As our republic is ground to nothing between the boulders of socialism and populism – the abyssus abyssum invocat of our two-party system – it seems pointless except as an act of masochism to read anything about its founding and early history. Our institutions of freedom have been so glibly discarded that books about them can amount only to quaint and curious volumes of forgotten lore, immersion in which would make anyone weak and weary indeed.

Neverthehoo, old habits die hard, and this year, with a gap in my reading list and with July Fourth approaching, I decided to re-read David Hackett Fischer’s Washington’s Crossing, which I’d assigned myself as a morale-booster in the years after 9/11. (External blows stimulated my interest in the history of American freedom; self-inflicted ones killed it.) I’d remembered Fischer’s book for its stress on the ideological aspect of the Revolution and can now report that my memory was in this case true. Washington’s Crossing illustrates how different people (not just British, Germans, and Americans but different groups of Americans such as New Englanders, Virginians, and backwoodsmen) took different views of freedom and related it differently to ideals of equality and social order. My favorite players in this story are the Philadelphia Associators, radical egalitarians, who went so far as to design their uniform to “level all distinctions.” (p. 27)

An important subplot of the book details how George Washington, accustomed to believe in “liberty [within] a system of stratification” (p. 14), became general of an army composed of men (like the Associators) who saw freedom in a different light. As such, Fischer’s book is a study of leadership. Now, leadership today has become something of a fetish, with a cottage industry of how-to courses and its own section in the bookstore. Understood vaguely, leadership can encompass both democratic and undemocratic modes of motivation. Washington’s stereotypical embodiment of leadership is something that should be subjected – as it is in this book – to careful analysis, to yield a more precise conception of how it should function in a democratic society. Fischer’s book starts with an image of Washington as leader – the one in Emmanuel Leutze’s painting Washington Crossing the Delaware – in which he is shown with a telescope, symbolizing “a statesman’s vision.” (p. 2) Someone who leads by virtue of his unique sense of vision calls to mind Plato’s allegory of the cave, in which Socrates opines that only he with the true view of reality is qualified to be king. Indeed it was quite common in the before time to believe that kings were crowned by a special endowment such as vision, and I hope that readers of this review know that such a belief is as obsolete as kings are themselves.

Thankfully, Fischer uses the picture of Washington as the true-seeing leader only as a starting point and argues in the rest of his book that the real Washington was a leader of a different sort. At one point, he distinguishes democratic leadership from its non-democratic cousins by quoting Washington himself: “A people unused to restraint must be led; they will not be drove.” (p. 6) At another two places, Fischer draws important distinctions in his own words, remarking that Washington functioned “not only as a leader but a comrade in arms” and “more as a leader than a commander.” (pp. 251, 366) Elsewhere, Fischer employs a qualifier (“consultative leadership”), provides an example (“It was typical of Washington’s style of leadership to present a promising proposal as someone’s else’s idea”), and uses words besides “leading” to describe what Washington was doing (“listening, responding, encouraging, persuading.”) (pp. 265-266)

Since Fischer takes such pains to define Washington’s mode of leadership so narrowly, to the point of having to find better words for it, the reader may conclude that it scarcely warrants the term. (As for Washington’s using other people’s ideas, Fischer reports that the plan to attack at Trenton may have originated with Washington’s adjutant, Joseph Reed, and that the campaign that led to both second Trenton and Princeton was opened by the Associators – and not the officers but the men. If true, these cases stretch the definition of leadership about as far as it can go. [pp. 201-203, 265]) In fact, leadership has long been understood as a paradox, something so dependent on subtlety that it only functions in the absence of its assertion. Laozi’s injunction to “preside yet not control” (Daodejing, ch. 10) is typical of this paradox and seems to anticipate Washington.

