Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Sometimes it is good to repeat.

I haven't read this since my university years, and then it is especially important.

What I didn't see at a conscious level then, but should have seen, is how relationally oriented the book is.

Wittgenstein emphasizes again and again that the pattern of patterns, the relationships of the actual things, not the things themselves, is what is knowledge-fundamental.

This makes his later language game idea, which I saw as a charlatanry, become understandable and logical.

It is interesting to note how our perspectives can change over time.

What might have seemed puzzling or even false in the past can now make perfect sense when we approach it with a different mindset and more life experience.

Re-reading this work has allowed me to gain a new appreciation for Wittgenstein's ideas and has deepened my understanding of the subject matter.

It serves as a reminder that we should always be open to revisiting and reevaluating our previous understandings, as there may be hidden gems of wisdom waiting to be discovered.

Wittgenstein's work is a book that consists of his propositions in the fields of language, world, ethics, logic, philosophy, and thought, along with sub-propositions that further clarify these propositions. It was written during his lifetime.

He explains the importance of language through the path of logic and mathematical formulas. I was expecting a more organized book. It seems like there is no order, as if the thoughts were put into a book without maturing. Since it is the 1985 edition of BFS publications, I think I have read it before, but it has left no trace in my mind. Probably, I read it again because there are sentences that I underlined.

This work of Wittgenstein is a significant contribution to the fields of philosophy and logic. His ideas about language and its relationship to the world have had a profound impact on subsequent generations of thinkers. However, the lack of organization in the book can make it a challenging read for some. Despite this, it is still a valuable resource for those interested in exploring the depths of Wittgenstein's thought.

A tough read, but a necessary read.

The consequences of his claims are truly interesting. On one hand, in what he shows, there are some remarkable insights and findings that can potentially open up new avenues of thought and exploration. His presentation might offer valuable perspectives that could challenge existing beliefs and paradigms.

On the other hand, in what he fails to prove, it also presents an opportunity for further investigation and analysis. The areas where his claims lack conclusive evidence can serve as a starting point for more in-depth research. It makes us question and think critically about the subject matter, urging us to look for alternative explanations or seek additional data to fill the gaps. Overall, this read, despite its challenges, is essential as it forces us to engage with complex ideas and encourages us to expand our understanding of the topic at hand.

Revisiting this work with a solid understanding of formal logic and the ideas of Frege and Russell has significantly transformed my experience. It uncovers a piece that is as奇特 and idiosyncratic in its approach as it is profound. For instance, universal generality, a fundamental operator like “all men are moral,” Wittgenstein offers good reasons to be skeptical of. However, the point emphasizes more on our assumptions when using them rather than their usage itself. I feel one must first accept (∀x) as given before finding these points useful. And yet, if I were to go back two years, I would still recommend myself to read this as he does an excellent job of motivating the principal concepts of logic for those unfamiliar with it. But I would also tell myself to be cautious. I was initially drawn to his image of logic as a grid laid over the world, but it is extremely easy to misinterpret this as somehow trivializing logic or other systematic ways of understanding the world. I can confirm that Anscombe's Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus is a valuable resource.

I actually appreciate the form as it reveals how every argument fits together, making this somewhat dense work relatively easy to follow. It aligns well with his metaphor of how logical systems and frameworks function as a grid atop everything that exists, giving this work a nice uniformity. The only inaccessible aspects are the notation (although he explains it after using it, there are glossaries available if you get stuck) and Wittgenstein's irritating habit of vaguely referring to an argument by Frege or Russell without actually explaining the argument or its origin. If you're like me and only slightly acquainted with either, then those propositions will mean nothing to you. Russell himself wrote the introduction to this edition (more of a detailed synopsis) and at least points you in a direction, even if he only truly explains Wittgenstein's side of it. I've become aware of its errors, and while I don't completely embrace the ethic (or anti-ethic) of the Tractatus, I don't think this invalidates the work itself. There are some valuable insights that Wittgenstein explores here, which have changed how I view other thinkers. Even the ethic is valuable in the “intellectual discomfort” it provides, as Russell puts it. I wouldn't discard all of this just because years later Wittgenstein said, “hey guys, about that whole 'fuck philosophy' thing, well, actually...”

