"Digo, pois que, se a alma temperante e sensata é boa, a que não tem aquelas qualidades é má. Esta será a alma insensata e intemperante. - De acordo. - O homem sensato é, naturalmente, aquele que procede em relação aos deuses e aos homens de maneira que convém; seria insensato, se fizesse o que não convém. - É inevitável que assim seja. - Mas agir como convém relativamente aos homens é praticar a justiça; em relação aos deuses é praticar a piedade: ora praticar a justiça e a piedade é ser justo e pio. - Acho bem. - E é, necessariamente, ser também corajoso, porque o que é próprio de um homem corajoso não é procurar ou evitar aquilo que não deve ser procurado ou evitado, mas procurar ou evitar apenas aquilo que convém, que se trate de coisas, de pessoas, de prazeres ou de dores, suportando para tanto o que for necessário suportar."
(...) Sustendo, Cálicles, que o mais vergonhoso não é eu ser esbofeteado injustamente nem ver o meu corpo mutilado ou a minha bolsa cortada; mais vergonhoso e pior é o facto de me baterem, mutilarem ou despojarem, porque roubarem-te, reduzirem-me à escravidão, entrarem à força em minha casa, numa palavra, cometerem contra mim e contra o que me pertence uma injustiça, é pior e mais vergonhoso para o que a pratica do que para mim que a sofro."

SócratesLivro: "Górgias", Platão. Introdução, tradução do grego e notas de Manuel de Oliveira Pulquério

***

Em "Górgias" (Górgias pertencera à primeira geração de sofistas) Sócrates refuta das teorias de Cálicles, Polo e Górgias através do método que o imortalizou - o método socrático: este método assenta no diálogo e, através dele, o professor conduz o aluno ao auto-questionamento e reflexão. Trata-se de uma forma de decompor e de simplificar o raciocínio, através de um sistema de perguntas e respostas simples, que visam esclarecer e trazer à luz a verdade e a essência das teorias.
Ainda em jovem adulta estudei um outro diálogo, intitulado "Fédon", e esse estudo imersivo (digo-o porque se estendeu ao longo de um trimestre. É possível estudar uma obra intensamente e durante um largo período de tempo? Sim, evidentemente que é possível, e a nossa relação com os livros e autores sairá reforçada depois disso) acabaria por me tornar uma leitora atenta de Platão e, consequentemente, adepta dos métodos aplicados por Sócrates.

Neste livro assiste-se a um fenómeno interessante, os interlocutores de Sócrates vão abandonando gradualmente o diálogo, incapazes de o acompanhar, e o útlimo deles, Cálicles, acaba mesmo por se recusar a manter o sistema de pergunta - resposta e "obriga", em certo sentido, Sócrates a sistematizar tudo o que fora discutido e refutado, mantendo-se quase à margem do diálogo. Outro aspecto interessante, e que abunda neste diálogo, é a quantidade de ironia e de sarcasmo nos discursos de ambas as partes, sofistas e Sócrates.

Socrates at his finest.

A particularly amusing dialogue with lively characters and fine irony. Callicles is superb.

This is about Rhetoric and to what purposes it can be put: making a person better, more just or only for one’s gratifications. The dialogue is structured around 3 conversations of socrates with gorgias, polus and calicles. Certainly the last one is very long (half the book) and very winding and repetitive.

But this last conversation is compensated and followed by the beautiful myth about the judgement of souls by 3 judges who look at the soul and can see how ugly or beautiful the soul is. Based on this evaluation one is sent to the garden of bliss or the Tartarus . The condemned are to undergo punishment for their own purification or as example for others, is very comparable to Dante’s hell/ purgatory.

