في هذا الجزء يستمر بوبر في نقده القاسي واللاذع ، ل-الفكرين القومي والاشتراكي
اللذان يدعوان إلى أنظمة شمولية تمجد الأفكار اليوتوبية ، والمتمثلة في هذا الجزء بالمدرستين الماركسية والهيغلية.

*كان ماركس رغم مزاياه نبياً زائفاً.لقد كان نبي مسيرة التاريخ، ولم تتحق نبوءاته.
لعبت أفكاره دورًا هامًّا في تأسيس علم الاجتماع وفي تطوير الحركات الاشتراكية. واعتبر ماركس أحد أعظم الاقتصاديين في التاريخ.
كما كان ماركس، يعتقد بأن النبوءة التاريخية هي الطريقة العلمية لمعالجة المشكلات الاجتماعية وهو ما ينتقده بوبر.

هو أحد رواد حلقات عصبة الهيغليين التي انشق عنها فيما بعد مؤلفاً فلسفته الخاصة به.
ماركس الذي لا يرى وجوداً للدولة بل يؤسس لزوالها.

* هيغل هو أحد أهم الفلاسفة الألمان، حيث ي��تبر أهم مؤسسي حركة الفلسفة المثالية الألمانية في أوائل القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي. اهتم بالتحليل الفلسفي العقلي لمؤسسات المجتمع .

يرى هيغل بأن العقل نتاجاً إجتماعياً، بل رحلة نفس-أو روح- المجتمع ( مثلاً، روح الأمة أو الطبقة.) ومادمنا مدينين بعقلنا ل- المجتمع - أو لمجتمع بعينه كالأمة- كما يذكر، فالمجتمع هو كل شيء أما الفرد فلاشيء، أو أنه مهما كان مايحوزه الفرد من قيمة فهي مستندة من الجمعي حامل كل القيم الحقيقي ( نزعة الاستبداد المرجعي ) هذه النزعة العقلية الاستبدادية التي تبجل وجود سلطة مرجعية؛ العاجزة عن التمييز بين قدرات الإنسان العقلية ومديونيته للآخرين بكل ما أمكنه معرفته أو فهمه؛ (فالبنسبة إلى هيغل فالدولة هي التحقق الفعلي للفكرة الأخلاقية، انها العقل الأخلاقي بصفته إرادة جوهرية تظهر وتتجلى أمام ذاتها. وتعرف نفسها وتعقل نفسها أيضاً.)
فهيغل يرى الفرد تابعاً مملوكاً لها ل-( الدولة) لا جزء حي من كيانها.
عقلانية هيغل كما يراها بوبر عقلانية كاذبة!

‏
"المكون العاطفي للإنسان وليس عقله هو الذي يحدد موقفه. الأكثر من هذا، حدسه وبصيرته الباطنية بطبيعة الأشياء وليس تعقلها، هو الذي يجعل منه عالماً عظيما ً."
‏-كارل بوبر

ختاماً:
يؤكد بوبر في ( المجتمع المفتوح وأعداؤه) على مدى بؤس الفلسفة التاريخانية التي تدعي أنها تمتلك مفاتيح التاريخ أو ما سيؤول له.
كذا أراد من خلال الكتاب إبراز حق الفرد أمام حق الدولة، والتأكيد على حقوقه كفرد واعٍ مستقل ومتحرر من كل تبعية قصرية أو عمياء . سعى لبناء مجتمع خالٍ من الفكر الشمولي، و يعتمد في هيكله على المواطنة الكاملة الحقة لأفراده بمختلف أعراقهم و أقلياتهم دون تمييز أو استثناء.

وأختم بما قالته " فيلسوفة تفكيك الشمولية "
حنة أرندت:
‏"الحريه : هي التحرر من الكبح الذي لا مبرر له "
‏

گزیده ای از ضمیمه کتاب تحت عنوان "واقعیتها و شاخصها و صدق: انتقادی دیگر از نسبیگرایی" که در سال 1961 توسط پوپر افزوده شده است:

