Daniel Dennett loves to confuse you by hijacking terms and making you believe that you’ve completely misunderstood what a word means. One of my favourite passages from Freedom Evolves is where Dennett brings up Austin’s putt. Austin is a good golfer who is, we are told, faced with a simple putt, but it just so happens that he misses this one particular putt. The question now is: could he have made the putt? One possible answer is no: if you were to wind back the clock, and the universe is deterministic, Austin would miss the putt again—and he would miss it every single time you wound back the clock. So he couldn’t have made the putt—right? Well, yes and no. There is of course a different way we use the word could. Remember: Austin is a good golfer, so, in a way, he absolutely could have made the putt. It’s not like he doesn’t know what he is doing!
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For Dennett, free will (could he have made the putt?) is not about breaking the laws of physics—you can’t wind back the clock and expect something different to happen. No: for Dennett, it seems to be more about competence: of course, I may not have been able to make the putt, but Austin could. In fact, he makes puts like it all the time!
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So how is the putt related to free will? People are capable of making decisions in the same way Austin is capable of making the putt. When we make decisions, and say we could have done otherwise, we are using the word could in the same way we do when we talk about Austin and his putt. We are not saying that you could wind back the clock and make a different decision. What this implies for the "free" in "free will" is another story...

Finding room for free will in a deterministic world. "Deterministic is not the same as inevitable."

Book where Dennett argues that free will is an evolved capacity of humans. As an important part of this, he shows that the issue of determinism doesn't really pertain to the question of whether a free will can exist. This book ties some strands together of stuff I read over the last few years. This was reassuring on the one hand but also meant that it didn't add very much for me on the other. What I really like about Dennett's stance is that he is a philosopher who firmly believes that you need the natural sciences as a partner to progress significantly on issues like consciousness and free will. I like this stance and also think the past has shown that this is often the way that big questions get resolved (the most obvious example being the question what is life). I also like his writing, which has a playful quality and doesn't shy away from taking bold stances. The writing isn't extremely structured or rigorous, which I like in principle, but I felt that it also has a downside in later chapters - I think the argument could have been presented a bit more clearly there. All in all a very nice read!

My difficulty with this book is different than others'. Rather than finding fault with Dennett's arguments, I find them entertaining and ... obviously true.

I think I'm obviously a raging strong-AI person, but it seems very obvious to me that free will is completely compatible with a deterministic universe, as long as you define free will as "doing what it is that you want," and not simply defining free will as "non-deterministic." Fundamentally, I believe that those that disagree with Dennett aren't being completely honest with themselves about what they mean when they say "free will."

100 pages into this book and I became utterly bored. I find it hard to digest holistic overview approaches when used by a philosopher to prove his point. Let me say at the outset that I never studied philosophy (although I did study mathematical logic) and I haven't read much in the field either, and that my criticism is that of a writer and an enthusiastic reader who's always curious. The few classic philosophy texts that I've read in the past held me from start to finish, like a good novel does, and cajoled me into understanding where the philosopher is coming from and what it is he's trying to achieve. What I like about that is that the philosophy is argued within the realm of philosophy - logical thought arguments. More modern approaches seem to be overly scientific in that they actually need to site latest developments or discoveries from the hard sciences such as physics or neurobiology to...well, to sort of validate themselves. Like arguing for the sake of arguing within the parameters of the available knowledge in their field is.. pointless. I don't know if this is true, or a general shift in the field of modern philosophy, but reading it in these bestseller-type books is exceptionally boring to me. Besides, the eastern civilizations have, for centuries, approached the 'big questions' holistically - and they've done a brilliant job at explaining the universe without the scientific method or modern technology. So if philosophers and scientists have an itch in their pants to need to tackle these grand cosmic questions using their western tools, at least write about it bearing in mind that I'm a pea brain who likes digestible chunks of information without repetition, over explanation, mathematics, references... I mean, seriously, either stick to your academic papers or take a damn writing workshop if you insist on tormenting me with your rhetoric, you just might publish something worth reading outside academia.

Dennett’s definition of determinism is so broad that it overcomes all the objections to it, while his definition of freedom so narrow that it can be objectively defined. Determinism means that at any instant there can be one physically possible future. This does not mean inevitability of any particular future or rule out probability. Causal determinism is a thesis about sufficiency rather than necessity: the former meaning antecedents which in at least one physically possible world result in a consequent, the latter meaning antecedents which must exist in all possible worlds for a consequent. Fatalism is a denial of sufficient reasons (all is necessary, the consequent as well as antecedent) indeterminism is a denial of necessary reasons (nothing is necessary).
Freedom means the sufficiency of prior causes to produce alternatives, which develops according to the complexity and integration of an inertial being able to maintain heterogeneity with the environment which expands via language and society. Freedom is compatible with only being able to do what one is physically able at any moment. Freedom however doesn’t apply to the will but the agent, which itself is defined vis a vie the outside world and by social norms, who has the power to act or not accordingly can be called responsible.