The issue with Washington was that he initially failed to grasp leadership’s paradoxical nature and was thus forced to learn on the job. The first part of Fischer’s book is a catalogue of his slowness to learn. He ordered his troops not to plunder farmers, to no avail. He forbade them from visiting prostitutes, with the same result. He insisted that the Connecticut Light Horsemen get rid of their mounts and serve as infantry, causing them, after a brief period of conditional obedience, to leave the army (thereby depriving it of their service as scouts). (pp. 85-86) Encountering a group of militiamen fleeing the British at Kip’s Bay, Washington beat their officers and dashed his hat on the ground. (p. 104)

The main crisis occurred on the eve of second Trenton, when many soldiers’ enlistments were set to expire. Washington’s expression of vexation on the occasion is interesting for its repetition of the word liberty, once as a cause and once as a curse:

‘The great and radical Evil which pervades our whole System & like an Ax at the Tree of our safety, Interest, and Liberty here again shews its baleful influence – Tomorrow the Continental Troops are all at liberty.’ (p. 270)

“If Washington hoped to remain in the field,” Fischer notes, “he had to persuade some of his veterans to stay with him.” In the event, Washington resorted to bribery and begging, authorizing a ten dollar bounty for an additional six weeks of service (another idea borrowed from someone else) and imploring his men:

‘My brave fellows, you have done all I asked you to do and more than could be reasonably expected; but your country is at stake, your wives, your houses, and all that you hold dear. You have worn yourselves out with the fatigues and hardships, but we know not how to spare you. If you will consent to stay one month longer, you will render that service to the cause of liberty and to your country, which you probably can never do under any other circumstances.’

Two such appeals were necessary, and even then the deciding factor was individual soldiers encouraging each other to stay. As Fischer summarizes, “Only a few days before, Washington was infuriated with these men and ready to clap some of them in irons. Now he was leading them in another way. This gentleman of Virginia was learning to treat a brigade of New England Yankee farmboys and fishermen as men of honor, who were entitled to equality of esteem.” (pp. 271-273)

There’s at least a little bit of American exceptionalism operating here. For a gentleman to address once-thought-of inferiors as fellow gentlemen and to give up commanding in favor of entreating them was truly extraordinary. (Fischer discusses the evolving use of the term gentlemen and shows that the deemphasizing of formal status and prevalence of consultative leadership would have been unthinkable in British ranks. [pp. 273, 315-316, 331]) Washington could only resign himself to egalitarianism in a polyglot Yankee society in which no one was entitled to tell another what to do. We know that others were forced to accommodate as well. The immigrant officer Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben wrote home to a Prussian friend, “You say to your soldier ‘Do this’ and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say [to the American soldier]: ‘This is the reason you ought to do that’: and then he does it.” (https://www.smithsonianmag.com/histor...) Sometime later, we are told, Abraham Lincoln, as a militia captain, once issued an order, only to be told to go to hell. (https://www.historynet.com/black-hawk...)

For its reminder that, in spite of everything, Americans can’t be driven like cattle (and often, as we are daily reminded, speak out of turn), I’m grateful for my Fourth of July reading.

Excellent book.
"Why did Washington cross the Delaware?" If you answered, "To get to the other side." that's funny. And basically the same answer I gave before I read Washington's Crossing by David Hackett Fischer. But it's not the whole answer.
This book will lead you step by step through that crossing, and the days before and after. And how those days not only determined the eventual victory against England, but also, the birth of America. The methods used in the Revolutionary War, inclusive bottom up democratic decision making; treating British and Hessian prisoners with dignity; sticking to the ideals and principals of American decency and respect for the individual against all odds; and many others, led directly to the idea of America.
It feels like essential reading, when the very fabric of what it means to be an American seems to be torn a little more each day by our fractured politics. If you read this book, you will see a little of what our very first founders thought when they created America.
Enjoy it. You won't regret it.

An interesting history about how Washington, the Continental Army, and the American militia turned the tide of the Revolutionary War at a moment when defeat seemed imminent. Great information about Washington's leadership style during this phase of the war (including his many mistakes and how he learned from them), about the British troops and especially the often-overlooked Hessians, about some of the individual units in the Continental Army and their varied opinions and reasons for fighting, and about the New Jersey campaign (especially the role of the militia).