ممکن است اعتراض شود که صرف نظر از اینکه آراء من درباره ی ماهیت معرفت اخلاقی و وجدانیات اخلاقی پذیرفتنی باشد یا نه، به هر حال نسبی یا ذهنی است، زیرا هیچ شاخص مطلقی را در اخلاق تسجیل نمی کند و فقط نشان می دهد که تصور شاخص مطلق، تصوری تنظیمی است و تنها به کار کسانی می آید که قبلا به این عقیده گرویده اند و حال می خواهند درباره ی شاخص های اخلاقی خوب یا حقیقی یا صحیح بیشتر بدانند یا به جستجوی چنین شاخص ها برخیزند. پاسخ من این است که هیچ شاخص مطلق یا مجموعه دستورهای اخلاقیی نیست که حتی تسجیل آن -مثلا بر پایه منطق محض- تفاوتی از این جهت ایجاد کند. بفرض هم که توانسته باشیم منطقا صحت فلان شاخص مطلق یا مجموعه دستورهای اخلاقی را مبرهن سازیم به نحوی که بر مبنای منطق بتوانیم به دیگری ثابت کنیم که چگونه باید رفتار کند، باز هم او ممکن است اعتنایی نکند یا در جواب بگوید: ((من کوچکترین علاقه ای به بایدها یا قواعد اخلاقی شما ندارم، کما اینکه براهین منطقی یا نظریات شما در ریاضیات پیشرفته کمترین تفاوتی به حال من ایجاد نمی کند.)) بنابراین، حتی برهان منطقی نیز تغییری در این وضع نمی دهد که فقط کسی تحت تاثیر دلایل اخلاقی (یا هر دلیل دیگری) قرار می گیرد که حاضر باشد اینگونه امور را جدی تلقی کند و چیز تازه ای در این باره بیاموزد. شما نمی توانید با استدلال کسی را مجبور به جدی گرفتن استدلال یا احترام گذاشتن به عقل خودش کنید.


گزیده ای از تکمله (گفتگوی برایان مگی و پوپر در 1986) اضافه شده توسط مترجم (عزت الله فولادوند) :

مگی : با این وصف، این روزها می بینیم که جوانها باز به همان مکتبها و نویسندگانی -مثل هگل و مارکس و روانکاوی و اگزیستانسیالیسم- علاقه نشان می دهند که در گذشته مورد حمله ی شما بوده اند. توجیه شما برای این قضیه چیست؟
پوپر: در مردم همیشه تمایلی وجود داشته که دنبال حجرالفلاسفه (یا اکسیر) بروند و نسخه ای برای همه ی دردها مطالبه کنند. وضع فعلی تازگی ندارد - البته به استثنای کاهش غم انگیز علاقه به مباحثه عقلی. یکی از دلایلش بی صبری است؛ دلیل دیگرش این احساس است که اینهمه حرف بالاخره به جایی نرسیده است. بنابراین، بحث کردن با مخالفان، دیگر مورد پسند نیست. دیگر کسی در صدد این بر نمی آید که ببیند چه عیب و خطایی در دلایل طرف وجود دارد؛ در عوض، دربست پیرو فلان نظریه ی با ابهت می شود. البته این گرایش قابل درک است ولی اگر به صورت ویژگی روشنفکرهای جوان دربیاید، اسباب تاسف است و نشانه ی اضمحلال ملاکهای فکری و زوال حس مسئولیت عقلی خواهد بود ...

It is a great shame that my local library system does not have the first volume of this collection stocked but only the second, but as someone who finds much to enjoy in reading Popper, this book is certainly a thoughtful and provocative read that has a lot to say against the sort of prophetic culture that has become increasingly popular in Western Civilization from the 19th century onward.  Given the malign influence of Hagel on both Nazis and socialists and communists, this book was helpful not only in demolishing the ideological support for the Nazis who made Popper an exile from his native Austria but also made him a hero to anti-Communist figures who saw in his discussion of the problems of prophetic intellectual culture a way to discredit the claims of Communists to be destined for historical success.  Ultimately, the success of the efforts against Communism made this book somewhat forgotten, although the reliance on prophetic approaches by the left ought to make this book increasingly relevant where people rely on bogus and fraudulent means to argue that they are on the right side of history when it comes to a wide variety of political and social issues.

This particular volume is about 300 pages worth of material in fifteen chapters, chapters 11-25 of a longer work.  The author begins this part of his work by discussing the rise of oracular philosophy by examining the Aristotelian roots of Hagel's thinking (11) as well as the way that Hagel sought to encourage and inflame a new tribalism (12) which was supported by the Prussian state because of its usefulness to them.  After that the author spends five chapters discussing Marx's methods of sociological determinism (13), the argument for the autonomy of sociology (14), economic historicism (15), his view of classes (16), which has been repeated to the present-day by many ignorant and misguided writers, and Marx's views of the legal and social system (17).  After that the author spends four chapters examining the failure of Marx's prophecies concerning the coming of socialism (18), the inevitability of the social revolution (19), the fate of capitalism (20), all of which the author ties up nicely in an evaluation of Marx's thinking and where it went wrong (21).  After that the author discusses the moral theory of Marx's historicism (22) and the aftermath with a look of the sociology of knowledge (23) and the problems of the revolt against reason that Marx and Hagel's disciples showed (24).  Finally, the book ends with a discussion of the meaning of history (25) as well as notes, addenda, an index of names, and an index of subjects in the book as a whole.

Popper may have been an enemy of the open state himself, but at least he wrote about the sort of things that an open state needs in order to survive.  It seems likely that Popper's desire to preserve an open society had nothing to do about whether he personally was open to the thinking and opinions of those whom he disagreed with, but rather that as a Vienna Jew who had seen the writing on the wall when it came to the lack of openness in both Nazism and Marxism recognized that the ideological root and justification of closed societies needed to be addressed.  Popper took a dim view of historicism in general and that can definitely be found here, and Popper's takedown of Hagel and the corruption of philosophy by the German state is well worth paying attention to when we reflect upon the failure of German politics not only with Hitler but even in the contemporary issue with the corruption of "climate science."  This book has some memorable and snappy and witty comments against some of the most notable philosophical frauds of the post-Enlightenment period and is well worth an appreciative read.

