeira vez em 2018, quando Trump era presidente dos EUA. Este enquadramento serve para perceber que o livro se foca no estudo da comunicação pública, nomeadamente de figuras com autoridade, apesar de não serem mencionadas no livro.

"Why is there so much bullshit? (...) There is more communication of all kinds in our time than ever before (...) Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about. Thus the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person’s obligations or opportunities to speak about some topic are more excessive than his knowledge of the facts that are relevant to that topic."

Frankfurt procura assim racionalizar e teorizar o modo de comunicar assente na treta, apresentando-o como variação da mentira, segundo Frankfurt bastante mais perniciosa:

“Someone who lies and someone who tells the truth are playing on opposite sides, so to speak, in the same game. Each responds to the facts as he understands them, although the response of the one is guided by the authority of the truth, while the response of the other defies that authority and refuses to meet its demands. The bullshitter ignores these demands altogether. He does not reject the authority of the truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to it. He pays no attention to it at all. By virtue of this, bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”

Frankfurt qualifica a mentira como uma racionalização da realidade, um trabalho intelectual, enquanto a treta se define, a partir da criatividade e invenção, num trabalho artístico. Diria, seguindo este pressuposto, que a diferença contrasta o retórico e o entertainer.

“Telling a lie is an act with a sharp focus. It is designed to insert a particular falsehood at a particular point in a set or system of beliefs, in order to have that point occupied by the truth. This requires a degree of craftsmanship, in which the teller of the lie submits to objective constraints imposed by what he takes to be the truth. The liar is inescapably concerned with truth-values. In order to invent a lie at all, he must think he knows what is true. And in order to invent an effective lie, he must design his falsehood under the guidance of that truth.
On the other hand, a person who takes to bullshit his way through has much more freedom. His focus is panoramic rather than particular. He does not limit himself to inserting a certain falsehood at a specific point, and thus he is not constrained by the truths surrounding that point or intersecting it. He is prepared, so far as is required, to fake the context as well. This freedom from the constraints to which the liar must submit does not necessarily mean, of course, that his task is easier than the task of the liar. But the mode of creativity upon which it relies is less analytical and less deliberative than that which is mobilized in lying. It is more expansive and independent, with more spacious opportunities for improvisation, color and imaginative play. This is less a matter of craft than of art. Hence the familiar notion of the 'bullshit artist'.”

Publicado no VI: https://virtual-illusion.blogspot.com...