I find it interesting to read "historical" books to see how well they age. And by historical I mean those books just out of our memory, but they don't have the distance to be consider "great books" yet. This one was published in 2004. Most of this book ages quite well, at least the principles in it do. However there isn't much treatment about when non-democratic institutions (which are necessary) go wrong. Recent examples include the US central banks in the GFC, and Universities adopting critical * theories, social just theories, and victimhood as a virtue (all the cultural marxist, postmodern though stuff). I'm not suggesting the author should have been able to predict the future, but that he might recognize that just as democracy can be pushed too far, non-democratic technocratic institutions can do a lot of damage too. And I'm not even going to address the shit show that was the COVID response, the review can only be so long.

One big thing I took away from this was that democracy and classical liberalism are not the same thing. It seems to me because there are many well functioning, although that is debatable, liberal democracies that we focus on the noun and deemphasis liberal into an adjective. To be clear in our thinking we should be thinking in terms of both constitutional liberalism and democracy. Further that the order of operation is important. Unlike math where 2+3=3+2=5, democracy then liberalism does not beget the same outcomes as liberalism then democracy.

I found Chapter 4 particular interesting. As I was listening to it I couldn't help but draw parallels between the Arab Muslim fundamentalist issue and the cultural neoMarxist, postmodern ideologues.
The author explains that in many Arab countries, the political space is extremely limited, with no real political parties, free press, or pathways for dissent. As a result, the mosque became the primary place where people could discuss politics and express opposition to the regime.
This situation led to a few key consequences:
- The language of political opposition became intertwined with religious language, as the mosque was the only "safe" place to voice dissent.
- Fundamentalist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah, became de facto civil society organizations, providing social services, medical assistance, and other support that the state failed to provide.
- This combination of religion and politics proved volatile, as religious absolutes don't mix well with the compromise required in politics.
- The fundamentalists gained credibility and support by being the main opposition voice, without having to actually govern and prove their practical abilities.
- Regimes, unable to completely suppress religious institutions, often tried to co-opt them or use them to deflect criticism, further entrenching the role of religion in politics.

Some similarities that jumped out at me:

- Alternative spaces for discourse: Just as mosques became centers for political discourse in Arab countries, university campuses and academic circles often became the primary venues for neomarxist and postmodern thought in the West.
- Reaction to perceived failures: Both movements arose partly in response to the perceived failures of existing systems - authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, and capitalist liberal democracies in the West.
- Language and framing: Both movements developed their own specialized language and ways of framing issues, which could be exclusionary to outsiders.
- Critique without governance: Both groups often critiqued existing power structures without having to actually govern, allowing for more idealistic or extreme positions.
- Appeal to disillusioned youth: Both movements found particular appeal among young, educated individuals who felt disconnected from traditional power structures.
- Holistic worldviews: Both offer comprehensive worldviews that explain a wide range of social phenomena through their particular lens.
- Skepticism of Western liberal values: Though for different reasons, both movements often express skepticism towards traditional Western liberal values.

Why I found this interesting was that it emphasizes that the problems are probably not about democracy per se, but about liberalism, rule of law, economic disparities, etc. Fix that and maybe things will improve. And by improve I mean a move more towards law and order and less towards la Revolution.


Last point, in the conclusion the author praises the Federal Reserve for its insulation from political pressures, which allows it to make decisions based on long-term economic merits rather than short-term political considerations. This, the author suggests, is a model that could be applied to other areas of government, such as tax policy. In light of the 2008 financial crisis, the author may not have been directly critical of the Federal Reserve's actions. However, the events that transpired post-2008, such as the implementation of zero-interest rates and quantitative easing, could be seen as evidence of the Federal Reserve acting in a way that is insulated from political pressures and focused on long-term economic benefits rather than short-term political gains.

This almost got me laughing out loud. I lost a lot of money since 2008 because of how The Fed operated. They made a lot of decisions that caused a lot of economic damage that we are still digging out from. Insulation from democratic politics is not a panacea.

I did enjoy the book and plan to read a few more from this author in the future. Actually I started his most recent book this morning.

Extraordinary work!

Very insightful book. Great choice for summer reading assignment in AP Comparative Government! Really gets to many of the patterns behind today's international and national politics.

