careful and beautiful examination of naturalistic ethics

careful and beautiful examination of naturalistic ethics with as much as a historical analysis and the author own view. Highly recommended

Naturalistic Ethics

In Dostoevsky's "The Brothers Karamazov" one of the characters offers the famous observation that "if God does not exist, all things are permitted." One of the goals of Erik Wielenberg's study "Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe" (2005) is to rebut this claim. Professor Wielenberg is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at DePauw University.

Professor Wielenberg tries to do two things: first he wants to rebut claims that, without a supernatural basis, life has no meaning or purpose and that notions of right and wrong, good and bad, are untenable. The opponents he tries to rebut are for the most part contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians. Second, Professor Wielenberg tries to develop a basis and a content for a naturalistic ethics.

Professor Wielenberg adopts an analytical approach. Appropriate allusions to philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Plato, Aristotle, and Hume,to writers such as Conrad, and to modern movies and video games help enliven his text. I was reminded at various places of Spinoza and the Buddha in reading Wielenberg's study, and his work would benefit by explicit consideration of these great figures.

In successive chapters, Professor Wielenberg tries to argue that human life may have an internal meaning based on intrinsically good activities (such as falling in love, study, helping others, creativity, or -- an activity dear to my heart -- playing the piano) even if it doesn't have theological, supernatural meaning -- such as conforming one's life to a divine plan. Similarly, he argues that a theological warrant is not required for ethical behavior or to answer Plato's question "why be good". Interestingly, he argues that the answer to that question "because it is good" or "because it is the right thing to do" requires no further justification -- just as the statement "I am doing x because it is in my interest" requires, in its proper context, no further justification. Professor Wielenberg proceeds to develop some naturalistic standards for behavior drawing largely on the work of another contemporary philosopher, John Kekes. Kekes and Wielenberg identify three basic features of the human condition: contingency, the indifference of the order of nature to human effort, and the presence of destructiveness in human motivation" that are basic to the development of a human ethics. Professor Wielenberg recommends meditation, among other things, and increased attention to the teachings of science as useful to the development of a naturalistic ethics.

Professor Wielenberg doesn't fully develop what he understands by "naturalism" and I think this detracts from his study. His concept of naturalism excludes God, Cartesian immaterial souls, and miracles. But his concept is broader than mere bodies interacting in space under scientific, physical laws. He relies, as is apparent from my above short discussion, on an ontology broad enough to include intrinsic meaning and intrinsic goodness. I happen to agree, but I think he needs to show how and why he rejects a naturalism based upon scientism. Professor Wielenberg's naturalism, in other words, is so broad that it does some of the work otherwise done by religion (and for all his criticism of it, Professor Wielenberg seems to me deeply influenced by religion) and he needs to explain how. That is why I find Spinoza a relevant figure in his analysis. Spinoza to me is the naturalistic philosopher par excellence, but he packs a great deal of content into his naturalism that more hard-headed thinkers will, perhaps, resist and reject. Similarly, it would be interesting to know what Professor Wielenberg makes of a non-theistic religion such as Buddhism. I find his account close to Buddhism on many points, different from it on others.

Professor Wielenberg has written a challenging book that helped rekindle my love of thought and of the philosophic life.

Robin Friedman

WHAT ARE THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A NATURALISTIC WORLD VIEW?

Author (and professor of Philosophy at DePauw University) Erik Weilenberg wrote in the Introduction to this 2005 book, “The central project of this book is an examination of the ethical implications of naturalism… The central component of naturalism is the claim that no supernatural entities exist, nor have such entities existed in the past, nor will them in the future… our intuitive grasp of the sorts of entities that might reasonably be characterized as supernatural … includes the God of each of the three major monotheistic religions… as well as nonphysical souls of the sort posited by Descartes and others. Naturalism entails that none of these things exists… naturalism also implies that death marks the permanent end of conscious experience for the one who dies: there is no afterlife or reincarnation in a naturalistic universe… [Naturalism] does not… include the claim that all facts are scientific facts, or that all truths can be stated in the language of science.” (Pg. 2)

