Werkelijk verschrikkelijk. It is truly terrifying. Snap niet hoe je zo kan zijn. I can't understand how you can be like this. Wel heel knap gedaan. However, it is very cleverly done. Proficiat, Ludwig. Congratulations, Ludwig.

You have managed to create something that is both astonishing and somewhat disturbing. The way you have executed this is truly remarkable. Your skills and abilities are on full display here. It makes one wonder what else you are capable of achieving. Ludwig, you should be proud of your accomplishment. This is no small feat and it shows your dedication and talent. Well done!

More like... Tractatus Logico-PhiloLAMEicus!!!

I’m truly glad that Wittgenstein did not pursue a career as an aeronaut.

It is quite remarkable to consider the irony in his approach. Here is a thinker who is highly critical of language, yet he chooses the format of a book to convey and explain his profound ideas.

A book, after all, is a medium that relies heavily on the very language he is scrutinizing. It makes one wonder about the complexity of his thought process and the challenges he faced in attempting to express his views.

Perhaps this irony is a testament to the inescapable nature of language, even for those who seek to understand and question its limitations.

Wittgenstein’s decision to use the written word to explore language may have been a conscious choice, a way to engage with the very thing that fascinated and困惑ed him.

In any case, it adds another layer of depth to his already complex and influential body of work.

There are not many books like this.

Its tone is brash, irreverent, and cocksure. The points are painstakingly enumerated, the words are carefully chosen, and many points are stubbornly but alluringly confusing.

Despite not being certain that I fully understand Wittgenstein at each step in his argument, I am convinced that his critique is right but not one that undermines the possibility of analysis.

Trying to sum up, Wittgenstein is wary of the truth function of analytic language, especially logic, which is only true in the logic of its form and in the symbolism of its expression.

At some point, the aims of analysis go beyond describing elementary propositions about the world and attempt to posit relationships between objects. Then it assigns object status to those conclusions about states of affairs and, at each step, retreats a little further from making statements that can be verified by reference to the world and the states of affairs among things in it.

Eventually, analytic statements make claims about the world and assert relationships that are only true by definition. The language of analysis starts to refer only to itself and its own products. It becomes “senseless” in Wittgenstein’s terms, meaning it follows a logic of form but is ultimately not verifiable.

Sensible propositions assert falsifiable truths, allowing language to be tested against a state of affairs in the world of things. To achieve more certainty, more elementary propositions about the world need to be unpacked, chasing atomic facts and inventing additional objects and assigning unique signs and symbols to them.

However, this is futile because the world of things is endlessly divisible into more and more atomic facts and objects that need names. It is another form of Zeno’s paradox. To make more complex assertions, analysis needs to build on itself. Even if that analysis is based on a firm foundation of elementary propositions, the forms of logic used to combine those elementary propositions then become the object of analysis, and we are studying things that are not in the world.

These are the limits of analytic language, but I’m not bothered by Wittgenstein’s claims about the senselessness of logic and other kinds of interpretive and analytical language. It does seem true that there is a point at which the level of claims we want to make and support with analytic language escapes the bounds of verifiability against a world of atomic facts.

However, if we believe Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophy is an “activity” for the clarification of thought, then it retains its value despite working in the medium of language.

It is also true that philosophy and logic are not the only modes of analysis we have. Consider other modes of analytic expression, such as through art, music, and literature. Then, just like with senseless philosophy that follows the form of its logic, art, music, and literature also follow form, and form expands the limits of the possible, a point that Wittgenstein develops later into proposition 6.

The famous ending, proposition 7: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” seems a little less final. The problem may not be that there are things about which nothing can be spoken. Part of the problem may be the limited repertoire of ways we have for speaking. Forms of “speaking” like art and literature retain more of the experiential in a way that, to me, seems to allow for the kind of progress toward truth telling that Wittgenstein assigns to living.

What the hell am I supposed to say about this?

The parts that I managed to understand were truly hugely inspirational to my own thoughts. However, I have to admit that I suspect I didn't really understand those parts completely.

It is such a shame that someone as clever as this, who firmly believed that this book was the ultimate solution to all problems in philosophy, could only convey their ideas in a form that often escapes human comprehension.

