This is the story of what came to be known as the "American Establishment."

"Establishment" was a term that originated in England to describe a circle of powerful men. Richard Rovere proposed that the two parties in this country were really either populist or establishment, not conservative or liberal.

The American Establishment were "Atlanticists." Their similar schooling gave them an appreciation for Western European values and the perceived benefit of a traditional Europe. They were crucial in guiding the Marshall Plan through a hostile Congress. They felt a cosmopolitan duty to preserve the culture and civilization of the West.

This was to become a problem many years later as Asia became the focus of U.S. concern. Francophile Acheson was fundamental in recommending support for France in its futile attempt to preserve the colonial empire. Acheson's efforts led to a huge amount of U.S. funding, ultimately supplying France with far more than was spent on them during the entire Marshall Plan.

The establishment is profiled through the careers of Robert Lovett, John McCloy, Averell Harriman, Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, and Dean Acheson. They were all intelligent, educated at elite private schools, and most came from wealthy families. The six were not ideologues, preferring a pragmatic outlook, holding moderate views, and believing in consensus. Unfortunately, their sensible world view was misinterpreted in the fifties by more simplistic minds as being "soft on communism." They were not highly visible to the public (except when McCarthy made them targets), but preferred to persuade leaders privately and intellectually. They were fervent capitalists, which made McCarthy's charges against them absurd. They believed in a strong link between free trade, free markets, and free minds.

Isaacson and Thomas fill the book with wonderful anecdotes and lucidly and humorously describe the unique characteristics of the six. For example, Dean Acheson resigned as Under Secretary of the Treasury under FDR in a dispute over whether the United States could legally buy gold at a price higher than that set by Congress. The authors explain the differences among the six like this: "Acheson's friend Harriman would never have gone to the mat over a matter of principle with a President, he would likely have sidled away from the conflict to work on problems that he would be left to solve on his own. Lovett would probably have worked out some compromise, making any huge dispute seem suddenly like a small bump. So, too, would have John McCloy, the legal workhorse; like Bohlen, he would have been willing to go along. Kennan would no doubt have agonized about resignation only to become lost in philosophical brooding."

I had for many years greatly misunderstood George Kennan's role in the development of the cold war. The famous "X" article, which provided the foundation for containment, was misinterpreted to create the basis for Nitze's NSC-68 and the development of the arms race. Kennan was really arguing for a non-military, less aggressive stance. Ironically, Nitze, an icon of the modern American military, was firmly opposed to U.S. entry into Vietnam because he was aware of the limited resources of the United States. Truly prophetic.

We may owe current European unity to the efforts of John McCloy who, as High Commissioner of Germany and its virtual czar, was an extremely sincere and honest broker among the war-torn nations of Europe. His word was trusted equally in all the capitals and he laid the foundation for the economic miracle that was to occur. (There is a new biography of McCloy out recently - it's on my list.)

By the late seventies and early eighties the Establishment was out of favor. It was blamed for the cold war, Vietnam, and various other blunders; but its replacement, the self-centered, undisciplined, partisan, non-professional politicians-diplomats of the Reagan-Nixon era, has historians and revisionists longing for the old order which had been, at least, consistent, selfless, and dedicated to the national interest. "There was a foreign policy consensus back then, and its disintegration during Vietnam is one of the great disasters of our history," said Henry Kissinger. "You need an Establishment. Society needs it. You can't have all these attacks on national policy so that every time you change presidents you end up changing direction."

These men were responsible for building a coalition that led to 40+ years of Pax Americana. "They were public servants, not public figures, and did not have to read the newspapers to know where they stood....In their sense of duty and shared wisdom, they found the force to shape the world."

\\"The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made\\" is an absolutely enthralling account. It delves into the lives and the far-reaching influence of six truly exceptional individuals. These men were crucial in shaping post-World War II America. The author uses captivating storytelling and meticulous research to offer a deep and detailed insight into the complex geopolitical landscape of that era. It also explores the friendship that bound these six men together. This book is not only a thought-provoking read but also one that sheds a bright light on the profound impact these wise men had on the course of history.

It is indeed a quite long read, but it is well worth the effort. After reading it, I now have a much better understanding of the whys and hows of the Cold War. I also know precisely how the USA developed their foreign policy in combatting the USSR's brand of communism. This knowledge has given me a new perspective on this important period of history.

Great Post War Narrative


I have truly relished reading this book. Isaacson and Thomas have adopted a writing style that is simply captivating, making me constantly eager for more. The fascinating account of six members of “The Establishment” and their (primarily) selfless efforts in addressing international problems from the 1940s to the 1980s is truly engaging. This book effectively places today's world in a historical context. It makes one wonder where the Americans with such qualities are in the present day. It is an outstanding read that not only provides valuable insights into the past but also makes us reflect on the current state of affairs. It is a must-read for anyone interested in history and international relations.

