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"at this point, then, his whole soul seethes and pounds––in fact, the soul of someone who is beginning to grow wings experiences exactly the same sensations that children feel when they are teething, with their teeth just starting to grow, and they feel an itching and a soreness in their gums. so the soul, as it grows its wings, seethes and feels sore and tingles."

&

"at the end of their lives, when they leave their bodies, they may not have any wings, but they do have the desire to gain them, and this is no small prize to have gained from the madness of love. for it is a law that those who have already made a start on the skyward journey shall no longer go into the darkness and enter upon the journey downward to the underworld. instead, they live a life of brightness and happily travel in each other’s company, and sooner or later, thanks to their love, gain their wings together."

read in dialogue with death in venice, got caught on the strange & lovely eroticism of this account of teething soul-wings ? & on the poetic brilliance of a too fleshy, too earthbound love that still carries its lovers upwards ?

I read PHAEDRUS for a specific purpose.

Since the mid-20th century, there has been an ongoing effort to re-interpret Plato. Those pursuing this effort, not surprisingly, see it as the pursuit of a deeper truth. I assume that they are sincere in this belief.

Critics of the reinterpretation see many reasons to be skeptical. One reason is that the reinterpretation would make Plato relevant to our world today in a way that under the formerly prevailing interpretation was not the case. Another reason for skepticism is that the reinterpretation would immunize Plato from the charge that he favors authoritarian over more liberal governments. Skeptics suspect that the reinterpretation is driven, at least in part, by a 20th century agenda to defend western-style liberalism by portraying Plato as a fan of early governments that featured some characteristics of modern liberalism.

The reinterpretation of Plato relies heavily on something called ‘esoteric writing’. For those not familiar with the term, esoteric writing refers to writing that disguises the author’s true intention in such a way as to make it indiscernible to those who might persecute the author while, at the same time, communicating that intention to other readers who can be trusted to understand the intention and benefit from it. The best book about esoteric writing that I have read is Arthur Melzer’s PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE LINES. Melzer convincingly demonstrates that esoteric writing was common among philosophical writers until the 19th century.

In my own GR review of Plato’s THE REPUBLIC, I gave credence to one of the arguments that is important to the reinterpretation of Plato. Namely, the new argument that Plato did not intend for Socrates to be understood as anti-democratic by philosophically minded readers. Thus, when Plato has Socrates advocate censorship, the suppression of poetry, the removal of children from their families to be educated in state-run institutions of propaganda, etc., Plato intended for his readers to recoil at these extremist ideas. Our recoil is the message that Plato intended or so the reinterpretation wants to argue.

I gave this argument credence because it describes my own experience in reading The Republic. I did not like what Socrates had to say. That caused me to look more deeply to see if there was a subtle hidden esoteric message that I might detect and thereby understand the text more accurately.

A GR friend took me to task for this in the comments to my review. He rightly points out to me that there are many reasons to take Plato at his word and it makes sense that Plato’s philosopher king would run things as Socrates describes in the city in speech. One important reason why this is true, my GR friend argues, is that Plato believes that the organization of the city in speech should resemble the organization of a well-ordered soul, a subject also discussed in PHAEDRUS. Like THE REPUBLIC, PHAEDRUS is one of Plato’s middle dialogues. My friend argues that PHAEDRUS is solid evidence that the parts of The REPUBLIC that I do not like represent what Plato truly thought – and what most western philosophers have always understood him to have thought.

So that’s why I read PHAEDRUS. I wanted to see if it tends to confirm the old view of Plato. The short answer is that it does tend to confirm the old view. But it’s really a strange dialogue. Allow me to explain.

Phaedrus and Socrates are friends. Phaedrus has a copy of a speech written by a third friend, who enjoys a reputation as a good speaker. Socrates professes to be interested in speeches. He and Phaedrus leave the city for the countryside to find a place for Phaedrus to read the speech to Socrates. (Most of this can be argued to be very uncharacteristic of Socrates. He did not like to leave the city. And he did not like speeches, according to the explanatory essay included in this edition.)

Whatever. They find a suitable place. Phaedrus reads the speech. It is about eros, which in this context refers to the love shared by a youth and a mature man. The speech recommends that given a choice, the youth would be wise to choose someone who is a friend first rather than a love struck, impassioned lover.

Socrates does not like the speech. So he gives his own speech. Oddly, in my view, he makes the same argument as the speech written by the missing friend. That is, Socrates argues that the youth should choose someone who is a friend, not an impassioned lover. Though he argues for the same conclusion as the absent friend, he does so much more thoughtfully and persuasively than does the speech of the friend.

