Whoa nelly! He's really not kidding around when he uses a word like "investigations." There's an abundance of dialogue here that is centered around proving the intangible nature of meaning in language and the effect (though I envision it as a kind of grip) that said language has on our mental states. My absolute favorite parts are those regarding the question of whether there is such a thing as a private language. I also appreciate the general attitude that any philosophical problem bugs you because you're using the wrong words anyway, and that's the root of it all. It's excellent in the way that it causes frustration (perhaps due to the translation - every philosophical work translated from German always seems incredibly and unnecessarily dense to me, but that could just be my perception). However, it's a healthy and activity-heavy philosophical read that really makes you think and engage with the ideas presented.

This book is far too complex to be simply summarized. However, in a nutshell, it can be said that if one wants to understand the meaning of a word, one should consider how that word is used. Words are employed in a diverse range of “language games,” which are interactions among people and display “family resemblances.” In other words, there isn't a single model that can reveal the essence of how words are used. Instead, there are numerous overlapping and differing language games, each serving as a distinct model.

Enough of the summarizing. Now, let's turn to what I'm interested in, what I once referred to as “Wittgenstein’s behaviorism,” which I didn't particularly like. After delving into the Philosophical Investigations, I've reached the conclusion that Wittgenstein is not nearly as behavioristic as I initially thought. In fact, he is the most introspective behaviorist I can envision, yet he still leans more towards behaviorism than I prefer.

What exactly do I mean by “behaviorism”? Wittgenstein is a skeptic when it comes to meaning. He doesn't believe that meaning is something we can discover by looking within ourselves (introspection). As I summarized earlier, Wittgenstein contends that meaning is disclosed through the use of a word in social interactions, or in other words, through language games, which are the behaviors of the people using the word.

Let's consider words related to what we typically think of as mental phenomena, such as thinking, believing, remembering, knowing, and so on. How can we tell if someone “knows” that Paris is in France? If we ask them, and they provide the correct answer. But if they look inside their minds, does there have to be the “knowledge” that Paris is in France? Not necessarily. They might not even be thinking about that. And even if they were subvocalizing “Paris is in France,” is there a mental quality that distinguishes that as knowing? Thus, Wittgenstein presents a compelling argument that knowing does not consist in any mental phenomenon but rather in the behavior of giving the correct answer.

In making this argument, Wittgenstein has not shunned introspection as a technique. On the contrary, he has utilized it extensively. Even when he asks us to envision a particular language game, we are imagining a behavior, but we are using introspection to do so. Wittgenstein is a master at posing rhetorical questions that reveal how we use a specific word in social interactions, yet each rhetorical question demands a look into ourselves and our experiences.

Wittgenstein is not ultimately opposed to our looking within ourselves. In fact, I believe he would view it as a fruitful aspect of life. However, his fundamental point is that only when our introspected observations can be validated by being part of our interactions with others (our language games), only then can words have consistent and usable meanings.

My gripe with this is that introspection sometimes yields more results than Wittgenstein is willing to acknowledge. For instance, Wittgenstein asks how we judge time. He claims that we might sit for a while and say “About five minutes have passed,” and we could be correct. He asserts that there is no introspectable experience of time passing or of measuring time. But I'm not so sure about that.

Paul Churchland discusses a pulsing of neuronic signals from the center of the brain to the perimeter and back again. This implies that our sensory processing echoes and reverberates with these pulses, giving us a sense of time passing. If we pay attention to this experience, we may be able to discern what makes us sensitive to the passage of time, and we may be able to do so in a way that can be validated by others. If we are able to make these discriminations through introspection before the science is available to explain it, is it still meaningless? That is my rhetorical question.

Perhaps the most influential book of philosophy written in the 20th century is this one.

It's only rival is likely Heidegger's Being and Time.

This is my third time reading this very technical book.

Each time I read it, two things happen.

First, the focus of the book seems more narrow.

Second, the ramifications of the book seem more broad.

Wittgenstein asks: How does language operate?

His answer is that it does not operate according to a logical superstructure but according to discrete "games", rules, and patterns.

What does a word mean?

It does not mean according to dictionary definitions or logical relationships to objects, actions, or states-of-being.

No, the meaning of words comes from how the speaker uses the word.

"Do not ask, 'What does it mean?'" says Wittgenstein, but "Look and see how it is used."

What does the word "board" mean?

It doesn't have a single meaning, but varies according to how it is used.

For example, in a board game, it has one meaning.

In a board meeting, it has another meaning.

Ten feet of board-lumber has yet another meaning.

"My bed is hard as a board" and "sandwich-board" also have different meanings.