The essence of the dialogue is summarised towards the end: that doing what’s unjust is more to be guarded against than suffering it, and that it’s not seeming to be good but being good that a man should take care of more than anything, both in his public and his private life; and that if a person proves to be bad in some respect, he’s to be disciplined, and that the second best thing after being just is to become just by paying one’s [c] due, by being disciplined; and that every form of flattery, both the form concerned with oneself and that concerned with others, whether they’re few or many, is to be avoided, and that oratory and every other activity is always to be used in support of what’s just.

But I enjoyed much more the dialogue Phaedo for it’s content, condensed dialogue and beautiful images

I read this twenty years ago and participated in my first weekend retreat sponsored by the Basic Program of Liberal Education of The University of Chicago. It was an exciting weekend as we sat up past midnight discussing Plato's arguments for education and the power of the sophists represented by Gorgias. As part of the weekend we watched the film, Educating Rita, and it has become one of my favorites always bringing memories of that weekend and Plato's Gorgias.
The familiar saying of Socrates is that he only knows that he does not know anything. And he spends his time refuting his dialectical partners who claim to know something. This usually leads to the result that they admit they do not know what they claimed to, but also usually leaves the reader in the dark as the dialogue ends without any resolution or answer to the questions posed by Socrates. This occurs repeatedly with unsuccessful attempts to define temperance (Charmides), courage (Laches), or friendship (Lysis). It is surprising when, in a reading of the Gorgias, the reader finds a different Socrates who does claim to know several things. It is here, in the Gorgias, that we see Plato's own dramatic art at work, molding a new and improved Socrates to perform in a way that will display, perhaps, the views of Plato himself.
Plato's dramatic art is not unlike that of a playwright and several dialogues, including the Gorgias, have a dramatic progression and contain crises as plays do. The Gorgias as a whole can be seen as a fine example of Plato's art in the form of a dramatic progression. There are three perfectly connected episodes: Socrates' three conversations with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. Gorgias, the famous sophist, seeing only the technical side of the orators' training, is incapable of giving his art any moral purpose. Polus will not use rhetoric for an evil end but only because he is timid and respects prejudices. But let a violent person like Callicles come along: he will find in the school of Gorgias not a restraint, but an instrument for the expression of his violence. In this fashion all consequences of the intellectual attitude of Gorgias are developed in a living and dramatic manner. Interestingly, Plato ends the Gorgias with one of the famous myths that appear and reappear throughout the dialogues (Symposium, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic to name a few). They do not always appear in the mouth of Socrates, but at the end of the Gorgias it is Socrates himself who says to Callicles:
"Give an ear then, as they say, to a right fine story, which you will regard as a fable, I fancy, but I as an actual account; for what I am about to tell you I mean to offer as the truth." (523a)
Socrates goes on to present a treatise of a sort that comments on the destiny of the soul, giving the dialogue a foundation that in retrospect it seemed to be aiming at the whole time.

Gorgias is a Platonic dialogue between Socrates and sophists. Socrates begins by pursuing the nature of sophistry, specifically rhetoric. Gorgias argues that rhetoric, as a form of persuasion, prioritises conviction over facts. Gorgias asserts that rhetoric ought to be used for good, yet admits that one may not do so. If the latter, Gorgias proclaims that the teacher cannot be blamed. Socrates believes this is unjust. If one was a good teacher, they would instil justice into their pupil. Vis-à-vis politics, Socrates argues that the philosopher is the specialist in matters of justice. Philosophy, not sophistry, should therefore underpin a political education.

Although this is a fictional dialogue, it is important to recognise an empirical flaw in Plato's/Socrates' argument. Socrates taught Alcibiades, an Athenian statesman and general. Alcibiades acted unjustly. He was accused of aspiring to tyranny and fled to Sparta--Athens' enemy during the Peloponnesian War. Plato was also the teacher of many tyrants, including Dionysius of Syracuse. If the teacher is to blame for the actions of their students, therefore Socrates and Plato are culpable for the unjust actions of Alcibiades and Dionysius. Perhaps philosophers are not good teachers; perhaps philosophy does not guarantee justice.

