The Phenomenon of Life

I stumbled upon this book at a very opportune moment in my life. In my drive towards understanding the nature of reality I had been recently engrossed in certain problems of a philosophical nature that had to do with the inadequacy of the metaphysical presuppositions of the scientific worldview in doing justice to the phenomenon of life and mind. I always suspected that our scientific models would gain much if the current scientific paradigm engaged in a critical re examination of its own foundations. This would not only help it reframe the phenomenon of life in terms more suited to its own concrete factuality but also help circumscribe the domain of applicability of principles like reductionism, extrinsic causality, the persistence of identity in the notion of substance and wholes taken as being no more than sums of their parts, all notions which, while being demonstrably effective in the analysis of non-living nature as such, inevitably hit against the outer limit of their pragmatic usefulness when confronted with the phenomenon of life. I approached this book keeping in view three primary problems which directly pertained to these lines of thought, namely:

1. The Mind-Body Problem and it's contemporary reframing as The Hard Problem of Consciousness
2. The nature of causality in light of the devastating critique of Hume and the insufficiency of Kant's transcendental solution.
3. The inadequacy of mechanistic models in Biology and the machine metaphor in general.

This book not only contains a highly original discussion of the aforementioned problems but also brought to light certain connections between them that I had only vaguely perceived beforehand. It went on to reveal their inner unity in the same prevalent but deficient worldview which came about as a result of misfired attempts to understand the nature of being qua being and the ontological priority of death over life that reigns in our current historical epoch in the form of materialistic monism. The book helped me understand the necessity for Whitehead to posit the role of 'causal efficacy' in contrast to 'presentational immediacy' as the more original and prior mode of perception that fades out of view in the dominant mode of perception, e.g vision in which the object presents itself to a passive subject in a form entirely divorced from its causal nexus. This causal nexus can be directly felt in the proprioceptive feelings of the living body, whose significance was entirely missed by Hume and whose wider application to nature at large is unthinkable for science as it stands now as it would be an instance of the sin of anthropomorphism. The book highlights the nature of the practise of science as pushing anti-anthropomorphism to its ultimate limit in which man and the scientific observer himself comes to be viewed from this perspective thereby nullifying the validity of his own reasoning as a thinking subject by a performative contradiction in a form of reductio ad absurdum.

Another feature of the book is it's exemplification of these philosophical problems not as isolated conceptual curiosities but as moments in a historical process that reminds one of Hegel's dialectics. Instead of the naive view of science progressing by a gradual accumulation of its qualities in a linear fashion, the complex reality of an oscillatory movement in which knowledge struggles to articulate the nature of being via a process close to:
A. Discovering a tention within a pre existing monism with attempts at concealment in order to preserve the original unity.
B. The tention erupting into a polarity which can no longer be suppressed. Attempts to eliminate the polarity by a reduction of one side to the other.
C. A dualism in which the polarity is acknowledged but cleanly separated into two parallel domains.
D. A synthesis that respects the original tention and yet results into a higher unity.

Hans Jonas explains how the various attempts at understanding the nature of being, despite being seemingly contingent products of prolific geniuses at critical junctures in history, still can be viewed as moments of a grand historical dialectic, thus revealing the imminent necessity of their contingent eruption in time.

The rigour and depth of the book in the treatment of its subject matter is matched only in its broad scope that ranges from discussions of the aforementioned problems to a treatment of gnosticism and it's relation with contemporary nihilism and existentialism. This is fitting for a book that re examines the nature of being and man not in terms of the tyranny of abstraction but in the concrete corporeality of man qua man. It affirms the intuition that an analysis of man can only be adequate if it gives voice to his being-in-the-world instead of falling prey to a deficient abstract system that suffers from Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

That being said I disagree with Jonas's contentions with Whitehead's philosophical scheme. Michael Levin's work has shown that postulating the properties of life as universal to 'being' as such with the difference being of degree rather than kind is a valid postulate that is not in conflict with empirical findings, assuming that you take the principle of least action in physics as an exemplar of its minimal yet fundamental incidence in nature.