Each use elicits a different meaning that changes, not merely by context, but by use.

This book was assembled posthumously. Wittgenstein, who had published very little during his lifetime, is often associated with the Tractatus. However, this book is actually more representative of his thought and method.

Wittgenstein's virtue lies in the fact that there is no trace of metaphysical conceit or self-deception in him. Instead, he consistently treats reality as various "language games". Here, "language" is understood broadly to encompass everything from the semiotic to the symbolic, from the denotative to the connotative, and "games" are seen as intersubjective practices. Interestingly, behind this reserve, there is a strong mystical sense comparable to Kant's attraction/aversion to the Ideas of Reason. On the one hand, he is a thorough critic of sloppy thinking and expression. On the other hand, he is also prone to the religio-aesthetic flights of the late Heidegger. The study of his biography and jottings presents the image of a man who is both piercingly clear and personally enigmatic, both a dispeller of illusions and a victim of multiple neuroses. While he apparently comes across as a genius to his formidable colleagues, including Bertrand Russell, his actual writings are rather easy-going, suggesting, at least to me, that we are all - or none - of us geniuses.

So here it is, what is widely regarded as one of the most significant philosophical works of the 20th century. That's the consensus among many, at least. There are indeed moments of brilliance scattered throughout, but I couldn't help but walk away with a sense of disappointment. I find Wittgenstein's idea of meaning-as-use to be quite powerful, albeit perhaps a bit off the mark. I still have a soft spot for the now unfashionable position of descriptivism. He also makes some rather questionable suggestions, such as the claim that language is necessary for thinking, or that most (or perhaps all?) philosophical problems can be resolved simply by clarifying language. His philosophy of psychology, while potentially insightful when it was written, now seems rather trite.

Mostly, I think it was Wittgenstein's writing style that really got on my nerves. I've read that he writes in a "conversational" tone, but to be honest, he comes across more like a pretentious jerk. He's truly a lousy writer. Sometimes the numbered "observations" flow smoothly and are easy to understand; other times it sounds as if he's being deliberately obtuse just for the sake of it. It's frustrating to try to wade through his convoluted prose and figure out what he's really trying to say. Overall, I'm left with a sense of dissatisfaction and a feeling that I didn't quite get what all the fuss was about.

§246. It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I'm in pain. What is it supposed to mean, except perhaps that I am in pain?

I was conducting a writing exercise with my students. One of the prompts I provided, rather loosely following the tradition of ekphrastic poems, was to compose a poem based on another work such as a book, a film, a video game, or a song. I always enjoy doing these exercises with them. It's not only fun but also helps me test the prompts to ensure they are truly generative. In just twenty minutes, I managed to write two lines, haha...

On Reading Wittgenstein

If I were a bur, I would not know that. I simply would be.

A propagatory castaway, riding on sleeves.

This short piece explores the idea of pain and self-awareness as presented by Wittgenstein. The writing exercise with students serves as a backdrop, highlighting the creative process and the inspiration that can be drawn from various sources. The two lines of the poem add a touch of whimsy and offer a unique perspective on the concept of being and knowing. Overall, it is a thought-provoking and engaging exploration of these ideas.

I’ve read some excellent reviews of what Wittgenstein intended with his book.

The role that the social context plays in our language – the use and interpretation of words and propositions can be understood as a social game that is conducted according to certain rules - is indeed good stuff. However, it’s not an area of inquiry that interests me.

I was really struck by Wittgenstein’s equation of language analysis with his repeated (and seemingly categorical) references to “doing philosophy.” With that term and this book, it seems as if Wittgenstein has appropriated the subject matter of philosophy and restricted it to an overly narrow focus. This focus lends itself to tangible data with precisely understood terminology, all neatly aligned with scientific inquiry. As a result, the affective life and essential human concerns are cast outside the philosophical realm and termed (non-pejoratively) “nonsense.”

Right away, I don’t see how his approach inherently conflicts with what others might regard as the soul and heart of philosophical investigation: what values matter, what are their grounds, what ought we to do, and so on. Interior data can be brought forth and expressed in the exterior world and subjected to precise uses. For instance, “pain” is private, but at a general, common-sense level, we know that it describes a negative interior reality. Through stipulation, we can further describe “pain” as an object much like some exterior object might be described, although admittedly verification is a challenge. Here, Wittgenstein’s rich appreciation for language can be utilized as a tool to deal with hidden meanings, to sort through the problem of conflation, and to guide us through the traps of using words, concepts, and propositions in misleading ways. But if Wittgenstein’s way of doing philosophy is incompatible with our affective life, then it could be argued that he is doing something like linguistics and not philosophy. Or, alternatively, it could be said that Wittgenstein’s approach is one form of philosophy, but not philosophy in its purest sense. Then philosophy could focus on looking at both the “ought” and the “is” world and attempt to build bridges between the two (that is, to construct a philosophy grounded in, or not inconsistent with, science).