4.5 stars. Dated but Zakaria understands all the pieces that are there to explain how we got here and ideologically what is going on in the world. I find him thought provoking and the chapter on the death of authority in particular, to be a fascinating look at 2020/21.

Quarantine read.

I knew a lot of people who didn't like this book. Then again, many of the people I know are contrarians. If something's popular, they are sure not to like it. So I'm not sure how much you can take from that.

I liked this book because it brought to my attention interesting ways of looking at issues I thought I was familiar with. I was most interested in the discussion of the "at Home" portion of the discussion: the discussion of how our democracy is potentially being paralyzed from being "too open" was thought-provoking.

The Future of Freedom is one of those rare books that doesn’t just inform—it transforms the way you think. Fareed Zakaria delivers a deeply thought-provoking and elegantly argued exploration of democracy, liberty, and the complex dance between the two. With clarity and insight, he unpacks the idea that not all democracies are inherently free, and that liberty can sometimes suffer at the hands of democratic institutions gone awry.

Listening to this audiobook pulled me straight into Zakaria’s world of geopolitical analysis and historical context. His ability to weave together examples from ancient history, Enlightenment philosophy, and modern political case studies is nothing short of masterful. This isn’t dry political theory—it’s a compelling, often sobering look at how freedom actually functions in practice, and what happens when form ovhttps://www.goodreads.com/blog/show/2... substance.

This book was my introduction to Zakaria’s work, and I’ve been a devoted reader ever since. His balance of optimism and realism, along with his commitment to nuance, is a breath of fresh air in a world often dominated by polarized discourse.

Whether you're politically engaged, historically curious, or simply someone who enjoys smart, well-reasoned commentary, The Future of Freedom is absolutely worth your time. It’s a listen that will linger with you long after the final chapter—and likely inspire you to explore more of Zakaria’s body of work.

Democracy has many forms and the illiberal democracy may not be the ideal one in people's mind. Zakaria pointed out that the illiberal democracy would be harmful to the people and may even be worse than authoritarianism. Statistics showed that rich democratic countries would last longer. Religious, generally Islamic countries, would suppress the freedom of other religions which are not recognized by the current regime. Voting only counts if people actually cast votes and the candidates they vote for may not be the representatives of the party. Also in countries where Americanized democracy is replicated without the full extent e.g. without separation of powers, the elected presidents may not deliver their promises to the people but instead abusing political powers to infiltrate business, influence military and affect country's equilibrium. Eventually democracy may eventually become authoritarianism with electron being a formality rather than the crucial means of achieve democratic liberty.
Democracy is like fire as a great aid to cook meat but can also burn down houses. People should confront the "dark side" of democracy and reflect on how to preserve the the freedom in the future.

A tremendously thought-provoking and relevant book that was in a way ahead of the political curve we are now in the midst of. The subtitle about illiberal democracy really brings home the argument: We have seen a wave of democratization in the late 20th century, but it has not necessarily made our politics, economics, and societies that much better. Shedding orthodoxies of the left and right, Zakaria outlines the rise of illiberal democracies in places as varied as India, Russia (still a semi-democracy in 2003), Indonesia, Malaysia, Venezuela, and elsewhere. He defines these as states that have instituted key aspects of democracy (elections, parliaments, campaigns, usually constitutions) without liberalism, classically defined (civil society, strong constitutional traditions, norms like the loyal opposition, cultural resistance to strongman or ethno-centric appeals, religious tolerance, freedom of speech and the press, the rule of law, independent courts, the separation of powers, etc). He is also skeptical of countries that rush into democracy without liberal institutions or a certain amount of wealth. He cites extensive political science research that shows that democracies are vastly more likely to succeed once they hit around 8-10,000 dollars in GDP per capita. The main reason is that the key demographic for the survival of democracy and a strong civil society that can balance and hold accountable the power of gov't is the middle class. It is educated, solid enough in its socio-economic standing to resist blatant economic populism, usually more political moderate, and it wants accountable government in exchange for taxation.

