الكتاب يطرح الفرق بين الديمقراطية و الليبرالية الدستورية
فالديمقراطية هي حكم الشعب عن طريق انتخابه لممثليه
و الليبرالية الدستورية هي دولة القانون,و فصل السلطات
و مراقبة المسؤلين و محاسبتهم بالاضافة لحقوق الافراد
يطرح الكتاب تاريخ الليبرالية و الديمقراطية
كيف تطور بتطور الوعي
ما الاخطار التي قد تسقطها
نماذج من التاريخ و الامثلة على سقوط امم و نجاح امم
يشير مثلا الى ان الدول الغنية بثروات الغاز و النفط في الشرق الاوسط هي الاقل ديمقراطية من غيرها لان الانظمة بها لا تحتاج لشعوبها لبناء ثروة فهي تعتمد على الاقتصاد الريعي.
يشير الى ان متوسط الدخل السنوي للافراد في اي دولة هو مؤشر مهم يتنبأ باستمرار الديمقراطية في تلك الدولة ام لا.
يرى ان الصين بدات بتحرير السوق بشكل بطيء جدا لان استراتيجيتها ان تهيء لطبقة متوسطة كبيرة قبل القفز لنظام ديمقراطي .
لا يمكن اختصار الكتاب بمنشور انصح بقراءته لانه مليء بالمعلومات و النماذج التي تعتبر دروسا للشعوب
كتاب روعة

Like a graduate course on freedom and democracy, this book teaches you, challenges your knowledge, opens your eyes and mind, but does not give you a ready-made opinion ― it invites you to elaborate your own.

And just like a graduate course, the book gets really boring sometimes; it focuses too much on meaningless details or quickly skips through important information. But what's trivial for some is primordial for others, and not all students (/readers) have the same background knowledge on the subject.

I definitely recommend this book.

Well written. Very informative

Huh. So Zakaria's point is that, in this Internet age, we've gone too far with disintermediation, specifically with our government. One can have too much direct democracy--witness California, says Fareed, and I'm not inclined to argue. This book challenged my thinking, made me cranky, and in the end its conclusions are quite strong. Hmmmmm. . .. let's intermediate!

Not my favorite read, but definitely interesting in the initiation of liberal democracies--their rise and fall around on a global setting.

Gerçi kitap biraz eski ama oldukça iyi tespitleri vardır. Demokrasi ve özgürlüğün aslında farklı şeyler olduğunu ve günümüz demokrasisinin aslında kapitalist demokrasi anlamına geldiğini öğrenmiş oluyoruz. Yazar bir liberal olarak fazla tarafgir davranmamış. Politika ve demokrasinin sorunlarını öğrenmek isteyenlerin okumasını tavsiye ederim.

Zakaria si presenta come uno di quegli autori che vede nel costituzionalismo liberale (e non nella democrazia) la culla e l'argine del nostro attuale sistema delle libertà. Non tratta quindi la democrazia come un feticcio.
Attraverso una disamina storica viene chiarito come l'enorme problema del populismo e dell'elezione di leader non democratici e/o apertamente razzisti è già stato ampiamente vissuto per la prima volta con la democratizzazione dei paesi occidentali, attraverso l'estensione del suffragio universale a cavallo tra la fine dell'800 e i primi del '900. Illuminante l'esempio dell'ex sindaco razzista di Vienna Karl Lueger, che poi ispirò Hitler.

L'argomento principale del libro è quello della frattura che si pone tra libertà e democrazia, per cui con l'avanzare di quest'ultima il liberalismo si ritrova sotto l'assedio della politica di massa e delle sue insidie populiste.
In particolare, mano a mano che la democrazia si espandeva, il programma moderato e liberale che rivendicava diritti civili, il libero mercato e il costituzionalismo, perse vigore dinanzi al potere di fascinazione che avevano sulle masse il comunismo, la religione e il nazionalismo in genere.
Questo processo fu il frutto anche di una deliberata strategia di alcuni politici conservatori, come Benjamin Disraeli nel Regno Unito e Otto Von Bismarck nel Regno di Prussia, per contenere il potere dei liberali attraverso il voto delle masse guadagnato con la retorica populista.

