Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire

I was delighted to meet Richard Frank at the National World War II Museum Institute for teachers while I was reading this book. Being able to talk with him and ask him questions enhanced my experience with this book. A key takeaway for me was the evidence they Japan was likely to starve in the spring of 1946 of the US hadn’t helped or if the war was still ongoing. I also appreciated the analysis of the Emperor’s role in the war and the decision to allow the Emperor to remain in a diminished position.

Great details on the American and Japanese decision-making leading up to the end of WW2 in the Pacific.

Richard Frank conclusively shatters a number of myths about the end of the Pacific side of World War II.

First, Japan was NOT ready to accept unconditional surrender, even with the caveat of the preservation of the Japanese throne, until after both bombs were dropped. Frank uses extensive declassified transcripts of Ultra (military) and Magic (diplomatic) U.S. codebreaking to get members of the Japanese war cabinet's own words, or lack thereof, on this issue. Within that is the fact that Japan's attempt to use Russia as an intermediary-ally in negotiations was totally out of tune with reality, so much out of tune that Tokyo actually expected Moscow to honor the full one year's "down time" after abrogating the two countries' neutrality agreement.

Second, the Japanese Army was ramping UP the plans for Keisu-Go, the all-out defense of the Japanese homeland, after the spring firebombings of Tokyo and elsewhere. Top Army brass considered that the U.S. might well try blockade, and thought it had enough kamikazes, midget submarines, etc., to make the U.S pay enough a price for even the blockade that it would settle for a negotiated peace. Again, Frank looks in-depth at Magic and Ultra transcripts to show how much support there was for this.

Third, Frank demonstrates that U.S. casualty fears of an invasion of Kyushu were well-warranted and may even have been understated in some cases.

The determination of the Japanese Empire to resist was well-known by American troops in the Pacific who had seen the Japanese, on average, take 97 percent casualties in many of their defensive actions. A militaristic government was ready to exploit this to the death.

The atomic bomb was therefore used for reasons of the highest seriousness. It was NOT dropped on Hiroshima as a demonstration for Stalin. And, speaking of demonstrations, the fact that it took two atomic bombs on Japan to get it to surrender puts the lie to the idea that a "demonstration" bomb would have been enough to get the Japanese to a non-negotiated surrender with them attempting to hold on to territory.

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I re-read this 12 years later, and it's as pertinent as ever. Here's additional notes.

Downfall

As for the “let blockade work” folks? Per Chapter 10 (149ff) a formal blockade started in early June, not too long after Okinawa was done. And, we’d been dropping aerial-placed sea mines on Japan’s Inland Sea, and selected spots elsewhere, already in March.

Rather than “unconditional surrender,” the Potsdam Guarantee not only (roundaboutly) guaranteed the Imperial House, it made other Atlantic Charter-based guarantees that were never offered to Germany, enough of them to appal the Aussie prime minister.

But, as of Aug. 9, that wasn’t good enough for many Japanese leaders, who also knew they were running ever lower on military goods and that the morale of many citizens was weakening.

On Aug. 9, in light of Hiroshima and hearing the first word about Soviet war entry, the Imperial War Cabinet met. The Kwantung Army did not know immediately how badly outnumbered it was, especially on armor, but they knew that this part of their self-deception had now vanished. Then, in the middle of the meeting, came first word of Nagasaki.

And YET, half the War Cabinet kept a “four-condition” stance.

The “one condition” stance was surrender based on the Potsdam Declaration, with the assumption its wording meant that, in some way, shape or form, the Emperor stayed.

The “four condition” stance was, well, in light of reality, intransigent. The other three conditions were that Japanese troops would disarm themselves, that Japan would itself oversee any war crimes trials, and that Japan would not be occupied.

(Up to the time of Okinawa, at least, many Japanese military leaders had been “five-condition” persons, though Frank doesn’t talk about this in detail. That fifth condition was that Japan keep at least part of the territory it had gained in the 1895-1914 period. And, Hirohito himself held to this, as well as holding at that time to a refusal to negotiate until Japan won once more. To overview that?

In the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, Japan crushed China. China ceded the Liaotong Peninsula and Taiwan to Japan. But Russia, in part fronting for other European powers, forced Japan to surrender it and the strategic Port Arthur to Russia in exchange for a bigger Chinese indemnity, with Russia also working to supplant Japanese influence in Korea. That set the stage for the Russo-Japanese War. Japan got Korean influence, Port Arthur, and southern half of Sakhalin Island. But Teddy Roosevelt, in reaty negotiations, backed Nicholas II in refusing to pay an indemnity. That was the first incident to raise Japanese suspicions of US plans for Asia.

Japan then, working off its 1902 alliance with Britain, entered World War 1 with the Allies. Its goal, met successfully, was to take German holdings in China and the Pacific. That was the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands, important in World War II. The not quite totally nutters among the Japanese military believed America would be OK with those surrendered to them but Japan keeping everything else up to 1905.

At the end of the book, Frank refutes a number of misconceptions, starting with the “bombs vs invasion” one. Yes, the two bombs did save as many as 500,000 casualties and 100,000 US deaths just for the invasion of Kyushu, and yes, that was mentioned soon after the war, but that wasn’t the primary concern at the time, or at least not the sole primary concern.

Rather, and especially before Trinity and it being known we had a working plutonium bomb, the issue was “blockade and bombardment alone” vs “that plus invasion” on getting Japan to surrender and even more, getting Japan to surrender IN AN ORDERLY FASHION.

Caps-lock is needed on this.

Even after the two bombs AND Hirohito’s rescript, Truman and the brass weren’t 100 percent sure all Japanese troops in Japan would surrender in an orderly fashion and they were VERY unsure about troops in outlying areas of Japanese occupation. In fact, Japanese military leaders were also unsure.

