I don't have a great fondness for the format of this book. It simply consists of 600 - 700 numbered aphorisms, or in some cases, just statements by Wittgenstein. There is no real structure, although certain statements do follow from those that preceded them.

That being said, the numbered statements are truly interesting and sometimes quite strange yet quite logical. Also, as a beginner German student, it's wonderful to have short statements like this in a bilingual edition. Many words are used repeatedly, and it provides excellent practice for reading aloud and thus memorizing new vocabulary.

I'm aware that this review doesn't say much that is useful about Wittgenstein's work itself. I've never read him before, so I can't speak with any authority about much of anything related to the content. I do feel that he could have delved deeper into the linguistic aspect of his assertions. His discussions of certainty and doubt rely on the concept of "Sprachspiele" or "language game." So it's a bit frustrating that Wittgenstein fails to discuss the significance of the game for statements like "Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius." He questions whether such a statement can be made with any certainty, yet doesn't acknowledge the difference between this statement and "I know that this is my hand." It seems to me that the next step is obvious: to talk about the fact that what we call "boiling" occurs at 100 degrees because we (humans, speakers) decided to call boiling boiling and because we decided to call the temperature at which "boiling" takes place by the measurement "100 degrees." The question of how I know that my hand is my hand or the question of whether a table still exists when no one is looking at it is of an entirely different nature.

Perhaps I'm being foolish in judging this work as I have. It is a collection of thoughts that dates up to two days before Wittgenstein's death. Maybe he had planned to address the linguistic issues but never got around to it.

Vic highly recommends an author as his favorite (linguistic) philosopher. The philosopher holds the concept that language can only be understood when it is externalized and everyone reaches a common understanding.

For example, there is the Beetle Box concept. It goes like this: "What I have in this box is a beetle. Tell everyone it is so." And then, and only then, when the masses comprehend the concept expressed in the language, can a meaningful discourse about it take place.

Moreover, this philosopher writes in aphorisms, which are short and pithy statements that convey profound wisdom or insights. These aphorisms often require careful thought and reflection to fully understand their meaning and significance. Vic finds this way of writing both challenging and intellectually stimulating, as it forces him to engage deeply with the philosopher's ideas and思考 them from different perspectives.

Puro pinche Wittgenstein. He is truly the GOAT. A mastodon, a fierce beast, a machine. Here's an unpopular opinion. This is the third Wittgenstein, the one that all of us were looking for. Enough of the nonsense. All of life is a game, and games are just that. Games of language, forms of life, images of the world. Thanks for messing up my existence. A kiss.

Wittgenstein's ideas have had a profound impact on philosophy and our understanding of language and reality. His exploration of the nature of language games and forms of life has opened up new ways of thinking about how we make sense of the world around us. While his work may be complex and challenging, it is also deeply rewarding for those who are willing to engage with it.

Despite his importance, Wittgenstein remains a somewhat controversial figure. Some people love his ideas, while others find them晦涩难懂 or even objectionable. But regardless of one's personal opinion, there is no denying the influence that he has had on philosophy and beyond. So here's to Wittgenstein, the GOAT of philosophy.

Epistemology as linguistic analysis is an interesting perspective. The phrase "I know _" can be more aptly rephrased as "I believe _ to be so", which indicates a certain degree of certainty about a proposition within a specific frame of reference. The understanding that all judgments of "truth" ultimately rely on some faithful assumption is indeed an important insight.

However, rather than delving deeper into Wittgenstein's rabbit hole of stifling hypotheticals, I would much prefer to read about the domain-specificity of skepticism and heuristics as Nassim Taleb presents. In Wittgenstein's works, we may hear the faint murmurs of understanding, but there is a lack of dynamic movement. Ayn Rand's criticism of the philosophy of language as sterile and ultimately impotent holds some truth. After all, the question of how many Wittgensteins can dance on the head of a pin is somewhat thought-provoking, but it's not really to my taste.

"I believe it might interest a philosopher, one who can think for himself, to read my notes. For even if I have hit the mark only rarely, he would recognize what targets I had been ceaselessly aiming at." This statement further emphasizes the idea that different philosophers have their own unique perspectives and pursuits in the realm of knowledge and language.

Devi crederci Witt.

In questo mondo, ci sarà una storia d'amore meravigliosa in un mondo migliore. Un mondo dove l'amore è vero e profondo, dove le persone si amano senza condizioni.

Ci sarà un azzurro più intenso in un cielo più immenso. Il cielo sarà così blu e limpido, come se fosse un lago infinito.

E ci sarà la tua ombra al mio fianco vestita di bianco. Tu sarai sempre accanto a me, come una presenza calma e confortante.

Questa è la certezza che abbiamo, la certezza dell'amore e della bellezza.

Potete scoprire questa storia d'amore e molto altro ancora guardando il video sul seguente link: http://youtu.be/ctvldN26Rfs.

Non perdete l'occasione di entrare in questo mondo meraviglioso.

