This was an excellent read. Wittgenstein's main works are, of course, the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. However, some people consider On Certainty to be his third major work.

Unfortunately, On Certainty was not formally organized by Wittgenstein. It is more or less a collection of notes that represent Wittgensteinian thought after the Philosophical Investigations.

Some readers believe that Wittgenstein's stance in these notes is sceptical. But I personally don't agree with this view. In fact, Wittgenstein is strongly anti-sceptical. His discussion on 'hinge propositions' is particularly enlightening. I found Meredith Williams' exegesis to be very helpful in understanding Wittgenstein.

In conclusion, for those of you who are trapped in Cartesian (Humean) scepticism, Wittgenstein is definitely worth the time and effort you invest.

Wittgenstein is always worth reading.

His works offer profound insights into the nature of language, thought, and reality.

His ideas have had a significant impact on various fields, including philosophy, linguistics, and psychology.

By reading Wittgenstein, one can gain a deeper understanding of the complexity and richness of human experience.

His unique approach to philosophical problems challenges us to think differently and question our assumptions.

Moreover, his writing style is often characterized by clarity and precision, making his ideas accessible to a wide range of readers.

Whether you are a professional philosopher or simply interested in exploring the big questions of life, Wittgenstein's works are sure to provide you with valuable food for thought.

So, if you haven't already, I highly recommend picking up a copy of Wittgenstein's writings and embarking on a journey of intellectual discovery.

You won't be disappointed.

I found myself in a quandary, unable to determine whether this book was intended for humans or space aliens. In the end, I surmised that perhaps it was for both.

Wonderful Wittgenstein! Here we have 90 excruciating pages (comprising 676 numbered sections) delving into the question of whether G. E. Moore was justified in holding up his hand and proclaiming, "I know that here is my hand." The second half of the book is rather eerie to read, considering he was penning it while succumbing to cancer. The dates are inscribed on the entries, with the final page written just two days before his demise.

Some of the highlights include:

Section 127 - How do I know that someone else employs the words "I doubt it" in the same way as I do?

Section 152 - The propositions that remain firm for me are akin to the axis of a spinning object.

Section 210 - Does my telephone call to a friend in NYC fortify my conviction that the earth exists?

Section 279 - Cars do not sprout from the earth.

Section 281 - My friend does not have sawdust in his head.

Section 282 - Cats do not grow on trees.

Section 287 - The squirrel does not infer through induction that it will require stores again next winter.

Section 315 - THE game that teachers endeavor to impart to pupils: how to pose questions.

Section 341 - Propositions that are immune from doubt are like hinges upon which the others pivot.

Section 418 - Is my understanding merely a blindness to my own lack of comprehension? It often appears so to me.

Section 450 - A doubt that questioned everything would not be a legitimate doubt.

Section 616 - Would it be unthinkable that I should remain in the saddle regardless of how much the facts resisted?

Although this work is significantly shorter than Philosophical Investigations, it is advisable to read PI first, as this was composed subsequent to it and makes occasional references to PI.

The text has a high degree of ambiguity and complexity.

Despite the clarity of the translator's introduction.

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The book review is continued on my blog:

((( Hami Al-Gaith )))

https://www.hma-algaith.com/%d9%81%d9...

This text seems to present a rather convoluted idea. It starts by highlighting the ambiguity and complexity of the content. Then, it mentions the clarity of the translator's introduction, perhaps suggesting that despite this initial clarity, the overall text remains difficult to understand. The ellipsis in the middle might imply that there is more to the story or that some details have been omitted. The mention of the book review on the blog adds another layer to the narrative, as it indicates that there is further discussion and analysis available. Finally, the link provided gives readers the opportunity to access the full review and explore the topic in more depth.

Overall, this text leaves many questions unanswered and invites readers to dig deeper into the subject matter.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty is one of his most important works, completed before his death. It consists of a collection of paragraphs and remarks that form this book. Against the backdrop of his discussions with his friend Norman Malcolm in 1949 about knowledge and common sense regarding G.E. Moore. It was first published in 1969. This work has sparked a great deal of controversy in philosophical, linguistic, and psychological fields. It also draws attention to the logic and understanding of the use of concepts and the referential distinction of words in language.

Some quotes:

In paragraph 559, Wittgenstein tells us that the language game is something unpredictable, and it is not rational. Perhaps the really interesting and thought-provoking thing is its connection to the existence of the language game with the existence of our lives.

Also, in paragraph 357, he says that one can say: "The sentence 'I know' expresses comfortable certainty, not the certainty that is still suffering."