Now, those casualties.

There was no final, formal assessment by US planners after the war was done about what Olympic would have cost. But we know that casualty estimates were going up and Nimitz had already soured on it because of this. The numbers above are reasonable estimates.

And, that’s just US military casualities.

From the start of the war in non-Manchuria parts of China in the last 1930s, Frank shows that Japanese occupation had been killing a million Chinese a year. From 1941 on, it had been killing half a million residents in other occupied countries.

So, every month the war continued was a month, even with the loss of parts of the Empire, for 100,000 or more civilians to die.

Then there is the issue of how many more Japanese would have died.

Frank does a good job of showing how, if we had continued the full blockade, and then intensified disruption of Japanese transportation as planned, a million or more Japanese might have died of malnutrition and starvation.

And, for moralizers? He points out that blockades are wars against civilians, women and children just like either atomic bombs or napalm incendiaries. Period.

Related to that, he notes that within early military moralizers, many, like Ike, have faulty memories. In other cases, like Leahy, their memories might not be faulty, but they might have been guilty of turf wars. Plenty of Army and Navy people “found” a conscience. Army Air Force / Air Force brass, not so much; per Bomber Harris, after all, the ultimate bomb had gotten through.

Meticulously researched book on the end of Japan and the use of the atomic bomb, Sheds a lot of light on a much debated topic, with as much information as currently available, (records of the Kwantung Army, while seized by the Soviets, at the date of writing had still not been released)

Author draws the conclusion that use of both atomic bombs were justified, though all the evidence leads to the opposite conclusion.

Every August the world commemorates the Atomic bomb droppings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and just about as often we are treated to disagreements over whether the Atomic bomb droppings were justified . Most critiques center on the belief that the Japanese were willing to surrender and were even making an attempt to surrender . Other makes the claim that the claim of American losses were highly exaggerated. Still another group likes to claim that it was the Soviet Unions entering of the war that caused the Japanese to surrender and not the Atomic Bomb droppings .

First the diplomatic overtures Japan made weren't very serious. There would be no surrender but an Armistice. Japan would not be occupied. no war crimes. The Japanese military would not be touched. Even their occupation forces could stay until they were de-colonized. Other diplomats tried but weren't officially recognized . They were freelancers with no official government recognition.

Also it's important to understand that the Japanese decision makers were six men almost all had a military background and were loathe to surrender.

Where this book makes its strongest case for the necessity of the Atomic bomb droppings was an analysis of the Japanese Army as it prepared to fight the Americans . While the Japanese Army lacked many resources it certainly had the ability to fight a defensive battle. It had well trained and disciplined men. They were fighting on their home turf. They were fanatical in their devotion. Seeing the number of men. The equipment they possessed the number of Kamikaze aircraft and boats. It's obvious that the American military would have suffered losses in the tens of Thousands .

I don't think you cannot read this and not come to the conclusion that dropping of the Atomic bombs was justified.

A truly fascinating book on the end stages of World War II. Quite frankly, anyone who wishes to consider the question of the Atomic Bombs needs to read this book. It deals in detail with the key arguments:
1) The potential costs of invasion
2) The onrushing famine crisis in Japan caused by the US destruction of the transportion net
3) The contents of intercepted Japanese Diplomatic messages which indicated that Japan was unwilling to surrender on the eventual terms (Uncondtional, Emperor allowed to remain) until August
4) The Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, and then Sakhalin

(as well as a number of other things)

Even if you don't agree with Frank's conclusions this book sets out the key points of discussion very well.

Richard Frank argues that the decision to use the atomic bomb originated out of military rather than diplomatic necessity. Frank begins his account with an explanation of the Tokyo firebombings and the military thought that lead to the decision to use less discrimination in regards to civilian targets. Much of the book demonstrates Frank’s comprehensive understanding of military strategy as he goes on to describe the strategies used throughout the Pacific and their relative successes. He uses this information to argue that the atomic bombs were not an aberration but a logical next step in a military campaign that accepted tremendous civilian losses while trying to minimize American casualties.

Throughout his analysis Frank puts forth a convincing and thorough military argument, taking issue with historians such as Gar Alperovitz who have vehemently criticized the decision to drop the bomb. The fact that he includes sources from the Japanese lends credibility to his argument as well. However, his final chapter gives the impression that he is seeking “vindication” for the decision-makers during the Pacific War especially in terms of using the atomic bomb. This is where Frank engages in the same moral judgments that he seems to criticize other historians for. Certainly, in light of Frank’s evidence, the atomic bomb seems to have ended the war earlier than the planned invasion of Kyushu with fewer American casualties, but Frank remains narrowly focused on military aspects alone. Although he does grant a chapter to discussing the role diplomacy with the Soviet Union played in the use of the atomic bomb, he maintains the belief that diplomacy only played a secondary role in the decision-making process. Frank asserts in his final chapter that “alternatives to the atomic bombs carried no guarantee that they would end the war or reduce the amount of human death and suffering” (360). In 1945, the atomic bomb, having never played a role in warfare before, made no such guarantee either. Frank offers a comprehensive look at military strategy and thinking during the Pacific War, which adds a valuable component to the history of the atomic bomb. However, his rationale for the use of the atomic bomb must be considered in light of other theories that highlight other lines of reasoning. It is only with an eye for a varied historical account can we begin to offer vindication or villainy. And, due to the fact that many of these historical accounts will never be resolved, perhaps it is fruitless to try to seek that distinction.

A fascinating and important book. The latter chapters (18-20) are particularly valuable in documenting the time line of Japan's decision to surrender, effectively refuting the notion that it was the two atomic bombs. Spoiler: it was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.