The 9-11 Commission Report is over 500 pages long. In the preface the authors say that the report was written to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9-11. However the collapse of Building 7 wasn't even mentioned in the report. Building 7 was a 47-story skyscraper which was not hit by a plane. It fell straight down symmetrically into its own footprint at virtually freefall speed. And they completely ignored it!

While there is a lot of material here and not all of it is exactly engaging, it is a very important and, in my opinion, well-researched and presented document that makes for a very harrowing read.

It is often said (though researchers dispute it) that we always remember where we were when a historical event occurred. Well, I was only ten years old on September 11, 2001, so my memories are necessarily hazy.
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My mom had dropped me off at school before heading to her job in Manhattan. My dad was on his way there, too. This was one of my first days of fifth grade. Yet class was immediately derailed. Teachers went in and out of classrooms, whispering to one another. I was confused. No explanation was given to me except that “a plane crashed into a building.” It did not even occur to me that my parents might be in any danger. (They were fine.) The drama and significance of the moment were completely beyond me.
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So it was only many years later, when I finally visited the memorial and museum at Ground Zero, that I started to understand, really understand, the trauma inflicted upon the American psyche that day. Much like the pandemic, the attack created a rupture in history, marking everything else as either “before” or “after.” Yet as American forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and the 20th anniversary of the attack looms, the historical significance of the event is still rather unclear. This was why I decided to read this report.
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The 9/11 commission was established by an act of congress in order to investigate the attacks, with the aim of increasing the country’s preparedness in the future. The commissioners—career politicians, from both parties—conducted well over 1,000 interviews to produce an authoritative explanation of how this came about. However, as the Chairman and Vice Chairman said in a later book, though the commission was created by an act of Congress, the White House and the intelligence community were anything but cooperative during their investigation.
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Be that as it may, the commissioners managed to create an impressive document. It begins with a genuinely gripping narrative of the attacks. The rest of the book is, unfortunately, not nearly so riveting, but the reader is rewarded by a thorough analysis of the attack from a multitude of perspectives. The commissioners recount the history of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden, and several of the hijackers, and examine the actions of the military, FAA, and emergency response personnel that day. The lion’s share of analysis is, however, given over to determining what the intelligence community knew, when they knew it, and what they tried to do to stop the attacks.
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The report’s major conclusion is that a lack of cooperation between the CIA and the FBI (among other failures) allowed the terrorists to evade the grasp of the US government. They end with a series of proposals aimed to bolster the country’s capacity for counter-terrorism. These recommendations range from the specific (related to the organization of our intelligence apparatus) to the vague (broad statements of values, etc.), and I would be lying if I said I knew how many have been implemented. Notably lacking was any attempt at a broader historical contextualization of these attacks—any serious consideration of why the United States was chosen as a target in the first place.
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What struck me most of all, however, was how much the mood of the country has changed since this commission was written. Nowadays, most of the criticism aimed at Biden concerns the how—and not the if—of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Twenty short years later, our overpowering concern with Islamic terrorism has substantially receded (though I am sure it could easily be reignited). The spirit of the commission is also a reminder of our deteriorating political culture. Though the Bush years were hardly a paradise of bipartisan harmony, it is difficult to imagine anything like the degree of consensus on display in this report, about any topic, being held by professional politicians nowadays.
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In any case, this document remains a surprisingly readable account of one of the most significant turning points of this century. Not bad for a government report.

The 9/11 Commission, at a difficult time in the nation’s life, achieved something that might previously have seemed impossible. The people of the United States of America were convulsed with grief, reeling with shock, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; but the members of the commission calmly and coolly looked at the situation that the country faced after 9/11, undistracted by the feelings of panic that had seized so many Americans. In a country that had been torn by partisan political division, Democrats and Republicans – conservatives, liberals, and moderates – worked together productively for the greater good. The 9/11 Commission Report, crafted in the wake of tragedy, stands of evidence of the great things that Americans can still do, when we trust the better angels of our nature.

For the benefit of those who are not old enough to remember those times, it may be helpful to recall just how fear-ridden the country was in the wake of those attacks. When a celebrity music telethon was held, to raise money toward relief and rebuilding in the wake of the attacks, the musicians played in an undisclosed location, as if otherwise the terrorists would surely find the location and fly a hijacked jet plane into it. When President George W. Bush threw out the first ball at a Texas Rangers baseball game, the first game played after the attacks, the crowd cheered their hearts out, as if relieved that a hijacked plane hadn’t been flown into that ballpark in Arlington, Texas. In those days, it was routine for the passengers on an airline flight anywhere in the U.S.A. to break into applause once the plane had landed safely.

