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Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations, especially the rule-following paradox and the private language argument, has become one of the most challenging topics in contemporary philosophical literature. Although according to the interpretations of Wittgenstein scholars, Kripke's interpretation - known as "Kripkenstein" - does not accurately conform to Wittgenstein's thoughts - and Kripke himself does not claim otherwise - the arguments presented in Kripke's book are very powerful.

The book consists of two chapters and an appendix. In the first chapter, Kripke uses the concept of rule-following for the act of "addition" and arrives at a skeptical conclusion that there is no objective fact by which we can understand what rule we mean.

In the second part, after accepting the skeptical results of the argument in the first chapter, by drawing on Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, he presents a skeptical solution to this problem: by taking the criterion of rule-following as "hinge", the problem of the non-existence of objective facts will be solved. The formulation of the hinge rule of addition is as follows: we call that which we "use" the rule of addition in this way "addition"; it is not the case that there is a specific rule like addition and we "follow" it.

In the appendix, the central question is how we understand that others have minds. Can we conclude from our own personal experience - for example, pain - that others also have this experience? Kripke, based on some parts of the Tractatus, interprets that Wittgenstein, like Hume and Lichtenberg, does not believe in a "soul" or "subject" that is "existent" ontologically. Consequently, the connection between inner feelings and the soul as an objective fact is meaningless; so attributing feelings to other souls is also meaningless. Kripke, while accepting this solipsistic view, again finds the solution in using the concept of being a hinge. The reason we are willing to help a person in pain is not because we know he has a soul and attribute to him the pain we have previously experienced; on the contrary, it is because we feel empathy with the person in pain that we consider him to have a soul and a mind.

Although Mr. Lajevardi's translation is not unreadable, it is not so smooth and flawless. Therefore, I recommend reading the original text.

This is an interpretation of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein's views on meaning are centered around a paradox regarding what it means to follow a rule.

Since he wasn't able to convince himself that he was doing justice to the paradox in a book, I won't attempt to explain it in a paragraph.

Wittgenstein wrote in short, loosely related, and often metaphor-rich paragraphs rather than in connected arguments. As a result, it's not always evident what he's attempting to convey.

I read part of Philosophical Investigations and the entire book for college. My professor believes that Kripke explains the paradox extremely well but misinterprets Wittgenstein's solution to the paradox to some extent.

I don't have a deep enough understanding of Wittgenstein to form an independent opinion.

Philosophical Investigations would be more suitable for someone interested in the history of philosophy and wants to know what Wittgenstein himself thought. However, the argument in this book is more clearly presented and thought-provoking on its own merits.

Kripke wrote this book to explain and clarify some parts of Wittgenstein's philosophical research that deals with the discussion of following a rule and private language. With the publication of this book, the problem of following a rule has been transformed into one of the most important discussions of contemporary analytic philosophy. Many philosophers have written about whether Kripke's interpretation is in line with Wittgenstein or not, and have also presented their views on his skeptical challenge, regardless of whether it can be attributed to Wittgenstein or not.

Besides the introduction, the book has two main chapters and an appendix. One chapter shows the skeptical challenge of how to follow a rule in new cases and the failure of common answers (such as interpreting a rule with the help of other rules, dispositional analysis, simplicity, introspection, and Platonic realism). The other chapter explains the solution that Kripke found in Wittgenstein's expression, that is, agreement and accordance with others in sufficient cases, and its connection with the impossibility of private language. The appendix raises a related problem about Wittgenstein's view on other minds.

The two main chapters are very detailed. Certainly, it could have made the reading of the book easier by providing subheadings to separate the topics. The text itself is not so clear and bright. As a result, the ambiguity of the text has led some philosophers to misunderstand and others to write explanations and interpretations. In this regard, the book is similar to another book by Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Although that one is a collection of several lectures and this one is a book written at one go, it is expected to be written with more order.

In 1996, two Persian translations of this book were published: one by Dr. Kaweh Lajevardi at the Publication Center, and the other by Hamid Mohammad at the Publication of Ney.