Socrates contends that receiving injustice is preferable to inflicting it, as the latter harms ones soul, while the former does not. Socrates implicitly asserts that all souls are the same, and that harmed souls will be punished by the gods if they escape punishment in the mortal world. However, modern evidence suggests that tyrants--e.g., Alcibiades and Dionysus--are often sociopaths. Their 'soul' may therefore not be corrupted by acts of injustice. Additionally, Socrates readily admits that his judgment in the afterlife argument is based on Greek mythology. Such logic appears comparable to the sophist who prioritises conviction over facts.

Intertwined in this dialogue are several other themes, including temperance, ethics, and the pursuit of happiness. Compared to other Platonic dialogues where Socrates' postulations are met with agreement by his interlocutors, the sophists offer more rigorous rebuttals. The arguments presented can be esoteric at times and may require rereading. This said, Gorgias is reasonably short and provides a good introduction into Platonic philosophy. For deeper understanding, I recommend reading it alongside other dialogues concerning Socrates' trial and execution, namely Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno and Phaedo.

Ben hakikaten sevmiyorum bu Platon'u ya. Gorgias'ı tekrar okuyunca tekrar farkettim. Şimdi kitap elimde değil, zaten sağlıklı analizler yapacak halim ve iştiyakım da yok ama özetle şöyle söyleyebilirim: Platon, Sokrates'in tartışmayı sanki son derece sistematik ve kullandığı kavramların her birini açık seçik tanımlayarak yürüttüğü gibi bir izlenim vermeye çalışıyor ve fakat aslında durum hiç de öyle değil.

Platon, Sokrates'in muhataplarını kendilerini bir şey sanan avanaklar gibi gösterip duruyor ve Sokrates'in, sazı eline aldığı zamanlarda son derece tutarlı bir düşünce çizgisini sürdürdüğü izlenimini uyandırmaya çalışıyor okurda. Halbuki hiç alakası yok. İyi, kötü, çirkin, üstün, değersiz... Bu kavramların hepsini kaypak bir şekilde, anlamlarının nerede sabitlendiğini anlamadığımız bir şekilde kullanıyor Sokrates. Hatta yer yer "bir şeyin çirkin olduğunu, o yüzden de kötü olduğunu" falan söyleyebiliyor. (Açıkça kaynak veremeyeceğim tabi şimdi ama "kötülük etmenin, kötülük görmekten daha kötü olduğunu" ispatlarken böyle bir şey yapıyordu mesela. Daha neler neler... Acaba terimlerin çeviride anlamsızlaşmasından falan olabilir mi bu? Yunanca bilsek durum farklı olur muydu acaba? Sanmıyorum ama böyle bir ihtimal de var elbette) Hatta Kallikles metnin içerisinde bir yerde "Sokrates, senin söylediklerin bana hiç inandırıcı gelmiyor ama sana itiraz da edemiyorum" falan diyordu da, Sokrates o çok bilmişliğiyle kendini hakikate teslim etmenin zorluğundan falan dem vuruyordu. Hadi lan oradan, demiştim okurken; Platon'un çizdiği şekliyle Kallikles safın önde gideni, Sokrates de diyalektik yöntemin, tartışmalarda üste çıkmanın ustası bi herif. Ondan oluyor o. (Muhtemelen Platon böyle bir yorumu hoş karşılamazdı tabi).

