Works that deal with interesting concepts can be truly fascinating. They have the power to demolish some of the very silly thinking that people intuitively bring to the subject of the philosophy of language. This is no small feat. On the other hand, the author in question is perhaps a bit more than supportably behaviorist. With an annoying frequency, he confuses something that he can't find out with something that is unknowable by definition. He seems to ignore the fact that science has indeed taken what were once philosophical problems and transformed them into experimentally answerable questions. Cog sci, quantum physics, and relativity are especially good examples on that front.

That being said, it is still a great introduction to Wittgenstein. One has to remember that there actually were people who thought in the way that his seeming strawmen did. This provides valuable context and helps to understand the significance of his work.

Our curiosity has another important aspect: our inclination towards the scientific method. By the scientific method, I mean reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the fewest possible fundamental natural laws; and in mathematics, the method of unification by understanding various subjects through a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the scientific method in front of them and have an irresistible inclination towards the scientific way of asking and answering questions. This inclination is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into absolute darkness.

This curiosity-driven pursuit of the scientific method is not only a characteristic of philosophers but also extends to various fields of study. It is through this method that we strive to understand the complex workings of the natural world and make sense of the diverse phenomena around us. The reductionist approach in science helps us break down complex systems into their basic components, allowing for a more in-depth analysis and understanding. In mathematics, the unification of different concepts through generalization provides a powerful tool for solving problems and making connections between seemingly unrelated areas. However, as we delve deeper into the realm of metaphysics, this inclination towards the scientific method may lead us into uncharted territory and raise questions that are difficult to answer.

These companion studies play a significant role in facilitating the reading of his more 'organized' Logical Investigations. They assist the reader in positioning themselves in relation to the project.

What I have to say regarding these studies might not be of utmost importance and could even be considered inappropriate. After all, who really delves into the mood of a philosopher? However, every attempt at 'essential definition' seemed to cause a great deal of bother to LW. Such definitions were the kind that Socrates was constantly inquiring about. But I simply cannot fathom what it means when I am asked for that definition of a chair which gives rise to every chair and leaves none out. There is nothing mysterious about this question. The mode of research holds no meaning for someone who is attuned to the grammar of the request. What one implies by 'chair' is a matter of grammar. Grammar is usage. It is what binds words together. Does the sense of a sentence pertain to grammar? Or does grammar trail behind, naming the particularity of kind? 'Kind' and 'category' are profound mysteries. And I wonder if such proclamations irritate LW as thoughtless? He believes that the mystery inherent in language should be disregarded so as not to obscure thinking from its proper task, which is to work through complexity. From the simple to the complex. From language games to language. It is as if he imagines that it is a flaw in man to be burdened with a mystical or magical way of being. All I mean is that when I ask you for an apple, I am referring to apples. There is no grammar involved. LW is not lenient towards the original, transparent condition of language. When language is most true to itself, it expresses what is present. Is that what he means by live language? Originally, there is no such thing as a primitive language and thus no language game. There is only language. Does this matter?

Reading Wittgenstein put an end to my interest in philosophy. I had once been deeply intrigued by the mysteries and inquiries that philosophy seemed to offer. However, as I delved into Wittgenstein's works and witnessed the kinds of language games he played, my enthusiasm waned. It became clear to me that if philosophy was simply about these convoluted and often seemingly pointless language manipulations, it wasn't worth my precious time. I had expected philosophy to provide profound insights into the nature of reality, ethics, and the human condition. But Wittgenstein's approach left me feeling disillusioned. I began to question whether there was any real substance to the discipline at all. Perhaps there were other ways to explore and understand the world that would prove more fruitful and engaging.

Fascinating background to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

It truly feels very much like lecture notes rather than a cohesive work. The structure and presentation seem to lack a seamless flow, which might make it a bit challenging for some readers to fully grasp the overall essence.

Interestingly, when comparing it to the Blue Book, the latter is much more readable. The language and organization in the Blue Book are more accessible, allowing for a smoother reading experience.

From an intellectual history perspective, it is extremely interesting to observe how Wittgenstein's work developed. Tracing the evolution of his ideas and the different stages of his philosophical thinking provides valuable insights into the broader context of 20th-century philosophy.

Overall, while Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations may have its quirks, it remains an important and influential work that continues to be studied and debated by philosophers and scholars alike.

**Linguistics According to Wittgenstein**

Books about coffee and blue books are a good metaphor for expressing the concept of language. The placement of contrast and commonality side by side. Just as the concept of linguistics can be a combination of several different and common concepts. Wittgenstein, whom we often recognize because of his very good views and writings about the concepts of art, philosophy, and language, in this book tells stories about the concept of linguistics. A book that, in my opinion, can be really useful for lovers of the fields of philosophy and linguistics.

