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This excellent book was recommended to me, while I was looking for resources that would introduce the classic problem of free will.
Strictly speaking, it is not an introduction at all; characteristic of modern philosophy, it is a deconstruction of the concept of moral autonomy. This deconstruction takes the form of a Nietzschean reconstruction of the history of this concept.
The similarity to Nietzsche doesn’t end there - for the author, the ground upon which our modern structures of moral autonomy rest, is the area ploughed by the ancient Greeks. The author makes the same historical demarcation that Nietzsche insisted on – namely, that the true genius of the ancient Greeks lay in their tragedians; and that this genius was appropriated by the burgeoning philosophers, beginning with Plato, inaugurating a history of conceptual development, refinement, and revocation that has eventually dovetailed into something resembling our modern concepts.
What is the purpose of this historical reconstruction – or, to remain with Nietzsche, this genealogical investigation into our cherished heritage of moral autonomy? The author avers that philosophers tend to lack a sense of history – that they use concepts without an appreciation of the modulating soil from which these concepts gain their sustenance. This is, of course, a point that has been well taken since the beginning of the last century. The difference is the brilliant exegesis that author conducts within these pages - he successfully argues that, simply because the lived concepts that percolated within the words of the ancient dramatists had not been consciously elucidated in philosophical discourse, this did not mean that these concepts were absent of their force. It is in the link between these unspoken concepts and their elucidation at the beginning of the philosophical tradition, that the author's interpretive energies are focused.
The modern concept of moral autonomy is shown to be the latest stage in a long process of development that has its roots in the lived, 'primitive' concepts that were dramatized in ancient tragedy. An incipient philosophy of action is evidenced - questions of moral responsibility, the specter of fate, and the evolution of moral autonomy from a much earlier shame-based honor society are all brought to light to showcase the distinction between 'what we think, and what we think we think.' The point is that, we actually think much like the ancient Greeks themselves thought about such matters; where the difference lies is the changing nature of self-interpretation i.e. what we think we think; and this, the author avers, is the result of the historical development of philosophy.
The blurb mentions that Williams is regarded as 'an analytic philosopher with the soul of a humanist', which is accurate praise. The author's vast erudition and clarity of thought is evidenced throughout by the tightly-packed sentences that abound in this book. I am now much more curious to read his other works - if they are half as enlightening as this book, I shall be well-served.
Strictly speaking, it is not an introduction at all; characteristic of modern philosophy, it is a deconstruction of the concept of moral autonomy. This deconstruction takes the form of a Nietzschean reconstruction of the history of this concept.
The similarity to Nietzsche doesn’t end there - for the author, the ground upon which our modern structures of moral autonomy rest, is the area ploughed by the ancient Greeks. The author makes the same historical demarcation that Nietzsche insisted on – namely, that the true genius of the ancient Greeks lay in their tragedians; and that this genius was appropriated by the burgeoning philosophers, beginning with Plato, inaugurating a history of conceptual development, refinement, and revocation that has eventually dovetailed into something resembling our modern concepts.
What is the purpose of this historical reconstruction – or, to remain with Nietzsche, this genealogical investigation into our cherished heritage of moral autonomy? The author avers that philosophers tend to lack a sense of history – that they use concepts without an appreciation of the modulating soil from which these concepts gain their sustenance. This is, of course, a point that has been well taken since the beginning of the last century. The difference is the brilliant exegesis that author conducts within these pages - he successfully argues that, simply because the lived concepts that percolated within the words of the ancient dramatists had not been consciously elucidated in philosophical discourse, this did not mean that these concepts were absent of their force. It is in the link between these unspoken concepts and their elucidation at the beginning of the philosophical tradition, that the author's interpretive energies are focused.
The modern concept of moral autonomy is shown to be the latest stage in a long process of development that has its roots in the lived, 'primitive' concepts that were dramatized in ancient tragedy. An incipient philosophy of action is evidenced - questions of moral responsibility, the specter of fate, and the evolution of moral autonomy from a much earlier shame-based honor society are all brought to light to showcase the distinction between 'what we think, and what we think we think.' The point is that, we actually think much like the ancient Greeks themselves thought about such matters; where the difference lies is the changing nature of self-interpretation i.e. what we think we think; and this, the author avers, is the result of the historical development of philosophy.
The blurb mentions that Williams is regarded as 'an analytic philosopher with the soul of a humanist', which is accurate praise. The author's vast erudition and clarity of thought is evidenced throughout by the tightly-packed sentences that abound in this book. I am now much more curious to read his other works - if they are half as enlightening as this book, I shall be well-served.
