The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, also known as the Logical Philosophical Treatise or Treatise on Logic and Philosophy, was written by Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is the only book-length philosophical work by Wittgenstein published during his lifetime in 1921.

The aim of this work was broad, seeking to identify the relationship between language and reality and define the limits of science. It is widely regarded as a significant philosophical work of the 20th century. G. E. Moore suggested the Latin title as a homage to Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.

This book has been translated into Persian multiple times. It is a unique work as it contains no references and has only one appendix. The author seems to believe that he has opened a new path for the caravan of human philosophy. It reflects a comprehensive view, influenced by the analytic tradition and the first-generation philosophers like Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, as well as the German idealist tradition and the key concepts of Kant's thought. It also has a connection with the works of writers like the Brothers Karamazov and the wisdom and meaning in their works.

Perhaps by considering all these aspects, the famous contemporary analytic philosopher Ian Hacking regards the Tractatus as the peak of creativity and the genius of Western civilization, believing that until Western civilization collapses, this outstanding work will be read, criticized, and examined.

The date of its first reading was in 2009 AD. The dates of its Persian publications vary.

The date of dissemination was 12/09/1399 in the Iranian calendar.

First of all, it should be acknowledged that my entire philosophical background lies in continental thought, rather than analytic thought. I approach Wittgenstein with very little context. The only other philosophers Wittgenstein directly references in the Tractatus are Frege and Russell, neither of which I have studied. My only preparation for reading this was a (very good) book by Anthony Rudd that compared Wittgenstein's work with that of Heidegger, uncovering unexpected similarities in their projects. Both philosophers endeavored to negate skepticism, albeit from the context of very different philosophical traditions. This is the contextual background with which I engage with the Tractatus. I am rather humble in presenting my responses to this book. When writing about philosophical works for which I possess a great deal of background information, I am confident that my responses at least signify a competent understanding of the text. That may not be the case here. Feel free to correct me.

From what I can gather, Wittgenstein commences his project in a not-too-dissimilar fashion as Descartes did in the Meditations On First Philosophy - by asking himself what he truly knows. What he knows is that he has an understanding of the world that he expresses to himself through language. He has a picture of the world that he can describe with words. This picture is an idea about reality that may or may not be correct but is understood as having the potential to accurately capture reality, and this captured reality can then be conveyed through language. However, the picture cannot depict itself. Knowledge cannot transcend itself. It cannot state what it is, because that would entail knowledge picturing itself, which is to step outside its own limit (itself) and view itself in a larger context.

We cannot think illogically because logic is the “shape” of thought. We can only logically recognize that we understand our own thoughts (our pictures of the world) and that we understand our conveyance of these pictures in language. To doubt one's understanding of the world, or to doubt that the world exists (skepticism), is to attempt to depict one's own understanding of the world, it is to attempt to think beyond thought itself, which is nonsensical. Thought can only depict its own understanding, not its non-understanding of what it has no access to in any case.

Like Heidegger, Wittgenstein feels that the Cartesian tradition is a misdirected attempt to think beyond the world that the subject is already a part of. For Heidegger, the subject is already in the world that the Cartesian thinker doubts, giving form to the world by embracing his own actions within it. For Wittgenstein, the subject has already acknowledged the world simply by having an impression of it that he can convey through language. The otherness of the world is a logical proposition that we can only admit we understand.

I have always loved reading Heidegger, but I had a troubling thought recently while reading Michel Lowy's interpretive work on Walter Benjamin's “On the Concept of History,” entitled Fire Alarm. If Heidegger's being-in-the-world cannot doubt the light of being that shines upon him, how was the clearing through which the sun reaches him created and shaped? Was the clearing of cultural being not carved by what Benjamin referred to as the tyrannical victors of history? Was the clearing that shapes being's experience not constructed through the toil of slaves? Is it, then, that Heidegger's being-in-the-world cannot doubt the rightness of the dominator in rejoicing in the sun of life? For he frolics in the architecture of the tyrant, which only masquerades as the “nature” of the forest.

Similarly, in Wittgensteinian language, if the other is a proposition that consciousness cannot deny it understands, can consciousness doubt its own intentions towards the other? Does it not understand the other perfectly, and thereby know that it understands what is “best” for the other?

Is it possible that Heidegger and Wittgenstein managed to negate skepticism only to deepen for philosophy the primary ethical criticism of the Cartesian tradition: that if consciousness properly understands the Other, it does not have to question its own (exploitative) designs on the otherness of the world?

Love is a profound and mysterious emotion that defies simple explanation.

It cannot be merely put into words; rather, it reveals itself through actions, gestures, and the smallest of details.

A gentle touch, a warm smile, a listening ear - these are the ways in which love manifests.

It is in the sacrifices we make for those we care about, the patience we show in difficult times, and the joy we share in their happiness.

Love is not just a feeling; it is a force that has the power to transform lives and bring people closer together.

It is something that we should cherish and nurture, for it is one of the most precious gifts that life has to offer.

So, let us not just talk about love, but let us show it in every aspect of our lives.

This book is like a really difficult puzzle (

Please provide the article that needs to be rewritten and expanded so that I can help you.

Whereof one cannot understand, thereof one must reread (or don't). This simple yet profound statement holds great significance in the realm of learning. When faced with complex or unfamiliar concepts, it is natural to encounter difficulties in comprehension. However, the decision to reread or not can have a significant impact on our understanding and knowledge acquisition. Rereading allows us to delve deeper into the text, pick up on details that may have been missed the first time, and gain a more comprehensive understanding. It gives us the opportunity to analyze, interpret, and make connections. On the other hand, not rereading may lead to a superficial understanding or even confusion. It is important to assess our level of understanding and make a conscious decision. Sometimes, a second or third reading can make all the difference in grasping a difficult concept. In conclusion, whether to reread or not depends on our individual learning style and the complexity of the material. We should be open to the idea of rereading and not shy away from it when faced with challenges in understanding.

