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Vasili Mitrokhin was a KGB officer who grew disillusioned with the Soviet system. Given his access to KGB records, he decided to undermine it by memorizing records at work and re-creating them privately at home, hoping to expose the KGB and the Soviet system it supported one day. Over time, he amassed a significant collection of documents. In 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union, he managed to contact the British government, which arranged to secretly extract him, his family, and that treasure trove of records from Russia. Besides examining them for intelligence value, MI5 arranged for Professor Andrew to study them and write at least one book based on them to tell the story of the KGB. As far as I know, this book is one of two that emerged from that effort. This book focuses on KGB operations in Europe, Canada, and the U.S., while another book addresses its operations in the third world. Since Mr. Mitrokhin’s collection of records was incomplete, Professor Andrew used additional sources to provide context and a more comprehensive account.
The KGB had various organizational structures and names over the years. Its original name was Cheka, and KGB officers often referred to themselves as Chekists, harking back to its glorious days. One of its roles was intelligence, similar to the CIA in the U.S. or MI5 in the UK, but another crucial role was suppressing internal dissent.
Early on, Vladimir Lenin couldn't understand the people's opposition to his government, which was theoretically for the people's benefit, and had to establish an organization to quell the people's dissent for the people's good. His successor, Joseph Stalin, was extremely paranoid and focused on imagined threats to the regime, completely ignoring or missing real ones. For example, after World War I, the western powers deployed military forces into the Soviet Union to aid the doomed White Russian effort to overthrow the fledgling Communist government. After the Communists' early attempts to export their revolution to Europe failed, the Soviet government focused on consolidating its power, and the western powers turned their attention elsewhere. However, Stalin was convinced that they were plotting against him and dedicated significant effort to detecting and foiling their imaginary plots. In addition, he tasked the Cheka with suppressing Russian expats considered enemies of the Soviet government and sometimes assassinating them. During the Terror, also known as the Great Purge, many loyal officials became victims of Stalin's paranoia, and the Cheka was decimated to the point where its effectiveness was severely compromised. In other words, the greatest threat to the Cheka was the man it faithfully served, not counterintelligence by the western powers, which were more or less unaware of Soviet intelligence efforts. At any rate, the Cheka was effectively destroyed by Stalin's paranoid delusions just in time for World War II, and it took a while for it to regain the extensive skill sets that had been lost to the firing squad.
Foreign intelligence was coordinated by embassy and consulate staff, as well as by illegals, KGB officers operating under assumed identities (live doubles and dead doubles) in countries targeted for espionage. A live double assumed the identity of a westerner who had emigrated to the Soviet Union, and a dead double assumed the identity of someone who had died. In the event of hostilities, Soviet embassy and consulate staff would be sent home, but illegals could remain and continue espionage and other subversive activities. Generally, espionage was carried out by agents, citizens of target nations recruited to conduct espionage under the control of KGB officers. Some agents, especially the early ones, were motivated by a desire to advance the cause of Communism, but others were in it for the money or were blackmailed into the role after being photographed while engaging in illicit sex acts.
Targets for espionage included ciphers, military and political intelligence, and technology. Interestingly, the most productive source of intelligence was science and technology, but the Soviets were particularly ineffective at exploiting it. Their command economy was too rigid to rapidly integrate stolen technology, and western computer technology was regarded with suspicion. Did it contain back doors and other programming that would allow western governments to sabotage its use by the Soviets? Paranoia had struck again!
Several factors hampered the KGB’s intelligence gathering efforts. The heyday of the illegals was in the early years of the Soviet Union, when the Cheka was staffed by people who had not grown up under a totalitarian government and could thus better adapt to life in the West. There was also a problem with political correctness. If the Politburo expected intelligence to reveal something, but there was no evidence of it, the KGB staff would simply fabricate something and tell them what they wanted to hear rather than the truth. Sometimes a defector or agent would provide intelligence that would enable a spy ring to be broken up. For example, this allowed the British to identify all Soviet embassy staff in London who were actually working for the KGB and expel them, effectively crippling intelligence gathering efforts in the UK for a while. To be fair, the KGB also had similar successes against the West.
I was particularly intrigued by the chapter on the KGB’s attempts to disrupt the church. Not surprisingly, the Soviet government’s official policy of atheism was manifested in efforts to suppress the church. At the same time, many leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church collaborated with the KGB or were even KGB officers. They would use their positions to influence the World Council of Churches (WCC) to criticize problems in the West, such as racism, while remaining silent about the human rights abuses behind the Iron Curtain. Given the Russian Orthodox Church's long-standing tradition of submission to the secular government, it is not entirely unexpected that it would submit to the Soviet government. However, I have to question the folly of Christians, whether in the East or the West, who assist and empower those who would harm them.