It's just like the old saying goes: if the human brain were simple enough for us to understand, then we would be too stupid to do so. In other words, the brain is something that we may never fully understand.

Perhaps if someone were really smart enough to solve all the problems in philosophy, they could only communicate their findings in an incomprehensible language.

And then, later on, they might even decide that they were wrong after all.

WTF.

Sure, understanding Wittgenstein's work is no easy feat, especially considering his autistic-child-like writing style.

And indeed, I don't always find myself in agreement with his ideas, mainly due to my materialist inclinations and my greater affinity for his later rejections of his earlier work.

However, there's no denying the importance and influence of his work. It's truly of great significance.

Does this mean it's worth reading? Probably so.

But did I enjoy it? No, not in the slightest. This is especially the case when considering that the logical positivist program it inspired, although equally important and influential, ultimately turned out to be an intellectual dead end.

Despite my lack of enjoyment, I still recognize the value and impact that Wittgenstein's work has had on the field of philosophy.

As I pen down these words, I am making a Herculean effort to keep my eyes wide open. I have been deprived of sleep for the past 48 hours, and my eyes are burning with exhaustion. A pounding headache is wreaking havoc inside my skull.

Why haven't I slept? Maybe my naive response would be that I was attempting to experience life more fully with my eyes open. But alas, I failed miserably as the lack of sleep has severely affected my quality of life. I have been functioning like a semi-awake, semi-asleep zombie with my eyes open.

Perhaps Wittgenstein, with his book, was trying to address an issue similar to this, but from a philosophical perspective. However, his kind of philosophy seems to choke those who are striving to be freer souls rather than helping them. It makes people neurotic instead of enabling them to admire the beauty of the world around them. Maybe he was engaged in a battle against something like this, and he felt as intelligent as a human being could be while writing this book.

The preface and the final part of the book were the simplest and easiest to read. The rest of it, however, might seem difficult. But if you pick it up, I suggest you persevere as it all comes together beautifully in the final part. It clicks into place from all the buildup, transforming the book from something that feels like a mathematical theorem to a work of mysticism.

The Tractatus was truly a beautiful book.

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A note on the translation/edition I picked up:

I read the Michael Beaney translation published in 2023 by Oxford World Classics. I am extremely glad I chose this particular edition. It had a very good and detailed introduction that discussed Wittgenstein and the text. It also included Russell and Frege's thoughts in sufficient detail, which I realized was extremely helpful as I read the book. There were numerous footnotes that explained the meaning of sentences and the translation choices. I did not feel any lack of elucidation or support from Beaney anywhere in the book. He utilized his expertise and translation skills very well, making it a very comfortable and smooth read. I loved it and would highly recommend this edition any day of the week.

The highest way to say that you have no idea what you are talking about is to shut your mouth. This simple yet profound statement holds a great deal of truth. In many situations, people tend to speak without thinking, often resulting in misinformation or unnecessary arguments. By remaining silent when we are unsure or lack knowledge, we can avoid making fools of ourselves and causing more harm than good.

Moreover, silence can also be a powerful tool for listening and learning. When we stop talking and open our ears, we give ourselves the opportunity to gain new perspectives and understandings. It allows us to truly listen to others and absorb their ideas and experiences. In this way, we can expand our own knowledge and wisdom.

So, the next time you find yourself in a situation where you are not sure what to say, remember this advice: the highest way to say that you have no idea what you are talking about is to shut your mouth. It may seem difficult at first, but with practice, it can become a valuable habit that will serve you well in all aspects of your life.

The text seems to be a set of comments or grades related to something. Here is the expanded version:

The grade given is 3/5. There are several reasons for this. +5 is awarded for writing this, apparently while serving in WW1. However, -1 is deducted because there are not enough examples. Examples would have been very helpful in clearing up a ton of confusion. For instance, it's not clear what exactly the N-operator is. Another -1 is deducted because of the statement "because I CAN". It's not entirely clear what this means in the context of the grading. Overall, the grade of 3/5 reflects these considerations.

Much Needed Hygiene to Modern Philosophy

In the realm of modern philosophy, there is a crucial aspect that often goes overlooked - hygiene. Just as personal hygiene is essential for our physical well-being, a certain kind of intellectual hygiene is necessary for the health and progress of philosophical thought.

