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I read this after having read similar books with a similar premise: namely, that there exist fundamental and irreconcilable differences between the worldviews of conservatives and liberals, and that all political conflicts are therefore primarily due to different worldviews talking past each other. The books include Lakoff's "Don't Think of an Elephant", Haidt's "The Righteous Mind" and Weston's "The Politcal Brain", and I think my reading of this book was probably unfavourably shaded by these prior experiences. "A Conflict of Visions" was, of course, originally published much earlier, which makes it a little unfair to judge it through the lens of these later books, but unfortunately that's just how it happened. This isn't a bad book, but I'm a little bit weary of the "Democrats are from Venus, Republicans are from Mars" shtick (as one prior reviewer put it), and unfortunately this book just happens to typify the problems I've begun to amass with such approaches to differing political ideologies.
To start with, I'm still not entirely sure what Sowell has in mind by the word "vision" which forms the basis of his theory (namely that political thinkers can be roughly divided into possessing "constrained" or "unconstrained" visions of political problems, leading to conservative and liberal politics respectively). He makes it quite clear that such "visions" indelibly shape the way we are prone to "viewing" certain political problems, and that such "visions" should not be confused with mere value judgements (as, on occasions, the "constrained" and "unconstrained" visions can be shown to be motivated by similar sets of values - the public good, for example), but I don't believe it was ever made explicitly clear quite where such visions originate, how they are transmitted or in what sense they are revealed. If we trust Sowell's judgement that such "visions" do in fact exist in the roughly dichotomous form presented here then there is probably much good sense adumbrated in this book, but the premises of the theory still strike me as being rather too fuzzy and opaquely defined to take his subsequent conclusions in good faith.
Furthermore, I'm not exactly sure what might be said to positively distinguish the political "visions" of Sowell from the political "frames" of Lakoff, or from the emotional-affective categories of Haidt, for example. What specifically does the notion of visions tell us about how people form political allegiances or political beliefs? What predictions about political behaviour can be made from such a theory? And what does the constrained / unconstrained dichotomy of political thought offer in terms of explanatory value that other political dichotomies ("left / right", "authoritarian / libertarian", "nurturing parent / strict parent" etc.) lack?
In any case, surely it's a little too simplistic to place all political ideologies on such a one-dimensional axis? It may be good enough to explain political differences in the overwhelmingly binary politics of the modern United States, but can it offer any insight into the processes that occur in far more pluralistic European systems? To say nothing of the kind of political ideologies that persist in non-Western cultures? How would a Confucian (constrained) socialist (unconstrained) be comfortably explained within this system, for example? Or a Muslim (constrained) democrat (unconstrained)? Or a Hindu (constrained) radical (unconstrained)? Other works of political psychology suffer from a similar inordinate focus on the American political system, but none quite so fatally as this one.
Even in the American example, this book lacks the applicability it may once have had. The last 25 years have seen one side of American politics (try to guess which!) completely fall off the deep-end in terms of their hard shift to the political right, and their conterminous abrogation of reason and moral decency. In this book, the political thinkers contrasted (from the modern age at least) include Godwin and Rawls from the unconstrained side, and Friedman and Hayek from the constrained side. In 1987, these may well have been representative thinkers of the two visions, but I don't think the same could be said today. The passages quoted make Hayek and Friedman seem downright reasonable and moderate in comparison with the poisonous politics of present-day Republicans, and when these two start to appear as voices of moderation then you know that something, somewhere must have gone terribly wrong. I am prepared to accept that there exist principled, decent, well-spoken conservatives, with whom I differ only on matters of "vision" rather than on any deeper principles, but such men and women to not exist in the modern Republican party. It is a party fuelled not by political visions, but rather by the bile of jealous, impotent rage: trying to place them on any conventional political map is an effort bound for failure.
And here is my problem in general with books which try to explain political differences purely in terms of differing worldviews: it overlooks the overwhelmingly obvious fact that one side, even within the confines of their own political "vision", may just happen to be wrong. It seeks to excuse political behaviour that is frankly without excuse. If someone believes that tax cuts are the solution to our current economic malaise, or that gay relationships are fundamentally inferior to heterosexual ones, or that restricting gun ownership will not reduce guns deaths then they don't just happen to possess of different "vision" of politics to my own, they are fundamentally and intractably wrong. There are almost certainly solutions to political problems that exist beyond the narrow focus of my own politics, by the way, but I still feel confident in saying that no present Republican politician is in possession of any of them. When you deliberately abandon the use of evidence and reason, after all, then any conclusion you reach can only find itself in consonance with reality by pure, dumb luck. "Framing" or "Visions" are irrelevant in such an event.
Let's put it in a wider historical context: political ideas emanating from the "constrained" vision of 50, 100 or 200 years ago are rightly scandalous to us now. Segregation? Anti-miscegenation laws? The disenfranchisement of women? Slavery? Absolute monarchy? All of these once fecund political visions have entirely receded from view now, and with good cause. No-one will seriously try to morally defend such views on the basis that their supporters just happened to possess a different (but equally valid!) political vision to our own, we will rightly say that they were blinded (by racism, by sexism etc.) to what would otherwise have been in plain moral sight. They were wrong, and it was good that such worldviews came to be extinguished. In fairness, Sowell does say here (tucked deep into chapter 9) that ultimately political visions must be responsive to the demands of evidence and that we can expect them to shift over time, but that just raises two futher questions. Firstly, if political beliefs are genuinely so fluid, then what possible use is this static dichotomy of "visions"? Secondly, how is it, then, that the constrained visions of politics have invariably been the unsuccessful ones, the ones left withered and dessicated by the brilliant, white light of reason and progress? Why do we still read Paine today and not Burke? Why did Locke's political visions win out over Hobbes'? Why does the arrow of progress point (with the occasional reactionary blip) so unequivocally in one direction?
