In dit werk geeft Plato met een genadeslag zijn onvrede over de sofisten.
Sofisten zijn vertellers, leraren die de deugd en andere aanverwante kennis aan anderen doceren voor een prijs. Plato is niet bepaald over hen te spreken: ze fabriceren hun eigen kennis op basis van drogredenen en onjuiste retoriek. In dit werk probeert hij de sofisten onderuit te halen.

Dit boek is behoorlijk droog en naar verhouding best lang (tenminste, in vergelijking met het werk dat ik hiervoor van Plato heb gelezen). Het is interessant om zijn beredeneringen over het ontstaan van onjuiste beweringen te lezen, maar het kostte mij behoorlijk veel kruim: ik vond het vrij taai om erdoorheen te komen. Het verhaal is geschreven als dialoog maar de hoofdpersonages 'praten' niet echt met elkaar, doordat het één lange stuk tekst is geeft het ook weinig ademruimte.

sabe aquelas discussões imaginárias que você tem no chuveiro e sempre ganha porque na sua cabeça a outra pessoa é meio retardada e não sabe como responder, mas que na vida real você nunca teria se saído tão bem? esse livro é exatamente isso. era pra ser um diálogo entre um estrangeiro e Teeteto - bela tradução de nome hein, porra, parece um DJ - sobre sofismo e acaba sendo o primeiro falando um monte de merda silogística (o céu é azul, meus olhos são azuis, logo meus olhos são o céu) e o segundo, paga-pau do caralho que é, concordando até cair o CU

sinceramente, viu. platão escreveu esse com uma mão no pincel e a outra na calça

The dialogue's explicit aim is to define, oppose, and discredit “the Sophist”; but it ends up discussing very important issues like being, non-being, truth, dialectics, motion, rest, sameness, difference, sophistry, philosophy, and so on. The Sophist raises serious problems against Plato's philosophy, while Socrates (“the Philosopher”) stays there in the background and does not intervene at all in order to clarify, rebuke, or defend. Theaetetus, mechanically agrees to everything that the Sophist says.
Probably the most topic is the one concerning being/non-being and its relation to truth. Truth is to claim that what “is” is and what “is not” is not. But what “is” is? I love when we are told that there are two ways to approach beings/to be – one that claims that only what you can grasp with our hands “is” and another one that is more theoretical/ideal/general. “Is” can be a form of predicating; but more importantly it concerns beings in their existence. But how can we talk about a non-being as if it “is” and moreover in singular (or plural); and how can we generalize and find some common ground between clearly-different beings (like motion and rest) by virtue of their being/to be?
The topic of beings/non-beings, Being, and its connection with truth raised here by Plato stayed more or less in the background for more than two thousands of years until Heidegger brought it explicitly to the forefront again.

Bão

This is the first dialogue of Plato that I read where Socrates was not entirely present and only appeared at the beginning. But I felt his spirit roaming around this Eleatic stranger. Both of Plato's works, Statesman and the Sophist, seem to have the same format and talk about metaphysical issues.

At some point, I was confused about what precisely this stranger was trying to say. Theaetetus was so distracting with his yeses. I had to reread some passages repeatedly to get his point by skipping Theaetetus's assurances: 'Yes' 'Certainly' 'Most true' 'absolutely' 'It is nothing but that.'

We do not know much about the sophists outside of Plato's conception of them. There could be other things we do not know about them or their ideas. Moreover, since what appears is a commentary, we shall explain the sophist based on that.
The stranger recognizes the sophists as those who have many definitions. And with too many definitions, it is easy for them to escape arguments or claim that they know nothing when confronted.

Who's a sophist? After several speculations, the stranger deduces the nature of the sophist as the following:
1- He who is a paid hunter after wealth and youth
2- A merchant for the good of the soul
3- A retailer of the same sort of wares
4- He belonged to the fighting class (after the long divisions the stranger made), and he was then a hero of debate.
5- "He was a purger of the soul, who cleared away notions obstructive to knowledge." Aka a soul purifier.