Finally, by analysing the psychological undercurrents that held sway in the era in which gnosticism sprung up in history, Jonas digs deep underneath the surface mythology of the gnostics and reveals how it sprang from their worldview of alienation from the cosmos. Something being repeated in the modern era after the loss of the horizon of transcendence that was lamented by Nietzsche. It shows how the improper relations of part to whole in which there is a tyrannical supremacy of one side over the other gives way to an ontology of power in which domination can be overcome either by passive resignation to fate as in spinozism / stoicism or rebellious yet frightened self assertion as in existentialism, Heideggerian being-towards-death or gnosticism.

Reading this book was nothing short of an intellectual tour de force. As everything began to fall into place I experienced what can only be described like an aesthetic experience of consummated rational contemplation. To fully appreciate the subtle points of the arguments of this book one should be familiar with basic philosophy but I would recommend it highly to anyone sufficiently curious.

Thoughts from my second time reading this book:

From my perspective, out of the 12 essays, only 2 of them have relevance to philosophy of mind. The rest consist in Jonas's riffing about his feelings about how humans ought to live, and in defending Christianity in the face of natural science. Let me summarize the key ideas in those 2 worthwhile chapters.

In chapter 4 "To move and to feel: on the animal soul" picking up the thread from Aristotle, Jonas starts off in his theory of mind from the point that animals are mobile, perceptive, and emotional, unlike plants; these three dimensions of existence are what, for Jonas, essentially distinguish animals from plants, and are the conceptual starting points for figuring out how consciousness works. Jonas sketches out how perception and action allow animals to be more free, and to have a sense of an individual selfhood. When one can move towards and away from things in one's environment, this makes it possible to undertake temporally extended pursuits; these may involve various steps, each of which now may demand for a particular task or purpose, involving different emotions. This change is concomitant with a psychic "distance" between one's urge, and the satisfaction of that urge. Plants, which lack the mobility of animals, cannot experience this psychic distance. Their roots are directly webbed into the soil, where nutrients come up; there is no physical distance between the plant and the things it needs to survive, and so there is also no psychic distance between need and satisfaction. Plants cannot desire.

Deferred fulfillment of an urge or want makes desire possible. Desire always comes with fear; the two are sides of the same coin. When the animal's self is individuated from its environment, and so it has distance from the goods it desires, it both desires those goods, which are not yet attained; and because they are not yet attained, there is always risk or uncertainty regarding whether the desired outcome will come about. This uncertainty is the basis of fear. So with the individuation of self comes freedom, which implies both desire and fear. This freedom also includes freedom from being conscious of and pursuing solely metabolic aims, like satisfying thirst and hunger. There are now various different aims one can take up, which might be understood as initially aims relativized to steps found in the temporally extended trajectories needed to be taken to satisfy metabolic needs; but one can imagine how these diverse aims can come to be ends in themselves, as opposed to means to metabolic ends.

The only other worthwhile chapter is 6, "Image-making and the freedom of man." There, Jonas examines the human phenomenon of fashioning images. (I took much of this exploration as a placeholder for talking about the imagination, as a mental activity that need not involve material expression; I was surprised that Jonas did not raise this extensions of his discussion). What is a visual image? It has visual likeness to some other thing that it represents. It is produced with the intention that it has this representational function. The likeness isn't complete; there are differences between it and the thing that it represents. This incompleteness, concerning the visual similarity, is expressive of intentional selection. When we make images, we will present only the features that seem most relevant or significant to us. The more visual detail that is presented need not correspond with enhancing the image's capacity to represent the thing; rather, the way in which a person making the image selects which features to present, and the exact way in which these features are rendered, modulate the image's representative capacity. (It is interesting to think of why this is the case; Richard Moran gets at this point in his paper about make-believe emotion in respond to Kendall Walton's paper. Moran talks about how rhetorical devices at large are directly responsive for conjuring imaginings that are more vivid or intense, rather than the literal realism of the artwork. He also doesn't explain why this is the case exactly. I won't explore this issue much here, but I'll mention that perhaps many rhetorical devices can be explained by a combination of appeal to cross-modal 'perception' and evolutionarily-given 'affect programs'; certain forms of stimuli will automatically trigger certain affect, given our evolved responses, and these stimuli can be understood as relating different sensory/cognitive modalities; a certain color, for example, can conjure a certain action or event type, which is more explanatorily immediate in relation to the affect that is triggered. This is all very preliminary, and it'd be fun to investigate these issues further.)