Wittgenstein's approach to linguistics offers a unique perspective. He shows how language is not just a set of words and rules but a complex web of meanings and usages. The idea of contrast and commonality in language is explored in depth, highlighting the rich and diverse nature of linguistic phenomena. His writings on this topic can help readers gain a deeper understanding of how language functions and how it shapes our thoughts and experiences. Whether you are a philosopher, a linguist, or simply interested in the power of language, Wittgenstein's work on linguistics is well worth exploring.

The Blue Book commences with the query, "what is the meaning of a word?" When posing such general inquiries, we frequently define words by envisioning solid, material entities like pencils, chairs, and tables. These words can be defined ostensively, by indicating the object they signify. We might then be inclined to believe that the meaning of these words is the mental act of interpretation that links the word with the thing it denotes. However, Wittgenstein contends that, contrary to common belief, the meaning of a word is determined by its usage in language. If these mental acts that supposedly determine meaning are merely a matter of manipulating signs, we could just as easily assert that thinking and meaning can be accomplished on paper or with the vocal cords.

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of a language game, a more basic form of language that assists us in highlighting certain characteristics of our own language. We can construct a diverse range of language games, each with unique features. Philosophers typically avoid this approach due to what Wittgenstein terms a "craving for generality": they desire to discuss the general aspects of language rather than its specific details. This craving gives rise to the misconception that every word has a single, fixed meaning.

We are tempted to think that a spoken word requires interpretation (we need to be informed of its meaning), but that its meaning does not demand any interpretation. This is incorrect, just as it is incorrect to assume that while we must adhere to a particular rule to act in a specific way, we do not need an additional rule to interpret that rule. There is no clear justification for why every word must be connected to its meaning in our minds. Words are not intrinsically related to the things they denote.

Metaphysical claims often attempt to make general statements about the nature of things, such as "everything is in flux." However, the words "in flux" can only have meaning when contrasted with their opposite, "stable." If we assert that everything is in flux, the term "in flux" loses its significance. Wittgenstein discusses solipsism, the view that "only I exist." The solipsist encounters difficulties when attempting to make comprehensive claims about the nature of experience. If she claims "only what I see is truly seen," she drains the word "see" of meaning because she misuses the word. Such a claim can only amount to a request for a new notation, a redefinition of the word "see." It cannot state any metaphysical revelations about the nature of experience.

The first part of the Brown Book consists of a series of language games. Wittgenstein employs these games to emphasize the different forms of expression and to point out that although we may assume all words share something in common because they can all be represented as written signs, they actually have very little in common. For example, the words "chair," "one," and "this" are not alike.

Throughout the Brown Book, Wittgenstein examines words such as "recognize," "compare," "believe," "read," "understand," and so forth, to demonstrate that there is no common feature among all the different uses of these words. Instead, there is a family resemblance. Certain uses of a word may share certain characteristics with others, just as members of the same family might have certain traits in common. This line of thinking reveals that these words have no single fixed meaning but only a number of loosely related uses.

If we accept that individual orders must be interpreted according to some sort of rule, we must also accept that rules themselves need to be interpreted. For instance, if in reading items from a printed table, I need to understand the rule that we correspond different columns by reading left to right, I may also require a rule to tell me how to correspond different columns by reading left to right, and so on. Sometimes I can read a table without referring to any general rule about how to read tables. That rule need not always be present in my mind.

There are numerous uses of the word "can," some of which refer to what someone has done, and some of which only refer to a potential for future action. We should not be misled by grammar into believing that the present tense of "can" denotes a state of the person we are discussing. Similarly, we should not be misled by grammar into conceiving of the past and the future as things that have passed or are yet to come and then puzzling about where the past goes. Wittgenstein's discussion of "can" also leads to some reflections on reading and on the expression, "I can go on," in both cases showing that there is no distinct process that is present in all uses of these expressions.

Part II of the Brown Book focuses mainly on the idea of seeing something as something else and on the idea that there must be a feeling of similarity when we use the same word in two different contexts. It makes sense to see a group of squiggles as a face, but it does not make sense to see a pencil as a pencil because there is no real alternative.

We should not assume that there is a single, paradigmatic use of a word to which all other uses are compared. If I talk about one vowel being "darker" than another vowel, I need not be comparing vowels to colors. Similarly, there need not be a paradigmatic "feeling" that is present whenever I mean or believe what I say. The meaning of a word is simply a matter of how we use it and not a matter of identifying it with other objects or paradigmatic cases. There is no standard outside of language to which language must compare itself.

Finished the Blue Book on July 10th. It truly blew a great deal of other philosophy out of the water. I have an obsession with words and their exact meanings, and so does he. He really clarifies extremely well what we are truly asking or feeling when we are philosophically puzzled.

I am not quite intelligent enough to understand a significant portion of this. However, I believe it is largely true.