Hygiene in modern philosophy involves several elements. It requires a meticulous examination of our assumptions, beliefs, and arguments. We must be willing to question and challenge the ideas that we hold dear, ensuring that they are based on sound reasoning and evidence. This process of self-reflection and critical analysis helps to eliminate the clutter of unfounded or outdated ideas, allowing for a more clear and accurate understanding of the world.
Moreover, intellectual hygiene also entails respecting the views and opinions of others. We should engage in respectful and meaningful dialogue, listening to different perspectives and considering them with an open mind. By doing so, we can avoid the pitfalls of dogmatism and narrow-mindedness, and instead foster a spirit of intellectual curiosity and growth.
In conclusion, much needed hygiene is an essential component of modern philosophy. It helps us to maintain the integrity and vitality of our intellectual pursuits, and enables us to make significant contributions to the field of philosophy.

At least some fundamental knowledge of Logic is required in order to understand Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

I'm inclined to even add that if you've no Philosophy background, this is not worth reading yet. It is truly a complex and profound work that demands a certain level of familiarity with the concepts and theories within the field of Philosophy.

My rating of 4 stars is mainly due to the lack of examples. While the text presents highly abstract and intricate ideas, the absence of concrete illustrations makes it a bit more challenging for the reader to fully grasp and apply those concepts.

This is one of those seriously "smart" books that requires careful study and deep thought. It offers valuable insights into the nature of language, logic, and reality, but it is not an easy read by any means. One must approach it with an open mind and a willingness to engage with the difficult ideas presented.

I was just about to pen down, “Of what we cannot speak we must remain silent,” as my review. The book concludes with this rather affected assertion, which in fact would make a flawless book review for me too. However, it is an atrocity to read (or pretend to have read) a book of such stature (allegedly the most significant philosophical work of the 20th century, no less) and not jot down a paragraph or two about it.

Wittgenstein composed this book in the trenches and P.O.W. camps during World War I. At the commencement of the book, he states: “Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it.” That was disheartening news for me right from the start. I don't think I have ever entertained such lofty thoughts – not even remotely.

I would have awarded this book one star and labeled it as a一堆 pompous and pretentious intellectual trickery, but Wittgenstein cannot be disregarded. You see, someone like Bertrand Russell, whose genius I acknowledge, was so impressed by this Wittgenstein fellow that he abandoned mathematical logic simply because Wittgenstein said so. This was after Russell had dedicated years to writing Principia Mathematica and attempting to defend logic and set theory against the sort of paradoxes of which Russell's paradox is the most renowned one. Russell claimed that he couldn't quite fathom what Wittgenstein was saying, but he intuited in his bones that he must be correct. That's the kind of individual we are discussing here. I am thus left with no alternative but to humbly concede that this book was far beyond my comprehension. Respect, Mr. Wittgenstein!

The book consists of seven main propositions, each elaborated upon by other propositions (except for the seventh proposition that concludes the book). I believe I grasped quite a few of them, but I couldn't convey what the book as a whole is striving to accomplish or prove. Some propositions sound so abstruse that I didn't even bother to attempt to understand them. Some propositions piqued my interest, like Proposition 3.333. I read it, and then it ended with: “That disposes of Russell’s paradox.” I was like: What? How did you resolve Russell's paradox in one paragraph? I stared at that proposition intently for a long time, but I didn't get it. Some propositions simply appeared strange to me, like Proposition 6.1203 where he proposes an “intuitive method” to recognize an expression as a tautology.

I leave it to another genius like Kurt Gödel to assert that he wasn't overly impressed with Wittgenstein. You see, when Gödel published his Incompleteness Theorem (approximately 10 years after Tractatus) both Wittgenstein and Russell were confounded by it. Gödel was a Platonist who believed that mathematics describes an abstract reality, not the empirical reality of logical positivists like Russell and Wittgenstein. Gödel proved that there are true but unprovable propositions in mathematics. That comes perilously close to stating that mathematical truths are independent of any human activity. Wittgenstein did not accept Gödel's results, and the Dark Prince of Mathematics appropriately told him to “be fruitful and multiply, but not in those words.” (Sorry, I just had to incorporate Woody Allen into all this.)