Okay I know I know I know, I have said countless time that I don't like Plato and that I don't like dialogues... Apparently, I do like the Sophist...

I'm not going to try to go into too much details about why I did like this book in contrast to my general opinion on Plato's dialogue, but I think it has something to do with the fact that this dialogue was so clearly rooted in issues of language, semantics and linguistics which is something that plays out best in the act of it. I'm still not completely sold on the idea of dialogue as a feasible philosophical method, but I do think it worked in this case.
And the fact that it was about Parmenides' being and not-being and how both being and negation work - subjects I already found very interesting - probably helped with me liking this one.

Definitely recommend this to anyone interested in a dialogue about the meaning and expression of being and not-being!

“Sophist” provides a deeper understanding of what constitutes sophistry and how it differs from genuine philosophy. For anyone interested in philosophy, it can provide foundational knowledge, improve critical thinking skills, and offer relevance to modern intellectual discussions.

Unity: Sophists are “imitative dialecticians” who use this imitation to make money and corrupt the youth. Whereas philosophers use dialectic in service of being, sophists “feel around in the darkness” and generally hide behind problems of “non-being.”

3 Prompts:
1. What the heck is a sophist?
2. Why is the definition so hard to come by? The sophist is a master imitator, who hides behind notions of non-being, giving seemingly reasonable arguments that are ultimately nihilistic.
3. By what method can we ensnare the sophist? By an analytic dialectical method, which seems to rely in its greatest part on transcendental categories [which, e.g., even Heraclitus must assume]

2 Implications:
1. How come Socrates stays silent? Maybe Socrates was not so Eleatic as this. Here Plato seems to
2. Why is Socrates present?
3. If non-being “is” in a certain way [albeit not simpliciter]; in what way “IS” non being? A. Says non-being is SOMETHING?

Rating: 5/5
As usual for Plato, this is a work of sustained brilliance, which satisfactorily solves one of the most pernicious problems of philosophy: "what is nothing?" This is not the Platonic dialogue to be read first -- it requires too much background. But is certainly to be read if you want a salve against nihilism!

One of Plato’s weaker dialogues. An uninteresting read.

Detta är en av de böcker som jag uppriktigt inte förstår.

Så vitt jag kan bena ut det, är det en kombination av reducto ad absurdum av idén om formella - funktionsgrundade i motsats till betydelsebärande - definitioner, i kombination med ett hån av idén om ädla lögner (son dock Platon själv accepterar senare - hur hänger det ihop?).

En konkurrent till Sokrates görs till talesperson för dessa dumheter.

Fula trick i kombination med fula idéer med andra ord.

A Sophist is a hunter of young boys by the way.

Chato demais. Mas tal qual o Parmênides, vale pelo modo de raciocinar

One of the less accessible of Plato's works. Tedious at times but it is a great example of his 'dialectical' method.

Sophist is one of the few Platonic dialogues which don’t have Socrates as the main character (all are from the late period). This seems to offer Plato some advantages, especially for this book’s purposes. Using the Eleatic Visitor as the main speaker allows Plato to make sustained arguments consisting of series of positive statements as opposed to the Socratic character’s standard approach, claiming to know nothing and play the midwife of others’ thoughts – asking questions, testing answers, usually showing their inadequacy, and typically ending inconclusively. Arguably Plato could have used Socrates the same way he used the Visitor, but that would have been odd as Socrates is the main speaker in the Theaetetus, Sophist’s predecessor in a trilogy, in which Socrates is true to his old form. Sophist is an attack on Plato’s adversaries, the sophists, and on some of their most important (and to Plato, very dangerous) word or logic puzzles. His animus towards sophists, and towards poets, might seem excessive, but we should remember that he saw both as educators offering falsehoods, in some cases in the guise of truth and in others with a relativistic view of truth. And this was at a time when disinterested, rational investigation into truth was new and insecure. For some it was seen as impious, probably for others a potential threat to society and the state. Another danger that seems to have been quite real was the conflating of philosophy and sophistry (as we see in Aristophanes’ Clouds, and as Plato’s Apology seems to suggest, though in reality they were perhaps less distinct than Plato might have us believe). Regarding at least some sophists, the main issue was the reality and importance of truth and the importance of pursuing truth regardless of outcome as opposed to developing and teaching skill in persuasion regardless of truth. The sophists’ puzzles posed serious problems for Plato, causing fundamental aspects of existence (being and non-being, rest and motion, one and many, etc.) to appear hopelessly mired in contradictions and confusions, leading among other things to relativism about truth and morality.

Primary among these problems was confusion about being (i.e. the word “is”) and manipulation of the confusion of “is” as denoting existence with its denoting a thing’s having particular qualities. With this difference long clear to us, it’s hard to understand how the brightest minds in ancient Greece were stumped by it, but it was a major problem that Plato seems to have effectively clarified in Sophist. Another main problem in sophistical arguments was the equation of “not being x” with “being the opposite of x.” Plato pretty effectively clarifies that “not” indicates difference but not necessarily contrariety. He also, very importantly, believes he establishes that we can talk about things that don’t exist without necessarily contradicting ourselves. I’m not sure he established this in a way that would decisively undermine the sophists, but this issue was central to Plato’s problem with them. Some sophists claimed there couldn’t be false belief or speech because no one could think or say “that which is not” since “that which is not” has no share in “being” (this picks up an issue from the Theaetetus, while Sophist in general is largely directed against Parmenides, with some mostly indirect connection to the dialogue named after him). We might say that Plato demonstrated, or believed he demonstrated, that at least some things which don’t exist (e.g. things that are false) are nevertheless available to thought and speech.