Wittgenstein has introduced a novel form of scepticism. Personally, I tend to view it as the most extreme and original sceptical issue that philosophy has witnessed thus far, one that could only have been produced by a highly extraordinary mindset. Of course, he doesn't aim to leave us with this problem but rather to solve it: the sceptical conclusion is crazy and unacceptable. I will contend that it is his solution that contains the argument against 'private language'; allegedly, the solution won't allow for such a language.

Kripke presents his perspective on the sceptical problem and the rule-following paradox. In his words, he submits the Wittgenstein version of the problem as it occurred to him, so it's neither an exegesis nor a solution to Wittgenstein's problem/paradox. It's more like Kripke's version, which I'll henceforth refer to as Kripkenstein's (or KW) problem and Kripkenstein's solution to the paradox. This small book has initiated an important discussion about rule-following and scepticism, with the concept of meaning in the spotlight, formulated in a detailed and objective manner.

The KW's problem challenges us to answer questions like: how can you claim to be justified in answering 125 to the query "What is 68 + 57"? He proposes that we can't answer this question with unrestricted epistemic access to some area and invites us to provide a strong meaning-constitutive fact. To do so, he suggests considering two areas: our previous behavior, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, and the entire contents of our previous mental histories.

The KW's skeptic doubts which function we're truly using when answering "68 + 57". We might say we're following the addition rule learned in elementary school, but how can we be sure the other person is using the same rule? The skeptic then proposes a function called quaddation, defined as x ⊕ y = x + y if x, y < 57, otherwise = 5. We can't be certain which function people are using for x, y < 57. Kripke suggests investigating our past behavior and mental consistency to answer this question.

The KW's solution initially admits that the fact questioned by the skeptic doesn't exist. Secondly, it claims that our use doesn't require the type of justification the skeptic demands. Instead, we can ascribe meaning in other ways. The solution admits that sentences ascribing meaning don't have truth-conditions and there are no facts or states of affairs that make them true or false. We should look at the circumstances under which such ascriptions are made and their utility in the present context.

For example, in a community, someone is justified in using the 'correct' meaning of '+' when they've performed satisfactorily enough to be trusted by other members. This shows that meaning is ascribed by the community under certain conditions and has a specified utility. However, if a person is isolated on an island and claims that '+' means addition, there's no community to approve or disapprove their meaning. The skeptical solution fails in this case, as there's no distinction between believing or intending to mean something and being correct. This leads to the conclusion that it makes no sense to talk about "correct" in a private language.

In conclusion, the skeptical solution asserts that ascribing meaning is an investigation of the conditions that justify a statement's acceptability in a community and its usefulness in our lives. Since a community is necessary for ascribing meaning, KW's solution claims to demonstrate the impossibility of a solitary language. Some questions to consider are: what is a community and how can it be defined? Is this notion of meaning useful for formal languages? What type of reference would be appropriate for this theory? Maybe the answers to these questions are in the text or will be found in other works of Saul Kripke.

As a piece of Wittgenstein scholarship, this is deeply flawed.

This can be established by spending a relatively short time with the Investigations itself. One quickly realizes that there are fundamental issues and inaccuracies in the analysis.

However, Kripke's paradox itself is a major contribution to the philosophy of language. It presents a profound and challenging problem that forces us to reexamine our understanding of meaning, reference, and rule-following.

I find myself struggling with it to this day. The paradox continues to puzzle and intrigue me, and I constantly find myself grappling with its implications and trying to find a satisfactory resolution.

Despite the flaws in the Wittgenstein scholarship, Kripke's paradox stands as a significant and influential work that has had a lasting impact on the field of philosophy of language.

Kripke undertakes to analyze the sceptical paradox found in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations."

The analysis focuses on the question concerning following a rule. The paradox, as I understand it, concerns that the past adherence to a rule does not determine future adherence.

Kripke uses a simple arithmetic problem to illustrate this problem. For example, when we consider the addition operation, our past use of it may not uniquely determine how we should apply it in a new case.