Tornando al mondo attuale si può facilmente riconoscere che gli autocrati di molti paesi arabi (Giordania, Marocco, Kuwait, ecc..) sono più liberali dei loro stessi popoli. In questo casi la democrazia può rappresentare un rischio più che un'opportunità.
Di conseguenza, per Zakaria, l'occidente deve riconoscere che i paesi del medioriente non hanno bisogno in primis della democrazia, ma del liberalismo costituzionale. Cioè di quel sistema di diritti e libertà che può essere la culla di quel progresso economico e sociale in grado di ospitare poi una democrazia compiuta e durevole nel tempo.
Ponendo la questione sul livello di progresso sociale, in base ad alcuni studi empirici, si può dimostrare che 3000-6000 dollari è la fascia di reddito per capita che garantirebbe un passaggio ad una democrazia stabile.
In questo discorso Zakaria inserisci la ben nota maledizione dei paesi ricchi di risorse naturali: paesi ricchi di materie prime (Venezuela, Russia, Arabia Saudita, ecc..) non hanno bisogno né di tassare, né di fornire grandi servizi alla popolazione. La classe politica non ha la necessità di far crescere l'economia (e quindi il gettito fiscale) per poter trarre il suo sostentamento, bastano i proventi delle materie prime. La conseguenza è che le istituzioni politiche e la società rimangono sottosviluppate.

Nella seconda parte del libro il discorso si estende alla società civile, dimostrando come la democratizzazione abbia profondamente modificato (se non corrotto) mondi come quelli della religione (attraverso i predicatori mediatici), dei libri, dell'arte e dei professionisti in genere (avvocati, banchieri, ecc..)
Negli ultimi cento anni le istituzioni democratiche hanno subito un processo di graduale screditamento presso l'opinione pubblica, con il paradosso che, mentre i politici e tutti i corpi elettivi perdevano quote significative di fiducia tra la popolazione, ne acquistavano invece sempre più i corpi non elettivi della società: forze armate, corte costituzionale, magistratura, ecc..
Lo stesso processo è capitato alla classe dirigente. Non c'è più una classe dirigente, quella di oggi non si sente tale e anzi tende ad immedesimarsi come facente ancora parte della classe borghese, con il rischio concreto che così facendo la società tende a privarli del peso delle loro responsabilità verso la società stessa; si perde un meccanismo di controllo verso il loro potere, che oggi aumenta in modo smisurato. Dalla classe dirigente di oggi ci aspettiamo poco e non veniamo delusi mai.

In conclusione il libro ha un grande realismo politico, non è un libro contro la democrazia ma ha il pregio (e il coraggio) di descriverne chiaramente i limiti.

Reason read: TIOLI #10 title with freedom
First off, this book is nonfiction, written by Fareed Zakaria (Indian/American) journalist, works for CNN and Washington Post. He is a political person and identifies as a centrist; Centrism is a political outlook or position involving acceptance or support of a balance of social equality and a degree of social hierarchy while opposing political changes that would result in a significant shift of society strongly to the left or the right. This book is a commentary of democracy and constitutionalism and the many forms of democracy. Illiberal Democracy restricts freedom of thought and behavior. The US was a constitutionalism country originally but that has been eroded over the years. This book covers all the problems with the US political system and how there really is no two party system. It is a system run by special interest and polls and how a lot of reform has actually caused the many losses to the original ideas that the country was founded on. The author also covers in depth all the countries of the world and the forms of government and what he considers the deciding factors of freedom. Easy money whether it is oil based or money given to countries by other countries does not promote movement toward freedom for the people. The book also covers religion; Christianity, secularism, Islam and its affect on government and governments effects on it.