Then, after some discussion of rhetoric generally, Socrates gives a third speech. This one is much longer than the others. In this third speech, Socrates argues that the youth should choose the man who loves the youth with passion and not the lover who will be a friend. This is so, argues Socrates, because this kind of erotic love allows the youth to experience genuine beauty – beauty as it is understood in Plato’s theory of the forms. Such beauty allows the youth to experience the extraordinary, indeed, something divine.

It seemed to me that the dialogue is only a bit more than half completed when this third speech is concluded. The rest of the dialogue is devoted to more discussion of rhetoric, including written advocacy versus oral advocacy and so on. Socrates argues that to be persuasive the speaker/writer must know the truth about his subject. One who does not know the truth about his subject will not be persuasive, even if he knows what his audience wants to hear about the subject. This line of argument suggests that the philosopher has an advantage over the sophist when it comes to speeches.

Thus, it is not crystal clear what this dialogue is about. The candidates are numerous: speeches, erotic love, the forms, the benefits and drawbacks of oral versus written advocacy, philosophy, philosophy vs rhetoric or the well-ordered human soul.

Wait. What? Why are Socrates and Phaedrus discussing the human soul?

Good question. It did not seem a necessary topic to me, given the rest of the dialogue. But it is in PHAEDRUS that Plato first introduces his famous metaphor of the chariot: a driver and two horses, one bad and the other good. A human soul is like such a chariot. The driver must control the horses, especially the badly behaving horse. In the well-ordered soul, the driver is firmly in control of both horses and manages them in such a way as to keep them working together as a team toward a goal.

In THE REPUBLIC, this metaphor makes another appearance. There, Plato tells us that the city in speech should resemble a well-ordered soul. That is, the driver (philosopher king) should control the populace and steer it toward the goal that the philosopher king dictates to the citizens of the polis. That is how to best govern a city.

And there it is. PHAEDRUS confirms this vision. It is an authoritarian notion. The philosopher king knows best (and may not be questioned) and he manages the public toward his vision of what is best. This is the old understanding of where Plato’s head was at when he was writing his middle dialogues. The reimagining of Plato is less plausible to me after rereading PHAEDRUS than it was before.

The sad thing is that the old view of Plato makes Plato less relevant and less interesting today than the new view of Plato would make him. So be it. Let’s agree to reject the implausible in the name of sanity even if it means that Plato has less to say about our current liberalism vs anti-liberalism struggle in the West.

Contrary to the image of a stiff built up by some of his other work, Plato here seems willing to allow for forms of ‘divine’ madness caused by love for another person, tempered by shame, awe, and pre-birth memory that facilitate the contemplation of the forms, even when you don’t know you’re doing it!

The existence of the soul is taken for granted rather than argued for, maybe it’s argued for elsewhere, but I’ve not seen it. Either way, if you were to grant this point then the arguments Plato makes from there - that the soul is immortal, that it is privy to that which physical being corrupts, and that its continuance in human bodies allows us to partially remember ‘how things really are’ are basically believable. But, again, that first point of the soul existing at all is taken as a given, or indeed that anything but the physical is real.
From there, though, the defence of love as a force through which we can contemplate and become obsessed by the true form of beauty, through the vector of another person, is very good. This latter argument is presented in a palinode which is opposed to two previous speeches which are broadly ‘clever’ in their condemnation of gratifying lovers as opposed to non-lovers, but ultimately, as Plato shows, fail to account for the possibility that loving and being loved can aim towards something other than the gratification of physical lust or social ambition.

The argument I found most convincing was not even the main subject of the book, Plato roundly trounces the ‘expertise’ of rhetoric by showing that a truly good rhetoric would essentially be identical to philosophy, so why someone would pursue rhetoric as opposed to that is made doubtful in the extreme. Maybe, we might say rhetoric is good because it allows us to present the truth in an attractive way that will bring others closer to it. But again, Plato demonstrates that to do this one must a) know the truth in the first place and b) be aware of what sort of person we’re talking to so we know to what sort of persuasion they would be most malleable. All this is identical to dialectical philosophy, one on one conversations contemplating the truth of the divisions and categorisations we have come up with.

I was embarrassingly showed up for my preference for reading books over talking about philosophy to people. Plato argues that the written word obscures one’s ability to think properly by not only damaging the memory by making it rely on ‘jogging’ exercises, but also filling it up with phraseology that we might instead replace with our own conversations. That Plato wrote this at all, of course, belies that there may be some value to writing after all.