And in my home state of Maryland, some politicians were seriously suggesting that Baltimore’s own World Trade Center, on the city’s waterfront, be “protected” by parking the old naval frigate U.S.S. Constellation in front of the building. Left out of those calculations, evidently, was the question of how a wooden warship from 1854, its masts reaching perhaps three stories into the air, could “protect” a 30-story building. The time after 9/11 was, in short, a time when clear thinking was often being squeezed out by fear.

Seen against that background, The 9/11 Commission Report is doubly impressive. The ten-member commission, chaired by Republican Governor Thomas Kean of New Jersey, with Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton of Florida as vice-chair, conducted exhaustive research in order to present their Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the report’s subtitle). The report’s first chapter, “’We Have Some Planes,’” provides a harrowing, in medias res recounting of the events of September 11, 2001. From there, the commission looks back to the very beginnings of the ideological conflict that led to the attacks – as the commission authors put it, “The Foundation of the New Terrorism.”

From there, the commission examines the long sequence of events that led to 9/11 – counter-terrorism efforts by the U.S. intelligence agencies, al-Qaeda’s initial attacks against American targets abroad, U.S. responses to those attacks, and finally al-Qaeda’s planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks. The commission is carefully bipartisan in apportioning responsibility for the U.S. intelligence failures that led to the attacks, saying of the U.S. Congress, for example, that “Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider. Congress asked outside commissions to do the work that arguably was at the heart of its own oversight responsibilities” (p. 107). There are 535 members of Congress. Would not any member of Congress from the pre-9/11 years, in his or her heart of hearts, find truth in that statement?

In the bipartisan spirit in which the commission worked, both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations come across as concerned about Islamist terrorism – but as one problem among many, and not necessarily as a priority. One of the most sympathetic figures to emerge from The 9/11 Commission Report is former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke, who spoke for so many years about the importance of taking seriously al-Qaeda’s threats of a massive attack against the American homeland. It is a telling indicator of the frustration that Clarke felt that “In May or June [2001], Clarke asked to be moved from his counterterrorism portfolio to a new set of responsibilities for cybersecurity. He told us that he was frustrated with his role and with an administration that he considered not ‘serious about al Qaeda’” (p. 205).

A chapter that returns to the actual day of the attacks as they unfolded at the World Trade Center site in New York is appropriately titled “Heroism and Horror,” and contains plenty of both. Amid the heroism being demonstrated by members of the various public-safety agencies responding to the attacks – FDNY, NYPD, PAPD – there is the shock of learning that the sheer scope of the devastation revealed the communications difficulties within as well as among those agencies. For example, the commission reports that “To our knowledge, no FDNY chiefs outside the South Tower realized that the repeater channel was functioning and being used by units in that tower. The senior chief in the South Tower lobby was initially unable to communicate his requests for more units to chiefs either in the North Tower lobby or at his outdoor command post” (p. 300).

The 9/11 Commission Report looks forward as well as back from the events of that terrible day, providing a long list of well-considered recommendations for changes in future policy. Characteristic in that regard is the commission’s finding concerning the coordination and distribution of terrorism-related intelligence: “In each of our examples, no one was firmly in charge of managing the case and able to draw relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government, assign responsibilities across the agencies (foreign or domestic), track progress, and quickly bring obstacles up to the level where they could be resolved. Responsibility and accountability were diffuse” (p. 400).

The commission made many recommendations. Some were acted on fully and promptly; others were acted on only partially; still others were ignored altogether, notwithstanding the commission’s regular and energetic remonstrances to the government. Nonetheless, The 9/11 Commission Report stands as a powerful reminder of the good that Americans can do, even under the most difficult and tragic of circumstances, when they put aside day-to-day disagreements and work for the good of all.

THE CONTROVERSIAL REPORT ON THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

The 9/11 Commission report has been vilified as "partisan," as a "cover-up" (cf. the supposed cover-up of the JFK assassination by the Warren Commission), etc.; but whatever one's perspective, one should definitely simply READ the report itself (and pay attention to information in the FOOTNOTES; sometimes "minority" members of the Commission were only able to get material included in the report by having it relegated to seemingly obscure footnotes).