The American side is somewhat glorified (we hear a lot about their humane treatment of prisoners, for example, but little about their often rough treatment of Loyalist civilians), but the British are treated in an evenhanded manner rather than demonized. The Forage War during the winter of 1777 is often neglected in Revolutionary War histories, but Fischer makes a strong argument for why it should be considered a significant event.

If you don’t have a crush on George Washington after this , you’re not alive.

Now I want to see the painting and the location. Week trip this summer?

A rare and impressive example of a modern academic doing military history, and doing it well.

Yet clearly part of the reason Fischer wrote this book was to provide a kind of on-the-ground justification for his earlier work of social and cultural history, "Albion's Seed," where he discovered four major "folkways" in America which he thought descended from four separate waves of migration. Sure enough, he finds similar divisions here, such as that between the "ordered liberty" of the New England regiments and the "levelling liberty" of the Pennsylvania Associators. Whats surprising perhaps is how convincingly he makes his case, describing how the Pennsylvanians, for example, elected their own officers and forbid sartorial displays of differing rank. He furthermore extends his social analysis to those on the British side like the fiercely independent Highland Foot regiments (one of whom fought a bloody battle in its own right to keep its kilts and tartans back in Scotland) and the infamous Hessians, who were sent over to the US as part of the Handelsoldieten (solider trade) in what some at the time called "the deal of the century" for the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who received millions in gold for his troubles.

Fischer also demonstrates the world-historical consequences of these social and military confrontations along the Delaware river in late 1776 and early 1777. The defeat of the Hessians at the first battle of Trenton caused Europe, inspired especially by an anonymous pamphleteer who was probably Ben Franklin, to react against the mercenary trade and helped end it on the continent. On the other hand, Washington is portrayed as one of the first to understand how to create a new American order out of distinctive and differing visions of liberty, namely, through negotiation and tolerance. His command foreshadowed later government recognition of differences and compromise, yet kept the army united enough to achieve victory.

Overall though, the book is mainly a well-wrought military history, describing the lay of the land and dispositions of regiments and how they clashed in battle. I haven't read anything like it in awhile, but I'm certainly glad I read this one.

David Hackett Fischer is the Earl Warren Professor of History at Brandeis University. His book Washington’s Crossing is a thoroughly engaging account of the events of 1776 and early 1777. The ragtag force assembled by the colonists was thoroughly whipped on Long Island and in New York. They proceeded to lose New Jersey and Rhode Island. Thousands of Americans began signing loyalty oaths to the English crown, and George Washington’s army was faced with constant shortages of manpower. The outlook was bleak; most Americans thought the war was lost. By December 1776, Washington realized that he needed to gain the initiative. On Christmas night, he and his army crossed the frozen Delaware River. They attacked Trenton, which was guarded by a force of Hessians, and managed to defeat the enemy before retreating back across the river. Then, early in the new year, Washington again stunned a combined force of British and Hessian soldiers at Trenton and then captured a British base at Princeton. Fischer argues that these battlefield successes revitalized the American cause. Militia groups began attacking British and Hessian units in New Jersey. It was the British army’s turn to be back on their heels. American morale soared, and many new recruits poured into Washngton’s army. More importantly, they began to believe that the war against the British was winnable.

"We have seen how it happened: not in a single event, or even a chain of events, but in a great web of contingency."

"The American army of 1776 came mostly from middling families who cherished the revolutionary principles of liberty and freedom but understood them in various ways: the collective rights of old New England, the reciprocal rights of Philadelphia Associators, the individual rights of backcountry riflemen, and the hegemonic rights of the Fairfax men."