Üstüne üstlük Platon, tartışmanın karşı-taraflarına (Gorgias, Polon ve Kallikles) sormaları gereken yerde sormaları gereken soruları sordurtmuyor, pekala kabul etmeyebilecekleri sonuçları sanki akıl yürütmenin zorunlu sonuçlarıymış gibi kabule dayatıyor, dahası Sokrates o muhteşem dehasıyla herkesin düşünce zincirindeki eksik halkaları bulup çıkarırken bir Allah'ın kulu da Sokrates'in atladığı, kusurlu olduğu, yanlış akıl yürüttüğü, kavramların anlamlarındaki muğlaklıklardan faydalandığı kısımları gösteremiyor. Bir yandan bu normal, Platon kendi akıl yürütmesindeki kusurları göremezdi elbette ve bu yüzden diyalog içerisinde kendi kendisinin hatalarını gösteremediği için ona çemkirmek yersiz olabilir. Ama bir yandan da diyaloğun Sokrates dışındaki tüm karakterlerinin Sokrates'ın görüşlerini açıklaması için işlevsel araçlar olarak kullanılması benim "Sokratesçi soruşturma" falan diye göklere çıkarılan şeye gıcık olmama yetiyor. Çünkü aslında ortada basbayağı uzun bir retorik var. Tartışma falan hak getire. Şu bizim klasik eserlerde "in kîle... feyekulü" ("eğer bu görüşe şöyle şöyle diyerek itiraz edilirse, biz de şöyle şöyle diyerek cevap veririz") kalıbı vardır ya hani, işte onun aynısını yapıyor Sokrates. Tartışmadaki karakterleri Sokrates'in görüşlerine şerh düşmek için kullanıyor resmen.

Neyse... Normalde üç beş olumlu şey de söyleyebilirim aslında Platon'un bu diyaloğu için ama kızgınlığım ve hayal kırıklığım daha baskın geldiğinden onları da yutuveriyorum. Pata küte yazdığım, üzerinde uzun boylu düşünmediğim vs. için yukarıda saçmalamış da olabilirim. Dahası, hakikaten bir şeyleri komple yanlış anlıyor, Platon'a hiç mi hiç nüfuz edemiyor da olabilirim. Bu mümkün tabi. Ama şu anki kafamla, Gorgias diyaloğunu okuduğumda, Platon hakkında aşağı yukarı böyle düşünüyorum işte.

P.S.: Bir de şey; metin eğlenceli sayılır. Yani sıkıla darala okumadım, tam aksine hayli akıcıydı diyalog. İki oturuşta bitti. Az önce de "Sofist" diyaloğunu okudum mesela (ya da "hızlıca okudum" diyeyim, atlayıp zıpladım çünkü sıkıldıkça), o hiç tat vermedi resmen. Gorgias diyalogu nispeten iyi, nispeten keyifli. Başta iki olan notumu, üçe çıkarıyorum o yüzden. İkiyi Sofist'e vereceğim. Ehehehe...

While the Gorgias gets off to a dull start, it turns out to be one of the best—and by far the funniest—of Plato’s dialogues. Socrates takes on a party of sophistic rhetoricians, demonstrating that the “discipline” of rhetoric, when used for any purpose but to identify and advance the good, is no discipline at all, but only a form of flattery—analogous to “cookery” and “ornamentation”—which corrupts the life of the city. True statesmanship is not about persuasion, flowery speeches, or getting one’s way, but is fundamentally concerned with the moral rectitude and self-discipline of one’s people, and seeks above all else to protect them from the immorality that threatens their happiness. Since he alone recognizes that statecraft is soulcraft, Socrates proves to be the only true statesman that Athens has ever had; and this, ironically, is what will inevitably make him a target of state persecution. “My trial”, he says, “will be equivalent to a doctor being prosecuted by a cook before a jury of young children.” The bitter, effervescent medicine will be scorned in favor of the savory, corrosive dessert. But this is of little concern to one intent on happiness—in this life and the next.


SOCRATES: I’ll review the whole argument so far. Is the pleasant the same as the good? No, they’re different. Callicles and I agreed on that.

Should the good be the reason we do pleasant things, or the pleasant be the reason we do good things? The good should be the reason we do pleasant things.

Isn’t it the quality of being pleasant which makes us enjoy things, and the quality of being good which makes us good? Yes.

Now, what does it take to be a good human being? What does it take to be a good anything, in fact? It always takes a specific state of goodness, doesn’t it? I don’t see how we can deny that, Callicles.

