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Fundamentally disappointing. I went in hoping for a good defence of compatiblism and got nothing other than a few bland assertions
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Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting
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Anyone who has wondered if free will is just an illusion or has asked 'could I have chosen otherwise?' after performing some rash deed will find this book an absorbing discussion of an endlessly fascinating subject. Daniel Dennett, whose previous books include "Brainstorms "and (with Douglas Hofstadter) "The Mind's I, " tackles the free will problem in a highly original and witty manner, drawing on the theories and concepts of several fields usually ignored by philosophers; not just physics and evolutionary biology, but engineering, automata theory, and artificial intelligence.
In "Elbow Room," Dennett shows how the classical formulations of the problem in philosophy depend on misuses of imagination, and he disentangles the philosophical problems of real interest from the "family of anxieties' they get enmeshed in - imaginary agents, bogeymen, and dire prospects that seem to threaten our freedom. Putting sociobiology in its rightful place, he concludes that we can have free will and science too. "Elbow Room" begins by showing how we can be "moved by reasons" without being exempt from physical causation. It goes on to analyze concepts of control and self-control-concepts often skimped by philosophers but which are central to the questions of free will and determinism. A chapter on "self-made selves" discusses the idea of self or agent to see how it can be kept from disappearing under the onslaught of science. Dennett then sees what can be made of the notion of acting under the idea of freedomdoes the elbow room we think we have really exist? What is an opportunity, and how can anything in our futures be "up to us"? He investigates the meaning of "can" and "could have done otherwise," and asks why we want free will in the first place.We are wise, Dennett notes, to want free will, but that in itself raises a host of questions about responsibility. In a final chapter, he takes up the problem of how anyone can ever be guilty, and what the rationale is for holding people responsible and even, on occasion, punishing them.
"Elbow Room "is an expanded version of the John Locke Lectures which Dennett gave at Oxford University in 1983.
In "Elbow Room," Dennett shows how the classical formulations of the problem in philosophy depend on misuses of imagination, and he disentangles the philosophical problems of real interest from the "family of anxieties' they get enmeshed in - imaginary agents, bogeymen, and dire prospects that seem to threaten our freedom. Putting sociobiology in its rightful place, he concludes that we can have free will and science too. "Elbow Room" begins by showing how we can be "moved by reasons" without being exempt from physical causation. It goes on to analyze concepts of control and self-control-concepts often skimped by philosophers but which are central to the questions of free will and determinism. A chapter on "self-made selves" discusses the idea of self or agent to see how it can be kept from disappearing under the onslaught of science. Dennett then sees what can be made of the notion of acting under the idea of freedomdoes the elbow room we think we have really exist? What is an opportunity, and how can anything in our futures be "up to us"? He investigates the meaning of "can" and "could have done otherwise," and asks why we want free will in the first place.We are wise, Dennett notes, to want free will, but that in itself raises a host of questions about responsibility. In a final chapter, he takes up the problem of how anyone can ever be guilty, and what the rationale is for holding people responsible and even, on occasion, punishing them.
"Elbow Room "is an expanded version of the John Locke Lectures which Dennett gave at Oxford University in 1983.
248 pages, Paperback
First published January 1,1984
This edition
- Format
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248 pages, Paperback
- Published
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November 21, 1984 by MIT Press
- ISBN
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9780262540421
- ASIN
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0262540428
- Language
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English
About the author
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Daniel Clement Dennett III is a prominent philosopher whose research centers on philosophy of mind, science, and biology, particularly as they relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He is the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Dennett is a noted atheist, avid sailor, and advocate of the Brights movement.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He is a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He is a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
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More formal philosophy in background would have helped. Everything he said was well argued and made sense, but he was generally reacting to and responding to quesions in contemporary and historical philosophy.
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I had been meaning to read some Daniel Dennet books for a while. Saw this one at the library and decided to read it. Or maybe "I" didn't, who's to say. Maybe I can't actually "decide" anything. I'm kidding, but also, who knows haha. I don't think the audiobook version was the way to go for me on this one. I think I needed to read the physical book and spend more time with this, because I either couldn't really follow it, or I'm dense. I'll be re-reading this at another time.