Jonas thinks the capacity for an image to represent something is based in the audience's capacity to recognize the intention of the person who made the image. Some degree of visual similitude between image and thing in the world is key for this recognition, but then there are many symbolic and cultural conventions that can allow for 'communication' between image-maker and audience; there's a shared 'lexicon' regarding what sort of visual gesture is supposed to be expression of what sort of intention.

Jonas points out how any image or representation itself is "unsubstantial" and so cannot endanger us, or unleash any real consequences upon us. This implies that we will apprehend the thing, when represented in the image, as not connected to the past, present, or future. It appears in a timeless form. (I think that that the thing qua represented by an image cannot harm us, and is timeless, is suggestive of further facts about our experience in relation to it; we are freed up from having to attend to all the issues that'd be entailed if it were apprehended as part of reality, for example.) This timeless quality implies that one image can represent an indefinite number of objects, just as one object can be represented across an indefinite number of images.

Jonas points out that we can always choose to deviate from accurately representing the object, when we make an image. He talks about this as our capacity to "transcend actual reality"; this is a lovely and evocative phrase, I think.

Jonas examines our "experience of truth," in light of his discussion of images and representations. Without explanation, he assumes his points about visual representation hold for linguistic representation (while I don't think he is wrong in the conclusions he draws here, it would've been nice if he walked us through the differences and places of continuity between the two kinds of representation; Sartre does this very nicely in The Imaginary). The notion of truth becomes relevant only once we have an unanticipated experience of error or uncertainty. Jonas analyzes this in terms of that "freedom" is a precondition for experiencing truth; our freedom here is a matter of being able to change how we behold a representation, from the initial state of the representation as transparently giving us reality, to the later state of that it is erroneous or uncertain.

Jonas thinks that the most basic cases of falsehood are perceptual error and lying. (This is a fascinating suggestion; perceptual error and lying are very different types of error, and if they are indeed the ontogenetic basis of our various adult ways of understanding what it means for something to be false, analyzing each case, and how they might relate, could be helpful. Jonas does not go into any depth on this matter.)

So Jonas claims that Heidegger is wrong to think that truth is fundamentally a matter of un-concealing or disclosing; rather, according to Jonas, it is a matter of un-deceiving yourself. It is delusion, rather than opaqueness or ignorance, which is the first obstacle towards truth. (I think the two thinkers are simply talking about different notions of truth. There is a matter of truth v. falsity, and then there's a matter of clarifying or deepening one's understanding. It might be interesting to investigate whether one is primary over the other, and how the two relate, but I will not do that here. Preliminarily, perhaps Heidegger's sense of truth is indeed primary; only when we find ourselves in a contradiction, once we explore and disclose something further, do we then posit falsity, which makes way for truth defined in Jonas's sense.)

Now, I will ramble a bit about thoughts I had while reading these chapters. I was most fascinated by implications Jonas's claims about visual images has for making sense of the imagination or thought. I wonder whether make-believing is developmentally prior or subsequent to imagining at large. Probably the latter. It makes sense that in earnest attempts to represent something, we can make mistakes, or see that others in our community mis-apprehends which object it represents. This may inspire purposive misrepresentation, which is just make-believe. There is delight in this, insofar as we’re led to think one thing but it’s surprised. The context of dealing with representations takes advantage of our primitive affect of surprise and interest, and since it’s a safe context, i.e., it is not part of real life where things are at stake, we can respond with taking pleasure, with laughing.