This review only touches on the surface of such an extensive book and does not do it justice. If you want to better understand the Cold War and related issues, this book is a good starting point. As for me, I enjoyed reading this book and look forward to reading its companion volume.
The KGB had various organizational structures and names over the years. Its original name was Cheka, and KGB officers often referred to themselves as Chekists, harking back to its glorious days. One of its roles was intelligence, similar to the CIA in the U.S. or MI5 in the UK, but another crucial role was suppressing internal dissent.
Early on, Vladimir Lenin couldn't understand the people's opposition to his government, which was theoretically for the people's benefit, and had to establish an organization to quell the people's dissent for the people's good. His successor, Joseph Stalin, was extremely paranoid and focused on imagined threats to the regime, completely ignoring or missing real ones. For example, after World War I, the western powers deployed military forces into the Soviet Union to aid the doomed White Russian effort to overthrow the fledgling Communist government. After the Communists' early attempts to export their revolution to Europe failed, the Soviet government focused on consolidating its power, and the western powers turned their attention elsewhere. However, Stalin was convinced that they were plotting against him and dedicated significant effort to detecting and foiling their imaginary plots. In addition, he tasked the Cheka with suppressing Russian expats considered enemies of the Soviet government and sometimes assassinating them. During the Terror, also known as the Great Purge, many loyal officials became victims of Stalin's paranoia, and the Cheka was decimated to the point where its effectiveness was severely compromised. In other words, the greatest threat to the Cheka was the man it faithfully served, not counterintelligence by the western powers, which were more or less unaware of Soviet intelligence efforts. At any rate, the Cheka was effectively destroyed by Stalin's paranoid delusions just in time for World War II, and it took a while for it to regain the extensive skill sets that had been lost to the firing squad.
Foreign intelligence was coordinated by embassy and consulate staff, as well as by illegals, KGB officers operating under assumed identities (live doubles and dead doubles) in countries targeted for espionage. A live double assumed the identity of a westerner who had emigrated to the Soviet Union, and a dead double assumed the identity of someone who had died. In the event of hostilities, Soviet embassy and consulate staff would be sent home, but illegals could remain and continue espionage and other subversive activities. Generally, espionage was carried out by agents, citizens of target nations recruited to conduct espionage under the control of KGB officers. Some agents, especially the early ones, were motivated by a desire to advance the cause of Communism, but others were in it for the money or were blackmailed into the role after being photographed while engaging in illicit sex acts.
Targets for espionage included ciphers, military and political intelligence, and technology. Interestingly, the most productive source of intelligence was science and technology, but the Soviets were particularly ineffective at exploiting it. Their command economy was too rigid to rapidly integrate stolen technology, and western computer technology was regarded with suspicion. Did it contain back doors and other programming that would allow western governments to sabotage its use by the Soviets? Paranoia had struck again!
Several factors hampered the KGB’s intelligence gathering efforts. The heyday of the illegals was in the early years of the Soviet Union, when the Cheka was staffed by people who had not grown up under a totalitarian government and could thus better adapt to life in the West. There was also a problem with political correctness. If the Politburo expected intelligence to reveal something, but there was no evidence of it, the KGB staff would simply fabricate something and tell them what they wanted to hear rather than the truth. Sometimes a defector or agent would provide intelligence that would enable a spy ring to be broken up. For example, this allowed the British to identify all Soviet embassy staff in London who were actually working for the KGB and expel them, effectively crippling intelligence gathering efforts in the UK for a while. To be fair, the KGB also had similar successes against the West.
I was particularly intrigued by the chapter on the KGB’s attempts to disrupt the church. Not surprisingly, the Soviet government’s official policy of atheism was manifested in efforts to suppress the church. At the same time, many leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church collaborated with the KGB or were even KGB officers. They would use their positions to influence the World Council of Churches (WCC) to criticize problems in the West, such as racism, while remaining silent about the human rights abuses behind the Iron Curtain. Given the Russian Orthodox Church's long-standing tradition of submission to the secular government, it is not entirely unexpected that it would submit to the Soviet government. However, I have to question the folly of Christians, whether in the East or the West, who assist and empower those who would harm them.
This review only touches on the surface of such an extensive book and does not do it justice. If you want to better understand the Cold War and related issues, this book is a good starting point. As for me, I enjoyed reading this book and look forward to reading its companion volume.