And whether we’re talking about a good artefact, a good body, a good mind for that matter, or a good creature, what it takes for these states of goodness to occur in an ideal form is not chaos, but organization and perfection and the particular branch of expertise whose province the object in question is. Right? I agree.

In every case, then, a good state is an organized and orderly state, isn’t it? I’d say so. So a thing has to be informed by a particular orderly structure—the structure appropriate to it—to be good, doesn’t it? I think so.

Doesn’t it follow that a mind possessed of its proper structure is better than a disordered mind? It’s bound to be.

But a ‘mind possessed of orderly structure’ is an orderly mind, isn’t it? Naturally.

And an orderly mind is a self-disciplined mind? Absolutely.

From which it follows that a self-disciplined mind is a good mind. Now, I can’t see anything wrong with this argument, Callicles, but if you can, please tell me what it is.

CALLICLES: Just get on with it, Socrates.

SOCRATES: All right. If a self-disciplined mind is good, then a mind in the opposite state is bad. In other words, an undisciplined and self-indulgent mind is bad. Yes.

Now, a disciplined person must act in an appropriate manner towards both gods and his fellow human beings, because inappropriate behaviour indicates lack of self-discipline. Yes, that’s bound to be so.

Well, when ‘appropriate’ is used of the way we relate to our fellow human beings, it means ‘just’; and when it's applied to the way we relate to the gods, it means ‘religious'. And, of course, anyone who acts justly and religiously is a just and religious person. True.

He's also bound to have courage, because a disciplined person doesn’t choose inappropriate objects to seek out or avoid. No, he turns towards or away from events, people, pleasures, and irritations as and when he should, and steadily endures what he should endure. It follows, Callicles, that because a self-disciplined person is just, brave, and religious, as we’ve explained, he’s a paradigm of goodness. Now, a good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfillment and happiness, whereas a bad man does badly and is therefore unhappy. Unhappiness, then, is the lot of someone who’s the opposite of self-disciplined—in other words, the kind of self-indulgent person you were championing.

That’s my position, and I believe it to be true. If it really is true, it looks as though anyone who wants to be happy must seek out and practice self-discipline, and beat as hasty a retreat as possible away from self-indulgence. The best course would be for him to see to it that he never has to be restrained, but if he or anyone close to him…does ever need it, then he must let justice and restraint be imposed, or else forfeit happiness.

I’ll tell you what the ideal is that we should set ourselves to live by, in my opinion. We should devote all our own and our community’s energies towards ensuring the presence of justice and self-discipline, and so guaranteeing happiness. That’s what should guide our actions. We shouldn’t refuse to restrain our desires, because that condemns us to a life of endlessly trying to satisfy them. And this is the life of a predatory outlaw, in the sense that anyone who lives like that will never be on good terms with anyone else—any other human being, let alone a god—since he’s incapable of co-operation, and co-operation is a prerequisite for friendship. In fact, Callicles, the experts’ opinion is that co-operation, love, order, discipline, and justice bind heaven and earth, gods and men. That’s why they call the universe an ordered whole, my friend, rather than a disorderly mess or an unruly shambles. . . . [We] should denounce any wrongs committed not only by ourselves, but even by our family and friends…this is what rhetoric should be used for.

Γοργίας = Gorgias (dialogue), Plato, Walter Hamilton (Translator), Chris Emlyn-Jones (Commentary)

Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1960 = 1339, In 149 Pages
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Gorgias is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 380 BC. The dialogue depicts a conversation between Socrates and a small group of sophists (and other guests) at a dinner gathering.

In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that philosophy is an art, whereas rhetoric is a skill based on mere experience. To Socrates, most rhetoric is in practice merely flattery. To use rhetoric for good, rhetoric cannot exist alone.