This book offers several excellent vignettes that vividly depict what a true statesman should look like.

It delves deep into the events that led up to the Cold War era and introduces the men who laboriously worked behind the scenes to formulate American foreign policy in the 20th century.

However, it should be noted that this book was written with a particular generation in mind. As a result, it fails to provide some of the essential details that would be beneficial for those who lived after this period, roughly from the late '40s to the early '70s.

Nevertheless, I truly relished learning about these remarkable men and understanding what made communism such a significant threat to America during the last century.

The information presented in this book offers valuable context for contemporary conversations, enabling us to better understand the historical background and implications of various issues.

Overall, despite its limitations, this book provides a fascinating and informative account of an important era in American history.

Truly, it is a remarkable tour de force by Isaacson and Thomas.

They have delved into the lives and contributions of the six men who shaped the post-World War II world and the Pax Americana.

If one desires to understand how the world reached its state during the Cold War, this book is a must-read.

For a Cold War enthusiast like myself, who even wrote a master's thesis on NATO, this book has provided a profound insight.

It has enabled me to see more deeply into how these six men propelled America to become the indispensable nation it is today.

There are indeed great thinkers in foreign policy at present, but none can rival the likes of Acheson, McCloy, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, and Lovett.

Their ideas, strategies, and leadership had a profound and lasting impact on the course of history.

This book serves as a valuable resource for anyone interested in understanding the complex web of events and personalities that defined the post-war era.

This is a captivating "collective biography" that delves into the lives of six major, interconnected figures within the American establishment from the 1930s through the 1960s. Some might view it as an earlier version of "Best and Brightest." However, while Halberstam used that term ironically, the authors here are sincere when they refer to the six as "the original brightest and best" (Page 19).

The opening sets the stage for what follows. Isaacson and Thomas note that (Page 19): "Six friends. Their lives intertwined from childhood and schooldays, from their early days on Wall Street and in government. Now they were destined to be at the forefront of a remarkable transformation of American policy." They (Page 19) ". . . knew that America would have to assume the burden of a global role." And, as the authors state, their (Page 19) ". . . outsized personalities and forceful actions brought order to the postwar chaos and left a legacy that still dominates American policy today."

These are bold claims. Does the book support them? To a significant extent, it does. But it's a stretch to say that these six were the masterminds. They were undoubtedly key players, but to assert that they were the architects of the American century (the title of the chapter where these quotations are found) is an overstatement.

Who were these six individuals? George Kennan, Dean Acheson, Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, and John McCloy. From a young age, they were groomed to undertake great endeavors. For example, Harriman took over his father's economic empire and expanded it. Later in life, he was elected governor of New York (only to be defeated by Nelson Rockefeller after one term).

The story reveals the interconnections among them. Harriman, for instance, coached Acheson in rowing at Yale. As they grew up, they pursued careers in business. Later, all became interested in public service under the FDR Administration. The book meticulously chronicles their achievements (and some failures) from FDR's term onward. The occasional friction that flared up among them is also explored. They played crucial roles in the Truman Administration.

Later, when Lyndon Johnson was grappling with what to do in Vietnam, he held numerous meetings, in which many of the "wise men" participated. Given Halberstam's account of the "best and brightest" who led the country into Vietnam and couldn't find a way to succeed, the "wise men" were opposed and raised their concerns with Johnson.

Finally, their later years and fates are discussed. . . .

I believe the work could have a more critical tone, but it does an excellent job of depicting these prominent figures in American politics. If there has been an "establishment," they were surely part of it during their era. I think the authors may overestimate their influence, but they undoubtedly made a difference.

Written in 1986, I'd be extremely interested to see what Isaacson would pen about the contribution of these 6 men if he were to write today. After all, the geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically with the demise of the Soviet Union, the remarkable rise of China, and the relative decline of the US.

I don't think his main point would change significantly. However, given the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, he might look back and wish to see how some of these old hands would have dealt with Putin and how that would have played out.

It's truly remarkable how many diverse positions, both in public and private life, and held formally as well as informally, these 6 individuals occupied. In particular, Averell Harriman stands out. I would compare him to Marshall, and in terms of the longevity of influence, he exceeded. He always seemed to be at the center of the important events of the day.

It's also interesting to note that these men traced their lineage from Elihu Root (who held various important positions such as Secretary of War, Secretary of State, Ambassador to Russia, and won the Nobel Prize) to Henry Stimson and then to them. They strived to be non-partisan yet internationalist, supporting containment, serving out of duty and honor, and having faith in free markets.

