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This has good advice based on clear case studies.
Most interesting highlights:
1. Big companies ignore smaller segments to their detriment; the company that focuses on a niche market and does really well with them will then expand outward to the more generic market and kill the competition. Big companies want to move on markets that already exist but you can’t know anything about a market that doesn’t exist yet.
2. Disruptive markets are the ones where first mover’s advantage matters the most
3. There is no market data, there is no hard numbers, there's none of that when you're dealing with a new emerging market
4. Discovery-based planning: this is when you assume the market forecasts are wrong, not right
5. As the products in a new market evolve, the customers’ main desires that drive their purchasing decisions go from functionality to reliability to convenience to price. Once you’re competing based on price you are making low margins and can only win through economies of scale and things like that.
6. Almost all large companies are terrible places to do discovery of new projects; it will always be an uphill battle of people asking why that project needs to exist at all because it’s such a small portion of the pie, it doesn’t match with a large company’s growth needs.
7. Normally the only times a large company fosters a new innovative product successfully is when the CEO himself (or someone nearly as important) makes it their personal vision and mission to make it happen at all costs, and even then it’s just a one time deal. Like Steve Jobs pushing Apple to make the iPhone even though it cannabalized iPod.
8. Johnson and Johnson is an interesting case study, the exception to the rule. It manages 160 completely autonomous companies
There’s good stuff in here. But some of the advice is old news, the case studies are ancient history, and it’s also written clearly for a target audience of middle managers at big stuffy corporations that don’t understand how innovation works in the least. You know, the kind of companies that are dinosaurs; huge but ultimately irrelevant because they probably won’t be around twenty years from now. Finally, the tone was too corporate to be engaging.
I’m still begrudgingly glad I read this and at least it had the blessed strength of not being as overly long as most nonfiction is.
Most interesting highlights:
1. Big companies ignore smaller segments to their detriment; the company that focuses on a niche market and does really well with them will then expand outward to the more generic market and kill the competition. Big companies want to move on markets that already exist but you can’t know anything about a market that doesn’t exist yet.
2. Disruptive markets are the ones where first mover’s advantage matters the most
3. There is no market data, there is no hard numbers, there's none of that when you're dealing with a new emerging market
4. Discovery-based planning: this is when you assume the market forecasts are wrong, not right
5. As the products in a new market evolve, the customers’ main desires that drive their purchasing decisions go from functionality to reliability to convenience to price. Once you’re competing based on price you are making low margins and can only win through economies of scale and things like that.
6. Almost all large companies are terrible places to do discovery of new projects; it will always be an uphill battle of people asking why that project needs to exist at all because it’s such a small portion of the pie, it doesn’t match with a large company’s growth needs.
7. Normally the only times a large company fosters a new innovative product successfully is when the CEO himself (or someone nearly as important) makes it their personal vision and mission to make it happen at all costs, and even then it’s just a one time deal. Like Steve Jobs pushing Apple to make the iPhone even though it cannabalized iPod.
8. Johnson and Johnson is an interesting case study, the exception to the rule. It manages 160 completely autonomous companies
There’s good stuff in here. But some of the advice is old news, the case studies are ancient history, and it’s also written clearly for a target audience of middle managers at big stuffy corporations that don’t understand how innovation works in the least. You know, the kind of companies that are dinosaurs; huge but ultimately irrelevant because they probably won’t be around twenty years from now. Finally, the tone was too corporate to be engaging.
I’m still begrudgingly glad I read this and at least it had the blessed strength of not being as overly long as most nonfiction is.