This is up there with the Symposium in terms of having merit both as philosophy and as a piece of fiction. Weirdly for Plato especial attention is given to Socrates and Phaedrus’ surroundings, they are in the countryside, and the two comment on the beauty of their location. This is not only beautiful language, it also provides relevant window-dressing to the philosophy itself - what better way to gear us up for a conversation partly about the merits of being enraptured by beauty than bringing the beauty of nature to the forefront?

A very interesting read. With the Symposium, this book is one of Plato's most important books on love. His exploration of the relationship between love and beauty is very interesting.

His treatment of love in a homoerotic relationship (specifically between adult men and boys of between approximately 13 and 18) in both the Symposium and the Phaedrus is sometimes placed center screen, as if Plato was approving of it, when it is only a culturally accepted practice that is used by Plato as a way of talking about love (and, in fact, of pointing away from sensuality towards training in philosophy). Some people try to make a great deal of Plato's treatment of homoerotic love, as if this is what the book is about. This is to misread Plato. For others, his treatment of this subject may keep them from reading this book, but, it is worth noting that though homoerotic relationships between boys and men were often accepted in Ancient Greek culture, Socrates and Plato are actually to be read as dissenting voices. In fact, as the translator and editor of this volume notes, Socrates and Plato would probably have argued that homoerotic behaviour was against the very nature of love, as the purpose of love was reproduction. Physical erotic love was for reproduction (thus between a man and a woman), and so was mental or spiritual love. But mental or spiritual love was for the reproduction of lovers of the divine ideas and beauty--the philosophers.

Almost all of Plato's observations, made in the context of homoerotic love between men and boys, can be removed from that context and placed within the context of any human relationship.

''Trebuie să facem tot ce ne stă în putinţă pentru a ne împărtăși, cât suntem în viaţă, din virtute și înţelepciune. Frumoasă e răsplata, iar speranţa mare. Firește, nu se cade ca un om cu bun-simţ să se înverșuneze în a susţine că lucrurile stau întocmai așa cum le-am înfăţișat eu. Dar ceea ce se cuvine să susţin cu toată dârzenia este că, de vreme ce sufletul, nu-ncape îndoială, e nemuritor, soarta și sălașurile lui vor fi cam așa cum am spus. Crezând asta, cred că merită să îţi asumi oarecare risc. Căci e un risc frumos și tot ce ţine de el trebuie să ni-l repetăm ca pe o incantaţie. Iată de ce zăbovesc de atâta vreme asupra mitu- lui. În orice caz, ţinând seamă de acestea, omul care, de-a lungul vieţii, și-a luat rămas-bun de la plăcerile și de la podoabele trupului, pe care le socotea străine de el și dăunătoare, omul care, dimpotrivă, și-a dat toată silinţa să înveţe ceva, care, în loc de podoabe străine, a vrut pentru sufletul său podoabele sale adevărate: cumpătarea și dreptatea, curajul, libertatea și adevărul, omul acesta trebuie să aibă încredere în soarta sufletului.''

Todo mundo cita só o final desse livro (trecho sobre a superioridade do conhecimento oral sobre o escrito), mas a verdade é que esse diálogo tem muitos trechos importantes, inclusive, e na prática, uma antecipação in nuce do que viria a ser a Retórica de Aristóteles. Excelente.

This is a short dialogue and I read it quickly. It's the one with the argument against the invention of writing.

Basically Socrates (the character) is suspicious of any attempt to replace a process that uses the whole of a human's abilities (like spoken discourse) with an automated process that's simpler and more rigid, like written language. A book can't talk back to you, can't explain the nuances; a book is dumber than a wise human. (Just like, in the Laws, Plato is skeptical of legal codes because a formally codified law is dumber than a wise human.) I think this is a valuable concern, especially in an age of automation.

przepraszam, ale nie mogłem znieść tego pierdolenia….

Phaedrus is another Socratic dialogue, but one which actually is a dialogue. Socrates runs into his friend Phaedrus, who tells him of a conversation he just had with Lysias, a mutual acquaintance. As in the Symposium

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the topic is love, but here, instead of looking at many different aspects of love, the topic is, initially, who is the better object of a man's love? One should keep in mind that one of the positions defended in the Symposium is: the most noble form of love is that of a mature, virtuous man together with a young, inexperienced man, because the latter could learn thereby from the former how to be a man of virtue; moreover, because they could go to war (or to the assemblies of (solely male) citizens) together, the fear of shame in front of the loved one would assure that both would fight (or otherwise comport themselves) bravely and virtuously. After walking into the countryside, Socrates and Phaedrus find a secluded spot and Phaedrus recounts Lysias' view that, on the contrary, better than a love to such a beloved is a love to a non-beloved.