I found it an interesting book but I can't say that I understood it. I do think there were gems but on the other hand, you can't pin any one thought down. The author does not like to take sides but rather provides information. I ended up feeling that there really is no hope of turning things around here in the US and voting really doesn't offer any leverage to influence change. Published in 2004 and still pretty much describes things as they continue to be.

for much of modern history, what characterized governments in Europe and North America, and differentiated them from those around the world, was not democracy but constitutional liberalism. The "western model of government" is best symbolized not by the mass plebiscite but the impartial judge. [20.]

what is distinctive about the American system is not how democratic it is but rather how undemocratic it is, placing as it does multiple constraints on electoral majorities. [22:]

the French under the old monarchy held it for a maxim that the king could do no wrong... and if he do no wrong, the blame would be imputed to his advisors...The Americans entertain the same opinion with respect to the majority. [24:]

European deviations from the Anglo-American pattern- constitutionalism and capitalism first, only then democracy- were far less successful in producing liberal democracy. [58:]

the process of economic development usually produces the two elements that are crucial to the success of liberal democracy. First, it allows key segments of society- most important, private businesses and the broader bourgeoisie- to gain power independent of the state. Second, in bargaining with these elements the state tends to become less rapacious and capricious and more rule oriented and responsive to societies needs, or at least to the needs of the elite of that society. This process results in liberalization, often unintentionally. [71-72:]

Dictatorships believe that they want growth but actually they make a serious mistake in fostering it. Development favors the expansion of an educated middle class; it engenders a "pluralistic infrastructure," ramifying civil society even more difficult to manage from above... [The] authoritarian state may opt at this juncture to relax its grip on public life. The decision is a fatal one, for into the openings created by liberalization poor accumulated discontents that, articulated, take on the character of outright opposition. [72-73:]

In general it is fair to conclude that although certain historical and institutional traits help, capitalist growth is the single best way to overturn the old feudal order and create an effective and limited state....At the very least, without a government capable of protecting property rights and human rights, press freedoms and business contracts, antitrust laws and consumer demands, a society gets not the rule of law but the rule of the strong. [76-77:]

two key lessons that one can gleam from the historical experience of democratization: emphasize genuine economic development and build effective political institutions. [92:]

No America without democracy, no democracy without politics, no politics without parties.... Without parties, politics becomes a game for individuals, interest groups, and strongmen [94:]

as countries became democratic, people tended to believe that "too much importance had been attached to the limitation of [governmental] power itself. That... was a response against rulers whose interest were opposed to those of the people." Once the people were themselves in charge, caution was unnecessary; "the nation did not need to be protected against its own will." [101:]

Ethnic conflict is as old as recorded history, and dictatorships are hardly innocent in fomenting it. But newly democratizing societies display a disturbingly common tendency towards it. The reason is simple: as society opens up and politicians scramble for power, they appeal to the public for votes using what ends up being the most direct, effective language, that of group solidarity and opposition to some other group. Often this stokes the fires of ethnic or religious conflict. Sometimes the conflict turns into a full-scale war. [113:]

a common and often mistaken, assumption: that the forces of democracy are the forces of ethnic harmony and peace. Not necessarily true. Mature liberal democracies can usually accommodate ethnic divisions without violence or terror and live in peace with other liberal democracies. But without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy in divided societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict...[114:]

In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it hypernationalism and war-mongering. When the political system is opened up, diverse groups with incompatible interests gain access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders, who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize that to succeed they must rally the masses behind a national cause. The result is invariably aggressive rhetoric and policies, which often drag countries into confrontation and war. [116-117:]

The arab world is an important part of the world of islam- its heartland. But it is only one part and in numerical terms a small one. Of the 1.2 billion muslims in the world, only 260 million live in Arabia. People in the west often use the term "Islamic," "middle eastern," and "arab" interchangeably. But they do not mean the same thing [127:]

Easy money means little economic or political modernization. The unearned income relieves the government the need to tax its people- and in return provide something to them in the form of accountability, transparency, even representation. History shows that a governments' need to tax its people forces it to become more responsive and representative of its people. Middle Eastern regimes ask little of their people and, in return, give little to them. Another bad effect of natural- resource- derived wealth is that it makes the government rich enough to become repressive. There is always money enough for the police and the army....but importing western goods is easy; importing the inner stuffing of modern society- a free market, political parties, accountability, the rule of law-is difficult and even dangerous for the ruling elites. [138-139:]

