I’m disappointed. This could have been a fascinating account of a pivotal moment in history, but it’s bogged down by bias. Macmillan’s writing too often reads like American propaganda rather than balanced analysis.

The book never misses a chance to criticize the Chinese historical figures, detailing every mistake, atrocity, and excess under Communist China. Meanwhile, American figures like Nixon and Kissinger, who, among other things, directly contributed to millions of deaths in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, get off easy. Their actions are whitewashed, and situations are routinely framed to favor the U.S. position.

That said, there are enough intriguing details and firsthand accounts of the summit itself to merit 3 stars.

There are not any major revelations or new interpretations in this narrative history, but it is an interesting read, as it provides a lot of background to the historic week in 1972 when Nixon visited China, as well as a lot of little "nuggets" of information about the personal interactions among the major players. One needs to become accustomed to the way that the book jumps back and forth chronologically, as the author tells the backstory interspersed with chapters about the journey. I was a little disappointed that she did not bring the long term repercussions of the Nixon visit into the 21st century. My school is filled with Chinese high school students, a development that directly comes from the relationship that was forged in 1972. Nevertheless, it is a book worth picking up.

Finished this quite some time ago. Nixon is a lot fucking smarter than Trump and Trump is too stupid to embody the evil and yet complex motivations of Nixon. Nixon comes across as a very aggressive and ambitious politician wanting peace. Mao seems more hands off. They only actually meet for an hour in China. Mao's decision. Nixon was overly ambitious to make history as a former anti-Communist dude who indicted Mr. Hiss to Mao's negotiator. Many delicious meals given to these diplomats--pretty damn good for a Communist country. The shrimp is just amazing. Nixon and Mao agree on one thing: the pathology and untrustworthiness of the Soviet Union, which is what Russia was called at the time. Kissinger comes off exceedingly sycophantic and not trustworthy..historically accurate. A good read for our times and back then.

Fascinating account of the Nixon-Mao meetings in 1972. The real meat of the book (CD as it were) are the biographies of all the participants: Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, Zhou En-lai, Pat Nixon, etc.

The structure of the book is somewhat choppy as it constantly goes from an event (i.e., Nixon getting off the plane in Beijing) and then dives into the biography of a major player or the description of a significant prior event. As a result, it is difficult to keep track of what actually happened during that momentous week.

The narrator of this audio-book was frankly not good. Her diction was such that I was often forced to replay sections just to understand individual words (or maybe my hearing is just getting bad).

2.5⭐️
Well written, well researched, and interesting to a certain demographic definitely.
Macmillan just failed to convey the stakes? For all the good reviews on this book I never really felt engaged with it. I suspect one of the problems is that I didn't live through these events, though that shouldn't be an issue with a history book. For example, the trade relationship between the US and China is certainly visible in retrospect and Macmillan does discuss it, however the importance of Vietnam isn't really touched upon until the last third of the book- for someone not well versed in the topic it becomes of questionable importance for a huge part of the narrative.
Macmillan favours the political details of Nixon's visit far more than explaining the stakes of the meetings that occurred, and though Nixon may have 'opened up' China you're left feeling like it wasn't the most momentous foreign policy.
Macmillan also tries to balance the perspective of this book between the Chinese and the Americans, but by the end it still feels like the Chinese were in an inferior position and this was an American triumph.
All in all Macmillan writes well, and has done some fantastic research but it's a dull read.

I love her style of writing history. She interweaves the plot of history with the biographical stories of the key characters (including nations) in a way that is informative and fascinating, rather than only one or the other. And her references are very helpful. I'd recommend the book, for sure. (I prefer it's organization and approach much more than I did Keegan's way of writing history).

Good book. Good mix of background on nixon/mao, joe/kissinger, sino-soviet conflict + info on Mao's pooping habits + american butt irritations.

My main problem with the book is that the conclusion is really weak. It doesn't go deep into results of china/usa deal, glosses over Kissinger's corporate role afterwards, and doesn't explore what could've been if the deal did not happen.

Most interesting part of the conclusion said the China/USA deal was major because until the deal China was treated as a pariah state similar to Iran, Cuba, North Korea...Which left me with an obvious question: would China have not prospered and was it supposed to [almost] fall apart like the other rejects? In that case, should we blame Nixon for setting up China for success and USA for failure(eg loss of industry to China)?

Basically, a bunch of really powerful men get their feelings hurt very easily. That being said, it was quite fascinating to listen to considering the current political climate, Chinese-U.S. relations, relations with Asia in general right now, etc. All the major players in this diplomatic endeavor get a mini-biography to provide background and context for the myriad underlying issues and tensions going on. I found myself alternately bored and riveted. Not much actually happened during that week, yet it set the stage for the China we're currently dealing with today.

I enjoyed MacMillan's treatment of this important event. Without sugar-coating Nixon's weaknesses, she went into great detail and included Kissinger's and Chou En Lai's important roles. In fact, she probably wrote more pages relating to these two than on Nixon or Mao.

It was enlightening to learn that Kissinger was passing secrets of Soviet security to demonstrate good will, and that he and Nixon did all they could to keep the US State dept out of the event, much to their dismay and anger.

You can see the seeds of Nixon's downfall with the demonstrated paranoia towards his own administration, the press and, in fact everyone outside his small circle of trusted aides sown in these years just before Watergate.

Still, you must agree with Nixon that he and Kissinger deserved credit for opening this important door that maybe nobody else could have.

In so many ways a fatally flawed man, who you cannot admire. Still, despite those inexcusable faults, he accomplished a major change in world history.

I'm not sure why it says Nixon and Mao on the cover of this book. It was published under the title "Nixon in China" in Canada. I guess maybe that title was taken in the US. Nixon was kind of awesome despite the evil corruption stuff.

MacMillan’s Nixon in China chronicles President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to the People’s Republic of China in 1972. Advanced the previous year by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger the trip cemented Nixon’s re-election and opened pathways for two superstates that had no relationship for 22 years. It is an unsettling story in many ways. Kissinger figures as an outsized diplomat thoroughly amoral to the core. He undermines his own State Department, passes on highly classified assessments of Soviet military capabilities to the Chinese, all but abandons US treaty obligations to Taiwan and destabilizes alliances throughout the Indo-Pacific. All to please his Chinese hosts Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. His obsequiousness and drive to achieve a new relationship was matched by Nixon’s obsession with re-election. Establishing a relationship was long overdue but at what price? The driving need to get a communique by this duo exposed a weakness the Chinese knew how to exploit. They gave up nothing on Indochina, alarmed the Soviets, rattled American alliances in the region and got the US to concede the status of Taiwan on their terms. Fifty years later China is an economic and military superpower seeking hegemony over the region and declaring the entire South China Sea as its own sovereign lake. In retrospect the legacy of Nixon (and especially Kissinger) is a dubious one that led to its own destabilization neither could have anticipated 50 years ago.

This is the history of the opening of US and China relations made by Nixon in 1972. It is covered extensively in Kissinger's memoirs but it was interesting to get an objective version of it. 6/3/07