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I wasn't really paying attention, but it didn't blow me away
189 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1,2000
"The answer to the question ‘What is happiness?’ [in Aristotle’s Ethics] is that it is a ‘something’ that lies outside the ethical life itself. Now the point of the ethical life is to get outside it. And given that contemplation is praised for being the most solitary and ultimate self-sufficient human activity, it is hard to resist the conclusion that, for Aristotle, the fundamental good of ethics is to get as far away from your neighbors as possible. The less you have to do with them the better! Even in the midst of ethical life, its real value, when correctly understood, is that someday it will allow you to get away from it.
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According to Aristotle, the goal of all human striving is happiness; according to Freud, ‘the aim of all life is death.’ In each case, as we have seen, there is something disruptive to the system, something which the system cannot itself contain. The mistake would be to think that our task is to think of another principle that would at last capture this leftover. That would be to engage in a repetition. For it is precisely the invocation of a principle that allows the formation of a conception of a ‘beyond.’ ... So if there is such a thing as ‘living life without remainder,’ it is likely that it will be achieved not by finally finding a principle which captures that remainder, but by finding acceptable ways of living without a principle." (pp. 53, 106)
"By now it should be clear that there are certain structural similarities between Aristotle’s treatment of happiness and Freud’s treatment of death. Happiness and death are each invoked as the purported aim of all striving. Aristotle and Freud’s project is to grasp the totality — to say what all human striving is a striving toward. The assumption is that nothing gets left out, that a teleological organized system will explain what is important about human existence. Now each thinker, in the very activity of describing human directedness, realizes that there is something important outside of that directedness. But he tries to capture that outside in teleological terms. Aristotle begins by setting happiness as a constituent end of ethical life, but he concludes that the deepest understanding of ethical life must see it as pointing beyond itself. Thus he is led to formulate two grades of happiness: the second-rate happiness of the ethical life, and the first-rate happiness of the life that is oriented toward contemplation. It is important for Aristotle that contemplation is a higher form of activity, but from our point of view the important feature is that ethical life is directed toward a form of existence that lies outside the ethical and is in itself totally impractical. Freud begins by thinking he can capture all human striving (conscious and unconscious) in terms of the pleasure principle and its variant, the reality principle. But he too comes to realize that much of human existence lies beyond (or before) such striving: in particular, the activities of installing the various capacities to be directed and primitive attacks upon those capacities. He himself tries to install the death drive as a more general principle which will both capture the strivings of the pleasure principle and give a conceptual framework in which the ‘beyond’ of the pleasure principle can itself be seen as a bizarre sort of striving on its own. Each in his own way sees a ‘beyond’ of teleology; each in his own way is reluctant to leave teleology behind." (pp. 98-99)
"And while it looks on the surface that ‘happiness’ is a profound organizing principle for human life, just under the surface we begin to see that its injection into life has a profoundly disturbing effect. For although it was originally deployed to show that the ethical life was a happy one, by encouraging us to think about the value of our lives taken as a whole Aristotle creates the conditions in which it is possible to formulate the fantasy of real happiness lying just outside. In this way, ‘happiness’ creates its own discontent. Now, Aristotle is too deep and honest a thinker simply to ignore this pressure, and he tries to contain it within the overall framework of his teleological system. But, as I think I have shown, it just doesn’t work. The teleological system cannot contain the expression of discontent and breaking-out which it itself generates. The question then becomes: How should we understand this discontent?" (p. 60)