Ah! The Tractatus, the core work of the young Wittgenstein, the young snake who with the accompanying arrogance just wanted to clean up the whole mess. Building on several assumptions (which remain limited in number but not in scope) that are not always easy to justify, Wittgenstein slowly but surely constructs a broad theory about the structure of the world. When he is done with that, he rubs his hands together and loudly proclaims that the job is done.

No matter how ambitious it is to "want to answer all philosophical positions", Wittgenstein (with sufficient penetration) makes a very valuable attempt. The structure of the book is almost aphoristic, with the important point that he uses a very strict numbering and hierarchy (e.g. proposition 5.1 is a comment on proposition 5, and proposition 5.12 is in turn the second comment on 5.1, etc.) - this makes it possible to read in a very circumscribed way.

What made it difficult for me to read was the use of what is now highly outdated mathematical notation. It itches me to make a new translation in which the notation is modernized. But well, you just have to have the time for it...

Thoughts are often misinterpreted, disguised, or limited when expressed through language.

The contemporary forms of letters and word sounds are a poor and countless derivation from the original pictures and symbols they once resembled, which more clearly and meaningfully depicted the object's appearance or represented ideas.

Language lacks the ability to accurately convey one's inner emotions such as grief, joy, pain, pleasure, hate, or love. When the limited capacity of language is reached, art, music, poetry, or human behavior can step in to express these feelings beyond the narrow confines of language.

Therefore, if one must speak, it is advisable to speak about the findings of the natural sciences, rather than using this pale and rudimentary interpretation called language to express beauty, emotions, or ideas. This is why Wittgenstein ends his short but profound book with the famous quote: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

1. The number of approaches can be written in this way:

lim x → ∞ f ( x ).

This notation represents the limit of a function f(x) as x approaches infinity. It is a fundamental concept in calculus and is used to analyze the behavior of functions as the input values become extremely large.

2. I read this book at the beginning of my studies.

2.01 There were some things that I didn't understand.

As I was just starting out, certain concepts and ideas in the book were a bit challenging for me to grasp. However, I was determined to learn and kept working through it.

2.2 We will see how it will look like after the completion of studies.

As I progress through my studies and gain more knowledge and experience, I expect to have a better understanding of the subject matter. I am curious to see how my perspective on the book and the related topics will change over time.

I look forward to the journey of learning and discovery that lies ahead.

David Markson came up with some rather humorous aphorisms in response to Harold Bloom's assertion to The New York Times that he could read 500 pages in an hour, which is highly suspect.

He wrote, "Writer's arse."

Then he described a "Spectacular exhibition! Right this way ladies and gentlemen! See Professor Bloom read the 1961 corrected and reset Random House edition of James Joyce's Ulysses in one hour and thirty-three minutes. Not one page stinted. Unforgettable!"

He continued, "What's this? Can't spare an hour and a half? Wait, wait. Our matinee special, today only! Watch Professor Bloom eviscerate the Pears-McGuinness translation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus - eight minutes and twenty-nine seconds flat! Guaranteed."

As for the person writing, they felt they breezed through something in just five days and had a comfortable understanding of about 20% of the propositions. They noted that one really needs a background in logic, philosophy in general, and in what Bertrand Russell was doing with Principia Mathematica and Frege's ideas prior to the publication of the Tractatus to understand Wittgenstein's perspective. They did some internet research, read some elementary backgrounds, and a bit of Russell, but couldn't really comment much on the work. They plan to come back to it in a few years after reading several thousand pages of philosophy, mathematics, and logic, or perhaps by taking some classes.

I would love to write a review about this particular subject. However, Wittgenstein's profound words keep echoing in my mind: "what we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence."

And unfortunately, in this case, I find myself in a similar situation. I cannot speak about it with confidence because I hardly understood it.

The concepts and ideas presented seem to be so complex and abstract that they elude my comprehension.

I feel as if I am on the verge of grasping something, but it slips away just as quickly.

Maybe with more time and further study, I will be able to make sense of it all and offer a more meaningful review. But for now, I must respect Wittgenstein's wisdom and remain silent.

First, I read the commentary and then the book itself.

The commentary has several good aspects. The Persian text of the author is mature and refined. Except for a few unfamiliar terms, we are dealing with a fluent and profound philosophical commentary. The main topics of the treatise on logical philosophy are separated from each other and placed in separate discussion sections, which leads to coherence in the study. The choice of terms has been done at a certain level. The translation of the text of the treatise has been done with the least ambiguity and the greatest possible accuracy. The topics that have been raised have been well discussed (although in some cases some questions have formed in my mind that the commentator has left unanswered). The commentator has sufficient supervision over the existing literature on the treatise and has sometimes given useful references to other books. Although I do not have an affinity with the analytic philosophical tradition (the reason for which goes back to the main approach of analytic philosophy regarding the way of approaching philosophical problems), I learned a lot from reading this commentary and also an interest was created in me so that I would not leave Wittgenstein's book unread.

The end of the treatise itself is rather ambiguous for me. The book is difficult and the respected commentator has either not presented some of the concepts of the book at all or I have not been able to understand his explanation well. But I think the commentary has not been comprehensive.

I really liked this book and above all, I had the pleasure that an Iranian author writes a commentary on the philosophy of a Western philosopher, which is not only a "compilation" in the true sense of the word, but also a compilation that is mostly understandable and far from the self-display and the usual ostentation in the popular compilatory books in the field of philosophy in our country.