After that, he began discussing their ideas. The stranger tries to first divide every concept into other concepts which underlie or constitute an abstract idea. For example, there is productive art (something brought into existence) and acquisitive art (conquering what exists). Both of these are divided into other categories which constitute --acquisitive art, for instance--sub-categories, such as exchange and force. Until he reaches the concept of Being and Not-Being, the core of this dialogue. It also appears to be a criticism of Parmenides' dictum which claims that we cannot think of not-being, namely, what-is-not.

The concept of being and not-being is a metaphysical issue. Can we think or perceive a not-being? When we speak of something, we speak of being. It is known, from Parmenides, that not-being does not belong in being. However, it is when we say 'not something' we surely speak of something. The world 'is' constitutes what is being. And so when something is, it is a being. If we say that not-being is unthinkable, the statement is contradictory (the inference is fallacious since it includes the word 'is'). Therefore, not-being is a defective form of being. Just as there is a concept of beauty, there is a defective form of beauty: not-beautiful.

I honestly couldn't get the part where he talks about the wholeness of being. He could be talking about whether a being can exist as a whole or in parts. But if being is a whole, how come we have different forms of being? I am not sure that is his main point. It is not clear to me.

For reference, Plato's metaphysics, Platonism, consists of abstract objects, namely, non-spatial, non-temporal objects that are non-physical entities and non-mental. This is known as his idea of forms. It would be better to take an introduction to Platonism before this.

At one point, when the stranger said, "Do not expect clearness from me." I began to doubt if this stranger was actually a sophist. This book is more complex than Plato's other works.

In this critique of sophistry (the imitation of wisdom) against philosophy (the knowledge of wisdom), Plato's Sophist exposes the weakness of Parmenides' theory of one-ness by building out the theory of negation—that is, the idea that our knowledge of *what is* is bound up in the existence of *what is not*. For example, when we say a thing is "not big" we are not necessarily saying that it is "small." So, our knowledge of this thing (and our ability to copy/imitate it) is not defined by its "big-ness" or "small-ness;" rather in the gap between the two, the thing's "not big-ness." We understand what present by what is absent; what exists by what doesn't exist. Sophists attempt to imitate *what is* by imitating (necessarily, *what is not*).

I think that this is a necessary piece in the Platonic theory of forms: It's a recognition that because we are never likely to be in the presence of an ideal form, so the only way we can apprehend the ideal form is to consider the commonality between imitations of the form and, by negation, measuring attempting to comprehend the gap between the form and its imitations. In concrete terms, our understanding of justice is most clearly defined by examples of its absence; our conception of "perfect justice" is bound up in negation, or imperfect imitations of justice. This is also helps us see more clearly the central difference between a sophist (one who seeks to imitate the ideal form, like justice) and a philosopher (one who seeks to know the ideal form, like justice).

This is an incredible dialogue. Reading this, it feels like Plato has paused, looked back at the tradition that came before him and to the things he has already said, and tried to fill in the gaps, or untangle some knots. Many questions regarding the intermediate world of perception and doxa are still left unanswered, but he still accomplishes what I think he set out to do.

What interests me the most is this dialogue's dramatic structure. It should be noted that the 'parricide', the refutation (or rather, clarification) of Parmenides' doctrine and the problem of not-being, in other words, the ontological and epistemological question whose very answer can either save or completely destroy philosophy, is placed in a sort of digression from the original objective the characters had established, and is central within the formal composition. The investigation had begun, at Socrates' request, from the very pragmatic necessity of differentiating the sophist from the politician and from the philosopher. After the first 6 divisions, the Stranger and Theaetetus realize there are obstacles - false opinions - getting in the way of their learning the truth, and so they must examine the very source of the sophist's fallacious premises. It is no small effort: as the Stranger says, its an ever-continuing battle between materialists and idealists, giants and gods, and never before has the Stranger been able to fully contradict his 'father'. In this way, Plato demonstrates how deeply 'abstract' philosophical problems are implicated in our full comprehension of daily life.

Other notes:
- Afterwards, when Theaetetus complains at the seemingly never-ending succession of obstacles to the definition of the sophist, the Stranger tells him to take heart. It then turns out it wasn't that hard at all, the worst had really been over. I thought this was cute.

- Insights into platonic pedagogy:

1. Socratic refutation as a cleansing/purification of the soul. The idea that lógos is a sort of pharmakon, and that the orator (the good one, the dialectician, the philosopher) and his craft are analogous to the doctor and medicine (of the body) is well established in the Corpus. The Phaedrus and the Gorgias come immediately to mind.