I truly relished this book, my initial encounter with Wittgenstein's works. It is a profound exploration of the essential function of language and can be regarded as a sort of "theory of everything" regarding meaning.

It commences with a remarkably cool, clear-sighted, and incisive examination of what language is, what it accomplishes, and how we can distill it to its essence to convey something meaningful and true. However, it concludes on an oddly metaphysical note that appears to cast aside everything that preceded it.

The format is as economical and mathematical as Wittgenstein's arguments. It is structured like a series of proofs, with an idea or definition asserted, and subsequent statements building upon or branching out from that assertion to delve deeper into what that particular piece of language does or what it means. In the middle chapters, he includes symbolic representations of what he claims language does best (and how meaning can be discovered), and it is captivating to witness language reduced to such simple, sterile characters. My comprehension often waned a bit as he delved deeper into a definition or concept, but Wittgenstein never completely lost me. (Although, at the end, he does label all the preceding writing as "senseless," so perhaps I should have been lost and actually was lost, only convincing myself otherwise out of pride...).

While logical positivism holds sway here, towards the very end, Wittgenstein's tone shifts, and he delves into a bit of metaphysics and the philosophy of ethics. He first decries causality, stating that "The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena." Then he asserts that propositions have no place in ethics, that "ethics cannot be put into words" because ethical propositions require something beyond the proposition itself and because a proposition must contain all states of affairs (if I am understanding Wittgenstein correctly). I did not find these of his arguments persuasive, and the last few pages as a whole felt slightly "tacked on," as if he felt compelled to say something about a larger issue than language itself.

Finally, his most referenced idea seems to be the unexpected culmination of his thought and examination: "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer." At the end, he almost undermines his entire work by stating that philosophy cannot really say anything, that only propositions of natural science can say anything, that all philosophy rests on a failure to "give meaning to certain signs in... [metaphysical] propositions." It was almost like reaching the last page of a book and having the protagonist wake up and reveal the whole story to have been a dream. Of course, I believe that philosophy CAN say something meaningful, so I disagree with this conclusion.... but I have to wonder if Wittgenstein truly meant that literally or if there is some other purpose at play. I really have no idea.

Side note: It is amusing how frequently Wittgenstein makes it known that he is refuting an argument of Russell or Frege, as if through the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was asserting his independence from his teachers and mentors. It is fascinating to witness philosophy in conversation.

This book is remarkable and captivating as an argument about the form of language and how it communicates true things about the world. For enthusiasts of symbolic logic, this is a treat. I must add, though, that I did NOT enjoy the e-book version I purchased (a different version than the one pictured). The text I read was rife with typographical errors, and the symbolic logic passages were a complete mess -- some not at all helpful or legible. Fortunately, I have a little experience with symbolic logic, so I was able to "translate" some of the chaos, but let my misfortune serve as a lesson to all of you: if you are going to read Wittgenstein, obtain a quality, reliable translation. Preferably in print. Wittgenstein's dissection of the form and logic of language is not a place for frugality.

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) by Ludwig Wittgenstein is an extremely captivating work.

It presents a collection of short statements that lead the reader towards a final conclusion, all while breathing an air of intrigue.

As one progresses through the text, it becomes evident that they are treading on unfamiliar ground that resists understanding.

Wittgenstein's project has two aspects. First, he aims to develop his logical theory. Second, he wants to explain how this conception of logic relates to the world of facts.

This work thus deals with two theories, one logical and the other epistemological.

The conclusions Wittgenstein draws from them are extraordinary.

He states that the world is the totality of facts, each divided from the others.

We perceive these facts by picturing them in our thoughts, where the logical-pictorial form of each picture corresponds to the fact it represents.

In short, the world consists of indivisible, independent facts, and each corresponds to a single indivisible, independent logical element.

When we think, our thoughts are translated into propositions.

