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A great companion to Richard Feynman’s book, Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman. His books, or books about him, are a pleasure to read. He was a fascinating guy who was endlessly curious about the way the world worked. He suffered a decades-long battle against abdominal cancer, to which he finally succumbed on February 15, 1988, two weeks after he taught his last class at Caltech. You get glimpses of his childhood, his first wife and her battle with Hodgkin’s disease (and passed while he was in Los Alamos working on the Manhattan Project), his father, who instilled in him to inquire how the world worked, his mother who taught him that humor was the highest form of understanding we can achieve, how he became an avowed atheist even though brought up in the Jewish religion, his younger sister, Joan, has a Ph.D. in physics, and much more. You also get to see some of his drawings.
About half the book deals with the Challenger accident on January 28, 1986. Feynman served on the presidential commission that looked into the cause of the disaster. The book explains how the outside temperature impacted the O-rings, but that wasn’t Feynman’s discovery. It was General Kutyna, another member of the commission. He debunks the notion that the president wanted the Shuttle to fly so it could place a call during his State of the Union Address. But there was enough pressure inside NASA for keeping the Shuttle flying—a failure of management underestimating risk assessment—by a thousand times. There’s a lot of detail in this section. You’ll love it if you were a fan of the Space Shuttle missions.
The last chapter is his talk, “The Value of Science,” which is excellent. Some of the profundities:
“I believe that a scientist looking at nonscientific problems is just as dumb as the next guy. Scientific knowledge is an enabling power to do either good or bad—but it does not carry instructions on how to use it.” Buddhist proverb: To every man is given the key to the gates of heaven; the same key opens the gates of hell.” The key has value, otherwise how can we get into Heaven?
The scientist has a lot of experience with ignorance and doubt and uncertainty, and this experience is of very great importance, I think. When a scientist doesn’t know the answer to a problem, he is ignorant. Scientific knowledge is a body of statements of varying degrees of certainty—some most unsure, some nearly sure, but none absolutely certain.
If we suppress all discussion, all criticism, proclaiming “This is the answer, my friends; man is saved!” we will doom humanity for a long time to the chains of authority, confined to the limits of our present imagination. It has been done so many times before.
He’s incredibly quotable, and some of my favorites:
I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something.
Humans who live about seventy or eighty years, knowing that death is going to come. We humans somehow figure out how to live despite this problem: we laugh, we joke, we live.
The real question of government versus private enterprise is argued on too philosophical and abstract a basis. Theoretically, planning may be good. But nobody has ever figured out the cause of government stupidity—and until they do (and find the cure), all ideal plans will fall into quicksand. (I would say Hayek and Mises did figure this out. It’s a knowledge problem, the kind of explanation Feynman would have loved).
General Kutyna: “A guy is flying along, looking in all directions, and feeling very safe. Another guy flies up behind him (at ‘six o’clock’—‘twelve o’clock’ is directly in front), and shoots. Most airplanes are shot down that way. Thinking that you’re safe is very dangerous! Somewhere, there’s a weakness you’ve got to find. You must always check six o’clock.”
About half the book deals with the Challenger accident on January 28, 1986. Feynman served on the presidential commission that looked into the cause of the disaster. The book explains how the outside temperature impacted the O-rings, but that wasn’t Feynman’s discovery. It was General Kutyna, another member of the commission. He debunks the notion that the president wanted the Shuttle to fly so it could place a call during his State of the Union Address. But there was enough pressure inside NASA for keeping the Shuttle flying—a failure of management underestimating risk assessment—by a thousand times. There’s a lot of detail in this section. You’ll love it if you were a fan of the Space Shuttle missions.
The last chapter is his talk, “The Value of Science,” which is excellent. Some of the profundities:
“I believe that a scientist looking at nonscientific problems is just as dumb as the next guy. Scientific knowledge is an enabling power to do either good or bad—but it does not carry instructions on how to use it.” Buddhist proverb: To every man is given the key to the gates of heaven; the same key opens the gates of hell.” The key has value, otherwise how can we get into Heaven?
The scientist has a lot of experience with ignorance and doubt and uncertainty, and this experience is of very great importance, I think. When a scientist doesn’t know the answer to a problem, he is ignorant. Scientific knowledge is a body of statements of varying degrees of certainty—some most unsure, some nearly sure, but none absolutely certain.
If we suppress all discussion, all criticism, proclaiming “This is the answer, my friends; man is saved!” we will doom humanity for a long time to the chains of authority, confined to the limits of our present imagination. It has been done so many times before.
He’s incredibly quotable, and some of my favorites:
I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something.
Humans who live about seventy or eighty years, knowing that death is going to come. We humans somehow figure out how to live despite this problem: we laugh, we joke, we live.
The real question of government versus private enterprise is argued on too philosophical and abstract a basis. Theoretically, planning may be good. But nobody has ever figured out the cause of government stupidity—and until they do (and find the cure), all ideal plans will fall into quicksand. (I would say Hayek and Mises did figure this out. It’s a knowledge problem, the kind of explanation Feynman would have loved).
General Kutyna: “A guy is flying along, looking in all directions, and feeling very safe. Another guy flies up behind him (at ‘six o’clock’—‘twelve o’clock’ is directly in front), and shoots. Most airplanes are shot down that way. Thinking that you’re safe is very dangerous! Somewhere, there’s a weakness you’ve got to find. You must always check six o’clock.”