While the Gorgias gets off to a dull start, it turns out to be one of the best—and by far the funniest—of Plato’s dialogues. Socrates takes on a party of sophistic rhetoricians, demonstrating that the “discipline” of rhetoric, when used for any purpose but to identify and advance the good, is no discipline at all, but only a form of flattery—analogous to “cookery” and “ornamentation”—which corrupts the life of the city. True statesmanship is not about persuasion, flowery speeches, or getting one’s way, but is fundamentally concerned with the moral rectitude and self-discipline of one’s people, and seeks above all else to protect them from the immorality that threatens their happiness. Since he alone recognizes that statecraft is soulcraft, Socrates proves to be the only true statesman that Athens has ever had; and this, ironically, is what will inevitably make him a target of state persecution. “My trial”, he says, “will be equivalent to a doctor being prosecuted by a cook before a jury of young children.” The bitter, effervescent medicine will be scorned in favor of the savory, corrosive dessert. But this is of little concern to one intent on happiness—in this life and the next.


SOCRATES: I’ll review the whole argument so far. Is the pleasant the same as the good? No, they’re different. Callicles and I agreed on that.

Should the good be the reason we do pleasant things, or the pleasant be the reason we do good things? The good should be the reason we do pleasant things.

Isn’t it the quality of being pleasant which makes us enjoy things, and the quality of being good which makes us good? Yes.

Now, what does it take to be a good human being? What does it take to be a good anything, in fact? It always takes a specific state of goodness, doesn’t it? I don’t see how we can deny that, Callicles.

And whether we’re talking about a good artefact, a good body, a good mind for that matter, or a good creature, what it takes for these states of goodness to occur in an ideal form is not chaos, but organization and perfection and the particular branch of expertise whose province the object in question is. Right? I agree.

In every case, then, a good state is an organized and orderly state, isn’t it? I’d say so. So a thing has to be informed by a particular orderly structure—the structure appropriate to it—to be good, doesn’t it? I think so.

Doesn’t it follow that a mind possessed of its proper structure is better than a disordered mind? It’s bound to be.

But a ‘mind possessed of orderly structure’ is an orderly mind, isn’t it? Naturally.

And an orderly mind is a self-disciplined mind? Absolutely.

From which it follows that a self-disciplined mind is a good mind. Now, I can’t see anything wrong with this argument, Callicles, but if you can, please tell me what it is.

CALLICLES: Just get on with it, Socrates.

SOCRATES: All right. If a self-disciplined mind is good, then a mind in the opposite state is bad. In other words, an undisciplined and self-indulgent mind is bad. Yes.

Now, a disciplined person must act in an appropriate manner towards both gods and his fellow human beings, because inappropriate behaviour indicates lack of self-discipline. Yes, that’s bound to be so.

Well, when ‘appropriate’ is used of the way we relate to our fellow human beings, it means ‘just’; and when it's applied to the way we relate to the gods, it means ‘religious'. And, of course, anyone who acts justly and religiously is a just and religious person. True.

He's also bound to have courage, because a disciplined person doesn’t choose inappropriate objects to seek out or avoid. No, he turns towards or away from events, people, pleasures, and irritations as and when he should, and steadily endures what he should endure. It follows, Callicles, that because a self-disciplined person is just, brave, and religious, as we’ve explained, he’s a paradigm of goodness. Now, a good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfillment and happiness, whereas a bad man does badly and is therefore unhappy. Unhappiness, then, is the lot of someone who’s the opposite of self-disciplined—in other words, the kind of self-indulgent person you were championing.

That’s my position, and I believe it to be true. If it really is true, it looks as though anyone who wants to be happy must seek out and practice self-discipline, and beat as hasty a retreat as possible away from self-indulgence. The best course would be for him to see to it that he never has to be restrained, but if he or anyone close to him…does ever need it, then he must let justice and restraint be imposed, or else forfeit happiness.

I’ll tell you what the ideal is that we should set ourselves to live by, in my opinion. We should devote all our own and our community’s energies towards ensuring the presence of justice and self-discipline, and so guaranteeing happiness. That’s what should guide our actions. We shouldn’t refuse to restrain our desires, because that condemns us to a life of endlessly trying to satisfy them. And this is the life of a predatory outlaw, in the sense that anyone who lives like that will never be on good terms with anyone else—any other human being, let alone a god—since he’s incapable of co-operation, and co-operation is a prerequisite for friendship. In fact, Callicles, the experts’ opinion is that co-operation, love, order, discipline, and justice bind heaven and earth, gods and men. That’s why they call the universe an ordered whole, my friend, rather than a disorderly mess or an unruly shambles. . . . [We] should denounce any wrongs committed not only by ourselves, but even by our family and friends…this is what rhetoric should be used for.

