Richard Frank has written a totally engaging book on the last six months of WWII in the Pacific; and more specifically, why Japan was NOT getting ready to surrender immediately prior to the atomic bombs being dropped.

Revolving around the entire book are the worries US officials had about the upcoming invasion of the Japanese homeland, Operations Olympic and Coronet. The US correctly surmised that the Japanese military and population would no doubt fight to the death making the approaching invasion an extremely worrisome affair.

Recent history has taken Truman, et.al. to task for dropping the two A-bombs on a country just about to surrender. Frank makes, and proves, the argument that the Japanese were NOT about to surrender. The more militant members of their high command wanted no part of "unconditional surrender," and were hence planning the Ketsu-go (decisive blow) operation prior to the US invasion.

It was only after both A-bombs were dropped that the Emperor realized the futility of continued resistance. Not only that, he, more than his military leaders, considered the millions of Japanese war dead that would occur should the US invade and/or continue their A-bomb attacks.

It's fashionable nowadays to accuse the US of racism in it's decision to use the A-bombs. It should be noted that previous fire bombings of major Japanese cities did far more damage, and killed more civilians than the two A-bombs did. Also, one only needs to look at the tonnage and complete destruction of Dresden, Germany, among other places, the US wrought upon the caucasian Germans. People should note that throughout WWII, over 75 percent of US war material was being directed toward the European theater, while the Pacific front was secondary to defeating Germany.

In the end, many thousands died in the Pacific theater (the Japanese alone killed over 18 million other Asian peoples...don't hear that often, do you?) The two atomic bombs, without a doubt, shortened the war and perversely saved over one million Japanese, and close to one million US servicemen.

My father in 1945 was in the 11th Airborne Division awaiting the invasion of Japan. I have heard him say that the bomb may have saved his life. Given this I feel I am truly a child of the Atomic Age. The conclusions of this book are that the bombs actually saved more lives than they took. The idea is that delaying the surrender of Japan and a possible invasion would have had massive untold consequences. I cannot help but feel that my family and myself may have been tremendously adversely affected. It is hard to argue with Mr. Frank's conclusions that the bomb may have been the least costly way to end the war given the terrible alternatives.

Fascinating but a bit academic in style. Debunks effectively many far too common myths about the end of the war

Clearest picture of a complicated subject.

once the Japanese realize they won't get their "20 million kamikazi decisive battle" they have to surrender....

As the subtitle of this book says, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire is about the end of WWII and the Japanese empire, which covers events from (roughly) the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945 through the weeks following the dropping of atomic bombs in August. It is NOT a simple history of the events, however, but a detailed examination of results of the events with the ultimate aim of justifying the use of atomic bombs. As such, Frank goes into detail about Japanese plans to defend the Homeland, how they anticipated the American invasion would be on the island of Kyushu, and the extensive preparations to defend it. Their purpose, he shows, was to extract such an enormous price from the Americans that they would sue for peace on terms modified from the “unconditional surrender” demanded by the Allies. He also examines Operation Olympic, the US plan to invade Kyushu with extensive figures on troop strength as well as estimates (from the time and later) on casualties.

Like I said, this is a very detailed book. Frank leans heavily upon evidence from the period (instead of recollections months or years after the fact) to make his point. But do not assume Frank is callous or unfeeling in any way toward the Japanese; his descriptions of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was horrific and sobering. He convincingly disputes myths that the Japanese would have surrendered if only the “unconditional surrender” demand had been modified as well as the idea that the Soviet entry into the war was actually responsible. He also runs through the numbers that suggest other ways might have been more humane (they’re not - by a wide margin!).

This is an excellent book for anyone interested in the debate about the morality of the use of atomic weapons to end the war, and he’s convinced me. In spite of the numbers becoming a bit tedious sometimes, this is probably the most detailed look at what happened and the possible alternatives.

Excellent history. Clear explanation of what would be expected in the title.

Best book I read in 2019.

Graphic description of the incendiary bombing campaign, which was more deadly and inhumane than the atomic bombs. Interesting that present day finger-wagging moralists don’t seem to mind that phase of the war.

The Japanese high command was willing to kill millions of their own civilians by battle or starvation.
Only when they realized that the US could level all of Japan with a few dozen bombs and no risk of casualties did they consider surrender seriously. A fascinating book.

The book makes cogent arguments concerning the use of the atomic bombs at the end of WWII. The author goes to great pains to frame his analysis in the perspective of the decision makers of the time, which is often lost to poor historians who attempt to overlay current contemporary thought/morals on the reasoning (separate from the actions) of decision-makers.

I was disappointed because I expected this book to focus on operations Olympic and Coronet, the components of Operation Downfall, rather than the atomic bomb decision. This was not the case. The possible outcomes and costs of Olympic and Coronet, especially Olympic are addressed in support of the analysis of the reasoning of both allied (US, mainly) and Japanese decision makers, but there is no real gritty level of detail on this, and that is the book I wanted to read. That is not this book.

If you want an analysis of the a-bomb decision and supporting factors, this is your read; if you are looking for detailed insight into Operations Olympic and Coronet, this is not the book

A good account of the events that led to Japan's surrender, including justification for the atomic bombings.

Anyone interested in the justification of A-Bomb use would find this book useful. The discussion of the Kyushu invasion plans, and the militarists plan to sacrifice millions of Japanese civilians to retain their standing, were chilling. Again I am amazed that more is not known about Japanese atrocities. This book also helped fill a gap in my knowledge about Russian activities in the theater, which are almost never discussed in American histories of the war.

This is a thorough account of the waning months of the Pacific Theater's war. There are many new details explained by the declassification of documents in 1995. From my perspective, the most interesting revelations are found in the internal instability of the Japanese regime in the last two weeks of the war. It is worth a read if one is interested in the minute details of the end of the war.