Contingency and cultural realities gently punctuate this illuminating military account by revered historian David Hackett Fischer, and Washington's Crossing is better for it. Fischer's narrative clearly illustrates all movements, strategies, and tactics of the brutal winter campaign of 1776-1777, but his overarching narrative is subtly balanced throughout by consistent references to cultural differences between Washington, his diverse army, and the various foreign factions (British regulars, Scottish Highlanders, and Hessian mercenaries) they faced. Careful to avoid overstatement, Fischer nevertheless highlights how these distinctive cultural realities led to varying decisions for good and for ill--moments of historical contingency that ultimately formed one nation and forever altered the trajectory of another.

Above all else, Washington's Crossing is simply an account too incredible to fabricate. In the 12 weeks surrounding the disastrous defense of New York, Washington lost three states and 90 percent of his men. From this nadir, Washington drew closer to his trusted advisors, restructured his leadership, and made a series of military decisions that led to Trenton and beyond--all in the face of a volatile northeastern winter. The rest, as they say, is history.

Excellent, engaging, interesting, and inspiring.
A few non-exhaustive notes:
•tWashington: “A people unused to restraint must be led; they will not be drove.”
•tPrivate Joseph Plumb Martin woke to the sight of 5 warships anchored in the East River near New York that were ready for battle. He remembered, “It was on a Sabbath morning, the day in which the British were always employed about their deviltry if possible.”
•tWashington wept when he realized the disaster that befell his (2,800+) troops after he assented to the wishes of Gen. Nathaniel Greene to try to hold Fort Lee, in spite of his better judgment.
•tPanics, in some cases, have their uses. In tough times, people begin to think anew. Paine’s An American Crisis captured the difficulty of the time and the resolve of the Americans.
•tAmerica’s great revival did not follow the battles of Trenton and Princeton; it preceded them and made those events possible, if not inevitable. The revival arose from many people, esp. the ordinary people in the valley of the Delaware (R.).
•tDr. Benjamin Rush thought that it was a national habit of the American people not to deal with a difficult problem until it was nearly impossible. “Our republics cannot exist long in prosperity. We require adversity, and appear to possess most of the republican spirit when most depressed.”
otFor example, when Congress was forced to move from Philadelphia to Baltimore in humble circumstances, Samuel Adams noted that the circumstances improved the virtue of Congress and that Congress was able to accomplish more in 3 weeks than they had done in 6 months in Phil.a.
•tDuring the winter campaigns of 1776-1777, there are many accounts of blood-tinged snow from the unshod or little-shod feet of the American troops. While the Americans had plenty of firearms, artillery, and ammunition, blankets and shoes were always in short supply during that difficult winter.
•tDuring the battle of Trenton, James Monroe took over the head of a corps from an injured Capt. William Washington. In the melee, he was hit by a musket ball that severed an artery and he bled dangerously. Fortunately, a local New Jersey doctor who had joined Monroe’s Company as a volunteer the night before, saved his life by clamping the artery just in time to keep him from bleeding to death.
•tInhabitants, including at least one woman, shot from their homes in the battle of Trenton. One of the woman’s shots hit and mortally wounded a Hessian captain.
•tAfter the Battle of Trenton, Washington ordered his men to treat the Hessians with humanity.
•tA voluntary (private) drive was organized to help gather clothing and especially shoes for the Continental Army as an emergency measure.
•tGeneral Thomas Mifflin, who pledged his life and fortune to the American cause, persuaded his men to stay on in the cause of liberty for 6 weeks (and for $10) just before (and in the nick of time) their time of service was expiring. Most of them agreed to stay.
•tWashington repeated this plea for troops to stay an extra month by appealing to their service to the cause of liberty and to their country, and to their sense of honor. Washington also addressed their material needs by authorizing $10 hard coin for those who agreed. Nearly all who were fit for duty (~200) agreed to stay on and serve. They knew the cost, and it was later determined that nearly half would be killed in the fighting or dead of disease soon after. A true sacrifice.
•tWashington and his officers were keenly aware that the war was also a contest for popular opinion. While the esteem of others was somewhat important to some of the leaders, what was more important was their belief that they would win only if they deserved to win. Even in the most urgent times of the war, these men were concerned about the ethical questions in the Revolution.