It must depend on philosophy to guide its morality, he argues. Socrates therefore believes that morality is not inherent in rhetoric and that without philosophy, rhetoric is simply used to persuade for personal gain. Socrates suggests that he is one of the few Athenians to practice true politics.

تاریخ نخستین خوانش روز دوازدهم ماه ژوئن سال 2008میلادی

عنوان: فن سخنوری گرگیاس؛ نویسنده: افلاتون، مترجم: لطفی کاویانی؛ تهران، کتابفروشی ابن سینا، شماره گذاری صفحات برای هر فصل جداگانه است در243ص؛ و102ص، و7ص، و96ص، و45ص؛ و ...؛

فهرست: فن سخنوری گرگیاس؛ دانایی شارمیدس؛ تقوای منون؛ دیانت اوتیفرن؛ سقراط در زندان کریتون؛ اپولوژی یا محاکمه سقراط؛ نامه؛

گرگیاس یا «جرجیاس»، از نخستین «سوفسطاییان یونان»، و همدوره با «پروتاگوراس» بودند؛ «افلاطون» این اثر خود را، به نام ایشان کرده‌ است؛ «گرگیاس» فرزند «خارمانتیداس» بودند، و در سال چهارصد و هشتاد و هفت پیش از میلاد، در شهر «لئونتینی»، از متصرفات «یونان» در «سیسیل»، زاده شدند؛ «گرگیاس» برادری به نام «هرودیکوس»، و نیز خواهری داشتند، که تندیس او را، پیشکش پرستشگاه خدای «دلفی» کردند؛ «گرگیاس» شصت‌ ساله بودند، که هم‌شهریانش، او را، در سال چهارصد و بیست و هفت پیش از میلاد، به «آتن» فرستادند، تا از «آتنیان» در برابر هجوم «سیراکوزیها»، درخواست یاری کند؛ «گرگیاس» در «آتن» به سخنرانی پرداختند، و به آموزش فنّ سخنوری مشغول شدند؛ نام آورانی همچون «ایسوکراتیس»، «پریکلس»، «کریتیاس»، «آلکیبیادس»، «توسیدید»، «آگاتون»، «کرفون»، «پولوس» و «کالیرس» از شاگردان ایشان بودند؛

تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 23/10/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ 17/09/1400هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی

n  … for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life.n

Gorgias is easily one of Plato’s best stand-alone dialogues. Indeed, as others have mentioned, it often reads like a germinal version of the Republic, so closely does it track the same themes. A transitional dialogue, the early know-nothing Socrates of unanswered questions is already gone; instead we get Socrates espousing some of Plato’s key positions on truth and morality.