The postscript of the book focuses on Wittgenstein's solipsism in the context of ascribing pain to others. It delves into the complex issue of how we can meaningfully attribute subjective experiences like pain to others.

Ideally, this would be read with or after reading the "Philosophical Investigations," but the book's contribution to these problems has independent worth. It offers valuable insights and perspectives that can enhance our understanding of these fundamental philosophical issues, even without a prior in-depth study of Wittgenstein's original work.

Kripke is a fantastically clear and creative thinker.

His ideas have had a profound impact on various fields, especially in philosophy.

With his sharp intellect and unique perspective, he has been able to dissect complex problems and present innovative solutions.

Kripke's work is not only highly regarded by philosophers but also has implications for other disciplines such as linguistics and logic.

His ability to think clearly and creatively allows him to explore new ideas and push the boundaries of knowledge.

Overall, Kripke is a remarkable thinker whose contributions have enriched our understanding of the world.

His work continues to inspire future generations of scholars and thinkers.

Kripke is truly brilliant, and I deeply regret that it has taken me until now to read and fully appreciate his work.

He offers an astonishing exegesis of Wittgenstein, who was also extremely bright but often obscured his ideas by presenting them through rhetorical questions.

Kripke has managed to figure out the answers to those rhetorical questions and has neatly tied up the loose ends.

Kripke argues that Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy is a skeptical paradox, along with a skeptical solution to that paradox, which is very similar to the skeptical paradox and solution proposed by Hume regarding cause and effect.

Hume contended that there can be no necessary connection in cause and effect, only a constant conjunction that leads to a habitual expectation.

According to Kripke, Wittgenstein's argument is that words cannot have a fixed meaning, and we can never be certain that what we mean by a word on one day is the same as what we mean by the same word on another day.

This idea has its clearest application when it comes to mental phenomena.

Wittgenstein famously argued against the possibility of a "private language" in which a person names and discusses things in their own personal experience that cannot be confirmed or validated by anyone else.

For example, there is no way to know if my experience of red is the same as your experience of red.

Of course, we can both react to the same object by saying it is red (this relates to the skeptical solution), but it may be that you see coral and I see fuchsia (even stating it this way is a mistake because it still implies that we have a way to compare the experiences).

According to Kripke, Wittgenstein goes even further to suggest that what I called red yesterday may not be what I call red today.

(Who knows? I am partially colorblind.) How would we ever know?

Wittgenstein rejects the idea of setting some rule for ourselves (such as matching a color sample) because rules can be interpreted by other rules, and this can lead to an infinite regress.

So, I can never be sure that what I mean by "red" remains consistent.

This skepticism is radical and extends to mathematics as well.

Kripke develops the example of using the plus sign "+" to mean addition.

He posits a rival meaning of "+" as the "quus sign" which means quaddition and gives results similar to addition until one reaches a suitably high number and then gives completely different results.

There is no way of knowing that when you thought "+" meant addition, it didn't actually mean quaddition.

This may sound like a truly strange argument, but once it is worked through, it casts doubt on whether a word can mean anything at all.

An analogy can help to give a more common sense understanding of the idea that we cannot mean anything by a word.

If a man is stranded alone on a desert island, it is impossible for him to assign a price to the objects he encounters.

Can he say that a coconut has a price of five cents? Five dollars? Five million dollars?

It's all the same and doesn't really matter.

This skeptical paradox pervades all meaning, but Wittgenstein (like Hume) offers a skeptical solution to the paradox.

The skeptical solution does not deny or eliminate the paradox but rather provides a workaround.

For Wittgenstein, the skeptical solution is language games.

Language games are a kind of social interaction that gives some validation to the meanings we assign to words.

As long as we can use the words successfully in our language games, it doesn't matter if we don't know precisely what the words mean.

As long as we can play our language games, life can continue despite the yawning chasm of meaninglessness.

I initially believed that I had retained an ample amount of knowledge from "Philosophical Investigations" such that I wouldn't have the necessity to keep it as a readily accessible reference. However, I was mistaken.