I was interested in Jonas's claims regarding the incompleteness of any visual image. Always there are details of the real object omitted. In the case of the imagination, as opposed to material images, perhaps any imaging, even the most automatic or spontaneous ones, can serve as a filter onto manifest reality. Our implicit or unconsciously activated interests/desires come to cast their shadows, make themselves visible, via how exactly the object or state of affairs is represented, or which of their features constitute them in our imagining, to speak a bit metaphorically. This would be a nice implication; it would shows moreover how our sense of reality is indeed dynamic, how emotion regulation may happen, and what freedom may look like. We can play around with which of our interests are activated, when we imagine, and this allows for a genuine randomness, from the chaos of emergence, which is nevertheless consciously governed by our agency, of which any of our interests is part.

I also like to think about spontaneous thought and imagining as not capturing reality for its visual dimension, but for its affective/emotional dimension. Jonas only focuses on only visual representation. Pure affect is hugely generic or underdetermined. So if thought and imagination transact with "affective contours" of the objects they represent, as opposed to their visual contours, this makes way for ever more creativity and freedom. Affect, as more underdetermined than vision, can bring forth to mind a more wide range of objects and states of affairs to be associated with that which is focally represented in imagination or thought. This range of objects will then set constraints for further adjustments or saliency-measures for perceptions and thoughts alike.

To extend this line of thought, of shifting representation's basis from its visual dimension to its affective dimension—it's interesting to think about how when we imagine an object, there are now many different ‘significances’ it object can have, relative to our many different interests and tasks. These significances are not distinctive of any sensory faculty, but correspond to our overall embodied being, with projects and cares. So in imagination, objects can be represented for different meanings, just as in visual drawing, an object can be represented for different visual aspects.

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Thoughts from my first time reading this book:

This is one of the most profound books I've read these past years. By profundity, I refer to that Jonas's ideas are radically countercultural, extremely convincing, and morally crucial to the development of modern thought and humanity's role in nature. Jonas's writing style is also incredibly beautiful, even literary, and yet does not suffer loss in clarity or philosophical rigor. If you care about having an enlightened perspective on our modern scientific era; having morality grounded in a substantial and, if I dare say, absolute way; or having your concept of the human species revolutionized in a manner that is ennobling and yet naturalistic -- please, I urge you, read this book.

Let me summarize Jonas's key ideas. Jonas provides a theory of biological life, of the essential properties of it that distinguish it from inanimate matter. All living systems are driven by homeostatic processes and have the proper function of preserving their life form. They must take in energy and expel waste, for example, to survive. Jonas then provides a theory of the differences between plants, non-human animals, and humans. Plants always have direct contact with the source of their essential nutrients; their vital needs are necessarily satisfied, as long as they are living in apt conditions (e.g. their roots make direct contact with nutritious soil; leaves with sunlight; etc.).

In contrast, animals do not have such endless and guaranteed supplies. They are set at a distance from objects that will satisfy vital needs. This distance is crucial. This distance allows for animals to have desires, since satisfaction not immediate, and to act on their desires. Most strikingly, this distance allows for animals to perceive a world that is separate from themselves; the subject/object dichotomy emerges. This world is populated by objects that have values relative to the animal's vital needs (e.g. some objects are attractive and others repulsive, depending on whether they will help or hinder the animal's survival). Finally, this distance allows for animals to have freedom; the satisfaction of any desire requires the animal to act, face challenges, and overcome. This amounts to a freedom that plants and non-organic matter do not have. This freedom is paradoxical, however, in that it stems from necessity; the condemnation to have desirable objects separate from oneself, and to have desires and needs to begin with.

Humans are distinguished from non-human animals on one major respect. We have cognitive capacities that allow us to radically expand the distance that separates ourselves from desired objects. Particularly, we are not confined to the immediate world that surrounds us; we can represent this world in pictures and language, and such representations allow us to see objects anew, alter our desires, and regulate our behaviors. Thus, this greater distance entails greater freedom. Moreover, we can also represent ourselves, not only the world. Non-human animals are constrained to apprehending objects found in the world; in contrast, we humans can take our very attitude towards objects as our object of apprehension. This magnifies our freedom. But it also magnifies our suffering; self-awareness comes with the possibility of despair, guilt, anxiety, and so on.