They note early on, "No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with multiple hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere in the world in more than 30 years, and never in the United States. As news of the hijackings filtered through the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to their leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might be at risk." (Pg. 10)

About Flight 93, they wrote, "The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them... Jarrah's objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the American Republic, the Capitol or the White House. He was defeated by the alerted, unarmed passengers of United 93." (Pg. 14)

They observed, "Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider. Congress asked outside commissions to do the work that arguably was at the heart of its own oversight responsibilities... these commissions made scores of recommendations to address terrorism and homeland security but drew little attention from Congress. Most of their impact came after 9/11." (Pg. 107)

It states soberly, "It was in Kandahar that perhaps the last, and most likely the best, opportunity arose for targeting bin Ladin with cruise missiles before 9/11. In May 1999... no one at the Pentagon or the CIA ... thought it was a bad gamble..." (Pg. 140)

They summarize, "While by no means as threatening as Japan's act of war, the 9/11 attack was in some ways more devastating. It was carried out by a tiny group of people, not enough to fill a full platoon. Measured on a governmental scale, the resources behind it were trivial. The group itself was dispatched by an organization based in one of the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth. The organization recruited a mixture of young fanatics and highly educated zealots who could not find suitable places in their home societies or were driven from them." (Pg. 339-340)

The official report is essential reading for anyone interested in the 9/11 attacks, and their aftermath.

I read this book almost at the 18th anniversary of 9/11. I think all Americans should read a book like this. Forget CNN, forget Fox News, you’ll never get the impartiality that you will get from this book.

Someone commented on the strength of the investigation. Well, they must be experts or something. In my opinion what was written was the best that could be written without going into classified material or giving alway the methods of how information was obtained.

It’s very clear from reading this that the mere bureaucracy is what prevented us from being able to prevent such an event from happening. All the signs were there. All the intelligence was there, but the dots were not connected in time.

American hasn’t had another major event like this since 9/11 from foreigners, so we’re doing something right. But what about the home grown terrorists or sympathizers? I’m pretty sure our current administration is not helping on this front.

Some of the information almost feels quaint in the wake of ISIL and the world we live in now. The report is refreshingly sober, methodical, level-headed and thoughtful.

It breaks the events of 9/11 into several parts: the attacks, the background, the planning stages, the victims and responders, the aftermath, and recommendations. It's not an "enjoyable" read by any means, but it is a compelling one, written by adults and not hyperpartisan hacks, thankfully.

As a visa officer in Riyadh after 9/11, I figured this book was required reading. (And it was handed out in our consular training course)

But from the analysis related to my line of work, I found it to be surface level, and offered very little strategic thinking into the fixes necessary to enhance security.

It took me years to come around to reading this, and what is there really to review here? As an historical document, knowing all that came during and after this report was being written--Iraq War, ISIS, etc. this is an interesting benchmark in the midst of a rapidly changing security context.

I had wanted to read this book for a while now and it was hard to get through, but I was finally able to get to it. After reading extensively on the topic over the years, I can say that I believe this book is a disgusting excuse of a commission report, not investigative at all and the ultimate insult to the victims of 9/11 and their families. It reads more like a novel and there is very little engineering or architectural investigation. It focuses mainly on pointing fingers at both the Clinton and Bush administrations as well as the various government departments that were apparently so grossly unprepared for an attack in the heaviest defense spender and most surveilled country in the world. If the book does any good, it points out that being partisan lead to a serious misstep in the government and that all of our tax money has gone to waste.

Here is everything I can think of off the top of my head that was NOT mentioned: Building 7 being "pulled" as said by owner Larry Silverstein (who profited greatly from the attacks), OBL denying he did the attacks only to later supposedly change his mind, the lack of WMDs in Iraq, the "missing taxes" announced September 10th being in the section of the Pentagon that was hit and consequently destroyed or that specific side of the Pentagon being remodeled beforehand to withstand a "plane or drone attack", the builder of the WTC saying they were made to withstand several plane hits, ANY real scientific explanation of how and why the buildings basically demolished onto themselves (the exact same way Building 7 was purposefully demolished)...the list goes on and on and on.

The reason this book reads like a novel is because it is exactly that; a fictitious piece of literature pushed out by every bought and sold media outlet while ignoring facts, science and common sense. I believe every American or person interested in this topic should read this book and others, as well as do other research to connect the dots for themselves.

After well over a decade on my bookshelf and several months of reading, I have finally completed The 9/11 Commission Report. The last three chapters were particularly interesting as they detailed the governments response to the attacks, including the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as laying the foundation for the War on Terror.

Very insightful and interesting. It lead me to different locations where I had to seek more information. I could see it as moving yet not a pretext to knowing where to end. War is so ... we attacked the wrong nation. I enjoyed the book.