•tThe American troops had a sense of their own strength, a confidence in one another, and a feeling that Providence was with them on the night of the Battle of Trenton.
•tThe weather proved to be a blessing from Providence many times during the War. One instance included the cold temps that came so quickly the night after the Battle of Trenton. As the Army proceeded to Princeton that night, the roads, which had been slushy and muddy the day before, froze within about 2 hours to provide for easier travel for the American troops.
•tSome of the differences between Washington and the British generals include:
otWashington listened to his fellow officers and encouraged them to share their views freely.
otHe listened more than he spoke.
otLater on, he worked more skillfully at the construction of consensus, as in a council.
otThese skills resulted in a community of open discourse and a spirit of mutual forbearance.
otThis also led to growing respect for Washington.
•tHistorian Gruuber (sp?) concluded that Trenton and Princeton were supremely important to destroy the illusion of British invincibility, making patriots of potential Loyalists, and spoiling the Howe brothers’ hopes to a quick end to the War and the start to a lasting reunion with the Crown.
•tAmericans became highly motivated by the cruel experience of oppression. Another strength was their religion—their faith sustained them in adversity. Another plus was that the free male population in America was among the most literate in the world. Also, the American economy generated higher income per capita than most European nations.
•tAmericans were also accustomed to govern themselves; by 1776, they had done so for 6 generations. In spite of the many failures, success came together in the winter of 1776. Why? A big reason was that the civil and military leaders were accountable to a free people through their representatives. Thus, military leaders spent much time to communicate with the people and their leaders.
•tThe victories at Trenton and Princeton added legitimacy and stability to the American Cause when most needed and helped the fragile invention that was America, grow into an American tradition.
•tA new way of war-fighting was developed in America that reflected the nature of the citizenry. Free Americans in 1776 were a restless, striving, entrepreneurial people who routinely assumed risk for the sake of profit. They were a practical people who judged actions by results. Thus, they saw war differently than Europeans. They knew that wars may have to be fought from time to time to accomplish a particular purpose or goal. They fought not for the sake of fighting, but for the sake of winning. While war has been a continual part of America’s experience (at least one war fought each generation), Americans always saw war as an interruption in their lives and something that they wanted to get done quickly in order to return to the ordinary business of life.
•tSome of the war-fighting differences were boldness and opportunism, initiative and tempo, speed and concentration, and intelligence. These differences came together in the winter battles of 1776-1777 and would define a new way of war that would continue to our time.
•tDuring the winter campaigns of 1776-77, neither Washington nor his leaders denied quarter to the enemy, in spite of the fact that quarter was denied to many Americans by the British and Hessians.
•tNote that 23% of the Hessians who fought in the War decided to remain in America after it ended.
•tThus, the Americans chose a policy of humanity that aligned the conduct of the War with the values of the Revolution. They set the standard high.
•tToo many scholars in the late 20th century tried to make the American past into a record of crime and folly. Too many writers have told us that we are captors of our darker selves and helpless victims of our history. “It isn’t so, and never was.” The story of Washington’s Crossing tells us that Americans were (and are) capable of acting in a higher spirit.

Excellent, engaging, inspiring, and incredibly interesting. I am usually not a fan of military history, but Fischer's use of backstory at the perfect moments really drew me in. His scholarship and writing style will have me going on to read other books by him.

Informative, detailed, and would recommend.

An excellent book on the defining events of '76-'77 that turned the tide of the revolution. Includes background info on the forces of both sides that paints a much fuller picture of the conflict.

This book is about more than just Washington crossing the Delaware to fight the battle of Trenton. It covers the events that lead up to this pivotal event, and effects of this important victory. It is very readable and enjoyable, and does make a great impression of what a massive accomplishment this was and how it impacted the psyche of the country.