Examines the nature of consciousness and intelligence across different species, challenging traditional views on what it means to be sentient. Dennett's central thesis explores the idea that consciousness is not a singular trait but exists on a spectrum, shaped by evolutionary processes and varying degrees of complexity.

Daniel Dennett is a crisp, clear thinker who explains his ideas and categorizes with precision, but the book failed to hold my interest in the second half.

Great subject, famous author truly intriguing beginning and then you are just flooded by the wave of words, threads going nowhere… a true disappointment for me.
If you are interested in other mind better read Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness by Peter Godfrey-Smith which is has all Bennett’s work lacks.

A short little work exploring, from a philosophical perspective, the possible differences between human minds and other possible minds, including the minds of other creatures on the planet. Dennett provides lot of good references for further reading.

Having read it quite a number of years ago, I remember liking it, yet I can't seem to remember too many specifics about it. Obviously it wasn't bad, otherwise I would have remembered that, but neither was it good enough to burn a vivid image into my mind, so three stars is probably the fairest rating I can give it.

Daniel Dennett är en skicklig författare av lättförståeliga vetenskapliga texter. Inte helt olikt Steven Pinker använder han sig flitigt av humor för att förmedla kunskap till läsaren (även om Pinker är snäppet vassare på detta). Mycket av det som står i boken är intressant, men som helhet lyckas den inte charma mig. Möjligtvis dras den med problemet att själva syftet är lite oklart? Är boken menad att vara en översikt över befintlig forskning på området, eller är den snarare en längre personligt hållen essä (om än fullpackad med referenser) i vilken Dennett resonerar fritt? Givetvis kan svaret vara båda. Men av någon anledning, som jag inte riktigt kan sätta fingret på, så får jag en något flyktig känsla när jag läser.

It's a fairly interesting read. Dennett employs philosophy, evolution, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence to examine the nature of minds. Most irritating, however, is Dennett's arrogance. I found myself adding ' I would argue that' before every time he said 'it is', and adding ' and some people still do' when he said 'people used to think...". Dennett is one smart cookie, and really doesn't need to appeal to the power of persuasive language to make his points.

Dennett jest Francuzem, nawet jeśli o tym nie wie. Co w połączeniu z byciem filozofem daje nieznośnie mętny wywód i wnioski, z którymi trudno się zgodzić. Na przykład, że zwierzęta nie myślą, ponieważ nie posiadają języka takiego jak ludzki. Nie jest to wystarczający argument, nawet sam autor na koniec przyznaje, że nie jest. Ake, jest dobrze rozumiem, potrzebuje go, żeby wyjaśnić przepaść ewolucyjną między człowiekiem a, dajny na to, kotem.

Natura umysłów to wyjaśnienie jak różnią się umysły innych żywych istot od ludzkiego, a także jak złożony jest ten nasz, w oparciu o najnowszą wiedzę z zakresu filozofii, neuronauki, kognitywistyki i biologii ewolucyjnej. Wszystko jest napisane tu prosto i logicznie, jak na taką, popularnonaukową książkę przystało, choć więcej tu jest pytań niż odpowiedzi jak zrozumieć świadomość, kiedy się ona rodzi i jak przejawia. To wczesne dzieło Dennetta, co mogą potwierdzić jego fani, szczególnie ci, którzy czytali opasły tom Świadomość. Jednak Naturę umysłów warto znać, bo wnosi dużą dawkę wiedzy, która może być przydatna, albo służyć jako zbiór ciekawostek, którymi można się pochwalić w towarzystwie...jak kto woli. Książka jest napisana przystępnie, znaki zapytania w niej są frapujące i pełne kokieterii ze strony autora, bo choćby nie wiem jak się zarzekał jest naukowcem pełną gębą. Gdyby był tylko filozofem śmiem twierdzić książkę czytałoby się gorzej. Na pewne sprawy w tej książce musimy sobie sami odpowiedzieć, choć nie jest to proste. Całość jest bardzo dobrą pozycją popularnonaukową, która niejednemu z nas przybliży temat umysłów i świadomości, a innych zmusi do szukania dalej i głębiej w tym temacie. Lubię takie książki i polecam szczerze. Warto zapoznać się z tym esejem!!!
Książka kupiona w księgarni @takczytam.poznan

"This book began with a host of questions, and -- since this is a book by a philosopher -- it ends not with the answers, but, I hope, with better versions of the questions themselves." p 168.

This is an important caveat for those hoping, upon picking up this book, to find a definite and unblurred demarcation between "conscious" or "sentient" beings. Dennett offers no quick and easy answer, but he does offer a compelling perspective in which to view this question under a different light.

The crux for consciousness is on natural language and its ability to represent internal and external objects within the mind. This is not an entirely new concept; the idea that symbols are the hallmark of consciousness is implicit in the very idea of consciousness... there cannot be an "I" to suffer if the organism experiencing pain is incapable of representing the concept of "itself" as the one experiencing the suffering. Without a concept of self, a concept necessarily reliant on symbolizing, then it cannot be legitimately said that an organism is suffering... it is merely pain. We do not recoil in horror at inflicting pain on "lesser" animals (e.g. crabs, spiders, etc.) since we are unquestionably certain that we are not harming a conscious being.

The morally imperative difference between sensitivity to pain and sentience of suffering is contingent on the development of an organism being capable of reflecting on the pain it endures with a yearning for relief, a despair of its current state, a bitter regretting of the foolish actions that led it to this crisis. Such sentience is contingent on the ability to internally symbolize the being experiencing pain as "myself". It is only with the introduction of "I" that morality becomes a key component. (This is, obviously, a vast oversimplification... I'm not condoning rampant torturing of "non-sentient" organisms. Dennett advocates a gradient of "sentience", one which is not readily discernable at present, but he provides many thought experiments to test your intuitive notions that certain creatures are endowed or bereft of this magical X quality. Read the book for the subtleties.)

The development of symbols, being capable of internalizing the external world, allows for representation of the environment within the mind. And the fascinating characteristic of symbols is the ability to re-represent them, to not only be capable of thinking about objects when they are not present but to think about the thinking itself. This sort of bootstrapping takes the creature from mere thinking about the environment (including the self) to thinking about the thinking itself. Symbols of the external world now become concepts which may be thought about in their own right in an ever-increasing hierarchy of representation, re-representation, re-re-representation, etc.

Symbols are the prerequisites of language, the ability to convey meaning in the absence of what is being referred, and allowing a culture to form. Symbols may also be "off-loaded" onto the environment in the form of tools, books, and other artifacts. We alleviate the cognitive burden of keeping everything in mind by off-loading these symbols and then manipulating them to perform cognitive feats that would be impossible (or at least extraordinarily difficult) otherwise. Try multiplying a couple three digit numbers (385 x 924) without the use of paper. By off-loading symbols we can manipulate them and incorporate the product. We need not off-load only to the environment outside ourselves, but can do so within the echo chamber of our minds. This ability to represent and re-represent is a characteristic of the human mind and a (seemingly) unique feat in the animal kindgom. And due to this off-loading outside ourselves we impinge our minds to the environment, we store our minds outside ourselves, and so where, really, does the "I" exist?

Daniel Dennett describes the types of minds there are and makes an argument for whether or not they are conscious. Specifically he argues that we have no way of knowing what it's like to be something for which we question its consciousness.

Very well argued, beautifully constructed argumentation. It reminded me of listening to good university lectures, ones whose syllabus and flow was perfected during years, where one idea naturally leads to another and everything fits in (not meaning that Daniel C. Dennet gives a hermetic set not open to discussion and other interpretations, but as a compliment to his style). Excellent!