Kripke's work delves deep into Wittgenstein's complex ideas.

He centers on explicating Wittgenstein's paradox of rule-following, which he deems the core problem in the Philosophical Investigations and the starting point for the argument against private language.

Kripke contends that Wittgenstein uncovers a novel form of philosophical skepticism that diverges radically from past skepticisms.

While Descartes and Hume question the validity of our knowledge, Wittgenstein probes whether there is any ultimate meaning or truth conditions of knowledge in the first place.

This is the difference between asking "is my belief true?" and "is there any possible truth behind my belief at all?".

Kripke uses an arithmetic example to illustrate the paradox.

With the addition sign (+), how can we be sure that in a specific case, we should add the given numbers?

Relying on past experience where "+" means addition is unreliable as all past experiences are finite and a new case might have unique features requiring a different function.

Moreover, we could have been wrong in using the addition function in all past experiences.

Kripke assesses several attempts to solve this skepticism, such as a dispositional analysis, an argument from simplicity, and an argument from qualia, but shows they all fail to explain why "+" indicates we ought to perform addition.

The skepticism about meaning leads Wittgenstein to develop the "language-game" theory of meaning, breaking from the Tractatus project of identifying truth-conditions.

The paradox of rule-following reveals the impossibility of ultimate, objective meaning for any sign. Instead, we look for assertability conditions.

"Truth" is replaced by appropriateness, relative to a social context.

Wittgenstein's argument against private language is fundamentally an argument against an individual having rules independently of a community.

Kripke concludes with a "postscript" on Wittgenstein's view of the problem of other minds.

Wittgenstein argues that mental states have unique properties preventing generalizing inference from our own mental states to others.

Overall, Kripke's book is clearly written and short, but focuses only on specific aspects of Wittgenstein's work.

It is highly recommended for those interested in Wittgenstein, but one must look elsewhere for explanations of other topics like family resemblances and "forms of life".

Kripke's elementary exposition is truly a delight. However, I have always struggled to understand what, in the skeptic's view, would be considered a justified rule following. Time and again, the case is presented that "nothing I have done can justify the future application of...terms or formulas." But surely Wittgenstein is not asserting a physical impossibility. What, then, is the nature of unjustified rule following? If a logical rather than a physical impossibility is maintained, what would be a justified instance of rule following?

There are a few lines here and there in the text where Kripke states that the skepticism is not about memory. But it seems to be about nothing else. Why else would it not be true that after one has (given oneself a rule), he could know if he were keeping or violating it?

M A G Stocker, in a 1966 paper titled "Memory and Private Language Argument," correctly maintains that Wittgenstein is mistaken to state "...as if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said is true" as analogous to checking one memory via other memories. What we do is more like buying several different papers.
For the so-called skeptic seems to single out private memory judgment from public ones and argues that only the former cannot warrant judgments... and "as every form of fact checking for consistency with past usage must invoke some memory judgment" unless an epistemologically significant difference between the two sorts of memory judgment is presented, the distinction is invalid.
I am not sure if Kripke disagrees with all this. His aim, as the title demonstrates, is to provide an exposition of the nature of the paradox, its analogy with Humean doubt, and the similarity of the skeptical solution in both cases.

This is an excellent book indeed.

It has had a profound impact on me as it led me to develop my dissertation topic.

The content within its pages was so engaging and thought-provoking that it sparked a new idea in my mind.

As I delved deeper into the book, I discovered various aspects that I could explore further for my dissertation.

The author's unique perspective and the way the information was presented provided me with a solid foundation to build upon.

Thanks to this excellent book, I now have a clear direction for my dissertation and am excited to embark on this research journey.

I highly recommend this book to anyone who is looking for inspiration or seeking to expand their knowledge in a particular field.

It truly has the power to open up new avenues of thought and exploration.

You don't have to agree with a single word of this book to enjoy it

(and to be compelled to think about the nature of natural languages). Kripke's style is always to ensure that he leaves no one behind,

and thus one finds oneself thinking 'along with him'. This partly accounts for just how much literature this book has inspired!

Kripke's argument is truly an exposition of Wittgenstein's 'private language argument'.

Whether he gets Wittgenstein right is beside the point. Kripke contends that Wittgenstein proposes a paradox:

just because I am inclined to conform my speech to the rules of speech,

it doesn't necessarily mean that there is any fact about me or the world

by virtue of which I can be justified in believing that the rule I am about to follow

is the correct rule (or the rule that I have been following up to this point).

So, what can justify my assumption that I can mean anything by what I say?

According to Kripke's Wittgenstein, the answer is that we know we obey the rules

by the judgment of the linguistic community in which we speak.

The problem with reading this book is that one will start making extensive purchases of the various responses.

I now begin with Baker and Hacker and then move on to Crispin Wright.

In other words, Kripgenstein can lead to addictive behavior.

I personally think that Kripke didn't fully understand what Wittgenstein was trying to convey. However, who am I to make such a judgment? Wittgenstein's philosophy is notoriously complex and open to multiple interpretations. Kripke, on the other hand, is a highly respected philosopher in his own right. His work on modal logic and the philosophy of language has had a significant impact on the field.

Perhaps my perception that Kripke didn't understand Wittgenstein is based on my own limited understanding of both philosophers. It could also be that Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein is different from mine, but that doesn't necessarily mean he is wrong.

In the end, the relationship between Kripke and Wittgenstein's ideas is a complex and ongoing debate. It is important to approach this topic with an open mind and a willingness to consider different perspectives. Only then can we hope to gain a deeper understanding of the work of these two great philosophers.

This is the first time you want to calculate 57 + 68. It's simple, isn't it? All you need to do is follow the addition rule and get to 125. Then suddenly a skeptic appears and says that instead of plus or +, there is another rule called thlawah that you have been using all along and thlawah is the same as plus for numbers less than 57, but if it is used for numbers greater than or equal to 57, the result should be 5. So the result is 5, not 125.

The philosophical discussion of the book exactly starts with this example, and we can see that the book is not for everyone. It is for someone who has that philosophical skepticism and logical mind.

As always, Kaweh Lajevardi's translation is accurate and with care. Of course, this may make the book a bit difficult to read smoothly, but it clearly indicates what the equivalent English word is for each Persian word where the discussion is precise.

Interesante y novedosa es la lectura de Kripke sobre el seguimiento de reglas, el significado y el lenguaje privado. Sin embargo, Kripke se aleja considerablemente de la posición de Wittgenstein en cuestiones centrales. Por ejemplo, en lo que respecta al lugar de las comunidades lingüísticas, Wittgenstein enfatiza la importancia de la interacción social y la práctica en el desarrollo y uso del lenguaje. Mientras que Kripke parece dar menos importancia a esto y se centra más en la relación individual con las reglas. Además, en cuanto a la normatividad del lenguaje, Wittgenstein cree que el lenguaje está gobernado por normas sociales implícitas. Pero Kripke tiene una perspectiva diferente en este aspecto. También, en lo referente al significado y la imposibilidad de un lenguaje privado, Kripke presenta argumentos que se apartan de los de Wittgenstein. En general, aunque la lectura de Kripke es interesante, es importante tener en cuenta estas diferencias con la posición de Wittgenstein.