Democracy without liberalism or a baseline level of wealth can quickly become a hollow shell, as Zakaria shows with illustrations from countries around the world. Leaders rely on patronage politics rather than taxation (which, of course, requires a certain level of legitimacy), intimidate the press, scapegoat minorities, and try to undermine weak constitutions and legislatures. Instead of rushing countries into democracy, Zakaria recommends that we take a more kindly view of liberal authoritarians like those of Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey under Ataturk, Indonesia under Suharto, or even Spain. These leaders were not nice guys, but they opened their societies economically, allowing for the building of private enterprises and a rising middle class that then pressed for more political openness. By the time that pressure led to the phasing in of democracy, the countries had the strong liberal institutions needed as the grounding of that democracy. This is not a guaranteed process: authoritarians are just as likely to ruin their countries in the interest of enriching themselves or enacting utopian dreams. However, we should not necessarily see immediate democratization of countries that aren't ready as the solution: following this route will most likely bring you to state collapse (see Sub-Saharan African states) or illiberal democracies like India.

I expected Zakaria's argument about American politics to be about the rise of illiberalism at home, but I think that development was not as apparent in 2003 as it is now. Instead, he focuses on hyper-democratization at home and the weakening of elite institutions. This is one of the great ironies of modern US politics: Americans routinely show the most respect for the institutions of the state (the military, the Supreme Court) that are least accountable to direct democratic control while detesting those that are most connected to democratic control (Congress, and to a lesser extent, the presidency). At the same time, Americans regularly complain that Washington is out of touch with their experiences, needs, and viewpoints and they demand more control over politics.

Zakaria's lesson here: be careful what you wish for. He surveys the dramatic democratization of American politics that occurred in the 20th century, starting in the Progressive Era: the referendum, the popular primary, the opening of campaign donation laws, the weakening of party structures to the benefit of popular control, the rise of polling, others that I'm forgetting. This shift has had several important and detrimental effects. One is that politicians are ever more obsessed with day to day polling, causing them to "lead" with their ears to the ground rather than by considering broader factors. Zakaria calls for a return of the Burkean ethos of delegated authority in which representatives exercise judgement in the best interests, but not the beck and call, of their constituents. Second, and more pernicious, is that the opening of politics to greater outside influence in the name of democracy has not benefitted the people but led to the rise of special interests in politics. Think of it this way: as politics is opened to outside influence, who is most likely to seize that advantage: the organized, the motivated, and the well-funded. In other words, efforts at democratization opened the door for interest groups, lobbyists, a new and out of control version of patronage politics that have hollowed out the parties and empowered groups like the Koch brothers, enabling them both paralyze and radicalize our politics. It's no wonder that ordinary Americans are fed up with American politics; what they need to realize is that more democratic control is not necessarily the answer. In fact, it's part of the problem (note: Zakaria sees the weakening of elite institutions in American politics as part of a broader weakening of the American elite, or at least its transformation from defenders of the public interest to a self-interested kleptocracy. He puts in more subtly than this, but I'd still like to hear thoughts about this cultural shift)

One can't help when listening to this book but see the dramatic connections to the wave of illiberal democracy sweeping the entire world right now. There are factors that he couldn't quite anticipate that now shape our politics: backlash to globalization, immigration, terrorism and Islamophobia, the new wave of illiberal leftism on campuses. However, he does point to many factors that help define the era of illiberal democracy: over-democratization of politics, the rise of populism, the resurgence of ethane-centric nationalism, the dominance of outside money in politics, the hollowing out of institutions like political parties. In sum, this book is great as a study of history, politics, and culture as well as a "how did we get here" read. It is provocative but balanced, firmly rooted in evidence, not too long, and continually relevant.

A bit out of date, but not as much as it could be considering its two decades, it still struggles to pin down a thesis while still presenting the author’s vast knowledge.

Cards on the table, I was tryïng to get Zakariäs (which the narrator, who I guess should know, pronounces [ˌzækə'riə] (like “Zack Korea”) and not, as I’ve always heard it, [zə'kʰaɹiə] (rhymes with “Daria”) newer book, but there was a long wait, so I read this premise and checked it out. But it is, in many ways, a post-9/11 book. It dœsn’t suffer at all for it, predicting a lot of messes that we find ourselves in. Even the potentially embarressing chapter about how mebbe this young Putin upstart might turn things around for Russia is tempered with a “or mebbe once he really gets power, he won’t.” Still, its focus is squarely on the U.S.’s view of the world at that time, which is not today.