2. At one point, the Stranger tells Theaetetus that young people impressed by the sophist will eventually come to realize the latter's copies are not truly being, either by experience or by the hand of someone older and more experienced, who will take them closer to the real. Reference to the erotic dynamic between master and pupil as indicated in the Symposium and the Phaedrus? I'd like to think so.

3. In the final division, the Stranger asks Theaetetus if he agrees with the ones who don't see or with those who do see rational causation emanated from the divine behind the workings of physis. Theaetetus tells him he oscillates between the two positions, which does not worry the Stranger: since he knows that the young man has a philosophical nature, and will come to the right conclusion in time, there's no need for long and persuasive arguments. This is interesting. How does it relate to point 2?

Anyway, 5/5 stars, there's no turning back, I'm officially Plato's little b****.

Clearly I’ll have to read this again. I suspect God kills a kitten every time Theaetetus says “clearly” “definitely,” “of course.” BECAUSE NONE OF THAT IS CLEAR AT ALL.

I became interested in Sophist through Heidegger. I’ve read a bunch of Plato’s dialogues before, I can’t remember which, I read them without any guide — they impressed me as mildly amusing, beyond that it’s completely mysterious to me how anyone can walk away with any sort of certainty, or conclusion. Plato always leaves me feeling “trolled.”

The “nice” (?) thing about reading backwards from modern “signposts” is that I get to appreciate other people’s interpretive efforts. I don’t think I could have taken this dialogue very seirously if I didn’t know it inspired so many generations of philosophers, and now I’m burning with desire to read Heidegger’s lecture on Sophist, and his investigation of “beings, even though I’ll have to learn to read Greek first.

And I suspect that’s the whole point — not to indoctrinate readers with any kind of solidified “knowledge,” but to inspire more dialogues, investigations, contemplations.

I don’t usually rate books I don’t understand, but I think, for the psychological effect it created — bafflement commingled with desires to dig deeper — it’s justifiable to give it ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ .

