An interesting read on foreign policy and the U.S. establishment has caught my attention. It presents a unique perspective, although at times it seems to glaze over certain administrations and events. Instead, it focuses intently on its subject matter. This approach left me having to search Google for additional context. However, this isn't necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it can be quite beneficial as it encourages further exploration and learning. Those who already have a greater understanding of U.S. politics are likely to gain more from this read. They will be able to fill in the gaps and make deeper connections. Overall, it's a thought-provoking piece that offers valuable insights into the complex world of foreign policy and the U.S. establishment.
The small group of men known as the "Wise Men" brought a unique combination of vision and practicality, aggressiveness and patience to the task of shaping U.S. foreign policy. They came together at a crucial moment in history, when their upbringing, character, and the circumstances of the time fused to give them the power to change the course of events. Their motives and wisdom can be debated, but their impact is undeniable. They made the U.S. assume the responsibility of a world power and defined its global mission. The Marshall Plan remains their greatest achievement, using power for the best possible end.
In his memoranda, Bundy began referring to Acheson, McCloy, Lovett, and other old statesmen as “the Wise Men.” The term was not entirely respectful, but it stuck. These men did not adhere to a single ideology; instead, they prized pragmatism, realpolitik, moderation, and consensus. They shared some basic tenets, such as opposition to isolationism and the doctrine of containment.
The Wise Men had diverse backgrounds and perspectives, but they were united by their commitment to the nation's interests. They did not let ideology cloud their judgment, but instead based their decisions on a realistic assessment of the situation. Their self-confidence gave them the freedom to be creative and bold, and their ability to work together and build consensus was crucial in shaping U.S. foreign policy.
The Wise Men came from an elitist background, but they used their privilege to serve the country. They were confident enough to level with the President and offer their honest advice, even if it was not what he wanted to hear. Their education and social connections gave them access to information and resources that others did not have, but they also recognized the importance of having public figures with the confidence to rise above party or the search for celebrity.
The new recruits to the foreign policy establishment were expected to adopt the values of the old club, regardless of their background. College provided not just an education, but a network of professional and social contacts that would serve them well in their careers. Kennan, for example, appreciated the value of his Princeton diploma and the opportunities it opened up for him.
George Kennan was one of the most influential members of the Wise Men. His early experiences, such as his visit to his distinguished relative and his exploration of Russia, shaped his views on the Soviet Union. Kennan was known for his intuitive judgments and his understanding that Communism was not monolithic. His "Long Telegram" had a profound impact on U.S. foreign policy, unifying the thinking of those who advocated firmness against Soviet expansion.
The Long Telegram was viewed as having two main messages: the need to forcefully oppose Soviet expansion and the importance of forging an alliance with Britain and other Western nations. What made it so influential was not so much what Kennan said, but what Washington was willing to hear. The telegram unified the thinking of those who advocated a tough stance against the Soviet Union and set the stage for the policy of containment.
Kennan gave the new policy of containing Soviet expansion a name: containment. However, the policy was not without its critics. Lippmann attacked the “containment doctrine” as a “strategic monstrosity,” arguing that it would lead to the squandering of U.S. resources and prestige. Kennan himself was mystified that he was unable to get across his argument that the main Soviet threat was political, not military.
Kennan believed that the U.S. could contain the Russians by confronting them firmly and politely with superior strength at every turn. However, he also recognized the limitations of using military force as a tool of foreign policy, especially in a democracy. He was concerned that the U.S. was too quick to see things in black and white terms and that it was not offering enough constructive alternatives to the Soviets.
Kennan argued that democracies are severely restricted in their use of armed forces as a weapon of peacetime foreign policy. They tend to see conflict as an all-or-nothing affair, and once committed to a course of action, they become victims of their own propaganda. This can lead to a distorted view of the enemy and a failure to consider other options.
The views of the Wise Men on the Soviet Union evolved over time. At first, they were more optimistic about the possibility of working with the Soviets, but as the Cold War intensified, their attitudes hardened. Bohlen and Kennan, in particular, were hostile towards Stalin and his system, seeing it as a threat to U.S. interests. Their views were in stark contrast to those of Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Hull, who had been more inclined to see the Soviet Union as a potential ally.
The Russians were seen as a complex and mysterious people, with a tendency to carry both truth and falsehood to extremes. Bohlen concluded that it was foolish to base a policy towards the Soviets on anything other than an appeal to their self-interest. The Kremlin was seen as making alliances solely on the basis of transitory needs, rather than true understandings.
The question of Russian expansion was a thorny one. Some, like Harriman, believed that the Soviets had expansionist motives and were setting their sights on the next layer of countries. Others, like Kennan, argued that the real threat was not Marxism, but Soviet control. The Soviets were seen as seeking to establish governments amenable to their own influence and authority, rather than spreading socialism.