What the devil did Lysias mean by that? I find that when I analyze Lysias' argument with the critical exactitude of a mathematician, it doesn't hold together. If one doesn't look too carefully, here are some of the main points. Strong desire blinds, causing errors and removing one's freedom; strong desire wanes, then obligations once willingly accepted are resented; if one chooses a lover on the basis of his apparent virtue (or potential for virtue), one is too strongly limiting the sample set - perhaps it is among the others you would find your truly deserving friend; if one has a lover, then everyone will think when they see you with him that you are either coming from or going to a sexual encounter (!! - Lysias counters that if you have a relation with a non-lover, then when others see you together, they will not have sex in mind...); if you have a lover, then you are doubly vulnerable to fate, for a blow to the lover is a blow to yourself. You get the idea. What Lysias proposes as better is, roughly speaking, don't get passionately involved with anyone, just have "friends with benefits" (or, using another colloquialism, "fuck buddies"). Note that the position taken has nothing to do with male-male relationships; it may be applied to any person-person relationship.

Having read a fair amount of Plato by now, I recognize that this is the set up of the straw man, whom Socrates/Plato(*) will now demolish. But, first, Plato's sock puppet, I mean, Socrates must go through his "Ah, shucks" routine and pretend not to be up to the challenge. (Big sigh...) After we have been subjected to that charade again, Socrates gets down to it.

I'm sure you noted in the partial list of Lysias' points above that he confused categories and tacitly weighted personal freedom of action and convenience more than other factors. That might go over well among Ayn Rand's flock, but, in light of Socrates'/Plato's defense in the Symposium of the position that the highest form of love is love for the Absolute, Lysias must get ready for a beat down. Duly delivered.

But, dear reader, this first third of the dialogue is just preamble. The reason why Plato wrote this at all is what comes next. He distinguishes between the natural desire for pleasure and the acquired desire, mediated by reason, for what is best. (Ever heard of persuasive definitions?) Guess which one he thinks is better. (Both Socrates and Phaedrus think that Socrates has been inspired by the gods here... sigh...) And then for 40 pages he elaborates in great detail on the position already presented in the Symposium - the highest form of love is divine love of wisdom, of the Absolute.(**) All other forms of love are lower and should best be sublimated into the higher form. But as transparent as Plato's rhetorical ploys have become to me, I must yet acknowledge that the man writes eloquently, if not always persuasively.

Plato makes an interesting digression in his paean to the Absolute - in the midst of an analysis of good versus bad speech (surprise: "good" speech reveals/serves the Absolute), he has Socrates expand upon the usefulness of written knowledge/wisdom. Although Plato's primary efforts were made in person in his school, he did, after all, write quite a bit. What did Plato think about such writings?

He begins the digression with an Egyptian (!) myth about the god Theuth, who offers written language to the king of upper Egypt, who politely declines, saying that the invention will ruin the memory of his people, for they will rely on the written page instead of internalizing the content. Having read such books, instead of being instructed by the wise, they will believe themselves to be knowledgeable, whereas they are actually ignorant. Socrates agrees with the king. The written word gives only the illusion of life, but it answers to no questions, cannot accommodate itself to different audiences, cannot defend itself against counterargument. This all is negatively contrasted with the living speech of the wise employing the "dialectical art" before his students. The only positive quality of writing books he mentions is if the writing is made "for one's self, to collect a supply of memories for one's own forgetful old age." (My translation from the German.(***)) He adds, rather inconsistently, the clause "and for every person who follows the same path" to this sentence.


(*) Once again, one should remember that Plato put these words into the mouths of all participants.

(**) Of course, I am oversimplifying here, as my next paragraphs already indicate.

(***) Read in a modern revision of Friedrich Schleiermacher's classic German translation.

Some thoughts herein are eternal. Ahead of its time maybe. I was more interested in how the dialogue flows, however not to say the least of the content. It is highly civilised how Socrates and Phaedrus conversed. All the world problems would be solved in an instance had everybody conversed like these two giants.

A truly miserable read. Two stars only because it has so much importance