"It is better to suffer injustice than to be unjust" - a moving exploration of rhetoric and persuasion, the nature of governance, and the goal of human action.

Γοργίας = Gorgias (dialogue), Plato, Walter Hamilton (Translator), Chris Emlyn-Jones (Commentary)

Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1960 = 1339, In 149 Pages
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Gorgias is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 380 BC. The dialogue depicts a conversation between Socrates and a small group of sophists (and other guests) at a dinner gathering.

In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that philosophy is an art, whereas rhetoric is a skill based on mere experience. To Socrates, most rhetoric is in practice merely flattery. To use rhetoric for good, rhetoric cannot exist alone.

It must depend on philosophy to guide its morality, he argues. Socrates therefore believes that morality is not inherent in rhetoric and that without philosophy, rhetoric is simply used to persuade for personal gain. Socrates suggests that he is one of the few Athenians to practice true politics.

تاریخ نخستین خوانش روز دوازدهم ماه ژوئن سال 2008میلادی

عنوان: فن سخنوری گرگیاس؛ نویسنده: افلاتون، مترجم: لطفی کاویانی؛ تهران، کتابفروشی ابن سینا، شماره گذاری صفحات برای هر فصل جداگانه است در243ص؛ و102ص، و7ص، و96ص، و45ص؛ و ...؛

فهرست: فن سخنوری گرگیاس؛ دانایی شارمیدس؛ تقوای منون؛ دیانت اوتیفرن؛ سقراط در زندان کریتون؛ اپولوژی یا محاکمه سقراط؛ نامه؛

گرگیاس یا «جرجیاس»، از نخستین «سوفسطاییان یونان»، و همدوره با «پروتاگوراس» بودند؛ «افلاطون» این اثر خود را، به نام ایشان کرده‌ است؛ «گرگیاس» فرزند «خارمانتیداس» بودند، و در سال چهارصد و هشتاد و هفت پیش از میلاد، در شهر «لئونتینی»، از متصرفات «یونان» در «سیسیل»، زاده شدند؛ «گرگیاس» برادری به نام «هرودیکوس»، و نیز خواهری داشتند، که تندیس او را، پیشکش پرستشگاه خدای «دلفی» کردند؛ «گرگیاس» شصت‌ ساله بودند، که هم‌شهریانش، او را، در سال چهارصد و بیست و هفت پیش از میلاد، به «آتن» فرستادند، تا از «آتنیان» در برابر هجوم «سیراکوزیها»، درخواست یاری کند؛ «گرگیاس» در «آتن» به سخنرانی پرداختند، و به آموزش فنّ سخنوری مشغول شدند؛ نام آورانی همچون «ایسوکراتیس»، «پریکلس»، «کریتیاس»، «آلکیبیادس»، «توسیدید»، «آگاتون»، «کرفون»، «پولوس» و «کالیرس» از شاگردان ایشان بودند؛

تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 23/10/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ 17/09/1400هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی

Socrates goes though a mind-numbing series of overly-long questions about some issues of philosophical import. While in the Protagoras Socrates complains about long-winded statements, he states in this dialogue that a four sentence response by Polus was “a lengthy exposition.” Unlike Polus, who Socrates treats unfairly, Socrates meets his intellectual match with Callicles. Callicles is not bullied into simplistic yes or no answers to questions and to a logic that he finds difficult to follow. Callicles responded once to a question posed by Socrates with a “perhaps,” which Socrates found unacceptable. On numerous occasions, Callicles answered with a “let it stand” response to keep the discussion going, not to indicate his agreement or disagreement which is what Socrates typically required.

How the Socratic method of argumentation is conducive to genuine dialogue is lost on me. Socrates comes across as the Sophist that he so much dislikes. He is a prosecutor who is leading his listener into an intended result. Callicles tells Socrates he doesn’t know what Socrates is saying or where he is going with his questions. And that’s the problem with Gorgias. What is the point of all of these Socratic argument chains? Instead of simply stating his position in a few lines, and then opening it up for discussion, the reader has to endure the Socratic method, wondering with Callicles, what the point is and when this is going to end.

