Very short, concise account of Dennett's approach to the mind and how it relates to other creatures. It is very well explained, however not that strongly argued. It is certainly written as an addendum to Consciousness Explained, however it might be better to read this first. In fact, I'd say its a great introduction to anyone who interested in a materialist philosophy of mind, or generally, cognitive science. It explains the big problems, and what he opines to be the best approaches. He gives no consideration to non-materialist approaches, its more of an explanation of his view than and argumentation for it.

Nevertheless, I always enjoy Dennett's style and thought process. I read this in a day (traveling), would recommend it highly. It gives a great tour through philosophy methods and ethology findings, resulting in a greater understanding of human consciousness and animal minds (or protominds).

(I originally published this review in 1996 in American Scientist)

At one point in his new book Kinds of Minds Daniel Dennett notes that “we (humans), in contrast are believe alls. There is no limit, apparently to what we can believe”(p 44). In Kinds of Minds Dennett is out to convince us that “mindfulness”is an attribute which we may justifiably apply to non-human entities, and that in so doing we will gain a more accurate view of our own minds. Should we believe him?

Dennett’s approach to “mind”is evolutionary. That is, he assumes first that humans have minds and second that there haven’t always been minds. Hence, natural selection must account for our possession of “mindfulness.” Of course, Dennett’s rhetoric to the contrary, one needn’t accept these initial assumptions. He states, “Now, it certainly does not follow from the fact that we are descended from robots that we are robots ourselves. After all, we are also direct descendants of fish, and we are not fish...So something made of robots can exhibit genuine consciousness, because you do if anything does”(p 23-24). What is the reader to make of such a statement? Ignoring whether “mind”and “genuine consciousness” are related, does it follow that we are not robots because we are not fish? Logically, no. Dennett’s assertions that humans have minds while grains of sand, plants, and autonomic nervous systems don’t are just that--assertions.

The reader is not helped by the fact that Dennett does not define “mind” during the first third of the book. This lack of a definition imperils Dennet’s third assumption that natural selection can operate on “mindfulness.” Natural selection can produce structural changes in a species over time, say make the average length of a beak longer, and these changes can affect an organism’s potential behaviors. Yet, no scientist would take seriously the claim that natural selection operates on a concept such as “liberty” (although clearly, concepts do experience their own selection pressures). Is “mind” an ability or a linguistic concept? Definitions do matter.t

If one manages to stay with Dennett past the first third of Kinds of Minds there are certain rewards. Dennett does eventually, vaguely define mind as an “expectation generator” or an “information processor.” Further, he proposes a system, his “intentional stance,” for comparing mind-like behaviors across entities. If we say that a human chess player makes a particular move because he or she believes it will eventually produce a desired result (i.e. victory), why not also ascribe such beliefs and motivations to a computer chess player? And aren’t choices made on the basis of beliefs toward a desired goal the hallmarks of “mindfulness?” In short, an intentional stance makes non-human minds possible.

The common measuring stick provided by the intentional stance allows Dennett to propose a progressive taxonomy of mind-like behaviors. This taxonomy contains four stages: 1) hard-wired response patterns (a grouping he terms “Darwinan”), 2) behaviors selected directly via reward and punishment (“Skinnerian”), 3) behaviors selected by considered rewards and punishments (“Popperian”), and 4) behaviors which make use of culturally transmitted tools (“Gregorian”). Explicit thought or reflection, says Dennett, is only possible in Gregorian creatures who possess the cultural tool of language.

However, there are many types of thinking, and unfortunately, that presented by Dennett in Kinds of Minds strikes this reviewer as peculiarly sloppy. Consider, for example, the just mentioned taxonomy of “mind-like” behaviors. Aside from the fact that Dennett’s taxonomy casts a progressive shadow over evolutionary history, Dennett makes several dubious claims in support of this taxonomy. “We human beings,” he writes, “have the capacity for quick, insightful learning--learning that does not depend upon laborious training” (p133). For example, in psychological experiments, whereas non-human animals require hours of training, humans can “usually just be told what is desired of them.” Such a statement blithely ignores human cognitive development and the years of laborious learning most human subjects bring with them to psychological experiments.

In conclusion Kinds of Minds is a frustrating book. Should we accept Dennett’s claims that non-human entities have minds? Why not. We are left, though, no closer to understanding the fundamental differences between human and non-human pyschological processes.

Basically, this book is an overview of how consciousness evolved. Beginning with the simplest self-replicating molecules and moving all the way up to human consciousness and all of its subjective experience. Most interesting is his explanation of 'the intentional stance', an explanatory view lets us examine mindless organic things in the same way that we look at mindful things like chimps and people.
Fascinating

makes you wonder and thats about it. Consiousness is a deep concept that is not easily guessed at or scientifically understood. Dennett brings up some interesting and fascinating ideas but thats all they are.

He’s onto something here.

Not that this was a bad book, but it’s not really obvious what Dennett is trying to say here.

Daniel Dennett sets out to make us think about minds in a different way after having read his book, and he certainly succeeds in what he set out to do. I found that this book does what a good philosophy book should do; it doesn't try to give any definite answers, but it is challenging most peoples' current conceptions towards the subject. I've seen a lecture with Dennett before, and found it stimulating and interesting despite the fact that I didn't agree with him on all accounts. Kinds of Minds is the first book by Dennett that I've read, and it met my expectations.

Really promising

Była całkiem spoko, fajnie potraktowany temat historii tworzenia się umysłu i to czym jest umysł, jednak obawiam się, że niedługo o niej zapomnę, bo jakaś szczególna nie była.

لم يزدتي هذا الكتاب الا المزيد من التساؤلات..
لازال العقل شي محير
متى تكون واين مكانه
لكن الكتاب فعلا مثير

Some interesting things here and a fair bit of review.

What stuck out to me:
- Dennett emphasizes the idea that human intelligence is closely linked to our ability to externalize our thoughts. Not our optimization power as a species, the connection there is obvious, but, I think, the actual structure and function of our brains. I think this is similar to David Deutsch's idea of cognitive artifacts. Anyway, I'll to think/read more on the topic.
- Suffering remains mysterious to me, and this reminded me why.

as self admitted, this is more an attempt to restructure questions than to outright answer them. what kinds of minds are there, and where should we decide moral consequence? well, it seems important to explore what we really mean by this, first. dennett embraces a functionalist approach that, when flirted with, flows quite wonderfully. it is rather funny which asides he chooses to detail exhaustively and which central arguments he seemingly brushes over (the wittgenstein referencing as an attempt to elegantly dismiss solipsism flew over my head at first, for example), but the playful language and ease of access is continuous, and the invitation to really consider what we so eagerly take for granted is a beautiful success