Sophist dialogue was primarily for explaining the nature of Sophist is, after Socrates asked the Stranger, whose name weren’t even mentioned, about whether in his place (Elea), Sophist, statemen and philosophers are one or three different names. At first, I presupposed that the dialogue will tackle primarily on those three, but after reading it, understand it with all my might. The dialogue was all about the Sophist, maybe thats the reason why does this dialogoue was named after it.
The stranger and Theodorus, has able to lay down six points about the nature of the Sophist, but before that, what amuse me to this Stranger is how he project or explain his first example. His first example was about an angler, what is he is doing? If he has an art or nothing or have somewhat a power to do what he was doing. The stranger presupposes that the angler has an art, and explain that art has two kinds, a creative art, he who brings into existence something that did not exist before and the other one is the acquisitive, he who mould things that existed before. They both agreed (Theodorus and the Stranger) that the angler is an acquisitive art, as the angler didn’t produce what he is having. Then the stranger divided the acquisitive into two parts, the exchange, by means of exchanging things, and the other is by conguest. And the conguest is later divided into two, by means of open force, fighting or by secret force, hunting. Then hunting then in turn divided into two, hunting the living or hunting lifeless prey. And the hunting the living is then divided into land-animals hunting and water-animals hunting. And further divide the water-animal hunting by two, in the way how they hunt their prey, one using nets (in which the Stranger said ‘capture with enclosures’) and one takes their preys by blows (or striking) and later said the land-animals hunting is too many to divide. Using this division, the Stranger has explained what does the angler do, it is, an acquisitive art that conguest or taking by force, water-animals by the means of striking. And using this division or method again, the stranger has explain what is the art of the Sophist. He explains that the Sophist were acquisitive (not creative), hunting their living prey (not fighting and not hunting lifeless prey), just like the anglers but their paths diverge when it comes to what type of animals they hunt, the angler hunts water-animals while Sophist hunts land-animals. The stranger then further divides this into two, tame animals which includes man and the other is wild animals. Than according to the Stranger taming can be either violence or art of persuasion, and that art 1 Plato trans, by Jowett, Benjamin, ‘Sophist’ retrived from http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/sophist... on date December 2, 2012
of persuasion can either be private or public, private for either hiring or by means of gifts, giving gifts. Thus, after sub-dividing of all this, the Stranger and Theodorus has met their first point explaining what is the nature of Sophist is, ‘his art may be traced as a trace of the appropriative, acquisitive family- which hunts animals,-living-land-tame animals; which hunts man,-privately-for hire,-taking money in exchange-having the semblance of education’. Which of course while reading it has met my exact definition to what Sophist do.
What then amuse again is other point that the stranger did to explain the Sophistry, being said that the acquisitive were divided into two, exchange and conguest, and exchange were divided into two, namely giving and selling, and selling was then divided into selling own production or selling other peoples product and these two (selling own production and selling other peoples product) can be either in retailing or by means of exchange, exchanging for food for the body (such as medicines) or exchanging for food for the soul (for amusements or for the sake of instruction). And exchaning for the food of the soul can be also divided into two, by virtue or by knowledge. According to the stranger, Sophist are those whose art may now be (also) traced from the art of acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue. Well, indeed, as i remembered Sophist were dependent for livelihood upon the tuition fees which they thus received2 from their students.
What was new to me after reading this dialogue is that the Sophist were known to be the minister of purification. Well, maybe i have come across to that when I was studying Ancient Philosophy or reading the book Sophist world. But if they are indeed the minister of purification why does still the Sophist are considered one of the lowest and controversals? Well, just like the dialogue or what was written on this dialogue, Sophist being the purger of the souls, who cleared away notions of obstructive to knowledge is very doubtful.
Thus, if i may conclude, the Stranger and Theodorus dialogue had come up with six points, one is that the Sophist paid hunter after wealth and youth. Two, they were merchants in the goods of the soul. Third, he had turned out to be a retailer of the same sort of wares. Fourth, they manufactured the learned wares which they sold. Fifth, they belonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguised as a hero of debate, who professed the eristic art and six, that they were purger if the souls. After this six point, after the Stranger and the Theodorus has come up to another path of explaining Sophistry, it is difficult for me to comprehend what they dialogue explains to be. But I do understand that the Sophist were disputers, that they seems to know all things that they dispute, but they only have apparent or conjectural knowledge of all things. They dialogue has also come up with the non-being, which of course my professor wants us to understand as his intruction of reading this dialogue was primarily for understand what non-being is. They do said that ‘non-being’ is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable. Non-being is nothing.
2 Fung Yu-Lan, ‘A History of Chinese Philosophy’, (China, The North-China Daily News, Shanghai, 1937), page 53

Sophists are jerks who misrepresent the truth for money.

欲回答智者、政治家和爱智者为三或一就要探讨各自定义。技艺的二分法生成三次智术；智术是控制术中教育的酬金赚取术、交换术中的德性商贸术、争斗术中盈利的辩论术；辩驳即净化。智者有六种形象，关于一切都显得智慧。摹仿使一切为一，却在遭遇中返回实在；影像制作术：仿像术和幻象术，智者定义从中再次逃脱。显象作为非是者而是，但绝对非是者不可思议，故为不真的是者；是为一而不可称谓二者，故名称不是；是者多于一或少于自身整体而不是不生。本是并非全然物质，是者因作用/被作用而是能力δύναμις。理念作为实在被认知而运动，运动是则有理智，一切在过程中；是包含动静却非动非静，是与非是无更高者。辩证法指出单一理念作为共同的属贯穿多理念，是谓通种论。是动静各异而有同异；运动同非同异非异，作为非是者亦分有是；非是不同而非否定是，并为是者的一种类型。理念的结合作为逻各斯不能割裂；名词动词联结为陈述，与不是结合而有假；灵魂的是非为判断。自然是神的技艺，影像是神的机巧；智者是自以为是的伪装模仿者；探究中发现爱智者；存在论差异被忽略。

This is a review for the Prometheus Trust edition of the Sophist, which is part of their Students' Edition books. It contains several essays in the back that are useful for understanding the dialogue, along with fairly extensive explanatory notes and excerpts from Platonists that are relevant to the passages. The text itself is translated by Thomas Taylor, and it's worth getting this version for the added material.