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Excellent book!!!
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Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness
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In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories—"so rambunctious," Dennett observes, "that several people are writing books just about the tumult." With Sweet Dreams , Dennett returns to the subject for "revision and renewal" of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since 1991 as well as recent theoretical challenges. In Consciousness Explained , Dennett proposed to replace the ubiquitous but bankrupt Cartesian Theater model (which posits a privileged place in the brain where "it all comes together" for the magic show of consciousness) with the Multiple Drafts Model. Drawing on psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, he asserted that human consciousness is essentially the mental software that reorganizes the functional architecture of the brain. In Sweet Dreams , he recasts the Multiple Drafts Model as the "fame in the brain" model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that "continue to bedevil the field." With his usual clarity and brio, Dennett enlivens his arguments with a variety of vivid examples. He isolates the "Zombic Hunch" that distorts much of the theorizing of both philosophers and scientists, and defends heterophenomenology, his "third-person" approach to the science of consciousness, against persistent misinterpretations and objections. The old challenge of Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary the color scientist is given a new rebuttal in the form of "RoboMary," while his discussion of a famous card trick, "The Tuned Deck," is designed to show that David Chalmers's Hard Problem is probably just a figment of theorists' misexploited imagination. In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in "Consciousness—How Much is That in Real Money?"
216 pages, Paperback
First published January 1,2005
This edition
- Format
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216 pages, Paperback
- Published
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September 8, 2006 by Bradford Books
- ISBN
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9780262541916
- ASIN
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0262541912
- Language
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English
About the author
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Daniel Clement Dennett III is a prominent philosopher whose research centers on philosophy of mind, science, and biology, particularly as they relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He is the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Dennett is a noted atheist, avid sailor, and advocate of the Brights movement.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He is a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He is a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
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He is trying to equate science and scientific principles and takes on reality synonymously with the 3rd person concept and then universal reality. This move by Dennett is a sly illusiatory slide of the philosophic hand in this “philosophic” magic trick. He is sneakily trying to reduce universal reality and understanding to the 3rd person concept, then in turn reducing this to within the physicalist paradigm and then further down to scientific parameters. Of course all this trickery seems to be going on below the surface, at the surface level… you have Martian’s because these beings would be presumably very different then us… so to have information that could be shared and attained synonymously between the two species would be non subjective information, this information would then be “objective” information. This objective information we brand as 3rd person perspective or community information, this is the type of information that science is concerned with, the objective. So if the Martians had scientist they then would be concerned with this type of 3rd person perspective information not this qualia stuff. The thing that Dennett’s science presupposes is rationality, so the Martians would be rational too. Consequently the Martians scientists would be acquainted with the “intentional stance” when trying to predict and understand observable phenomena. Again the Intentional stance is a predictive tool or position, where one makes the assumption (or gives ascription to) of rationality to an entity outside of ones consciousness, for the purpose of predictive behavior of that exterior entity (i.e. computers, aliens, humans, mice, and maybe bats)
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It is somewhat like a big party, which is coming to an end, many have gone and those that are still there are sitting down. D. C. Dennett is sitting in his armchair and recounts the evening, for those who will listen. As usual he rummages a lot, talks of the recent news, the last youtube meme, but it illustrates his view, and we wonder with him, about the evening, if it was unique (after all, we were all there!), or if it was just a party, a simple mechanical party.
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Was a good followup to Consciousness Explained. If you were not convinced by the first book, this book is helpful. It makes some expansions on the original ideas, and covers some of the experiments that have been done since then. It also clarifies some meanings of words that from Dennett's point of view have been confusing since the philosophers were not using the same meanings that the scientists were.
It is much more of a reflection on the past and a defense against critics of the first book than it is groundbreaking (as the first book was).
It is much more of a reflection on the past and a defense against critics of the first book than it is groundbreaking (as the first book was).
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Sweet Dreams serves as Daniel Dennett's recent follow-up to Consciousness Explained. In both books, he discusses a number of issues currently plaguing the philosophy of mind and primary theories of consciousness. In Sweet Dreams, Dennett revisits many of the same topics not always with the same amount of depth. This text, a compilation of previously published essays and talks given by Dennett after the publication of Consciousness Explained but before 2005, showcases the author's sense of humor and depth of thought when divulging upon the philosophies that constitute his relatively lengthy career.
Starting out on a particularly strong chapter, which lays the groundwork for what the author believes to be traditional myths surrounding the theories of consciousness, like the Cartesian Theater, Dennett also explores approaches to a theory of consciousness, such as first-, second-, or third-person perspectives -- the latter being Dennett's preference, through which he propounds a specific approach through the scientific-method-based heterophenomenology. Additional topics include a holistic discussion of qualia, the "stuff" that "makes life worth living," Chalmers' Hard Problem, the zombie paradox as well as Dennett's defense of the approach of the Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness.
This book does a fine job bringing those who may already be familiar with the philosophy of mind up to date with current discussions and approaches to the controversies permeating the field. Dennett possesses a keen sense for sniffing out unsupported assumptions and thinking outside the box -- a true testament to his old mentor, indeed.
Starting out on a particularly strong chapter, which lays the groundwork for what the author believes to be traditional myths surrounding the theories of consciousness, like the Cartesian Theater, Dennett also explores approaches to a theory of consciousness, such as first-, second-, or third-person perspectives -- the latter being Dennett's preference, through which he propounds a specific approach through the scientific-method-based heterophenomenology. Additional topics include a holistic discussion of qualia, the "stuff" that "makes life worth living," Chalmers' Hard Problem, the zombie paradox as well as Dennett's defense of the approach of the Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness.
This book does a fine job bringing those who may already be familiar with the philosophy of mind up to date with current discussions and approaches to the controversies permeating the field. Dennett possesses a keen sense for sniffing out unsupported assumptions and thinking outside the box -- a true testament to his old mentor, indeed.
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Dennett's latest book on the philosophy of consciousness.
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This is such a great book! I read Dennett's book Consciousness Explained (CE) right before I read Sweet Dreams (SD). Sweet Dreams answered many of my questions after reading CE. I highly recommend both books. I don't see why other people find it so hard to not completely buy into their intuitions regarding consciousness when trying to explain it. If we are looking to explain consciousness, why on Earth would we assume that there MUST be "intrinsic" "phenomenal" qualities that are only accessible from a first-person perspective? If you say that it is a possibility that there are such qualities, okay fine. However, I think that old philosophical traditions, the "method" of phenomenology and the framing of the philosophy of mind by newer philosophers has led to utter confusion regarding how to think about the human mind. I used to agree with David Chalmers and John Searle that subjectivity itself just simply could not be explained using third-person methods. However, Dennett is a bright and funny philosopher who helped me see the flaws in my thinking from multiple angles. It was a delight to read both CE and SD. Dennett goes beyond the obsession philosophers have had with mere conceptual analysis, intuition, assumptions based purely on first-person experience, thought experiments that are supposed to prove something on their own and what is "just obvious"for too long. By the way, his use of intuition pumps/thought experiments are just to help you think differently and combat other flawed intuition pumps. They aren't considered arguments on their own! He is ahead of his time. Now, I'm on to read a book by a neuroscientist who was inspired by Dennett's way of thinking: Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts by Stanislas Dehaene!
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Dennett debunks theories of consciousness that argue for a "magical residue" in the mind that cannot be explained by cognitive science. He's adept, but anecdotal and comic, too.
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