Socrates does not approve of Sophist spin, their lack of substance, their play to common opinion or their mode of pleasing those who pay their fees. Socrates, it is said, wants truth telling, even if he’s a minority of one, but he comes off as a pitchman who is not so honest himself. While it is more implicit than not in this dialogue, Socrates version of the truth is different than what most of us understand. His good is not about our world. It's not to cater to the body and its desires. In fact, these lead us down the wrong path. This is disorder when Socrates wants a soul that is ordered by mind. The standard for what is good and bad lies in a transcendent, eternal and perfect realm, not the life of the flesh. This, not bodily pleasure, is what is best for the soul and Socrates is unvarying in his vision. This all comes to a head at the tail end of the dialogue where Socrates outlines the afterworld where souls go to be assessed and judged good or bad, and assigned eternal life or life in an eternal hell-like world (Socrates is quite explicit in his discussion). This Christian-like afterworld does not exist for many. Once that rug is pulled out from people the age-old questions remain: What is good? Why be good? What is justice? Why be just? For those who do not, or cannot, believe as Socrates does, Plato becomes less relevant, philosophically.

If we had a genuine dialogue on these questions we might progress some, especially if we look at the body that Socrates so disparages. Might soul be the motivational force that drives us to survive and live well? Might this motivation underlie the mind so that the mind does what is best for the body’s interest (i.e., why be good, if it’s not in one’s own interest?), and is the Good and Just the pursuit of one’s interest in ways that are compatible with that of others who pursue their interest? And then, in lieu of Plato’s ordered class society (workers, guardians, philosophers), we throw them all into the same soup and judge them by what they do regarding their respect for the freedom of others. Those that step over the line of respect for others can be, figuratively at least, cast to Hades. Those who respect the freedom of others can live well in this life, if not in an eternal life on the Islands of the Blessed.

retorik yapma, adam gibi konuş

Kallikles'in sözleri Marquis de Sade'ı anımsattı fazlasıyla.

Is it better to commit evil or to have evil done to you?

Is temperance silly and hedonism sensible?

Does Socrates convince his listeners?

I was very intrigued by the idea of an afterlife. Socrates was close to the Christian view.

And much much more.

Great.
A superb and entertaining crash course on rhetoric. One can only dream of having the swift and skillful rhetoric of Socrates.

Oh Plato, my silly little edge lord, perhaps you should not be yapping so prescriptively hard about things whilst living at a time when the scientific method was fantasizing about being chained in a cave all while fucking your much younger femboy student.
God, I hate virtue ethics so much. Pleasure is good! Art is good! Humour is good! Lying is sometimes good, truth is probably relative, and it's pretty fucking convenient (gay) that a muscular body acquired through gymnastics is the height of virtue and good for the soul, while story-telling, pastry-making, and painting are manipulative "knacks". Yes, Socrates, certainly so!
Also, not Plato writing fanfiction about how a just man does not need rhetoric for logic will prevail over everything, and making the protagonist his teacher crush who is about to be executed by the city of Athens for being too much of a "facts don't care about your feelings" debate bro. Idk, perhaps a bit of flattery and a well-timed joke could have saved Socrates and call me crazy but hot take, that would have been good actually.
No amount of post-nut clarity could make this man acquire nuance or a sliver of self-awareness.

A particularly amusing dialogue with lively characters and fine irony. Callicles is superb.

This dialogue, man. (Socrates, man.) What is going ON? I don't understand what Plato is doing to my brain, but I think I like it. I feel all twisted about when I read Socratic dialogues, like I'm pretty sure Socrates is right but he definitely made me violate some of my internal moral logic to get there. Probably. He also never answers his own questions (what is justice? how is the tyrannical soul different from the philosophical?). I am tempted to read Callicles as saying something Plato thinks, but he's for sure at least offering a critique of 'Platonism' as we typically talk about it that must be addressed for anyone desiring to call himself a Platonist. Why doesn't might make right? Outside of a Christian context that turns suffering on its head in the Greek philosophical tradition, I don't know how to answer that. I wish Socrates answered more clearly.

I don't know what to think about Plato, but I always like thinking about him.

“En iyi dediklerin en güçlü olanlar mıdır? Ayrıca, en zayıfların da en güçlü olanlara boyun eğmesi mi gerekir? Büyük devletlerin küçük devletleri doğanın verdiği hakla alt ettiklerini söylerken, öyle sanıyorum ki onların daha kudretli ve daha güçlü olduklarını belirtmek istedin. Bu da en kudretlinin, en güçlünün ve en iyinin aynı şey olduklarını ortaya çıkarır. Peki en küçük ve en zayıf olan insan hiç en güçlü olabilir mi? Ya da en iyinin ve de en güçlünün tanımı aynı mıdır?”