Kennan was one of the few who recognized that the real threat from Moscow was not the ideology of Marxism, but the desire for more Soviet control. The Kremlin was seen as having no desire to see countries move towards a socialist system except under the guidance of those who recognized Moscow's authority. This understanding was crucial in shaping U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union.
The Truman Doctrine, which committed the U.S. to supporting free peoples everywhere, was a significant departure from previous U.S. foreign policy. Kennan was appalled by the open-ended commitment and feared that it would lead to the overextension of U.S. power. The doctrine was also criticized by Lippmann, who warned that it violated the balance of resources and commitments. Despite the criticism, the Truman Doctrine became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
The Marshall Plan was a bold and ambitious attempt to rebuild Europe after World War II. It was open to all countries, including the Soviet Union and its satellites, but the Soviets ultimately chose not to participate. The plan was seen as a great success, helping to revive the economies of Western Europe and strengthen the U.S. alliance with its European partners. Churchill called it the “most unsordid act in history,” and Lovett was proud that it stayed within its original cost estimates and ended when it had served its purpose.
The Soviets saw the Marshall Plan as a threat to their security and as a declaration of war by the U.S. for control of Europe. Stalin's reaction was understandable, given Soviet history and the fear of being encircled by capitalist countries. The Soviet Union responded by creating its own economic bloc, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and by tightening its control over its satellites.
Currency reform in Germany was a significant event that led to the split between East and West Germany. It signaled the end of any semblance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in Germany and set the stage for the division of Europe into two competing blocs. The split between East and West Germany would have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the Cold War.
The Berlin Air Lift was a heroic effort by the U.S. and its allies to keep the city of Berlin alive during the Soviet blockade. It required a massive logistical operation, with planes arriving every few minutes to deliver food, fuel, and other supplies. The air lift was a great success, and it demonstrated the U.S. commitment to the defense of freedom and democracy in Europe.
NSC-68 was a top-secret document that called for a massive military buildup in response to the perceived Soviet threat. Kennan was dead set against the writing of NSC-68, believing that it placed too much emphasis on the enemy's capacity and not enough on his intentions. He argued for a more measured approach that focused on diplomacy and economic aid. However, NSC-68 ultimately prevailed, and it set the stage for the arms race and the military buildup that characterized the Cold War.
The concept of “flexible response” was a new idea that emerged during the Cold War. It called for the U.S. to be able to fight small conventional wars anywhere in the world, rather than relying solely on nuclear weapons. The idea was to provide the U.S. with more options in dealing with the Soviet threat and to avoid the all-or-nothing approach of the past. However, the concept was also criticized for being too broad and for blurring the distinction between vital and peripheral interests.
The U.S. decision to intervene in the Korean War was a significant event that had far-reaching consequences. The war was seen as a test of U.S. resolve in the face of Communist aggression, and it led to a massive U.S. military buildup in Asia. Kennan believed that the war was a mistake, arguing that the U.S. should have focused on Europe and left Korea to its own devices. However, the U.S. was determined to stop the spread of Communism, and it committed itself to the defense of South Korea.
The Vietnam War was a long and costly conflict that had a profound impact on the United States. The war divided the country and led to a significant decline in public support for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. initially became involved in Vietnam to support the French colonial government, but it soon found itself committed to the defense of South Vietnam against the Communist North. The war dragged on for years, with no end in sight, and it ultimately ended in a humiliating defeat for the United States.
The end of the Cold War marked the end of an era for the Wise Men. Their influence had waned, and a new generation of policymakers had taken their place. The dinner they had in 1982 was, in a sense, the last supper for the Wise Men. They had witnessed the rise and fall of empires, the birth and death of ideologies, and the transformation of the world. Their legacy would live on, but their time had passed.
The Vietnam War had a profound impact on American foreign policy, leading to a significant shift in public opinion. The war had divided the country, and in the aftermath, power swung to the extremes. The foreign policy establishment, which had held sway for two decades, was shattered, and a new era of political theater began. The old guard was forced to choose sides between “hawk” and “dove,” and the center no longer held.
The Carter administration marked a significant shift in the balance of power between the State Department and the National Security Adviser. Brzezinski maneuvered to ensure that he, rather than the Secretary of State, was the President's true counsel. This led to a power struggle between the two, which ultimately ended with the resignation of Vance. The rise of the National Security Adviser and the decline of the State Department would have far-reaching consequences for U.S. foreign policy.
The cognitive element played an important role in shaping U.S. foreign policy decisions. The battle reports from the field commanders had a profound impact on Acheson, for example, convincing him of the suicidal determination of the enemy and the confusion and low morale on the American side. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, accurately perceived that Tet had been a psychological victory, sapping the will of the American people. These perceptions and misperceptions would have a significant impact on the course of the war.