The group did not all shine in school. Many were more imaginative than academic. Moreover, they didn't all come from wealth. For instance, McCloy was raised by a poor single mother in PA, yet he flourished due to the ethos of meritocracy.

When FDR wrote to EH Harriman about a railroad matter, he said, "You run the country. I'll run the railroads."

Acheson clerked for Brandeis and was mentored by Oliver Wendell Holmes. Both men were in the minority when voting to reduce the government's power to suppress dissent during the Palmer raids (although Acheson's stance changed later during the red scares). Holmes famously said, "The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."

Chip Bohlen, along with Kennan, was among the first to explain that the Soviets would act without sentiment or loyalty and only in their own best interests. He didn't believe the maxim that to gain trust one had to show trust (or perhaps he didn't believe the Soviets could ever be trusted).

McCloy claimed that he and Lovett rose to power by learning to do things independently (rather than relying on others).

The reasons for not giving a nuclear bomb warning included the plane being at greater risk, the possibility that the Japanese could move in US POWs, the uncertainty of whether the bomb would work, less shock value, and perhaps also the desire to demonstrate to the Soviets.

Lovett's favorite phrase was, "To hell with the cheese, let's get out of this trap."

Acheson was in favor of sharing the bomb with the Soviets, while Kennan was adamantly opposed.

To some extent, the Wise Men brought the later red scare upon themselves. They discovered that getting funded for internationalist projects (such as in Greece, Turkey, etc.) was easier if anti-communism was involved.

Kennan understood that the Soviet aim was not simply to have communism spread but to have it spread in a way that the Soviets could control the nations practicing it. They didn't want independent nations around them, regardless of ideology.

Truman was almost alone in the foreign policy establishment in deciding to support and recognize Israel. The "wise men" thought Arab oil was too crucial, and recognition would drive the Arabs to the Soviet camp. They also believed that Israel couldn't survive on its own and that the US would get pulled in. (It's worth noting that Truman, unlike the wise men, was up for election in 1948. Marshall thought this was a political decision and told Truman that he would vote against him in 1948 if he made that choice.)

Kennan was an early predictor that China would not be a puppet of Moscow and that the US should "let nature take its course" in Asia (until Korea happened). Harriman later adopted Kennan's view.

As a group, the wise men initially tried to avoid entanglement in Vietnam. However, once they were involved, they advised the full and continuous use of force.

THICK book but worth the read!

This book provides a detailed account of how Pax Americana came into being and the intentions of its visionaries.

The main characters are introduced, each with their own unique qualities and contributions. Dean Acheson, assertive and witty, was a key figure in the Cold War as the Secretary of State under Truman. He was responsible for important initiatives like NATO, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan, but also had the drawback of backing the Vietnam policy for too long.

George Kennan, an introspective and intellectual diplomat, was the author of the Containment doctrine. While his "X" article was a significant contribution, his idea of containment was militarized beyond his original intent.

Robert Lovett, a cool-headed and pragmatic figure, played an important role behind the scenes in rebuilding the postwar military and air force. However, he misjudged the escalation in Vietnam.

John McCloy, a tough and formal power broker, had a long and distinguished career. He helped form NATO, was involved in WWII mobilization, and advised JFK. But he underestimated the racial and social shifts of the 60s.

Charles Bohlen, a diplomatic and loyal career diplomat, was an expert on the USSR and a key foreign policy aide. However, he was sometimes too cautious and was overshadowed by others.

Averell Harriman, an energetic and ambitious international figure, had a wide range of experiences. He helped with the Lend-Lease program, the Marshall Plan, and led the Vietnam peace efforts. But he was initially a hawk on Vietnam and later flip-flopped.

The book also explores the lessons we can learn from the Cold War and Vietnam. Containment was a strategic concept, but it can be taken too far when politicians use it to stay in power. Kennan's original X doctrine was meant to be measured, relying on alliances and long-term pressure rather than fighting wars to expand democracy without understanding the local people and the geopolitical context.

The opening of dialogue with Ukraine led to Russia's attack, highlighting Russia's insecurity about its western flank. This raises questions about whether we are using the right approach with China today.

The book also discusses other interesting themes such as national pride, the challenge of attracting talented people to government service, and the use of new media by figures like Musk and Trump to spread their messages.

Overall, this book is a comprehensive and thought-provoking analysis of an important period in history. While it has its limitations, it provides valuable insights that can help us understand the present and shape the future.

I can't believe it's finally over.