I read this when all my reads were goodwill finds.

I resided in a small college town and devoured numerous excellent philosophy books.

I had a penchant for this book as it dawned on me that everything we believe we know might have been imparted to us by someone else.

We have never truly experienced them or verified the facts; we simply accept "their" society's truth.

One can only start to perceive beyond one's acculturation once one realizes that one has been brainwashed.

It made me question the validity of the knowledge and beliefs that I had taken for granted.

I began to wonder how many of the things I thought were true were actually just the result of the influence of the society I grew up in.

This book served as a catalyst for my intellectual growth and made me more critical of the information I received.

It taught me to always question and seek the truth for myself.

Overall, it was a thought-provoking and eye-opening read that had a profound impact on my perspective.

It seems to me that Wittgenstein, in this very late work, endeavors to address the questions posed in his Tractatus using the terminology he adopted in his mid-period, namely that of the language games from the Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations. With On Certainty, completed just two days before his death, I believe Wittgenstein reaches surprisingly Kantian conclusions.

Wittgenstein commences both this work and the Tractatus with an exploration into that which he can be certain of. In the Tractatus, he asks himself what he truly knows. In On Certainty, he ponders what he can and cannot be said to doubt. Doubting everything, Wittgenstein proclaims in the latter part of the text, would not truly be doubt at all. Doubting everything would render one unable to act or think as one would no longer believe even in the meaning of the words used to express doubt. The language game of social existence could not persist under such circumstances, and doubt is actually a product of the language game, one might say a subgenre of the game. (Does not Descartes, in doubting even his own existence, ultimately validate that existence and even assert its primacy?)

So, one cannot doubt the rules of the game themselves (i.e., “everything”), but one most definitely can doubt within the rules of the game. To determine if a proposition can be doubted, Wittgenstein says, look at what supports the proposition's truth-claim. In almost all cases, he contends, it will only be other propositions. Language games rely on themselves as proof. Even mathematics, Wittgenstein holds, is a kind of language game, asserting the certainty of its conclusions by insisting on the validity of its own rules. Within a language game, what is true is what is comprehensible according to the rules. Therefore, something can be doubted if said doubt does not make other propositions impossible (meaning that the vast majority of propositions can be doubted), but the doubt employed will (in the vast majority of cases) only end by affirming the rules of the game. (Wittgenstein does here acknowledge, which I don't think the young author of the Tractatus would have, that there are very rare instances when a doubt changes the rules of the game, for example, a momentous scientific “discovery” – something interestingly akin to a Badiouian Event. At any rate, for Wittgenstein, unlike Badiou, the game of meaning simply keeps reinventing itself and imposing its rules on us, even in cases of major changes to the way the game is played. I do think this avowal by Wittgenstein of the possibility of changes to the rules, while valid, gets him into some philosophical trouble. How can the rules not be doubted if doubt can change the rules?)

Wittgenstein distinguishes between “knowledge”, that which one must subscribe to if one is to continue believing anything, i.e., to continue playing the language game, and “certainty”, a term that he thinks, if we were to live completely honestly, we would abolish. “I am certain” should, ideally, be replaced with “I believe I know”. Belief is the ultimate justification for knowledge, and there is no ultimate justification for belief, except perhaps for faith, which is spiritual, not scientific, mathematical, or philosophical.

Wittgenstein's distinction between “knowledge” and “certainty” strikes me as similar to that of Kant between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. As with Kant, in On Certainty, we must think about the world in a way that enables us to keep thinking and acting in the world, whether or not said thinking corresponds to the reality of the world-in-itself. There are, of course, major differences between the two ontologies. For Kant, it is the nature of the human mind and senses that determines the shape of our experience, of our phenomenal world. For Wittgenstein, it is the rules of the particular language game that a person is taught to play that determine how a person thinks and acts. He describes a war of cultures as a contest between different language games, each trying, futilely, to persuade the other of its correctness. (Kant's nature versus Wittgenstein's nurture)

Whenever I read Wittgenstein, I sense a repressed fear and, yes, uncertainty. But the nervous energy is palpable in this last work, written as the philosopher was literally on his deathbed. Faced with the immediacy of the absolute uncertainty of death, I think the man clung to philosophy as both a comfort and an outlet for his dreadful suspicion that life may, in fact, be but a dream.

Abdul Qari, presents you with the new without talking about any new.

But I think it needs a second reading after a while. It is a mixture of the subject of knowledge, language, and logic. It actually explores "in certainty."

Whether you agreed or disagreed with his views, it is impossible to deny his distinctiveness.

This work seems to have a certain depth and complexity that requires careful consideration and reflection. It may challenge your existing ideas and make you think about things from different perspectives.

The author's exploration of "certainty" is particularly interesting. In a world full of uncertainties, trying to find a certain degree of certainty is not an easy task.

Overall, this is a work that is worth reading and pondering. It may bring you some new inspirations and insights.

