Fascinating play-by-play of the Sino-Nixonian thaw. I would recommend it to anyone interested in how today came to be in terms of Chinese-American relations.

I had two problems with this book. One was the pacing. MacMillan sometime is so invested in explaining the background and history of every aspect of this week in Sino-American diplomacy that she sacrifices narrative flow. The details are valuable; the story gets lost.

The second problem: MacMillan assumes more than shows the claim that Nixon's trip to China was really really important. I *believe* it, but really thought at the end of the book I would be able to say with some clarity why it was so important and ... it's still pretty vague.

the author provides all the necessary background information--mini biographies of all the key players involved, the historical context, a brief history of U.S. involvements in East Asia (namely Korea, Vietnam, and the support of Taiwan), a brief history of Communist China under Mao, stories of Kissinger's secret trips and the diplomatic backchannels over the years that made the trip possible, the details of every part of the week-long trip, the world's reaction, etc.

If you're looking for a book that will give you all of the above, you've found it. It's quite readable. The only dry parts are the biographical information about the various government ministry folks from both countries, but even those are sometimes intriguing.

I read this book because I wanted to know more about China, and particularly Mao. This book gives excellent insights into what can be known of The Chairman. I enjoyed the author's attention to detail, often quoting from memoirs, collected letters, Nixon's secret tapes, etc. A fascinating look at diplomacy.

Having already read Henry Kissinger's "On China" this book was good but redundant. The format is a little awkward, skipping around from the actual trip to the preparations for the trip and then back again. That being said, this is still a worthwhile and interesting account of the people and events that made Nixon's trip possible.

A masterful account of one of the most dramatic moments in American diplomatic history, President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. MacMillan provides vivid thumbnail biographies of the four major players in the drama of that weeklong visit, Nixon, Mao, Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai, each a fascinating character in his own right. The major issues that brought the two enemies together (mutual distrust of the Soviet Union) and kept them apart (Taiwan, Vietnam) are given a welcome amount of discussion as well. What I enjoyed most was the consideration of how individuals are shaped by history even as they try to bend it to their own will. The strengths and flaws of Richard Nixon, a truly Shakespearean figure who could reach such heights as a diplomat even as the seeds of his destruction via the Watergate scandal were being sown, are shown in a most fascinating way here. This book captures his contradictions as well as any full-length biography could, making MacMillan's work essential in understanding this most confounding of presidents.

really fantastic. It doesn't limit itself to the events of that week, but gives an excellent summary of Sino-American relations up to that point and brief but informative biographies of all the major participants

MacMillan entertains as well as educates readers yet again, exploring some of the most important aspects of the 20th century. Her focus, the February 1972 meeting between Nixon and Mao; her hypothesis, that it formulated a permanent change whose reverberations are still being felt around the world. While only an hour face-to-face, this meeting and its lead-up set the groundwork for lasting change in three major ways: political developments on many fronts, ideological shifts in the midst of the Cold War, and geopolitical progressions/regressions. MacMillan takes the time to lay out her arguments in a clear and thorough manner to argue that the summit was, indeed, highly effective in shaping Sino-American relations, as well as moving the world as a whole towards a better understanding of its conflicts, all while close to the lair of the Soviet Bear.

MacMillan argues that the Nixon-Mao meeting, and by extension those beforehand by Kissinger and Chou, helped to solidify many political developments that, in turn, had major and lasting effects around the world. MacMillan goes far to argue that China's role and involvement in the politics of other Asian states heaps additional power onto the PRC, offering a moniker of regional power broker. Through its summit, the US and China could forge platonic respect and understanding that would help to lessen the vilification of the former in the Asian sphere. While MacMillan does not support that the summit led directly to the end of the Vietnam War (where North Vietnamese communists signed treaties, knowing their Chinese comrades were on good relations), she is clear that there was a move in that direction. Perhaps the greatest political move to come from the summit was the US acceptance of mainland China as 'the' China, much to the chagrin of some Asian allies and to the joy of those in Europe and North America. Precarious as it was, it was also momentous in moving the political game piece forward. The opening of relations between the US and China permitted an ongoing dialogue, which, in turn, helped the two sides work towards resolution of the region's conflicts and help bolster a political position whereby two strong actors could speak in harmony, if not in unison. MacMillan argues effectively that the political power held by China over its regional 'red' governments may have gone far in paving the way to normalised political relations with the United States. It also helped show the world that there was a political alternative in the midst of the Cold War, an actor that could effect change who was not about to use faux-Marxist rhetoric and bang the proverbial shoe on the table to seek to be heard. This shift away the USSR's political influence, long seen as the other superpower and consummate communist sphere of influence holder, awoke a sleeping giant of ideological negotiating, long left to whither in the cold.