Edit on 8/4/09: Decided to skip the Brown Book. I suppose one can only endure so much of this stuff. Still, I just obtained a copy of the Investigations and might give it a try soon.

This philosophical exploration has been both enlightening and challenging. The Blue Book presented ideas that seemed to revolutionize my perspective on philosophy. The author's ability to clarify complex concepts through his understanding of words and meanings is truly remarkable. Although I struggled to fully grasp some of the ideas, I could sense their truth.

Skipping the Brown Book was a difficult decision, but I felt that I needed a break from this intense study. However, obtaining a copy of the Investigations has reignited my interest, and I look forward to delving into it soon.

Precursors to the more refined works published as the Philosophical Investigations, these Cambridge lectures offer a unique perspective.

For a counterpoint, one can refer to his Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. They reveal Wittgenstein's constant struggle to formulate the body of thought known as \\"Wittgenstein II\\".

This refers to all that which followed the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It is fascinating reading for anyone who enjoyed the PI.

However, it should be noted that neither in these lectures nor in the later tome can the WII program be said to be \\"complete\\". There is still much to explore and understand about Wittgenstein's evolving philosophical ideas.

These lectures serve as an important step in the development of his thought and provide valuable insights into the mind of one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century.

I won't pretend to understand everything about Wittgenstein.

Moreover, considering the fact that this is my bedside read, it implies that I might have failed to grasp a significant amount, especially during those moments when I fall asleep.

However, I still believe that this is a good beginning for someone who desires to understand the transition from the early to the late Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's philosophy is complex and profound, and it requires careful study and reflection.

By starting with this particular work, one can gain some insights into the evolution of his thoughts and ideas.

Although I may not have fully understood every aspect, I am hopeful that this initial exploration will serve as a foundation for further learning and understanding.

I look forward to delving deeper into Wittgenstein's philosophy and uncovering the many layers of meaning that lie within.

Perhaps with more time and effort, I will be able to gain a more comprehensive understanding of his work and its significance.

Until then, I will continue to read and思考, eager to expand my knowledge and appreciation of this great philosopher.

This book is truly a gold mine filled with profound philosophical ideas and thought-provoking questions regarding language.

The first part of the book delves deep into the question, "If life has a meaning, what would it look like?" This is a question that has intrigued humanity for centuries and continues to be a subject of intense debate and exploration.

I first came across this book during my college days. At that time, I didn't think much of it and it didn't leave a lasting impression on me. However, everything changed when I truly got into photography.

Photography opened up a whole new world for me, allowing me to see things from different perspectives and notice details that I had previously overlooked. It was through this newfound passion that I began to understand the significance of the ideas presented in the book.

Now, I realize that the question about the meaning of life is not only relevant to our existence but also has a direct impact on how we perceive and interact with the world around us. This book has become an essential guide for me in my journey of self-discovery and understanding.

Unlike most graduate students, I had the unique experience of maintaining a four-year teaching assistantship that included summers. And for the majority of that time, I worked closely with one particular fellow, Bill Ellos. While I did occasionally work for others in the philosophy and linguistics departments, those were usually part-time gigs that supplemented my main association with Bill. In fact, I might have even worked for or with him during months when I wasn't formally assigned. I know for sure that I worked far more hours for and with him than what was required. I didn't even know there was any time limit until towards the end of those four years.

Bill was a Jesuit who chose not to wear the traditional garb and didn't want to be identified as a priest. His main interests in coming to Loyola University Chicago were Wittgenstein, which was the subject of his dissertation, and medical ethics. Other than editing some of his writing, most of the tasks he gave me involved reading. Thanks to him, I delved into all of Darwin's major works, Wallace's two most memorable books, a collection of Scottish philosophers from the 18th century, some sociobiology, and most of Wittgenstein. Although he had me take notes on topics that seemed to interest him, I suspect a good portion of this was constructive make-work. Nevertheless, I enjoyed most of the work and was introduced to topics and individuals that I probably wouldn't have studied so thoroughly otherwise.

This "book" is really just a compilation of class notes, mostly recorded by others, and is relevant to what came to be known as the Philosophical Investigations. While it may be important to any Wittgenstein scholar, it's definitely not something to recommend to the general reader. For that, one should turn to the texts that the author intended for publication. (A number of philosophers have built their careers on producing books based on such notes, on scribblings, and on purported utterances of the great man. Frankly, I never understood why he should have been taken so seriously, except perhaps out of self-interest and because he's relatively easy to follow.)

Ironically, although I was never overly impressed by Wittgenstein, my only conference publication in a philosophy journal was about the development of his thinking. This was the result of Bill Ellos encouraging me to sign up for a conference and even helping me to secure funding for the trip. Indeed, throughout my first four years at Loyola, Bill was the one and only professor who took a significant interest in promoting my career, and for that, I will always be grateful.