These propositions are either elemental or composites of elemental propositions.

Wittgenstein applies symbolic logic to uncover the fundamental logical structure beneath all these linguistic expressions of our thoughts.

He discovers the general form of a proposition, or truth function, which collects different elemental propositions containing variables into one complex and generates a truth value.

However, a fundamental issue arises. Logical propositions are either true or false, depending on the input.

The input is accidental, while the logical propositions are necessary.

This leads Wittgenstein to conclude that logic is the exploration of all that's lawlike, while the world of facts is accidental.

After developing his logical theory, he applies it to physics and psychology.

He takes a radical stance, stating that causality isn't part of physics and that all laws are logical necessities about the relations between facts, not the facts themselves.

We can experience and talk about particular facts in the world but can never transcend them.

All propositions are of equal value, or rather, of no value.

Questions about religion, ethics, aesthetics, etc. are transcendental and cannot be talked about.

Wittgenstein concludes that even when all scientific questions are answered, the questions of life remain untouched.

The solution to the problems of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

He ends his work with the infamous words: "What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence."

It is easy to read these final pages and accept his claims at face value, but there is more depth to them than meets the eye.

Wittgenstein has built a self-contained and tautological logical apparatus that is separated from the world.

This apparatus is used to destroy claims of logical necessity in physics and psychology and reduce these sciences to statements about particular facts.

Finally, it shows that only facts in the world can be put into words, and everything else transcends the world and the possibility of speaking about it.

Wittgenstein throws away his tool and ends up with the mystical.

As he points out in the preface, after solving all the philosophical questions, there is not much achieved.

He has cleared up the pretence of thinking we can talk about the world in scientific and logical terms, and all that remains is our living in the world.

After writing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein decided he had solved philosophy once and for all and tried to live a life in accord with the mystical.

However, all his attempts failed, and in 1929 he returned to Britain to become a professor of philosophy in Cambridge, where he developed a new philosophy.

Wittgenstein was a remarkable and problematic character, and this shows in the Tractatus, which is as unconventional, extreme, and original as no philosopher since Plato.

Perhaps his background as an engineer in aeronautics, rather than a trained philosopher, allowed him to be free from common prejudices and restrictions, enabling him to invent two highly original philosophies that are more spectacular and ground-breaking than the works of most other twentieth-century philosophers.

**Title: The Significance of Wittgenstein's Philosophy**

Wittgenstein is one of the most prominent philosophers of the 20th century and a founder of the philosophy of language. His work, especially in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," has had a profound impact.

In this work, Wittgenstein presents a revolutionary view. He argues that the world is everything that is the case, and what is the case is the existence of states of affairs. A logical picture of facts is a thought, and a thought is a proposition with a sense. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The general form of a proposition is [ p ¯, ξ ¯, N ( ξ ¯ ) ].

One of the key aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy is the distinction between what is sayable and what is not sayable. He emphasizes that we must be silent about that which cannot be spoken. This has led to a new understanding of the limits and boundaries of language.
Wittgenstein's philosophy also has important implications for other fields such as metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. It challenges traditional views and opens up new avenues for exploration.
In conclusion, Wittgenstein's work is a significant contribution to the history of philosophy. His ideas continue to be studied and debated today, and his influence can be seen in many areas of contemporary thought.

Language is like a picture of reality

If Kant said in "Critique of Pure Reason" that the Copernican revolution in the world of philosophy has been numbered, the limits and bounds of the realm of knowledge have been determined, and its importance and centrality have been shown. Many Wittgenstein scholars believe that Wittgenstein has brought about a second Copernican revolution in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," and has drawn a meaningful curtain over the limits and bounds of speaking, and has reminded us of the importance of language as a philosophical subject.

I read this book in summary, which is written in a kind of mathematical language and requires more study to understand. This book is summarized in seven sections, which are important for shaping our thoughts and ways of thinking about physical and metaphysical issues. Bertrand Russell also wrote a good preface for it and considered this work as a symbolic work
P & Q
Link to the main English text
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/...