Wittgenstein's philosophical approach is rather unique. He does not simply convey his ideas through direct statements. Instead, he shows them.

This means that he presents his thoughts in a more implicit and nuanced way. By doing so, he challenges the reader to engage more deeply with his work and to discover the underlying meanings for themselves.

Wittgenstein's method of showing rather than saying can be seen in his use of examples, analogies, and thought experiments. These tools allow him to illustrate his points in a more vivid and concrete manner, making it easier for the reader to understand and internalize his ideas.

In conclusion, Wittgenstein's decision to show rather than say is a key aspect of his philosophical style. It forces the reader to think for themselves and to actively participate in the construction of meaning, resulting in a more profound and lasting understanding of his work.

My brain hasn't had this much fun in a long time. It's truly a remarkable feeling.

Every moment has been filled with excitement and engagement.

I find myself completely immersed in this experience, and it's like a breath of fresh air for my mind.

It's amazing how something can have such a profound impact on my mental state.

And you, you are the reason for all of this.

I love you with all my heart.

Your presence brings so much joy and happiness into my life.

You are the light that shines in the darkness, and I am so grateful to have you by my side.

Thank you for making my brain have this wonderful time.

I look forward to many more fun-filled moments with you in the future.

A rather lovely and smooth read peppered with a wonderful character. I enjoy Wittgenstein as a person perhaps more than his approach to philosophy. However, it's also possible that I'm just incredibly shallow.

In a sense, I'm in two minds here. On one hand, it does seem brilliant, rather cutting, and even sophisticated. The ideas presented are thought-provoking and offer a unique perspective on various philosophical concepts. On the other hand, it's difficult to avoid the sense of slight slapdashery at times. Some of the arguments may seem a bit rushed or not fully developed.

I think the most accurate I can be is to say that it's a text that demands a barrage of secondary readings. Not only for a better understanding of the main text but also for progression in one's own philosophical thinking. Quite possibly, this is discursive initiation, but I wonder if it struggles because Ludwig here is conscious of that.

Anyway, it's a nice read and I would recommend it to fellow literary masochists. It does scan rather well, and I appreciate that. Wittgenstein? Investigated. Propositions found.

“There is an abyss between order and execution. This has to be closed by understanding.” This profound statement highlights the significance of comprehension in bridging the gap. In any situation, whether it's in a personal or professional context, the ability to understand the essence of an order and execute it effectively is crucial. Without proper understanding, the execution may deviate from the intended purpose, leading to chaos and inefficiency.

“The kind of certainty is the kind of language game.” This thought-provoking sentence implies that certainty is not absolute but rather a construct within the framework of language. Different people may have different understandings and interpretations of the same concept, depending on their language usage and context. Therefore, it is essential to be aware of the limitations of language and the potential for miscommunication when seeking certainty.

“Man learns the concept of past in so far as he remembers.” Memory plays a vital role in our understanding of the past. Through memories, we are able to recall events, experiences, and emotions that have shaped our lives. However, memories are not always accurate and can be influenced by various factors such as perception, emotion, and time. Therefore, it is important to approach our memories with a critical eye and seek additional sources of information to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the past.

**Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein**

Philosophical Investigations is a highly significant work by the renowned philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was posthumously published in 1953. In this book, Wittgenstein delves into a wide range of problems and puzzles within the fields of semantics, logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of action, and philosophy of mind. He presents the view that many philosophical problems stem from conceptual confusions related to language use. Wittgenstein contends that these problems can be traced back to a set of assumptions about the nature of language, which presuppose a particular conception of its essence. However, this conception is ultimately rejected as being too general. It is too narrow an essentialist account to adequately explain the diverse range of things we do with language. This view stands in contrast to much of what he argued in his earlier work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921).

The book also provides details about its publication history, including translations and editions. It was first read on December 15, 2020. The Persian, German, and English versions are available, with the translation by Malek Hosseini. Published by Hermes in Tehran in 2019 (fourth edition), it contains 456 pages. The second printing was in 2021. The table of contents includes various sections such as "Notes of the Translator," "Preface of the Editors to the Fourth Edition and the Revised English Translation," and more. Philosophical Investigations is considered one of the most influential philosophical works of the 20th century. It presents Wittgenstein's second philosophy, where he believes that philosophy has the task of untangling linguistic knots, which he demonstrates through language games.