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Dennett believes interest in free will is motivated by fear, fear that without it our experience of life will change. Life will become either a dreamlike hypnotic state or a prison.
Dennett rejects this. Prisons, he observes, take many forms. One can be confined to a small cell or, like Napoleon on Elba, have an entire island.
The title of the book emerges from this idea, that our conceptualizations of free will need to account for its variety, or elbow room.
Dennett is a compatibilist. He believes free will and determinism are compatible, that you can believe in both and be logically consistent.
I’m currently re-reading the book. Even though I am overall more sympathetic to Sapolsky’s argument in *Determined*, I’m currently more persuaded by Dennett. Will need to brood further and may update my review later.
Dennett rejects this. Prisons, he observes, take many forms. One can be confined to a small cell or, like Napoleon on Elba, have an entire island.
The title of the book emerges from this idea, that our conceptualizations of free will need to account for its variety, or elbow room.
Dennett is a compatibilist. He believes free will and determinism are compatible, that you can believe in both and be logically consistent.
I’m currently re-reading the book. Even though I am overall more sympathetic to Sapolsky’s argument in *Determined*, I’m currently more persuaded by Dennett. Will need to brood further and may update my review later.
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What a journey :) I read this to get a better understanding of what compatibilism is all about and this book more than delivered. While I can't say that I was able to fully follow all of his arguments or that I am now fully convinced, I have to say that Dennett brings some very interesting perspectives to the table as to why we actually have free will in a deterministic universe (at least the kind of free will that one might want). It must also be said that he can be quite funny at times, "dropping some lines" that I would not have expected in a philosophy book on such a difficult subject.
Dennett starts by looking at typical ways in which a lack of free will is often introduced, and shows that these thought experiments (whether on purpose or without thinking about it) play on some innate fears that one might have about such a scenario. He shows that these fears are unfounded, which sets the scene for a more neutral discussion of what we might mean when we say "I have free will", focusing on different areas such as "What would be control over my decisions", "Who is this me that wants free will", etc.?
I can't really give a good overview of all the points made as I still need to read more to get the full picture, but just for the idea of "transivity of control" and the basic idea of "when you wake up in the morning you either get up or you don't - you have to choose" this was a wonderful read.
When I have seen more perspectives I will definitely revisit this for further understanding. I honestly regret buying this for the Kindle... This deserves a place on my physical bookshelf. But perhaps I was doomed to make that mistake < /pun>
Dennett starts by looking at typical ways in which a lack of free will is often introduced, and shows that these thought experiments (whether on purpose or without thinking about it) play on some innate fears that one might have about such a scenario. He shows that these fears are unfounded, which sets the scene for a more neutral discussion of what we might mean when we say "I have free will", focusing on different areas such as "What would be control over my decisions", "Who is this me that wants free will", etc.?
I can't really give a good overview of all the points made as I still need to read more to get the full picture, but just for the idea of "transivity of control" and the basic idea of "when you wake up in the morning you either get up or you don't - you have to choose" this was a wonderful read.
When I have seen more perspectives I will definitely revisit this for further understanding. I honestly regret buying this for the Kindle... This deserves a place on my physical bookshelf. But perhaps I was doomed to make that mistake < /pun>
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Interesting read, but difficult: Dennett writes for the student of Philosophy. Eminently accessible to a person willing to commit, but, as all philosophical writing, commitment it requires. He explores Free Will in terms of Determinism, that is, the proposal that Free Will as we think of it, is an illusion and that human beings as rational agents are as subject to causation as dominoes. It's an extremely uncomfortable idea for many people, and Dennett doesn't spend a great deal of time acclimating one. Best to get comfortable with the idea before Dennett sweeps you up in all the subsequent implications.
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What an absolute bore. He tackles non problems with great gusto and pishes away real challenges as if they were nothing and never actually addresses them. He comes across like the sort of man who never let's anyone else get a word in at a party. Heck, the author he most often references is himself.
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Dennett spends half his time making the case for determinism, and the other half laying out the argument for why it's really not that scary. He uses very clear language to keep the book accessible even to people without backgrounds in philosophy, which is good. Philosophers are weird, y'all.
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