And his claim that we shouldn’t be so quick to export (small-d) democracy without (small-l) liberalism first is interesting, but it’s unclear until the end (and then still not totally) how this would work. In so doïng, we see that Zakariä gives powerful elites a pass too often. This frequenly occurs in a “sure, the Fed dœsn’t always have our best interests in mind...” type of lead-in, but that just wasn’t enough for me. Still, I’ve never seen an attempt to explain so much in one mediüm length book (at least Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies was mostly sticking to the past and Thinking, Fast and Slow was limited to two—unimaginably consequential—decision0making mechanisms), and I respect that, and continue to respect our derided elites.

Every now and then, I venture beyond the genres I usually read and am impressed by the breadth of fantastic writing elsewhere - this is one of those cases. Government/politics is not a topic that I invest my free time following, but after buying (and not using) this book for a class, I figured that I'd read it anyways. Now, I'm glad that I did. Zakaria is a brilliant thinker, and it was the novelty and ingenuity of his ideas that kept me racing through this book. He approaches complicated issues with clarity, delineating liberty and democracy as he follows their paths through history and around the world. Even though it's been well over a decade since this book was published, his work still feels fresh and relevant.

When I first read that The New Republic put Fareed Zakaria on their list of overrated thinkers, I thought it must have been some mistake. I had listened to Mr. Zakaria on so many podcasts and he always seemed to be so insightful, measured and intelligent. But having read this book, I definitely see where the criticism comes from.

To quote from the article: "He is a barometer in a good suit, a creature of establishment consensus, an exemplary spokesman for the always-evolving middle." And this about sums up "The Future of Freedom" which argues for what he calls "liberal democracy" as the best system of government. But his points are rather milquetoast and his analysis of history is extremely surface level and nothing particularly revelatory is derived from his analysis.

The key take-away from this book is democracy does not necessarily the same as liberalism. Fareed Zakaria brilliantly draw a line between democracy and liberalism (which in politic take a shape of liberal constitutionalism). What does this mean? It means that democracy still can exist in non-liberal framework or in other word you can have an illiberal democracy.

The book described very briefly the history of liberty which Zakaria claimed, started when Constantine move his capital from Rome to Byzantium, creating a strong church in Rome which prevent the emperor to consolidate power unchecked. But of course its a little bit funny to start a history from there, as if there is no liberty before Constantine.

He also pointed out how democratization does not only impacting our political system but was spread into cultural realm, economic system, and even professional jobs like lawyers, accountant etc. It has become a new way of life.

But democratization is not without negative effect, it corrodes authority, and open-up the institution to public pressure including from lobbying group. It makes the institution harder to pass a policy for the future as the policy-maker trying to gain public support which often short-termed. Failing which, will make them lose office and voted out.

Citing a well respected non-democratic institution such as the court and federal reserve, Zakaria offer less-democracy as a solution to the democratic problems. He advocated for delegated democracy instead of direct democracy.

The book was praised by Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and Henry Kissinger - which gave you an idea on what's the book's ideology is about - American Exceptionalism. Although the intellectual argument is well presented, the ideological narrative is hard to swallow. I nearly puked when in the last chapter he wrote "My favorite story about the war in Iraq..". How can there be a favorite story of a war that killed over a million people? (some estimate put over a million - exact figure almost impossible to get).

In the first half of the book, the author provides a solid correlation between capitalism and capitalist policies followed only then by democratic systems. He points out several examples that have only moderate issues with time. In the eighteen years since this book was published, we've seen countries like Belarus fall into illiberalism. However, we haven't seen China become more liberal.

The second half I take more exception with. He tries to explain the merits of a liberal democracy and its employment of elites in what we may refer to today as technocrats. However he does a poor job of justifying liberalism over populism, oddly calling populism "democracy" in a way that conflates mob mentality with public insight. In this way he seems to advocate for a sort of authoritarian behavior that is discomforting to agree with on any level.

I wish he spent more time outlining what liberalism is and why it matters. It would be better rather than trying to explain flaws in democracy and why democracy is a bad thing. Because regardless of personal politics, you can't easily make things less democratic and the book gives poor reason why individuals should relinquish what little political power they have today.