I feel as if I've been engrossed in this book for an eternity. It is truly so darn long. And mind you, I usually have a penchant for long books! Yeesh.

While the content was interesting and thorough, I had the distinct impression that I was lost in a dense forest of details. There was just an overwhelming amount of minutiae. This is the second Walter Isaacson book I've delved into, and his writing style appears to be one of belaboring every point. The painstakingly comprehensive recitation of details was not only tedious but was further compounded by a lack of overarching analysis and cohesive connections. The tactical perspective was clear as a crystal, yet the strategic viewpoint was, at best, hazy and, at worst, non-existent.

I truly relished the early sections of the book that centered on their roles during WWII and the immediate post-war era. However, as it delved into the Korean War, it began to flounder. And then the epilogue was rather snobbish and dismissive of public servants following the departure of those six men.

The moral of this literary adventure - opt for the abridged version.

It is not often that persons who played such an important role in history are as unknown as these 6 men.

Having lived through most of the history recounted, I was vaguely familiar with two of the “wise men.” This makes me all the more curious about the others.

I very much enjoy well-researched, unbiased, well-written history that fills in the gaps that high school and college history books leave. Such detailed accounts can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the past.

Isaacson is one of the best for these types of histories. His works are known for their in-depth research and engaging writing style.

Perhaps through reading his books, I will be able to learn more about these mysterious “wise men” and gain a deeper appreciation for their contributions to history.

I look forward to delving into Isaacson's works and uncovering the hidden stories of these important figures.

As I embarked on my career at the State Department in the early 1970s, the "Wise Men" and their mentees, colleagues, and friends, were like stars shining brightly above us. Their names were associated with various rooms in the Main State building, where we would gather and meet to discuss and debate the issues of the day. Their collective influence, representing the long-established prep schools and the classic Ivy League schools with their private clubs, still lingered in the Department and the Foreign Service. However, there was also the shadow of their opponents, such as Joseph McCarthy.
Published in 1986, as this generation was gradually fading away but still available for questions, this is an interesting study of how U.S. government policy, especially foreign policy, was practiced in an exclusive club and how that club ultimately failed and saw its decisions pass into other hands.
From the perspective of 2024, the outdated nature of the entire story is painfully obvious, even as their successes and failures are recounted and explained. Few of the crucial decisions made over the decades were in their control, but they bore a heavy responsibility for the decisions made by the Presidents they advised. It is a very useful read for those interested in the deep roots of the world we face today.
The book also reminds us that the authors, like their subjects, are human beings with feet firmly planted in the ground. Their failure to recognize the wrongs done to the Japanese American community by Roosevelt and others, while disappointing, is not inconsistent with their class and the times. However, the authors' argument that the Japanese Americans in the internment camps "suffered far less than many other Americans who fought the war" is shameful, especially when considering their subsequent discussion of the war record of the Japanese Americans who left the camps to enlist in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and related units.
In the final chapters, as they discuss the role of the Wise Men in the Vietnam War, the authors detail the step-by-step process that led to President Johnson's attempt to negotiate an end to the war and his withdrawal from the Presidential race. Hubert Humphrey is mentioned, as is Richard Nixon's sabotage of LBJ's peace efforts, which ensured almost five more years of war. However, Robert Kennedy's presidential candidacy and assassination are only given a footnote. I can't help but wonder if this is a final snub from the Establishment against a man they clearly did not understand.
Overall, this is an important book for developing a deeper understanding of the US from the 1940s to the early 1970s.

The book "The Wise Men" offers a unique perspective on the Cold War era. It profiles six important but often overlooked figures: Averell Harriman, Chip Bohlen, George Kennan, Dean Acheson, Bob Lovett, and John McCloy. These men, who came from similar elite backgrounds, had long friendships and dedicated their lives to public service.

The authors, Isaacson and Thomas, managed to craft a coherent narrative that blends the lives and careers of these six individuals, which is a significant achievement. However, the book can be dry at times, making it a bit of a challenge to read through.

Despite this, the book exposes readers to the exploits of these lesser-known diplomats and their important contributions to American foreign policy. They were able to build relationships with foreign officials, utilize back channels, and effectively manage crises. Their work led to significant diplomatic accomplishments, such as the Marshall Plan and the prevention of the Korean War from escalating.

However, their legacy is not without flaws. Their initial support for the Vietnam War, before turning against it, is a damning aspect of their shared history. Overall, "The Wise Men" is a valuable Cold War history that sheds light on integral figures and the "out of style" methods of diplomacy that predated the post-Vietnam era. It also serves as a chronicle of the American upper-class and forces readers to consider the role of oversight in government.