He continues, “In this book I will not argue for the truth of naturalism. My project instead will be a conditional one: Let us suppose that naturalism is true. What are the ethical implications of such a view? Does it imply, for instance, that human life has no meaning, or that nothing is right or wrong?... Is there such a thing as virtue in a naturalistic universe, and if so, what is it?... I focus on Christianity primarily because it is the religious outlook with which I am most familiar. This book is, in part, a response to arguments made by certain Christian philosophers who sometimes seek to refute naturalism by claiming that it has all sorts of nasty ethical implications. Naturalism has been variously accused of implying nihilism, relativism, hedonism, or egoism. I will rebut these arguments.” (Pg. 3-4) He adds, “The overarching goal of this book is to say something interesting about what ethics might look like without God.” (Pg. 13)

He acknowledges, “how can I justify my list of intrinsically worthwhile activities? I am afraid that I have no philosophical proof for, say, the proposition that falling in love is intrinsically good… many of the things we know are such that we cannot give an adequate philosophical proof for their truth. The method I recommend… [is to] consider whether you would find it worthwhile even if it had absolutely no consequences… Claims about what is intrinsically good are the axioms of ethical theory; they are the starting points, the first principles. As such, they are unlikely to be the sorts of things that can be PROVED. Nevertheless, it is perfectly consistent to say that some activities are intrinsically valuable---and that we KNOW what some of these are.” (Pg. 35)

He argues, “If God is to impose moral obligations on humans by way of His divine commands, He must get his intended audience to recognize that the commands are coming from Him… it is not enough merely for God to have the right credentials; those whom He would command must RECOGNIZE that the commands in question are coming from an appropriately credentialed God. But it seems clear that there are plenty of people who do not believe that God has issues any commands to anyone---naturalists, for example.” (Pg. 61)

He adds, “We can conclude… that the presence of naturalists in the world---whether they are reasonable or unreasonable---teaches us that there are some moral obligations that are not derived from divine commands. God may impose SOME moral obligations on human beings by way of His divine commands, but not all of our moral obligations are so imposed… My goal instead has been to show that the idea that God is the complete source of all… our moral obligations, leads to problematic consequences and hence should be rejected.” (Pg. 63-65) Later, he summarizes, “The reason we should care about our obligations is just that THEY ARE our obligations.” (Pg. 97)

He admits in the opening of chapter four, “For the purposes of this chapter it will be useful to introduce a new assumption…: We know that naturalism is true. It is important to see that this claim is introduced only as an ASSUMPTION. My purpose here is ... [to] examine some of the consequences for ethics of naturalism being true---and not just BEING true but being KNOWN to be true.” (Pg. 98)

He suggests, “My own sense is that naturalism is a creed that some can live by and some cannot. What a person can believe varies depending on external circumstances, constitutional makeup, and a host of other factors. It seems clear that at least some people have been able to live out their entire lives as naturalists.” (Pg. 157)

He summarizes, “the goal of this book is not to determine whether naturalism is true or false, and so I will not attempt to settle the question of whether the person who finds religion has moved closer to or farther away from the truth. What I have tried to do in this book is to show that naturalism does not have some of the ethically repugnant implications that are often ascribed to it. Naturalism is not the same as, nor does it imply, nihilism, relativism, hedonism, or egoism. The naturalist can and should recognize at least some human lives have internal meaning and that there are various moral obligations in virtue of an individual’s position in the universe… naturalism may never gain wide acceptance. But if naturalism is to be rejected, it should not be rejected on the basis of bad philosophy. Those who reject naturalism because they think it implies any of the ethical hobgoblins just listed do precisely that.” (Pg. 158-159)

He concludes, “one does not have to be a theist, much less a Christian, to recognize that the tendency toward selfishness is at the same time one of the most entrenched as well as the most pernicious features of human nature. Naturalist and theist alike should acknowledge that one of the greatest challenges we face is the dark heart within ourselves…. I have recommended putting science to use in the Platonic quest for a reliable way of making people virtuous. These are all forms of a common struggle---the struggle against the selfishness inherent in human nature. Perhaps, then, this is one struggle in which we are all on the same side. Long live the ethical revolution.” (Pg. 160)

This book will be of great interest to those looking for philosophical analyses of naturalistic ethics.