Regrettably, I lent out my copy a long time ago, and now I find myself in the process of scouring the internet in search of another copy.

It seems that the wisdom and insights within that book have eluded my memory more than I had anticipated.

As I navigate through various online platforms, hoping to stumble upon a digital or physical copy, I am reminded of the importance of having such valuable literary works at hand.

Perhaps this experience will serve as a lesson for me to be more cautious about lending out my precious books in the future.

Until then, I will continue my search with determination, eager to once again immerse myself in the profound thoughts and ideas presented in "Philosophical Investigations".

THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT WITTGENSTEIN’S IDEAS

Saul Aaron Kripke, born in 1940, is a renowned American philosopher and logician. He is the Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at Princeton University and also teaches Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center.

In the Preface to his 1982 book, he mentions that the main part of the work was delivered at various places as lectures, series of lectures, or seminars. It serves as an elementary exposition of what he believes is the central thread of Wittgenstein’s later work on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics. This includes his interpretation of the ‘private language argument,’ which he explicates in terms of the problem of ‘following a rule.’ A postscript presents another problem Wittgenstein saw in the conception of private language, leading to a discussion of some aspects of his views on the problem of other minds. He had hoped to add a second postscript on the philosophy of mathematics but time did not permit.

In the Introduction, he points out that ‘Philosophical Investigations’ is not a systematic philosophical work where established conclusions need not be reargued. Instead, it is written as a perpetual dialectic, with persisting worries expressed by an imaginary interlocutor never being definitively silenced. Since the work is not presented as a deductive argument with definitive theses as conclusions, the same ground is covered repeatedly from various special cases and different angles, hoping to help the reader see the problems rightly.

He further explains that attempting to present Wittgenstein’s argument precisely may to some extent falsify it. Many of his formulations and recastings of the argument might not be approved by Wittgenstein himself. So, the present paper should be seen as expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument nor ‘Kripke’s’ but rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke and presented a problem for him.

He observes that when concentrating on what is in the mind, it is difficult to find instructions for future actions. The infinitely many cases of a table are not in the mind for future reference. Saying there is a general rule in the mind only throws the problem back to other rules given in terms of finitely many cases. It seems the entire idea of meaning vanishes.

He notes that by ‘reading,’ Wittgenstein means reading out loud what is written or printed and similar activities, not understanding what is written. He himself, like many of his coreligionists, first learned to ‘read’ Hebrew in this sense before understanding more than a few words of the language. Reading in this sense is a simple case of ‘following a rule.’

He suggests that Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism, which he regards as the most radical and original skeptical problem in philosophy to date. Wittgenstein does not wish to leave us with the problem but to solve it. The skeptical conclusion is insane and intolerable, and it is his solution that contains the argument against ‘private language.’

He states that the main problem is not showing private language or some other special form of language to be impossible but rather showing any language at all (public, private, or otherwise) to be possible. He argues that Wittgenstein’s main problem is that he appears to have shown all language and concept formation to be impossible and indeed unintelligible.

He suggests that if one person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding that person can have no substantive component. There are no truth conditions or facts in virtue of which it can be said that he accords with his past intentions or not. As long as we regard him as following a rule ‘privately,’ we can only say that he is licensed to follow the rule as it strikes him.

This book will be of great interest to anyone studying Kripke or analytic philosophy in general.

Good short read.

I don't entirely agree with some of the anti-internalist stances presented. However, I must admit that I really enjoyed the concept of the impossibility of a private model of rule-following.

This idea challenges the traditional view that an individual can follow rules in a completely isolated and private manner. It implies that rule-following is necessarily a social and public phenomenon, relying on shared understandings and practices within a community.

The author's exploration of this topic is thought-provoking and raises important questions about the nature of language, meaning, and human communication. While I may have my own reservations about some of the arguments, I appreciate the opportunity to engage with this interesting and timely debate.

Overall, this short read has provided me with valuable food for thought and has encouraged me to further explore these complex issues.