I was a bit disappointed by Freedom Evolves, but that’s largely due to my own expectations. I had heard that Dennett held some sort of compatibilist view, whereby he argues that true, non-deterministic free will arises through evolution from a basis of determinism at the lower physical level. I was looking forward to be challenged and even swayed to this position by good arguments. Unfortunately Dennett’s view seems to be simply that the universe is deterministic, but at the level of complex creatures, evolution has driven the interactions within the brain and in relation to the external environment to generate a kind of will that is intentional and beneficial, and that for all intents and purposes (legal, moral, etc), this can be considered “free” will, or at least “a kind of free will worth having.” But even Dennett acknowledges that this kind of will is not really free from constraints, and is still deterministic (though, like a coin-flip, the outcome is dependent on so many factors that it cannot be reliably predicted).

This secondary argument of evolved “free” will seems to have developed to provide a safety net for people who are convinced by the primary argument for determinism and would otherwise throw up their hands and scream, “then what’s the point!” - these are people who grasp determinism but have not thought about the subject any further. In this respect his arguments for evolved free will (though they are largely informal and often not logically argued) do provide some perspective for such people and may cushion the blow, or at least promote further thought.

What I do respect about the work is that it is (for once!) philosophy that is grounded in science, not simply speculation. Dennett draws from examples in psychology and neuroscience, and while his conclusions are sometimes tenuous and often speculative, they are at least grounded in physical fact.

For me though, the ideas presented are not really that profound. The conclusions are often pushed past the point that they have been established through the argumentation, and to the extent that they have been demonstrated, they are often fairly obvious. The ideas and examples given can often be found elsewhere in his own work and the work of popular authors like Richard Dawkins. I would therefore only recommend this to someone with an interest, but who has not read many other works on these topics.

I'm a fan of Dennett's work but somehow I wasn't able to identify with the ideas in this book. Dennett advocates the existence of free will, observing it through the physical, natural, sociological and psychological dimension. Book convinced me to the contrary - the absolute determinism and the fact that the freedom of the human will can occur only as a result of the vast number of possibilities. On the other hand, I'm not a philosopher by education and might be terribly, terribly wrong :-)

As expected, there was a lot of create content, good arguments, understandable examples in the book. The case for the evolution of freedom following a Darwinian approach makes sense. Somehow, unlike much of his other work, I didn't find it as completely convincing. It feels like it dodges the issue of determinism or at least doesn't provide a clear reason why it doesn't prevail. It did sway my thinking though and I will continue to try to act in a moral way, imagining I have the freedom to do so.

I didn't actually finish this, and I hope to come back to it.

I really respect Dennett for his willingness to embrace the logical conclusions of his materialist premises, but it doesn't change the fact that he sounds completely deranged and utterly unconvincing as a consequence. Not going to review this in full just yet because it has prompted me to start an essay on free will, which I will share by editing this post once it's written.

After re-reading Consciousness Explained (1991) and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995) recently, I decided to go all-out and re-read Freedom Evolves (2002) and Breaking the Spell (2006) as well. I'm glad I did; the books make a lot more sense on a second reading (and I have acquired a lot more background information and knowledge meanwhile). Each book contains a set of original ideas or new approaches to old problems, and for this Dennett deserves credit - a lot. A major drawback of his books is that he easily gets bogged down in philosophical issues that a lot of readers will not like (let alone follow). In this light, Freedom Evolves is a breath a fresh air, compared with Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea - two amazingly difficult, dense works of 400-500 pages...

Basically, Dennett applies the theory of evolution (an algorithmic process) to the notions of consciousness and free will. Does consciousness exists? Are we free? Dennett gives these questions his best shot and comes up with a coherent, convincing model of consciousness (and somewhat less convincing) human freedom. Here are some short steps that outline his main argument (I'm sure I missed some important details).

1. We - including our mental faculties - are products of natural selection, just like the rest of life on earth. Some steps are not yet clear and scientists are currently working on promising theories (e.g. origin of life). Even so, the broad outlines from millions of years of evolution are clear: from prokaryotes to eukaryotes to multicellular organisms to the diversity of life we witness. No skyhooks, cranes all the way!

2. There's a path up to Mount Improbable - via 'situation-action machines', 'choice machines', 'Popperian hypothesis-generating intellects' - leading to our own mental world: 'Gregorian creatures'. In other words: there's an immense variety of degrees of freedom, all according to the 'need-to-know-principle' that economically minded Mother Nature endorses.