If we say that Wittgenstein is one of the most prominent philosophers of the 20th century, we are not exaggerating. He is one of the founders of the philosophy of language

The main problem in philosophy is to distinguish between what is visible and sayable and what is invisible and unsayable. This is the main problem of Wittgenstein's own philosophy.
Wittgenstein's philosophy is a philosophy that has served philosophy and philosophical thinking abundantly and has brought great benefits. Wittgenstein's philosophy provides a linguistic and philological theory of the kind we see in Kant's philosophy, that is, it acquires a critical theory about language. In the theory that Wittgenstein has presented, we deal with the question of the limit and scope of language and meaningful speech, and we realize the importance of this problem that we must separate meaningful speech from meaningless speech. If we make this separation, we free our minds from distractions and trivialities, and we can keep in our minds what is worthy of truth and falsehood and continue our research on them. This liberating aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy is that no one before him had made such a great effort and had not brought such a detailed and attentive presentation of a critical theory about language to fruition.

His emphasis in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" is that in fact, a distance should be created between logic, metaphysics, art, religion, and ethics and the empirical sciences, which in his view are meaningful propositions, and prevent the mixing of these sciences, and show that when logic and the empirical sciences are put together in a sentence, problems such as the liar paradox, which is discussed in Russell's work, arise.

Wittgenstein actually determines the scope of the empirical sciences and what is represented and sayable, so that the way is opened for the conscience of the interlocutor regarding what is mysterious and ethical. Of course, there is a fundamental difference between Kant's and Wittgenstein's words. When Kant postpones knowledge to open the way for faith and ethics, he does not want to speak of the presence of faith and ethics in what is real and essential in the phenomenon or even in the noumenon for us. He only wants to postpone this empirical and phenomenal knowledge and open the way for other knowledge. But Wittgenstein's goal in this determination of the limit and boundary is to show us the presence of the demonstrative in the sayable.

The narrowness of human language
Wittgenstein says in the seventh section in this regard

“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”

Footnote: Wittgenstein says the opposite of Rumi
We look inside and the state / We look outside and the word

Flowchart of the seven sections of Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tractat...

The seven sections
There are seven main propositions in the text. These are:

1. The world is everything that is the case.
2. What is the case (a fact) is the existence of states of affairs.
3.A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4.A thought is a proposition with a sense.
5.A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
6.The general form of a proposition is the general form of a truth function, which is: [ p ¯, ξ ¯, N ( ξ ¯ ) ] {\\displaystyle [{\\bar {p}},{\\bar {\\xi }},N({\\bar {\\xi }})]} [\\bar p,\\bar\\xi, N(\\bar\\xi)]. This is the general form of a proposition.
7.Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

The fourth section
Possibilities of the existence and non-existence of the atomic
facts.
4.31 The truth-possibilities can be presented by schemata of the following
kind (“T” means “true”, “F” “false”. The rows of T’s and
F’s under the row of the elementary propositions mean their
truth-possibilities in an easily intelligible symbolism).
***
p q r ........ p q ........ P
===== ==== ====
T T T ........ T T ........ T
F T T
T F T ........ F T ........ F
T T F
F F T ........ T F
F T F
T F F ........ F F
F F F
***
For an easy understanding of the analysis of correct and incorrect sections, read this slide
https://www.slideshare.net/tristanjst...

The book ends by saying

"The correct method in philosophy would really be this: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy."

Wittgenstein would have done well to follow his own advice and actually write about nature instead of writing all his gibberish about "propositions", "states of affairs", "logic" and all the other things that he just introduces without understanding at all, because he tries to pull them out of his head instead of abstracting them from a genuine study of nature.

Perhaps if he had focused on the concrete and observable aspects of the natural world, his work might have had a more profound and lasting impact. Instead, his ideas often seem convoluted and disconnected from reality.

It is important to remember that philosophy should be grounded in something real and tangible, not just a bunch of theoretical constructs. By turning his attention to nature, Wittgenstein could have made significant contributions to our understanding of the world around us.