Another main issue Plato tackles, also without the greatest clarity, is that qualities (possibly the Forms or Ideas from his earlier works) can blend with each other (this revisits a central problem from the Parmenides, at least if we take it as dealing with the Forms). He doesn’t provide much of an account of how this works, but in a proto-Aristotelian manner he doesn’t seem to need to so he doesn’t bother; he gives some examples which appear to adequately demonstrate that this “blending” happens in at least some situations and then forgoes further proof as he’s achieved his primary objectives: demonstrating that things can either “be” in the sense that they exist or they can “be” possessors of qualities; they can “not be” in possession of quality x but this doesn’t mean they have (or are) its opposite; they can “not be” something without meaning they don’t exist; we can discuss things that “are not” without contradicting ourselves or saying nothing; and things can possess a multiplicity of differing qualities, “blending with each other,” without this being inherently contradictory or problematic. At least this is my understanding of what I take to be the main points of the dialogue. (The first third of the book is an entertaining search for a definition of “sophist,” in which we also meet the Eleatic Visitor and are introduced to his “method of division.”)

The Visitor seems to speak for Plato much more clearly than the character Socrates elsewhere, and it’s hard to imagine Plato taking on the tasks of this dialogue with the usual Socratic limitations and dialectical method. Decisively refuting the sophists on the points addressed was critical to Plato’s project (there is truth, it’s absolute and unchanging, and it very possibly can be discovered and understood by man; there also must be falsehood – both deceit and misunderstanding or ignorance; similarly, justice and knowledge are real, and attempting to pursue and understand them is not necessarily destined to be fruitless). But we also find the Visitor as the main speaker in Statesman, while Parmenides had been the main speaker in that dialogue (with a young Socrates largely on the defensive), and Socrates doesn’t even appear in The Laws. Timaeus and Critias are essentially monologues by those characters, and even in Philebus, with Socrates as the main speaker, he asserts positive doctrine rather than questioning others and demolishing their definitions and arguments. It seems Plato in his late period needed something his earlier Socratic character and method could no longer provide him (with the exception of the Theaetetus, perhaps acting as a coda for the old Socrates and an introduction to the trilogy which apparently was to include Sophist, Statesman, and the unwritten Philosopher).

I mentioned a proto-Aristotelian aspect in this dialogue; it seems there are several of these in the Parmenides and Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman trilogy: The logic puzzles in Parmenides almost demand an analysis and categorization of logical fallacies, for which a formal logic would be a prerequisite. The Eleatic Visitor’s method of division (used in Sophist and Statesman) is a step away from Socratic dialectic and a step towards Aristotelian logic. The Visitor also insists on differentiation between general and specific, and seems to be moving towards something like Aristotle’s genus and species. The unmoved mover makes a very brief appearance in Statesman’s cosmological myth, which also includes something like an initial abstract of Aristotle’s Politics (i.e. a survey and critique of existing political systems). And there’s also something similar to Aristotle’s beloved doctrine of the mean in Statesman. To be fair to Aristotle, no one else in the Academy took these hints or produced the remarkable body of work he did, and there are plenty of things in Aristotle, e.g. his causality, which don’t seem to have any obvious precedents in Plato. Certainly Aristotle’s formal logic was one of history’s great intellectual achievements, regardless of the extent of the foundation Plato provided. And of course the mindsets of the two men were very different, not least in the place (or lack thereof) of empiricism in their respective worlds of thought.

Perhaps it should be noted that our view of the sophists may be excessively negative and otherwise unbalanced largely due to Plato’s well-preserved and brilliant dialogues which so often savage the group. It’s unlikely we’ll ever have adequate knowledge of them to be able to independently assess Plato’s characterizations. But perhaps it’s worth keeping in mind Plato’s harsh view of the poets, who we do know, when considering his even harsher view of the sophists.

Although historically significant for probably containing the oldest description of the correspondence theory of truth, Sophist as a whole is one of Plato’s less enjoyable dialogues, being just so plain boring at times. It’s hardly even a true dialogue (and there is none of that puzzling subcontext or supposedly allegorical characters from some other dialogues) since it’s mostly just about one character giving a lengthy lecture of sorts while the other character mostly just agrees on everything the former says. Also, I’ve noticed that the last paragraph is notably different in different translations, since the original version in Old Greek is nigh-untranslatable so translators had to improvise.

What is a Sophist? One who seeks to mimic belief, unknowingly, to gain the wealth of rich young men. This book also gives insights into Plato's epistemology. Needs a reread, someday.

How to defend yourself against a politician and a lawyer.

Love,
Socrates

Seriously, this reminds me of that scene from the Simpsons where Lisa asks "what would the world be like without lawyers?" And it's just utopia. And I feel like Plato was channeled for that scene from this book. And yet another book where I typed it in and immediately Heidegger comes up, just like Parmenides by Plato. This is full of essential epistemology so dense your brain forgets what nouns and verbs are and you're rebuilding language the way Heidegger intended.

Solid, but nothing earth-shattering. Beware of people who argue a lot, especially if it's their job.