Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe

“The central project of this book is an examination of the ethical implications of naturalism.“

“… Naturalism leaves open the possibility that there are ethical facts that are not reducible to physical or scientific facts. “

“Is there such a thing as virtue in a naturalistic universe, and if so, what is it? “

“… It is perfectly rational for me to reject the Christian Supernatural claims about Jesus without having a detailed alternative explanation.”

Wielenberg’s foils in this book are: CS Lewis, William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga.

Chapter 1

It is often maintained that if God does not exist human life is meaningless. For human life to have meaning it is sometimes said is “for it to have a purpose that is assigned by a supernatural being.” “Under another interpretation for human life to have meaning is for it to bring goodness into the universe.” “Under a third interpretation for a human life to have meaning is for it to be good for the person who lives it and for it to include activity that is worthwhile.“

Wielenberg does a good job of going through the history of argumentation about the nature of meaning and ethics in the history of philosophy. While he is highly critical of the nature and source of ethical claims in the religious tradition when he gets around to offering his own positive content he doesn’t stray very far.

He claims that there are in fact intrinsic goods in a small list to us that includes: falling in love, engaging and intellectually stimulating activity, being creative in various ways, experiencing pleasure of various kinds, and teaching.“ Later he claims “the foundation of morality is a set of axiomatic necessary ethical truths.“

There is no place for God.

He concludes chapter 2 by saying “if there are ethical truths at all, then some of them lie at the very bedrock of reality, created by no one, under no one’s control, passing judgment on the actions and character of God and man alike.“

In chapter 3 he takes up the question: why be moral In a world without God?

Wielenberg is very comfortable talking about moral obligation in a naturalistic world. Just exactly how are such obligations created or binding?

In chapter 4, Wielenberg takes on the issue of whether or not a naturalistic perspective would support the notion of several key Christian virtues including humility, charity and hope.

“Being an ethically good person is, in part, a matter of being properly oriented toward the universe.”

His argument in favor of humility and a naturalistic world is basically that we did not create the world a combination of genetic determinism, material determinism, environmentalist determinism, social determinism, he takes much of the position that John Rawls does in A Theory of Justice: “You didn’t build that.“. We should consider ourselves to be very lucky if we live good lives and for that reason, we should be humble.

Then, Wielenberg severely criticizes the Old Testament, specifically the call to obedience to God. And he believes that he Crusades were initiated because of Christian beliefs. He does not take any position on the 450 years of Muslim advances throughout Africa and Spain and the Middle East.

“But one does not have to be a theist, much less a Christian, to recognize that the tendency towards selfishness is at the same time one of the most entrenched as well as the most pernicious features of human nature. Naturalist and theist alike should acknowledge that one of the greatest challenges we face is the dark heart within ourselves.

Egads!

He does a rather poor job of examining the ethical implications of naturalism.

This is both an account of how value is possible given atheism as well as a more subtle defense of moral realism. wielenberg does an admirable job of dissembling divine command theory and questioning how the presence of God is even supposed to answer any moral question. I'd recommend this book for anyone interested in metaethics generally, and more specifically who question the ability for atheists to have not only an objective moral standard, but to claim a robust moral realism complete with necessarily true moral propositions. I'd especially recommend this as a serious alternative to Sam Harris' confused work.

This is a good read. But, I disagree with Wielenberg's critique on the Aristotelian quote: a "high minded person is justified in looking down upon others for he has the right opinion of them." Wielenberg disagrees with Aristotle's view in that he seems to think that Aristotle is not entitled to such a lofty sense of perceived haughtiness. While this may be true under certain circumstances, I have to object on the premise of the context of Aristotle's quote. I'm quite certain that Aristotle is speaking from a judicial standpoint. And, it's my observation that no judge will look up to someone who's been convicted of a crime. In contrast, he's going to look down on the stupidity of the crime that's been committed. And, a judge does posses the education, intelligence, and "proper opinion" of such an individual. Therefore, it follows that this judge is "justified in looking down upon [this individual] for he has the right opinion of [him/her]." So, this book is politically correct in that it does not argue directly against anyone's fundamental beliefs. Therefore, I recommend the work to anyone.

One of the better agnostic/atheist writings on meta-ethics - though it still has it's problems; namely, addressing Hume's ought/is point.

The first half of the book is a rather well rounded discussion of moral arguments for the existence of God, as well as arguments against the possibility of atheistic moral realism. The author concludes that these arguments are defective in some sense or other. The first half is successful in its goal, as far as I'm concerned.

The second half of the book goes into what the author believes is a suitable picture of the moral landscape in a naturalistic worldview. However, I do not find the second half as convincing and engaging as the first; however, my own biases against the author's ethical inclinations may be coming into play.

This book is just bad. It's not worthless (the people cited and the examples given in the book are useful to add to your world-view), but it is just plain badly argued. It's the kind of argument which is going to be adored by people who already believe what it is preaching and panned by people who come from an alternative tradition. Additionally, the style is academic and dry: I would bet dollars to donuts that it is a dissertation with the literature review chopped off the front. But that's not really the biggest problem. The biggest problem is that the book is badly argued.

The author effectively shows that if you want to retain Christian values without God, there are justifications from within the modernist worldview that can be leveraged to accomplish that goal. What the author fails to do is accomplish the book's explicit goal: to justify the existence of virtue and vice with a naturalistic presumption.

If you're looking to retain Christian ethics without all the mystical stuff, I'd suggest What I Believe, What is Christianity?, or The Essence of Christianity. This book might help you if you are looking to retain Christian ethics but have become allergic to the "Christian" label, although the content is effectively the same.

The problem is that once you encounter non-Christian/anti-Christian ethical systems (e.g. Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morality), and especially once you are aware of the modernistic presumptions of tradition with its focus on the productive individual, then you're suddenly having to work with a lot fewer presumptions. Statements like this author makes frequently—"Obviously this is better than that"—suddenly require justification.

To give just one example: The author considers Sisyphus, who is condemned to roll a boulder up a hill, only to have it roll back down when it gets to the top—and this will repeat for eternity. Sisyphus's life is a bad one because it is one of frustration. But consider the case if Sisyphus loved rolling boulders up a hill. Maybe he got a "boulder roller's high", like runners and their "runner's high". In this case, Sisyphus would be getting to do what he loved for eternity. Is this a good life? The author says no...but why not? The presumptions creating into that "no" are massive—and none of which are addressed by the author!

The author is within a very particular tradition and does not break out from that tradition, despite the presumption of naturalism. This book is, ultimately, a very Christian text (what's more, it's actually extremely Protestant), even if it purports to be otherwise and presumes God does not exist. If you come from a Christian background and haven't analyzed your resulting formation critically—or if you have analyzed that formation and decided to go with your Christian formation anyway, even as a naturalist—then this book might speak to you. But as someone who is pretty hyper-critical of ethical presumptions, this book simply presumes too much.

I agree with another reviewer that, at times, his writing style is a bit awkward but this could be because it has been a long time since I've read anything that would qualify as "philosophy" and simply took getting accustomed to.
I think he makes a lot of really good arguments but I was unfamiliar with some of his references and some of the arguments so I did a lot of side reading to get other angles on his arguments and those he attempts to refute.
I have really enjoyed the book as a somewhat challenging (in the sense that it is a new "genre" for me and required some background reading) but quite accessible and a great look into some logical arguments that approach the issue of "naturalistic virtue" in a way that clearly develops the opposing arguments in order to support his own.

Great book if you think morality and meaning are only possible of God exists. Totally readable and lots of interesting things to think about.