We now face new threats but also new and deep pressures on government. Democracies will have to demonstrate that they can cope with terrorism effectively, or else in many developing countries we will see the rise of a new authoritarianism. Developing countries, particularly in the islamic world, will need to manage a difficult balancing act. They must remain strong enough to handle the new dangers of terrorism but yet be open and democratic enough that they don't create political opposition that morphs into extremism. In other words, they must be able to kill terrorists without breeding terrorism. When it works right, the state's power, legitimacy, and effectiveness can work together, each reinforcing the other, in a virtuous cycle. When things go awry, however, the virtuous cycle becomes vicious-and violent. Repression produces extremism, which produces more repression [241:]

Over a decade after publication, Zakaria's assertions resonate. He argues that the past century has been marked by an over-regulation of capitalism and under-regulation of democracy, resulting in dangerous implications within our own borders and the globally. His solution is "delegation" in order to legitimise institutions and protect constitutional liberalism and ensure safe democracy as the "last best hope" for modern civilisation.

A concept, bouncing around in my head for years as a formless blob, was crystallized into something more coherent after reading this book: democracy isn't a good unto itself, and having more of it doesn't necessarily make a society more prosperous or free.

This is the main argument of Fareed Zakaria's The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. The first four chapters I believe should be required reading of every citizen in this country. The section on the Middle East was particularly interesting, not only because of the timing of the events developing over there right now, but also because I happen to be reading another book on the region (I’m sort of getting a crash course on the subject). The main point, though, is driven home again and again, and I think, though such criticism of democracy is nothing new in the history of political theory, it feels new because of the rhetoric we’ve been raised on in recent generations.

With numerous examples of the worst of humanity resulting from democratic systems, including Hitler’s Germany, Chavez’s Venezuela, numerous Middle Eastern countries, and aspects of the USSR or Russia itself showcasing the “power of the people,” it’s not any wonder why thinkers from centuries past viewed democracy as the worst possible political system for human flourishing. It’s why the American Founders, basing their reasoning on Enlightenment ideals as well as centuries of historical study, came up with a Republic as a way to temper the evils of pure democracy while still being responsive to the masses.

To date, it still is the best system ever invented to balance the requirements of freedom and order, and this Western tradition has brought prosperity wherever it has been tried. Zakaria, however, makes a case for something a little more than this equilibrium, and this is where he loses me and, in my opinion, the plot.

The last couple of chapters, and especially the “way out” Zakaria proposed, couldn’t be more out of step with the reality we live in. In his defense, this book came out 21 years ago, and things have really come to a head that may have been brewing for the last 55 years or so that many signs simply couldn’t have observed in day-to-day life before but which are alarming obvious today. The author’s solution is for more bureaucracy, or what some have called the “deep state.” He sits squarely in the camp of belief that smart or qualified people should be making the decisions and the rest of us follow for our own good. I’ve checked back with him in some interviews he’s done recently, and he still seems to be unshakable in this belief, regardless of the failure of institutions around us.

If the mismanagement of the covid epidemic, race hustling, trans ideology, anti-semitism, political lawfare, corruption, and state-sponsored censorship can’t convince someone that maybe we shouldn’t leave it to “experts,” perhaps nothing will. One of the stats Zakaria mentions in his book is the high approval ratings of non-democratic institutions like the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve. Check those ratings again today, buddy. He seems to be about as “establishment” as they come, and while I don’t think that’s a terrible thing… all of us have some sort of starting point for our bias… it makes one wonder exactly what would need to happen to change one’s fundamental thinking on the topic. Like, what more proof do you need than having lived through the past ten years in the United States?

Despite my severe criticism, I still think people need to read this book in its entirety. We need to be exposed to ideas from people we may not see eye-to-eye with for a few reasons, but one of the big ones is to understand how we got here and how we can move forward. Zakaria has shown he is well-informed, fair, and willing to challenge basic assumptions (despite his associations with CNN), and I think voices like that should be encouraged.

Kitap, her alanda demokratikleşmenin etkilerine dair güzel örnekler verirken biraz karamsar bir bakış açısına sahip. Her ne kadar Fareed Zakaria'nın parmak bastığı birçok olgu doğru olsa da, eleştirmek istediklerinin ağırlıklı olarak olumsuz yönlerinden dem vurarak taraflı bir anlatım kullanıyor. Üzerine düşünmek için etkili savlar var. Kitabın başındaki insanoğlunun özgürlük hikayesi bölümü, gerçekten harika hikayeleştirilmiş.