3. Human consciousness and intelligence are adaptations, shaped by gene-meme coevolution. The origin of language led to an environment where humans communicate their mental states to each other and via this means learned to 'talk to themselves' (i.e. reflecting on our own mental states).

4. Not only this: consciousness itself is a tool that we use in our everyday communication: our 'self' is a point of reference in dealing with others. This leads to the illusion of consciousness. We think there's a centre (a Cartesian Theatre) where the 'buck stops' - a sort of control centre where we observe our bodies as machines under our control. This is simply not true (according to Dennett). In reality there are many simultaneous, parrallel processes going on inside our brains: consciousness is nothing else but our noticing of some processes - the ones that are most important for our functioning. (So, you don't notice the neurological processes regulating your heartbeat; you will notice changes in your visual area though).

5. Towards the end of his book - after dealing with consciousness - Dennett plunges into the debate of free will. Are we free? Well, according to Dennett, freedom is gradual. In general, we are more free than human beings were 100 years ago; some individuals are more free than others; human beings come equipped with more degrees of freedom (the maximum possible?) than other animals. This doesn't solve the issue though: does it make sense to ask: could I have done otherwise at time t in situation X? If determinism is right, I could have done nothing else, therefore I am not free. Dennett doesn't solve the puzzle, he just asks us to not be too narrow in defining the options at time t - minor variations are allowed ("If you make yourself really small, you can externalize everything"). In other words: it is not useful to take a dive into the quantum world (atom for atom comparisons or the (mis)use of quantum indeterminacy), just ask yourself if you could have achieved the thing you value in a range of similar circumstances. This still sounds fishy to me, it smells like a cleverly disguised evasion.

6. But luckily Dennett comes to the rescue: determinism is not related to freedom. In other words: whether we live in a deterministic or an indeterministic universe is completely irrelevant to the question about free will. Dennett argues that only a deterministic world offers the stability and predictablity for nature to 'design' organisms that can use their intelligence to interact with the world to accomplish goals. This is entirely convincing and I personally don't see why so many people who fear determinism flee into obscure quantum indeterminacy. In essence, they claim that we are guided - in all our decisions - by complete randomness. Is this free? It seems to me we would be just bouncing balls of random happenings: where's the freedom in this?

In all, this was an amusing book to read - food for thought - even though at some moments the main story became bogged down in intricate philosophical debates. I realize that this is a necessary inconvenience, but still found it tiresome at some points. In all, it's an interesting book that offers some original insights and is written in a clear and concise way. It's certainly one of Dennetts easier-to-follow books. For example, I found his treatment of consciousness (one chapter) much more enlightening than his treatment of consciousness in Consciousness Explained (a whole book!).

There's still a nagging question after closing the book though. I'm not a philosopher, I'm just an (interested) onlooker, but it seems to me that Dennetts treatment of freedom is ultimately a retreat into obscurity. Do we have freedom, or not? Maybe that's not the right way to ask it, indeed. But saying that freedom is the 'capacity to achieve what we value in a range of circumstances' leaves a lot of questions unanswered. I think Dennett is right in claiming that freedom is gradual and that it is a product of gene-meme coevolution. He convinced me on these points.

But that still leaves open the question of exactly how free the murderer is when he commits his act. According to Dennett, we should ask if this person can honestly acquiesce in his punishment; if not, then either this person is not rational (and therefore not responsible for his crime) or else this person is fully responsible for his self-control. In other words: anyone 'above the minimum treshold of self-control' is free and thereby responsible for his/her self-control; this treshold is politically agreed upon. Does Dennett claim that (at least in jurisprudence) freedom is a political construct? It seems so.

It seems to me that Sam Harris' answer is much more coherent and convincing (cf. Harris, 2011). Harris claims that if you would trade places, atom for atom, with this murderer, including his personal history, you would do exactly the same thing - is this freedom? But then again, if you would trade places, you wouldn't be you anymore...

This is another famous, excruciatingly tiresome philosophical thought experiment: If an evil neurosurgeon would take your brains out of your body and put it in someone else body - ofcourse under anaesthesia - would you be this other person? Or would you be your old self? These sorts of philosophical thought experiments are excruciatingly tiresome: if this evil neurosurgeon would do the things explained, you would simple be dead. Period.

What if an evil brain surgeon anaesthesizes you and puts your brain in vat and.... Practically impossible! Period.

Maybe I'll just wait another 25 years to await the advances in neuroscience and cognitive psychology instead of reading more books of philosophers on free will, consciousness and mind.