In paragraph 601, he also says that there is always a danger of the desire to find the meaning of an expression by reflecting on the expression itself and in the mental state that one uses it, instead of always thinking about practice. This makes a person repeat the expression to himself many times, as if one were forced to look for what one is looking for in the expression and in the feeling that it gives.

Paragraph 331: If we always act with certainty based on the strength of belief, should we be surprised that there is a lot that we cannot doubt?

Paragraph 300: Our corrections of our vision are not on the same level.

For more information about this work, read the book:

Wittgenstein and On Certainty by Andy Hamilton, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2014, pp. 340, Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall

Wittgenstein and On Certainty, written by Professor Andy Hamilton - translated by Mostafa Samir, published by Dar Ibn Al-Nadeem and Al-Rawafed in 2019. The book has 479 pages and is a comprehensive introduction to the last and most important thing Wittgenstein wrote (On Certainty).

Here are my references to the book

Wittgenstein has always held a great fascination for me.

His works are not easily accessible unless one is truly willing to delve deep into the realm of his mind.

He possessed a mind that was distinct from that of most of us, operating on a higher, meta level of what we refer to as "things in life."

This particular book challenges all the things that we take for granted in order to live, pushing the boundaries to an extreme extent that might even seem absurd.

After such intense questioning, there is very little remaining to uphold human life as we know it.

I often wonder how many individuals are capable of surmounting that sense of void that emerges.

It makes one reflect on the fundamental nature of our existence and the assumptions upon which we build our lives.

Wittgenstein's ideas force us to confront the limitations and uncertainties that lie beneath the surface of our seemingly ordinary lives.

His profound insights continue to inspire and challenge thinkers to this day.

The notes are indeed rather lackluster without G.E. Moore's articles. As per British World News, these notes primarily serve as responses to Moore's writings on diverse subjects.

Presented as a series, they often come across as trite platitudes, common sense quips, or gentle jabs at making sense of life. In and of themselves, although they may contain grains of truth, they don't seem to offer a great deal in terms of enhancing our understanding of the world. I truly struggle to fathom why they were published in this manner.

Of course, considering the inherent significance of many of the statements, one could argue that we are all philosophers as "complex" as Wittgenstein was reputed to be. However, I'm not a devotee of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To me, it appeared to be a treatise overly concerned with minutiae, overly catalogued and ordered, and, to be frank, a bit absurd.

Nonetheless, it does make for a decent bilingual primer for students of either language who aim to improve their English or German vocabulary and grammar.

If I send letters to my friend at 67 Parkway Lane, and receive letters from him. What does it matter if 67 Parkway Lane is not his address?

Well, it matters a great deal. If the address I have been using is incorrect, then there is a high possibility that the letters I send might not reach him at all. They could get lost in the mail system or be delivered to the wrong person.

Similarly, if he is sending letters to an incorrect address thinking it is mine, I might never receive those letters either. This could lead to a breakdown in communication between us.

We might miss important information, invitations, or simply the opportunity to stay in touch and share our lives. It is essential to have the correct address to ensure the smooth flow of communication through letters.

Therefore, it is crucial to double-check and confirm the correct address with my friend to avoid any potential misunderstandings or disappointments.

As the title indicates, On Certainty is an in-depth exploration of the philosophical issues related to concepts like “certainty”, “knowledge”, and “belief”. In contrast to Philosophical Investigations, which Wittgenstein painstakingly polished and refined over several years (albeit never actually completed), On Certainty consists of first-draft materials scribbled down during the last eighteen months of his life. Consequently, reading it can be both captivating and exasperating. It is captivating due to the profound insights it offers and the opportunity it provides to peek “behind the scenes” at one of the 20th century’s greatest philosophers at work. However, it is exasperating because it repeatedly circles around the same fundamental problem. That is, it seems improper to say “I know” in relation to certain propositions (such as “I have two hands” or “My name is so-and-so”), yet it also seems equally inappropriate to claim that one doesn’t know the truth of such statements. Time and again, the same difficulties present themselves to him, and time and again, he gravitates towards the same (or similar) solutions.

Although this can be extremely frustrating, the journey is still compelling. It vividly demonstrates the enormous challenge involved in accurately describing the usage of terms like “I know” and the surprisingly intricate and diverse role they play in our lives. Nietzsche once remarked that writing should always be “a conquest of oneself”, and here we witness Wittgenstein engaged in precisely such a struggle as he resists the temptation to be misled by our ordinary forms of expression. His refusal to take the easy way out – to let himself off the hook – cannot but inspire admiration.

