This is simply one of the best approaches to the topic of free will that I have ever read. Dennett is impressive in articulating and flushing out the nuances of the varieties of free will and is even better at convincingly marrying the groundwork of scientific deterministic principles with a compatible variant of free will. Libertarians should read this book.

I take the debate about free will very seriously. It's one of the few areas where I think a common-sense understanding (that we all have it) is wrong, and a philosophical dissection of the concept will do a lot of good. Many books on the subject, though, are unbearably dry and bog down in technical discussions that eventually bore even tech-y philosophers like myself. This one doesn't. It reaches a conclusion that I am in total agreement with, and it does so without "cheating" by avoiding any of the complex issues along the way. At the same time, the book remains readable throughout, Dennett consistently favoring the use of examples and analogies that are as catchy and memorable as they are illuminating. I think it is no accident that Dennett is one of the most celebrated philosophers of our time, and this book makes clear why. An oldie (from the mid 80's), but a goodie.

What does it mean to have free will? Is free will incompatible with determinism? With indeterminism? What does it mean to control oneself? What does it mean to make a choice? Why do we want free will at all and what do we want when we want it?

Dennett examines these perennial philosophical problems and disposes of many of the "bugbears" which plague the often fear-riddled investigations into these topics. Dennett also develops answers, or at least the start of some answers, that embrace the possibility of determinism and evolution. Good as usual.

Much more clear and focused than his later 'Freedom Evolves'. Probably recommend this to those new to the free will discussion who haven't yet familiarized themselves with compatibilism.

Do we have Free Will? The question is as old as philosophy itself. Western philosophers throughout history have had some conception of Free Will and 'Freedom.' However, this seemingly innocuous question becomes notoriously difficult to answer when one ponders the notions of Free Will and Freedom, not least because our physical universe appears to be governed by deterministic laws that, apparently, leave no room for free action. But is this really the case? Must we necessarily sacrifice our freedom in a causally determined universe? or insist that the universe is, in fact, not deterministic to salvage free will?

Perhaps neither of these drastic moves is necessary. Perhaps the choice between determinism and free will is simply a false dichotomy because determinism need not undermine free will and free will need not defy determinism after all. Counterintuitive though this idea may be, it has found acceptance among most modern-day philosophers, with Daniel Dennett being one of its major proponents.

Dennett, in his book "Elbow Room", anticipates all the difficulties that may arise in making sense of the 'compatibilist' view of free will and sets out to establish the validity of this position by ruling out these difficulties one by one. Drawing on his unique insights on a vast array of disciplines ranging from neuroscience to cybernetics and automata theory, Dennett goes on to show how, even in a determined universe, one can imagine a rational (free) agent who can view its future as open to possibilities even as it accepts that it could not have done otherwise. That rationality and causality need not be at odds with one another, that determinism need not erode an agent's self-control, and that ignoring minute details and forgoing deliberation can sometimes be the most rational approach to take.

Unlike what some may fear, "Elbow Room" is not an exercise in abstruse philosophical reasoning as a desperate attempt to salvage free will, as some skeptics and hard determinists are likely to feel. It is, in fact, one of the most lucid books in philosophy I have read so far, and one which I would recommend to anyone who's become convinced of the illusory nature of Free Will after reading Sam Harris. In fact, it's best if one reads Harris before Dennett because it's very likely that Harris' "Free Will" will appear far less impressive once one has had the taste of the careful considerations Dennett makes in establishing his case.

Will reading "Elbow Room" make one an ardent believer of Free Will? Dennett does not rule out the possibility that Free Will may be an illusion after all (a message that appears subliminally in the phrase "Free Will Worth Wanting") but insists that it might still be worth wanting if it were the best we could hope for.

Read it in college. Reading it again. He has a terrific beard.

A real slog that only a technical and philosophy nerd could love. Great topic, but not an engaging read for most people, I would wager.

I admit defeat. This book was hard going from the start, but it was a subject that interested me, and I have seen the author speak on youtube. I slogged though a few chapters, but I have given up, I am in over my head. Some sections were enjoyable and thought-provoking, but I am unwilling to carry on and am exercising my free will and shelving this book...for now.

Persuasive, i agree. He's a good writer, and though it feels slightly overly done at points it's mostly very readable. Maybe it just feels a bit overly laboured because i already agree with compatibilism, free will does exist. Politically, he comes with the weaknesses as well as the strengths of liberalism (and centrism).

This book should be called Varieties of Determinism Worth Wanting, or Varieties of Determinism Worth Having the Illusion that We Want, But are Incapable of Because Everything is Pre-ordained, Anyway.

Whatever the title, this book doesn't describe any credable model of freedom.

This is an excellent little series of essays on free will which only occasionally gets bogged down in "philosophese". Dennett very deftly takes on the fears based on the sneaking suspicion that we don't actually have "free will" by first asserting that we should buck up and not scare ourselves too much with deterministic bugbears. Then he makes the case that determinism could very much feel similar to free will. Then he points out that when many people talk about having even "free-er" will than we already seemingly have, they are talking about the ability to make contradictory choices or disobey other physical laws. He also considers the asymptotic case of using free will to make the best possible choices based on the most (and most relevant) information, and points out that we - tragically - don't have time for all of that nonsense in making our day to day choices.

In the end, his conclusion seems to be that of course we have free will, in that we seem to have free will in all of the ways that matter, and even if we don't we wouldn't know it, so quit worrying about it. A thoroughly humanistic and useful conclusion, and an enjoyable read.

"There's no sense wringing our hands because we can't undo the past, and can't prevent an event that actually happens, and can't create ourselves ex nihilo, and can't choose both alternatives at a decision point, and can't be perfect."