This covers only the four chapters of the book (chapters 1, 4, 6, 7). Chapter 2, 3, 5, and 8 present historical analyses of fundamental assumptions in natural science. Jonas shows that our basic scientific concepts (e.g. energy, causation) and criteria of scientific explanation (e.g. that an explanation details causal relations between different factors) are biased by the shadow of metaphysical dualism, which began with Gnostic religions and Christianity. Those religions framed human thought to conceive of a radical difference between the soul and the material world, and our contemporary science has kicked out the soul but preserves the conception of the material world -- which was originally formulated on the basis of its contrast with the soul. So, our idea of matter and nature presupposes the idea of soul. Religious thinking has snuck into our scientific materialism.

Chapters 9, 10, and 11 focuses on Jonas's view of morality and value, which follows from his theory of biological life and his critiques of modern science. All living systems have a natural function towards self-preservation. So we have an obligation to protect life. This obligation is not based in our subjective or cultural assumptions. It is rather commanded by nature itself. Here is the only part where I diverge from Jonas's position. I think his premises are insufficient to purchase that conclusion. The conclusion that can be legitimately made is that this obligation is commanded by all living systems; in other words, this obligation is grounded in not merely human practices, but in the views and needs of the various species that inhabit this world. This amended conclusion, however, is still a radical one.

Jonas attempts to create an "existential biology" which adopts the existential analysis of subjectivity created by Heidegger, but reads subjectivity as a fundamental feature of all living things.

I find this somewhat difficult to accept fully -- I can accept gorillas, fish, and spiders as subjects in some attenuated sense, but can't do so for mosses and fungi, as Jonas requires. Jonas wants to be both a Darwinian and an Aristotelian, and this puts irresolvable tensions on his characterization of what life does.

On the other hand, Jonas is exactly right to argue that "life" does need a distinct ontological category, and that the neglect of "life" in the Cartesian dichotomy of "matter" and "mind" is an important element in the historical trajectory that leads to modern nihilism.

Jonas also does a nice job of arguing how the phenomenology of life provides an ontological grounding for ethics without theologizing. (Though Jonas is a deeply religious thinker, his theology does not enter into the ontological grounding of ethics.)

So while I can't fully endorse everything Jonas does, it's an important step in the right direction!

Jonas changed that ways that I think and feel about life and living organisms. This number here opens your eyes to a new perspective on creatures that metabolize. If you think Continental philosophy is for guys with ugly mustaches -- give this one a try. His arguments against Descartes are awesome, to the max.

Super brilliant and thought-provoking but kind of falls short with some of the premises related to a distinction between human and non-human animals (self-reflection, etc.). Also seems a little (appropriately) reactionary against Heidegger's betrayal. The essay on gnosticism, nihilism, and existentialism is a pinnacle.

Towards a Philosophical Biology. 50 years too late? Freedom requiring organic. Deep complexities, and much to ponder, including how much if any has been overcome in the decades since these talks were given.

This book is for you if you are given to abstract thinking, have a strong vocabulary base, and are not afraid to stretch your mind. As for me, it was a required reading and it felt torturous! Life is complicated enough as it is; don't need philosophy to reiterate that!

A thoughtful consideration on what is life. The collection of essays delves into various concepts of life and reviews how different philosophers viewed life. Jonas raises serious ethical questions, but sometimes is to abstruse to make much sense. Some of the essays show their age. His agonizing over the philosophy of Heidegger and his contemplation of gnosticism left me cold. These were subjects important to him once, many years ago, but I have a difficult time seeing their relevance today. Other essays—particularly the ones on the value of knowledge and epistemology—are timeless. I want to do a more focused reading on his work on the ethics of technology and nature, but that will take some time and searching.