MacMillan also argues that the meeting opened the door to conversations between the leaders of the diametrically opposed ideological camps. She insinuates that the reader must accept China as the better communist representative in the discussion, clearly denoting an open dialogue speaks volumes over the rigid chest thumping and doctrine-spouting coming from Moscow. Pulling no punches in her historical groundwork, MacMillan shows how both Mao and Nixon came to hate the other's ideological stance, but were able to look past this to meet and forge great discussions. These talks superseded the ideological expectations they had of one another and laid the groundwork to prove more effective than any talks either had with the USSR to that point. Strengthened by a heightened hatred of the USSR, China sought to educate the US on how un-Marxist their communist brothers were and how the ideological differences need not be an impediment to successful relations, though both would remain leery of the other for years to come. This was, perhaps, the opening cracks in the Cold War walls and could surely have led to the beginning of capitalist-communist relations whose symbolic start is usually attributed to the Reagan-Gorbachev dialogues.

From a geographic standpoint, the opening of political relations permitted the thorny discussion of Taiwan to come to the forefront. Perhaps the strongest stalemate between the two sides, Taiwan became the issue that Mao would not permit to come up during the brief interaction with Nixon. In conjunction with the negotiations taking place, the worldview of Taiwan as the legitimate China was fast losing ground, as MacMillan writes, paralleling one of Kissinger's pre-summit meetings with Chou. The United Nations' vote in 1971 saw them expelled and the PRC take up rightful ownership of all things China. However, Nixon and Kissinger sought to come to terms with the strong Taiwan policy advocated by the US and their strong relations with the self-proclaimed rightful Republic of China. It was not until the final communique that this came to the forefront and almost cost all other progress made throughout the time Nixon spent in China. The eventual acceptance of a mainland China as 'the' China may have cemented the entire summit's progress, leaving Mao to realise he had finally scored the most important point for China since 1949. That said, the US was left to juggle all its allies and to appease some while straining relations with others. MacMillan points out how tenuous the trust became between the US and their Japanese/Philippine allies thereafter, while Canada and Western Europe applauded the result. To this day, the Taiwan situation remains somewhat clouded, though, as Mao put it, why should the world stick its nose into how the US and Delaware are getting along, as a state's internal issues are all their own?

The momentous nature of this summit cannot be downplayed. From strong enemies during the Korean War, with PoWs on both sides, the US and China chose to openly accept one another and finally meet in February 1972. Surely a pill that needed ingesting, but to see such steps being made at such a critical point in the Cold War should not escape the reader. Her frank ability to lay out the historical facts and let the reader come to their own conclusions is surely one of MacMillan's greatest gifts, as well as spinning the tale so effortlessly. She does not downplay or over-inflate the historical or political significance of this, but chooses to allow all those who've come to the table to take from it what they will, as Mao would surely have expected.

Kudos Dr. MacMillan for all your hard work arguing this most interesting point of view. I learned a great deal and am happy to have taken the time to delve into this historical landmark, told in so concise a manner.

I didn't get very far into this book. I started it, was intrigued, then put it down for long periods of time before picking it up again. The way MacMillan writes is very confusing. She inserts tangents in very random places and follows it with other tangents. She took an interesting topic and overwhelmed it with back stories. I did learn things I didn't know about such figures like Mao, Henry Kissinger and Chiang Kai-Shek, but it took away from the main points of her book. She was supposed to write about the week Nixon visited China and instead cluttered it up with historical information about everything that led up to that visit, whether it was vital to the story or not. I'm sure if I had kept reading I would have been more engrossed. She had to have gotten to the point eventually. But I had wasted enough time being stuck on this book, and decided to move on.

Superbly written. An easy 5-stars

This starts well and gets to the brunt of the matter: the meeting with Nixon and Mao. Everything's pretty much down hill from there.

I took a Chinese politics course in college and much of this book is a solid review of 20th century Sino-US relations; later chapters on the Soviet Union, Japan, and the Pakistan-India conflict are too long and, save the info on the USSR, not terribly relevant to the topic.

I like the way MacMillan tells history--anecdote followed by detailed history, forming a kaleidescope of sorts to tell the tale--but it also makes me think outside of its main implications there isn't much of a story to tell. I think this is apparent as several pieces of information are repeated throughout, and thus the book gets very repetitive. It could have been at least 50 pages shorter, maybe a 100--less would have been more in this case.

Margaret MacMillan follows Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (**** Mar/Apr 2003) with another tale of a world-changing encounter. She draws parallel narratives of how the two world leaders met in a momentous (if stilted) handshake, and she peppers her analysis with fascinating details, such as what led to Mao's 1958 decision regarding the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu and the American commitment to defend Taiwan. MacMillan's use of flashback (the narrative begins with Nixon's trip to Beijing and then moves backward to the months leading up to the flight) confused a few critics, and some wished for more nuanced analyses of Chinese and Soviet politics. Macmillan's portrayal of key characters, including Henry Kissinger and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, stands out. After meeting Mao Zedong, Nixon remarked to him that "history has brought us together." Thirty-five years later, it has brought them to MacMillan's capable hands.

This is an excerpt from a review published in Bookmarks magazine.

An enlightening look at the meeting that has changed the dynamics of trade and commerce. For all of the things Nixon wasn't, he was keen at foreign policy and though his actions we are communicating on cheaper devices.