While Popper's critiques on the dangers of total ideas can be helpful, but ultimately this is a fairly vapid critique.

This is the second part (the cover isn't correct, but oh well), and it's equally good. You should read this if you're uninspired to read anything else.

Just a quote:

"It should perhaps be admitted that the Heraclitean ethics, the doctrine that the higher reward is that which only posterity can offer, may in some way perhaps be slightly superior to an ethical doctrine which teaches us to look out for reward now. But it is not what we need. We need an ethics which defies success and reward. And such an ethics need not be invented. It is not new. It has been taught by Christianity, at least in its beginnings. It is, again, taught by the industrial as well as by the scientific co-operation day. The romantic historicist morality of fame, fortunately, seems to be on the decline. The Unknown Soldier shows it. We are beginning to realize that sacrifice may mean just as much, or even more, when it is made anonymously. Our ethical education must follow suit. We must be taught to do our work; to make our sacrifice for the sake of this work, and not for praise or the avoidance of blame. (The fact that we all need some encouragement, hope, praise, and even blame, is another matter altogether.) We must find our justification in our work, in what we are doing ourselves, and not in a fictitious ‘meaning of history’.

History has no meaning"

If readers would also read this, in advance or after reading Popper, they would ultimately conclude that this critique is a hatchet job:

[Walter Kaufmann, Beacon Press, Boston 1959, page 88-119, Chapter 7: The Hegel Myth and Its Method]

http://www.marxists.org/reference/sub...

Popper completely misunderstands Hegel, and if you want a serious criticism of Marx, you should look to Leszek Kołakowski - a far better and more reasonable criticism of the communist logic.

Popper's analysis, again, is full of excellent insights that cut through bad and dubious theories in history, sociology, and philosophy. However, substantively, the book leaves something to be desired, as I shall explain below. And stylistically, similar to volume one, Popper's essayistic, subjective, sarcastic, and moralizing tone of writing is a bit too much. His attacks on Hegel, like Plato in the previous volume, are strident and merciless. His mercilessness is mostly justified in the context of the fawning adoration targeted, at the time, towards Hegel by many socialist intellectuals but also by many liberals and conservatives. This contextual defence is the same that mostly justifies his harsh treatment of Plato in volume one. But since we live in different times now, we can afford more generous and level-headed readings of Hegel (and Plato) without fearing that we are thereby giving solace to the enemies of reason. So, I think that Popper's analysis of Hegel is worthwhile and sometimes illuminating but not very serious or comprehensive. And while his analysis of Marxian historicism is much better, since he is willing to treat Marx with respect, he is distressingly bad on Marxian economics. He fails to engage with ANY of the mainstream criticisms of the basic tenets of Marxist theory. To Popper's credit, he at least dismisses some of the more obviously false facets of Marxist theory, like the fallen rate of profit, but he nonetheless gives too much credit to Marx's other economic theories, such as his disproven theory of the trade cycle. In other words, his reading of Marx alternates between too much lenience (towards his various economic arguments and theories) and just the right amount of intellectual generosity (towards his humanitarian and moralizing impulses as found in his class analysis and the theory of exploitation). Curiously, Popper gives Marx the kind of sympathetic reading (even to the point of excessive generosity!) that he refuses to give to either Plato or Hegel. Whether this is fair or not is up for debate. But it is certainly a curious book that is a product of its time. Similar to my review of Volume One, I am torn on this volume. In many ways, this is a masterpiece that every student of modern history of ideas should study. The positive vision of an Open Society is only articulated "between the lines", as it were, but it is a powerful vision indeed. And almost every chapter is full of philosophical nuggets, paradoxes, and arguments that stimulate the mind. However, he is too harsh on Hegel and Plato, often to the point of blinding hostility, while he curiously understates Marx's failures as an economic, historical, and moral thinker. There is nonetheless a lot to love here. I would say Popper's work is a flawed masterpiece - equally brilliant, creative, and vindictive.

I thought that this book was great (both Volume 1 and 2, although people more frequently refer to Volume 2, likely since it discusses Marxism which seems to be more near and dear to people's hearts). Popper wrote The Open Society during World War II when he thought that Europe might soon be under a totalitarian regime.

After 10 years, finished read again both;
Volume One and Two

masterpiece!

A compendious effort that doesn't have a whole lot to say that isn't covered elsewhere. Perhaps more important 40 years ago.

Yeah, good ol Karl grinds his axe, Hegal is an easy target, ( but, hey wouldn't you put you face in the trough too ? ) so is Marx, on the positive side, a lucid account. A cry from the wilderness.