All of this does not imply that he simply goes around in circles without making any progress. Make no mistake: On Certainty contains significant observations regarding what it means to know something, the grounds (and sometimes the lack thereof) of certainty, the connection between knowledge and behavior, and the very nature of inductive reasoning itself. It is both profound and subtly disconcerting as Wittgenstein strips knowledge of its metaphysical pretensions and firmly anchors it in the life of the human being.

Finally, I must admit that for me, the book is a peculiarly poignant experience. After the first 36 pages, the entries are dated (beginning on 23 September 1950), and as I continued reading, I couldn't help but count down the days he had left to live. The final entry, on 27 April 1951, was written just two days before his death. Here is the very last section, which exemplifies both the originality of his thought and the elegance of his prose:
“But even if in such cases I can’t be mistaken, isn’t it possible that I am drugged?” If I am and if the drug has deprived me of my consciousness, then I am not truly speaking and thinking at this moment. I cannot seriously assume that I am currently dreaming. Someone who, while dreaming, says “I am dreaming”, even if they speak audibly, is no more correct than if they said in their dream “it is raining” when it was actually raining. Even if their dream were actually related to the sound of the rain.
On Certainty §676

Self-books, the way of presenting in three languages and Mr. Hosseini's translation, all of them are a struggle!

Self-books often face various challenges. The process of creating them requires a great deal of effort and dedication. Presenting them in three languages adds another layer of complexity. It demands not only a deep understanding of each language but also the ability to convey the same meaning accurately across different cultures and linguistic systems.

Mr. Hosseini's translation is also a remarkable feat. Translating a book is not just about converting words from one language to another; it is about capturing the essence, the emotions, and the cultural nuances of the original work. His translation efforts contribute to making the self-books more accessible to a wider audience, bridging the gap between different languages and cultures.

In conclusion, the journey of self-books, from their creation to their presentation in multiple languages and translation, is a continuous struggle. However, it is through this struggle that we can share knowledge, ideas, and experiences across the globe, enriching our understanding of different cultures and perspectives.

A compilation of notes that LW made in the early 50s, just before his death. Starting from Moore's common sense, LW makes an elaboration, which sometimes loses a bit of focus, on the possibility and impossibility of saying something wrong, on the relevance of the truth judgment, and on the absurdity of postulating doubts when there are no reasons to hold them.

The edition is bilingual (German-English), with a very brief introduction by the compiler of the text, his executor G.E.A. Anscombe. It doesn't make much sense to start with LW through this book, and it is preferable for that the Tractatus.

However, this compilation still offers valuable insights into LW's thinking during that period. It shows his continued exploration of fundamental philosophical questions, such as the nature of language, truth, and certainty. Although the elaboration may not be as coherent or comprehensive as in some of his other works, it provides a snapshot of his intellectual journey and the ideas that were occupying his mind at the time.

For those who are already familiar with LW's philosophy and want to gain a deeper understanding of his later thoughts, this book can be a useful addition to their studies. It can also serve as a starting point for further research into the specific topics that LW discusses in these notes.

In brief, W. analyzes the meaning of the expression "I know...". What does it mean to know? When can we be sure that we really know something?

Starting from language, W. shows how in reality man does not learn the precise meaning of a word, but its different uses. The child knows how to use a word even before being aware of the precise meaning of that word and what it means to "know something".

Knowing something means being certain about that thing. But from what does such certainty arise? It arises, first of all, from experience: countless cases have confirmed for me the certainty of that thing. But that's not enough: I could have been deceived. However, I can continue to be sure of it: if there is no data indicating that I have been deceived or how to prove the opposite, it is useless to doubt everything that I know. Doubt, when it is infinite, is no longer a doubt: indeed, doubt presupposes that there is a solution. If I cannot find such a solution, it means that I am certain that I cannot solve that doubt and, therefore, that doubt disappears.

W. claims that we learn things through their applications and not through grammatical rules. Indeed, these latter are the result of the attempt to recognize a rule in the midst of something regular, which, however, is not necessarily certain and sure. Nevertheless, it is in this regularity that man finds the necessary certainty to use words without being eaten away by doubt with every sentence.

Another problem is that the rule does not help us predict errors: they occur and we must analyze them, each time, empirically. Only then, if possible, can a rule be derived from them. This makes the error always something exceptional, which eludes definitions and our ability to predict things. If, instead, the error is contemplated by the rule itself, then it is not an error, but another manifestation of that rule (which, for various reasons, man considers an error because of its uselessness, nuisance, difficulty).