Although my initial sensations led me to think that the book mainly pointed to topics in the philosophy of mind, the truth is that the brief passages on the philosophy of mathematics are of considerable richness.

Not only considering the content (sometimes overlooked in Wittgenstein's philosophy), but also the systematicity of the exposition and its connection with various issues.

Taken together, the questions that Kripke poses throughout the text, by themselves, are a sufficient reason to read it carefully.

This work offers a unique perspective on the philosophy of mathematics, delving into aspects that are often not given due attention.

The systematic way in which the ideas are presented allows for a deeper understanding of the subject matter.

Moreover, the connection to other related issues enriches the overall discussion and makes it relevant to a wider range of philosophical inquiries.

Overall, it is a valuable contribution to the field of philosophy and well worth the time and effort to study.

In David Lodge's Changing Places, an interesting game called "humiliation" is played among some English professors. In this game, one mentions works of literature that they haven't read. Points are scored when others have read the book mentioned. One highly competitive professor, in an attempt to win, admits that he hasn't read Hamlet. This earns him a significant number of points. However, all the other professors are so appalled that he fails to obtain tenure.

This book is indeed something that it would be rather embarrassing to admit not having read, especially if one is a professional philosopher, and even more so if one works in areas such as philosophy of mind, language, or anything remotely related to M&E. Therefore, I have managed to avoid some potential embarrassment by finally reading this work from cover to cover. I had never before read the postscript on the problem of other minds.

After this reading, I am much less certain about how to characterize the "skeptical paradox" in part 2, and even less clear about what the "skeptical solution" is supposed to be. What I believe is a common interpretation of the skeptical solution (for instance, as seen in Making it Explicit, chapter 1, note 58), which is a kind of community-wide dispositionalism, is explicitly rejected by Kripke in the page-long final footnote (n.87). He appears to be much closer to the "official" Wittgensteinian view that there can be no justification or explanation for our ordinary talk about meaning and rules. We simply engage in it, and that's okay (even though our claims don't have truth conditions).

I was also struck, during this reading, by the centrality of a particular feature of the mental states that are supposed to constitute the fact that someone is following a rule. Kripke refers to this as a "logical impossibility": (a) our mental states are finite, (b) the rule determines an infinite number of applications, and all of those applications are "in some sense" present in the mental state. It is this "impossibility" that Kripke is most concerned with in part 2. And it hardly helps to resolve this apparent problem by invoking "basic" facts about rule-following or meaning, as many people do (and they believe they are addressing the rule-following paradox).

It can only be described as a journey that takes one down to the very depths of hell, where one expects to encounter the most fearsome and malevolent devil. And yet, to one's utter shock and amazement, it turns out that the devil is none other than oneself. This realization is both true and honest, cutting through all the layers of pretense and self-delusion. It forces one to confront the darkest aspects of one's own nature, the hidden desires and impulses that one has long tried to suppress or deny. It is a humbling and eye-opening experience, one that has the power to change a person forever. It makes one question everything one thought one knew about oneself and the world around them. And yet, in the midst of this turmoil and confusion, there is also a glimmer of hope. For in facing the devil within, one also has the opportunity to exorcise it, to transform oneself and become a better, more authentic person.

One of Wittgenstein's most remarkable strengths was his profound understanding that style and structure could serve as crucial elements of communication, just as significant as sentences and words.

Kripke, on the other hand, also endeavors to achieve clarity, yet he depends on repeated iterations. Even his metaphors, once formulated, he cannot refrain from overanalyzing.

Notwithstanding this, he provides a lucid and in-depth analysis of the rule following paradox, along with numerous digressions on a diverse range of topics. To examine the paradox, he had to extract it from the flow of the Philosophical Investigations, which inevitably caused some damage in the process. He also makes his own contributions. (I suspect Wittgenstein might have been highly confident in the remainder of his work, such that he did not perceive the paradox to be as revolutionary as Kripke does; it is encompassed by his "skeptical solution" and the framework that supports it.)