**Reflections on What Others Call Truth - And Why Radical Skepticism Is Just as Unattainable as Certainty. A Treasure Trove of the Philosophical Proof of Contradiction**

"On Certainty" is considered the last, relatively coherent set of propositions by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein did not aim for self-arguing, cohesive texts from his debut "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" to "Philosophical Investigations". His reflections are like annotations to mathematical proofs and can only be decoded with the mathematical foundation discussions of his time. If Wittgenstein is taken out of context, he appears trivial.

What "On Certainty" is about, which is thought of as an answer to Georg Edward Moore's "A Defense of Common Sense", relates to the search for propositions that can be chosen as the starting point of a logical conclusion. This question arose in mathematics in various ways due to the logical paradoxes discovered around the turn of the century, such as 'A Cretan says all Cretans lie'. In contrast to almost everyone, Alfred Korzybski and the late Bertrand Russell being an exception, Wittgenstein understands mathematics as a particularly simple language game.

To illustrate this, Wittgenstein's thinking revolves around the question of how he can be sure in a calculation, how he can ensure that he has not miscalculated. His answer is only through practice, but this leaves him unsatisfied. Why is Wittgenstein not reassured by this answer? Because the language game of philosophy and mathematics, in which Wittgenstein intends to participate, does not allow the answer that the question does not arise. However, Wittgenstein realizes that many mathematical as well as philosophical propositions are arbitrary from the perspective of enlightened thinking. Mathematically formulated: From false follows anything, and even more: From anything follows everything. So the question about things for which no reasons for assumption can be given pragmatically cannot be answered satisfactorily by definition.

Wittgenstein expands the results of Kurt Gödel from the first Gödel incompleteness theorem to the field of epistemology in "On Certainty". In contrast to Gödel, however, he does not take the non-refutability of a statement as a reason to assume its truth. In this sense, Wittgenstein shows his anti-Platonism. With him, it often remains, and is often written down by him, at: "… and write cheerfully 'In the beginning was the deed.'" A completely and clearly disqualifying statement in the field of mathematical epistemology. Worth considering in every respect.

As recalled, this was my favorite volume among the very many produced by the clever fellows who have made careers out of his works. Wittgenstein himself published very little. However, an enormous body of works attributed to him has been culled from his correspondences, notebooks, and students' notes of lectures and conversations.

On Certainty comes as close as Wittgenstein ever does to being a systematic philosopher rather than just playing at being a skeptic, phenomenologist, speculator, or analyst of language. It isn't original in the strictest sense. But it is interesting to observe how he seems to arrive at conclusions that are very similar to those of the transcendental philosophy associated with Immanuel Kant.

Wittgenstein's thoughts in this volume offer a unique perspective on the nature of certainty and knowledge. His exploration of these concepts challenges our traditional ways of thinking and invites us to consider alternative viewpoints.

Overall, On Certainty is a thought-provoking work that continues to be relevant in contemporary philosophy. It serves as a testament to Wittgenstein's profound insights and his ability to engage with complex philosophical issues.

Really could have been a short essay. It is philosophically intriguing, yet also very redundant. One wonders if Wittgenstein sat there and thought, ‘I wonder how many times I can rephrase the EXACT SAME THING over and over?’. I am not certain how I feel about this book. Or perhaps I should say that I lack unshakable conviction of how I feel about this book within the context of its own particular ‘language-game’. However, I believe I know that I am certain that I should have read G.E. Moore first.

Empiricism, when stripped of all the systematic fluff, is, at its foundation, based on assumptions. You can indeed choose to doubt these basic notions of causality and get all meta about it. But doing so trivializes the point of having the conversation in the first place. These assumptions, however, are only known when they are understood. That is, they only gain their certainty in their linguistic intelligibility and nowhere else. Otherwise, they can be subject to doubt. But I think Wittgenstein, and certainly Moore, would agree that it is not any reasonable doubt. All has meaning and certainty, contextually.

How can we be certain that anything is real?!! To ask this question relies on a world of language. For which we assume personal and interpersonal intelligibility. So, that much is real at least. It makes one wonder about the nature of reality and how our understanding of it is intertwined with the language we use. The relationship between language and reality is a complex and fascinating topic that continues to be explored by philosophers and thinkers alike.

Wittgenstein's collected notes were published posthumously.

He grappled with the task of reconciling Moore's somewhat cheeky "here is a hand" response to skepticism with the difficulties that strong skepticism presents. He aimed to fit this into his own language-game model.

He explored several solutions but found them lacking and thus had to start anew.

His overall approach was centered around examining what we truly mean when we utter the words "I know", rather than attempting to prescribe a one-size-fits-all level of appropriate skepticism.

This exploration into the meaning of "I know" within the context of language games was a key aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophical endeavor, as he sought to understand the nature of knowledge and how it is expressed and understood within our linguistic and social practices.

By focusing on the meaning and use of language, he hoped to gain a deeper understanding of the complex relationship between knowledge and skepticism.