Socrates descends on a party of rhetoricians, seemingly determined to expose them. He questions Gorgias, a well-known teacher of rhetoric, in the attempt to pinpoint what, exactly, rhetoric consists of. We get the usual Socratic paradoxes: if we ought to be convinced by knowledgeable people—a doctor when it comes to medicine, an architect when it comes to buildings—how can somebody who lacks this knowledge teach the art of convincing?
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Gorgias insists that rhetoric is used to accomplish justice. But is Gorgias an expert on justice? No. Are his pupils already just? Neither. And cannot rhetoric be used for unjust ends? Of course. This effectively trips up the old rhetorician. Gorgias’ energetic young pupil, Polus, steps up to defend the old master. He denies what Gorgias said about rhetoric being used to accomplish justice, and instead claims that it is used to gain power.
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This brings Socrates to another one of his paradoxes: that powerful orators are actually to be pitied, since inflicting injustice is worse than suffering injustice. Though Polus laughs, Socrates trips him up just as they did his mentor, by getting him to assent to a seemingly unobjectionable proposition and then deducing from them surprising conclusions. (Socrates was not, you see, without his own rhetorical tricks.) Polus finds himself agreeing that tyrants are to be pitied.
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At this, Callicles enters the fray, not a rhetorician but an Athenian gentleman and a man of affairs, who plays the same role that Thrasymachus plays in the Republic. He scorns philosophy and insults Socrates. All this highfalutin’ talk of justice and truth and such rubbish. Doesn’t Socrates know that what is right is a mere convention and justice is simply whatever the strong wish? Socrates then embarks on his usual procedure, trying to get Callicles to assent to a proposition that is incompatible with Callicles’ position. Callicles eventually gets confused and tired and gives up, allowing Socrates to finish with a grand speech and a Platonic myth about the judgment of souls.
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To the modern reader very little in this dialogue will be convincing. Plato is no doubt right that rhetoric is, at best, neither bad nor good, but is akin to cosmetics or cooking rather than exercise or medicine—the art of pleasing rather than improving people. Yet since we have learned that we cannot trust people to be selfless, disinterested seekers after the truth—as Socrates repeatedly claims to be—we have decided that it’s best to let self-interested parties compete with all the tools at their disposal for their audience’s attention. Heaven knows this procedure is far from perfect and leaves us vulnerable to demagogues. But the world has proven depressingly bereft of pure souls like Socrates.
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Also unconvincing is Plato’s moral stance—namely, that those who commit injustice are to be pitied rather than envied. He proves, of course, that the unjust are more deserving of punishment than the just; this was never in doubt. But he does not, and cannot, prove that the unjust are less happy—since a single jolly tyrant would refute his whole chain of reasoning. Indeed, by establishing a moral precept that is so independent of happiness, Socrates falls into the same plight as did Kant in his categorical imperative. This is a serious difficulty, since, if acting justly can easily lead to unhappiness, what is the motivation to do so? The only way out of this dilemma, as both thinkers seemed to realize, was to hypothesize an afterlife where everyone got their just desserts—the good their reward and the bad their castigation. Needless to say I do not find this solution compelling.
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Yet you can disagree with all of Plato’s positions and still relish this dialogue. This is because, as usual, the most charming thing about Plato is that he is so much bigger than his conclusions. Though Socrates is Plato’s hero and mouthpiece, Plato also seems to be aware of Socrates’ (and his own) limitations. Callicles is not a mere strawman, but puts forward a truly consistent worldview; and Plato leaves it in doubt whether his own arguments prevailed. He even puts some good comebacks in Callicles’ mouth: “Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.” By the Gods, he is!

Her ne kadar zaman aşımına uğramış bir sonuca bağlansa da Platon'un "Gorgias Ya Da Retorik Üstüne" eseri iyi ile kötünün ne olduğunu derin bir şekilde inceleyen, bunu yaparken de sanatın ne olduğunu açıklamaya çalışarak okuyucunun ufkunu açmayı başaran bir kitap. Sanatı daha çok politikanın vazgeçilmez aracı retorikle yani sözle etkileme sanatı üzerinden açıklamaya çalışan kitabın günümüzde bile hala devam eden sanat tartışmalarına ön ayak olduğu bir gerçek. Buradan kitabın politikaya da el attığını anlamak çok zor değil. Kısaca, bir nevi "Devlet"e hazırlık niteliğindeki eser, zaman aşımına uğramış yerlerine rağmen kesinlikle okunması gereken temel felsefe eserleri arasında.

03.02.2015
İstanbul, Türkiye

Alp Turgut

http://www.filmdoktoru.com/kitap-labo...

“En iyi dediklerin en güçlü olanlar mıdır? Ayrıca, en zayıfların da en güçlü olanlara boyun eğmesi mi gerekir? Büyük devletlerin küçük devletleri doğanın verdiği hakla alt ettiklerini söylerken, öyle sanıyorum ki onların daha kudretli ve daha güçlü olduklarını belirtmek istedin. Bu da en kudretlinin, en güçlünün ve en iyinin aynı şey olduklarını ortaya çıkarır. Peki en küçük ve en zayıf olan insan hiç en güçlü olabilir mi? Ya da en iyinin ve de en güçlünün tanımı aynı mıdır?”