I don't wish to savage this book: it isn't bad. The readings and quotes from political thinkers across the ages are worth your time. The shallow central thesis, however, probably isn't.
To start with, I'm still not entirely sure what Sowell has in mind by the word "vision" which forms the basis of his theory (namely that political thinkers can be roughly divided into possessing "constrained" or "unconstrained" visions of political problems, leading to conservative and liberal politics respectively). He makes it quite clear that such "visions" indelibly shape the way we are prone to "viewing" certain political problems, and that such "visions" should not be confused with mere value judgements (as, on occasions, the "constrained" and "unconstrained" visions can be shown to be motivated by similar sets of values - the public good, for example), but I don't believe it was ever made explicitly clear quite where such visions originate, how they are transmitted or in what sense they are revealed. If we trust Sowell's judgement that such "visions" do in fact exist in the roughly dichotomous form presented here then there is probably much good sense adumbrated in this book, but the premises of the theory still strike me as being rather too fuzzy and opaquely defined to take his subsequent conclusions in good faith.
Furthermore, I'm not exactly sure what might be said to positively distinguish the political "visions" of Sowell from the political "frames" of Lakoff, or from the emotional-affective categories of Haidt, for example. What specifically does the notion of visions tell us about how people form political allegiances or political beliefs? What predictions about political behaviour can be made from such a theory? And what does the constrained / unconstrained dichotomy of political thought offer in terms of explanatory value that other political dichotomies ("left / right", "authoritarian / libertarian", "nurturing parent / strict parent" etc.) lack?
In any case, surely it's a little too simplistic to place all political ideologies on such a one-dimensional axis? It may be good enough to explain political differences in the overwhelmingly binary politics of the modern United States, but can it offer any insight into the processes that occur in far more pluralistic European systems? To say nothing of the kind of political ideologies that persist in non-Western cultures? How would a Confucian (constrained) socialist (unconstrained) be comfortably explained within this system, for example? Or a Muslim (constrained) democrat (unconstrained)? Or a Hindu (constrained) radical (unconstrained)? Other works of political psychology suffer from a similar inordinate focus on the American political system, but none quite so fatally as this one.
Even in the American example, this book lacks the applicability it may once have had. The last 25 years have seen one side of American politics (try to guess which!) completely fall off the deep-end in terms of their hard shift to the political right, and their conterminous abrogation of reason and moral decency. In this book, the political thinkers contrasted (from the modern age at least) include Godwin and Rawls from the unconstrained side, and Friedman and Hayek from the constrained side. In 1987, these may well have been representative thinkers of the two visions, but I don't think the same could be said today. The passages quoted make Hayek and Friedman seem downright reasonable and moderate in comparison with the poisonous politics of present-day Republicans, and when these two start to appear as voices of moderation then you know that something, somewhere must have gone terribly wrong. I am prepared to accept that there exist principled, decent, well-spoken conservatives, with whom I differ only on matters of "vision" rather than on any deeper principles, but such men and women to not exist in the modern Republican party. It is a party fuelled not by political visions, but rather by the bile of jealous, impotent rage: trying to place them on any conventional political map is an effort bound for failure.
And here is my problem in general with books which try to explain political differences purely in terms of differing worldviews: it overlooks the overwhelmingly obvious fact that one side, even within the confines of their own political "vision", may just happen to be wrong. It seeks to excuse political behaviour that is frankly without excuse. If someone believes that tax cuts are the solution to our current economic malaise, or that gay relationships are fundamentally inferior to heterosexual ones, or that restricting gun ownership will not reduce guns deaths then they don't just happen to possess of different "vision" of politics to my own, they are fundamentally and intractably wrong. There are almost certainly solutions to political problems that exist beyond the narrow focus of my own politics, by the way, but I still feel confident in saying that no present Republican politician is in possession of any of them. When you deliberately abandon the use of evidence and reason, after all, then any conclusion you reach can only find itself in consonance with reality by pure, dumb luck. "Framing" or "Visions" are irrelevant in such an event.
Let's put it in a wider historical context: political ideas emanating from the "constrained" vision of 50, 100 or 200 years ago are rightly scandalous to us now. Segregation? Anti-miscegenation laws? The disenfranchisement of women? Slavery? Absolute monarchy? All of these once fecund political visions have entirely receded from view now, and with good cause. No-one will seriously try to morally defend such views on the basis that their supporters just happened to possess a different (but equally valid!) political vision to our own, we will rightly say that they were blinded (by racism, by sexism etc.) to what would otherwise have been in plain moral sight. They were wrong, and it was good that such worldviews came to be extinguished. In fairness, Sowell does say here (tucked deep into chapter 9) that ultimately political visions must be responsive to the demands of evidence and that we can expect them to shift over time, but that just raises two futher questions. Firstly, if political beliefs are genuinely so fluid, then what possible use is this static dichotomy of "visions"? Secondly, how is it, then, that the constrained visions of politics have invariably been the unsuccessful ones, the ones left withered and dessicated by the brilliant, white light of reason and progress? Why do we still read Paine today and not Burke? Why did Locke's political visions win out over Hobbes'? Why does the arrow of progress point (with the occasional reactionary blip) so unequivocally in one direction?
I don't wish to savage this book: it isn't bad. The readings and quotes from political thinkers across the ages are worth your time. The shallow central thesis, however, probably isn't.