Neither of these aspects pose problems if one keeps in mind that, as Kripke himself acknowledges, this book is not intended to be a definitive interpretation but rather what "struck" him about the Philosophical Investigations. The accomplishment of this work, aside from any role it may play in contemporary Wittgenstein scholarship, lies in the clear presentation of a paradox that, if one does not adhere strictly to Wittgenstein's ideas, may become a point that one has to grapple with and contain.

Furthermore, Kripke's digressions can be extremely interesting and rich. His commentary on the "common sense" sleight of hand was fascinating and revealed a broader perspective in someone whom I had expected to be entirely driven by instinct.

A mad man approaches me just as I am attempting to solve 68 + 57 for the very first time. This addition involves a number larger than 56, something I have never done before. Strangely, he claims the answer is five. He argues that I have mistakenly adhered to the rule of addition instead of a rule he calls 'quss'. According to this 'quss' rule, x + y = x + y if x, y < 57, otherwise it equals 5. I give it some thought and realize he has a valid point. What justifies my following the normal addition rule? After all, if it were incorrect, my past usages should have hinted at it. Therefore, this mad man's hypothesis is not a priori impossible. He challenges whether there is any fact that I truly mean the normal plus and if it is justified. I think to myself that perhaps I have been following the rule blindly.

Above is a concise outline of the nature of the Wittgensteinian paradox. In essence, it can be framed as a question about myself: was there some past fact about me - what I'meant by plus' - that dictates what I do now? If we expand on this, it implies that any new application of any kind of rule (whether it be linguistic or mathematical) is a leap into the unknown. There can be no such thing as meaning by any word.... (remaining faithful to the book)

Kripke, in the book, presents what he interprets as Wittgenstein's solution to this sceptical problem.

I purchased this book at least 25 years ago. At that time, I managed to get halfway through it. However, I'm not sure why I ceased reading. Maybe, it was because it was overly difficult for me back then. But I doubt that. I had already read the Investigations during my graduate school days, so I was well aware of what I was getting into. Perhaps it was because I disagreed with Kripke. Or maybe I simply got bored. I believe it was mainly due to disagreement, and that hasn't changed.

I think the skeptic's stance on quus and plus has an impact on all forms of discourse, even the very words he used to pose the challenge. I think Kripke's/Wittgenstein's'skeptical' solution regarding community agreement is incorrect. How could I know if I agreed with others? Skepticism pervades every word at that level.

Moreover, this disagreement has persisted over the years. It has made me constantly reevaluate my own understanding and beliefs. I continue to explore different perspectives and theories in an attempt to find a more satisfactory answer. Despite the passage of time, the questions raised by this book still linger in my mind, challenging me to think deeper and more critically.

This statement indicates that something is performing precisely as its title implies.

It not only meets the expectations set by the title but also does so in a highly satisfactory manner.

One might even go as far as to say that it exceeds those expectations.

This could refer to a wide variety of things, such as a product, a service, a piece of writing, or a performance.

When something lives up to its title in such a remarkable way, it earns the respect and admiration of those who encounter it.

It shows that the creators or providers have put in the effort and attention to detail necessary to deliver a high-quality experience.

This, in turn, can lead to increased customer satisfaction, positive reviews, and a good reputation.

Overall, it is a testament to the importance of fulfilling the promise made by the title.

John Searle once lamented, on an installment of The Great Philosophers, that there was an abundance of "trash" written regarding Wittgenstein's so-called "private language argument." It is a regrettable truth that, starting from the 1960s, Wittgenstein studies have been nearly overrun by scholars who regarded him more as a messianic figure than as a serious logician. The consequence has been to cause his work to largely lose its reputation among professional philosophers. It has deteriorated to such an extent that, at several junctures in my academic journey, I have been counseled not to engage with Wittgenstein because "nobody hires Wittgensteinians anymore."

Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) stands out as one of the rare scholarly works to break this pattern. Kripke's main assertion is that the private language argument is a specific instance of a broader skeptical paradox that pervades Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953). The paradox unfolds as follows. Consider any rule, for example, the rule governing addition, and then envision a new application of that same rule to a novel case. Wittgenstein's conundrum is that there seems to be no fact - whether it be a fact about our psychology or about our past utilization of the rule - that can determine how the rule should be applied to the new case.

According to Kripke's interpretation, Wittgenstein's later philosophy mainly consists of an attempt to solve this paradox. His thinking appears to be as follows. If we consider an isolated individual, then neither her mental state nor her past actions provide us with any basis for knowing how a rule is to be extended to new cases. However, if we place that individual within her broader context, there will be grounds for differentiating between correct and incorrect applications based on a consensus among the other members of a linguistic community. Hence Wittgenstein's emphasis, from the 1930s onwards, on "forms of life" and the "language games" that they play.

Bertrand Russell used to oppose Wittgenstein's later philosophy on the basis that it made truth a matter of mere agreement. If Kripke's reading is accurate, then it is challenging to avoid this conclusion. And like Kripke, I am deeply uncomfortable with it. If the only criterion of correctness lies in the shared inclinations of a linguistic community, then there would seem to be no common standard by which to resolve disputes. Whenever two culturally distinct groups diverge, we are left to conclude that they are playing different language games governed by different norms. Nothing more can be said.

**Title: The Importance of Recycling**

Recycling is of great significance in our modern society.

It helps to conserve natural resources. By recycling materials such as paper, plastic, and metal, we can reduce the need to extract and process new raw materials. This not only saves energy but also protects the environment from the negative impacts of mining and manufacturing.

Recycling also plays a crucial role in reducing waste. Landfills are filling up at an alarming rate, and recycling can significantly reduce the amount of waste that ends up in these landfills. This helps to extend the lifespan of landfills and reduces the need for new landfill sites.

In addition, recycling can create jobs. The recycling industry employs a significant number of people in areas such as collection, sorting, and processing of recycled materials. This provides employment opportunities for people and contributes to the local economy.

Overall, recycling is an essential part of sustainable living. It helps to conserve natural resources, reduce waste, and create jobs. We should all do our part to recycle as much as possible and encourage others to do the same.

I utilized a plethora of Kripkenstein's (that is, Wittgenstein + Kripke) concepts within my MA thesis. The ideas put forward by Kripkenstein have had a profound impact on my research. Their combined works offer unique perspectives and insights that have greatly influenced my thinking and analysis. By incorporating these ideas, I was able to explore and understand various aspects of my research topic in a more in-depth and comprehensive manner. The application of Kripkenstein's ideas allowed me to challenge existing assumptions and theories, and to develop my own original arguments and interpretations. Overall, the use of Kripkenstein's ideas in my MA thesis has been an invaluable experience, and has contributed significantly to the quality and depth of my research.

A hacker has offered a comprehensive critique of Kripke's interpretation. The skeptical Wittgenstein presented by Kripke is shown to be rather extreme. Although Kripke holds significant importance within the philosophy of language community, his interpretation still has many aspects that are lacking. The hacker delves deep into the details of Kripke's work, highlighting the areas where it falls short. This critique challenges the prevailing view of Kripke's interpretation and forces us to reevaluate its merits. It also opens up new avenues for further exploration and discussion within the philosophy of language. By bringing to light the flaws in Kripke's interpretation, the hacker is contributing to the ongoing evolution of this field of study.

I truly love the fact that I can become completely neurotic when I engage in a discussion about this book. It's as if the mere mention of it unleashes a torrent of emotions and thoughts within me. I find myself obsessing over every detail, analyzing each character's motives and actions with an almost fanatical intensity. The story has such a hold on me that I can't help but become completely absorbed in it, to the point where I might seem a little crazy to those around me. But that's the beauty of this book - it has the power to make me feel so passionately, to push me to the edge of my sanity and back again. I wouldn't have it any other way.